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[2017] ZALCJHB 231
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Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union obo Erasmus and Another v City of Johannesburg and Another (JS606/08) [2017] ZALCJHB 231; (2017) 38 ILJ 2774 (LC) (13 June 2017)
THE
LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
JOHANNESBURG
Reportable
Case no: J2606/08
In
the matter between:
INDEPENDENT MUNICIPAL
AND ALLIED TRADE
UNION
obo J ERASMUS AND A B J
CRAUKAMP
Applicant
and
CITY
OF
JOHANNESBURG First
Respondent
THE
MUNICIPAL MANAGER OF THE CITY
OF
JOHANNESBURG
Second
Respondent
Heard:
24 March 2017
Delivered:
13 June 2017
Summary:
Rescission application brought under the common law on grounds of
fraud. What factors to be alleged and considered.
JUDGMENT
PRINSLOO J.
Introduction
[1]
There are two applications before this
Court. In the one application (the compel application) the Applicant
(IMATU) seeks and order
to compel the First Respondent (the City) to
comply with an arbitration award that was issued on 6 September 2005
and that was
made an order of Court on 7 March 2007 under case number
JS 2505/06. The compel application was filed on 13 March 2009 and is
opposed.
[2]
The other application is a counter
application (the rescission application) filed by the City to rescind
the Court order of 7 March
2007. The counter application was filed on
3 August 2011.
Background facts
[3]
This matter has an unfortunate and
protracted history spanning over more than a decade. Briefly the
history of this matter is as
follows:
[4]
The individual Applicants (Erasmus and
Craukamp or the employees) were employed by the City as firefighters.
They subsequently qualified
as basic ambulance attendants, also
referred to as medical technicians. They were registered with the
Health Professions Council
of South Africa (HPCSA) as basic ambulance
attendants and as such they fell under the jurisdiction of the
‘Professional Board
for Emergency Care Personnel’ (the
Board) which functions as a body under the statutory umbrella of the
HPCSA.
[5]
Erasmus and Craukamp were dismissed on 17
February 2005 after they were found guilty of misconduct relating to
an incident on 21
September 2004 when they allegedly refused to treat
or arrange hospitalisation for an individual who became ill on the
street and
passed away the following day. The Applicant subsequently
referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the South African Local
Government
Bargaining Council and in September 2005 and following an
arbitration, Erasmus and Craukamp were reinstated retrospectively.
[6]
On 2 February 2006 Erasmus and Craukamp
were found guilty by the HPCSA on a charge relating to unprofessional
conduct, related to
the incident for which they were dismissed and
their names were removed from the Board’s register. Erasmus and
Craukamp appealed
to the HPCSA appeals committee and the sanction of
removal from the Board’s register was substituted with a
sanction suspending
them from practice for a period of two years and
eight months, effective from 2 February 2006, which sanction was
suspended on
condition that they undergo a BAA course within four
months of the date of the decision. Effectively this means that
Craukamp and
Erasmus were suspended from practice for a period of
more than two years from February 2006, unless they went for the BAA
course
within four months, in which event their suspension would be
suspended. Erasmus and Craukamp were reinstated on the Board’s
register with effect from 1 September 2008.
[7]
The
City never filed an application for review in respect of the
arbitration award. In December 2006 IMATU filed an application
in
terms of the provisions of section 158(1)(c) of the Labour Relations
Act
[1]
(the Act) to make the
arbitration award issued on 6 September 2005 an order of Court. The
City did not oppose the application and
on 7 March 2007 the
arbitration award was made an order of Court.
[8]
The City complied with the award insofar as
it ordered compensation to be paid, but did not reinstate Erasmus and
Craukamp. The
City’s view was that it was not able to comply
with the Court order unless Erasmus and Craukamp illustrated by 26
March 2007
that they met the minimum requirements to practice in
their jobs.
[9]
On 12 September 2008 the Applicant
addressed correspondence to the City and attached the outcome of the
HPCSA appeal and indicated
that Erasmus and Craukamp were reinstated
on the Board’s register with effect from 1 September 2008 and
since they met the
minimum requirements, they were entitled to be
reinstated. The City, instead of dealing with the issue as it
presented itself in
September 2008, responded by repeating that IMATU
was requested to provide proof of registration with the HPCSA by 26
March 2007,
which it failed to do, and therefore Erasmus and Craukamp
repudiated their contracts of employment with the City and as such
the
City was no longer obliged to comply with the order of the Labour
Court.
[10]
The response received from the City led to
the filing of the compel application in March 2009.
[11]
The City opposed the compel application and
filed the rescission application as a counter application in August
2011.
[12]
The compel and rescission applications were
enrolled for hearing on 12 October 2012 and judgment was handed down
on 13 December
2012, dismissing IMATU’s application.
[13]
The judgment was taken on appeal and the
City filed a cross-appeal. On 3 June 2014 the Labour Appeal Court
upheld the appeal and
the cross-appeal and referred the main and
counter application back to the Labour Court for determination
de
novo.
The Labour Appeal Court directed
that the rescission application should be determined prior to the
compel application.
The rescission
application
[14]
On 14 December 2006 the Applicant filed an
application to make the arbitration award dated 6 September 2005 an
order of Court. The
application was served on the Respondent but was
not opposed.
[15]
In the section 158(1)(c) application the
Applicant stated that the City has partially complied with the
arbitration award in that
Erasmus and Craukamp were paid the amounts
ordered in terms of the arbitration award but has failed to comply
with the award in
respect of their reinstatement.
[16]
On 7 March 2007 this Court issued an order
making paragraph 7.3 of the arbitration award, which reinstated
Erasmus and Craukamp,
an order of Court.
[17]
Upon having been served with the Court
order, the City requested Erasmus and Craukamp to furnish proof of
registration on or before
26 March 2007, failing which the City would
not be in a position to comply with the Court order by virtue of
impossibility of performance.
For a period of 18 months after the
date of the Court order Erasmus and Craukamp were precluded from
lawfully tendering their services
as a consequence of them having
been struck off the roll and during this period they did not tender
their services.
[18]
The City submitted that it has cancelled
their contracts of employment as a result of an inability to comply
with the Court order.
[19]
On 3 August 2011 the City filed a counter
application seeking to declare the Court order of 7 March 2007 void,
alternatively set
aside on the basis of the Applicant’s
fraudulent misrepresentation, alternatively fraudulent omission in
failing to disclose
to the Court at the time of the hearing of the
section 158(1)(c) application that Erasmus and Craukamp were not in a
position to
lawfully tender their services as a consequence of them
having been struck off the roll by the HPCSA with effect from 2
February
2006.
[20]
Erasmus and Craukamp were employed as
firefighters and medical technicians with the City and when they were
struck off the roll
by the HPCSA in February 2006, they could no
longer practice in the emergency services unit.
[21]
The City’s case is that at the time
the Applicant obtained the Court order, they were well aware of the
fact that they could
not lawfully tender their services and they were
patently dishonest by not disclosing this material fact to the Court
at the time
they sought the order.
[22]
The rescission application is brought in
terms of the common law.
The common law
position
[23]
At common law a judgment may be set aside
on grounds of fraud.
[24]
In
terms of the common law the court has the power to rescind a judgment
obtained on default of appearance provided that sufficient
cause for
rescission has been shown. Sufficient cause entails two essential
elements namely that the party seeking the relief must
present a
reasonable and acceptable explanation for default and that it has a
bona
fide
defence
which,
prima
facie
,
carries some prospect of success
[2]
.
[25]
In
order to succeed on a claim that a judgment be set aside on the
ground of fraud, it is necessary for the applicant to allege
and
prove the following
[3]
:
1.
That the successful litigant was party to
the fraud;
2.
that the evidence was in fact incorrect;
3.
that it was made fraudulently and with the
intent to mislead and
4.
that
it diverged to such an extent from the true facts that the court
would, if the true facts had been placed before it, have given
a
judgment other than that which it was induced by the incorrect
evidence to give
[4]
.
[26]
It must also be shown that the party
seeking rescission was unaware of the fraud until after judgment was
delivered. It is not sufficient
for the applicant for rescission to
prove merely that a fraud was practiced on the court, which resulted
in a wrong judgment. The
party seeking rescission must be able to
show that because of the fraud, the court was misled into pronouncing
a judgment which,
but for the fraud, it would not have done. There
has to be a
nexus
between
the fraud and the judgment to be set aside.
[27]
Fraud
can consist not only in the wilful making of incorrect statements but
also in the withholding of material information with
a fraudulent
intent. The mere circumstances that certain material facts were not
disclosed does not in itself establish that there
has been wilful
concealment. A fraudulent intent must be affirmatively proved and
when charges of fraud are made, it should not
only be made expressly
but should be formulated with the precision and fullness demanded in
a criminal case
[5]
.
[28]
It is within this context that the
Respondents’ rescission application should be considered.
Evaluation of the
rescission application
[29]
The City seeks the setting aside of the
Court order of 7 March 2007 on the basis of the Applicant’s
fraudulent misrepresentation,
alternatively fraudulent omission in
failing to disclose to the Court at the time of the hearing of the
section 158(1)(c) application
that Erasmus and Craukamp were not in a
position to lawfully tender their services as a consequence of them
having been struck
off the roll by the HPCSA with effect from 2
February 2006.
Good cause
[30]
In
Marathon
Earthmovers v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration
and others
[6]
it
was held that:
“
Where,
however, rescission is sought in terms of the common law, not only
must the party seeking relief 'present a reasonable and
acceptable
explanation for his default' but in addition such party must show
that on the merits he or she 'has a
bona
fide
defence which
prima
facie
carries some prospect of success' - per Miller MA in
Chetty
v Law Society, Transvaal
1985
(2) SA 756
(A)
at
765B-C. The court went on to observe at 765D-E:
'It
is not sufficient if only one of these two requirements is met; for
obvious reasons a party showing no prospect of success on
the merits
will fail in an application for rescission of a default judgment
against him, no matter how reasonable and convincing
the explanation
of his default. And ordered judicial process would be negated if, on
the other hand, a party who could offer no
explanation of his default
other than his disdain of the rules, was nevertheless permitted to
have a judgment against him rescinded
on the ground that he had
reasonable prospect of success on the merits.”
[31]
I
t is evident from the papers before this
Court that the City was served with the section 158(1)(c)
application, but failed to oppose
the application. There is no
explanation tendered why the City failed to oppose the application
and there is no reasonable and
acceptable explanation for the City’s
default. The City has failed to show good cause.
[32]
Insofar as it may not be necessary to show
good cause for the rescission of a judgment on the grounds of fraud,
the City still has
the onus to prove the other factors in relation to
fraud set out
supra.
Fraud
[33]
The City’s case is that at the time
the Applicant obtained the Court order, they were well aware of the
fact that Erasmus
and Craukamp could not lawfully tender their
services and they were patently dishonest by not disclosing this
material fact to
the Court at the time they sought the order.
[34]
In my view this is not a case where a
fraudulent misrepresentation was made, as a misrepresentation is a
false statement of facts.
This is rather a case where the Applicant
failed to disclose that Erasmus and Craukamp were struck off the roll
by the HPCSA with
effect from 2 February 2006. The question is
whether their failure to disclose this fact constituted a fraudulent
omission.
[35]
I
have already alluded to the principle that the mere circumstances
that certain material facts were not disclosed does not in itself
establish that there has been wilful concealment. The City has to
prove a fraudulent intent
[7]
.
[36]
In the application before this Court it is
a matter of utmost difficulty to ascertain the exact charges of fraud
against IMATU,
Erasmus and Craukamp.
[37]
The only allegation made by the City in the
rescission application is that Erasmus and Craukamp were patently
dishonest by not disclosing
a material fact at the time they sought
an order in terms of section 158(1)(c) of the Act. As the charge of
withholding information
appears to imply deliberately doing so, there
is no foundation laid for that or that they intended to mislead this
Court.
[38]
Patent dishonesty cannot be equated to
fraud, as fraud requires a false representation by means of a
statement or conduct or omission
made knowingly in order to gain a
material advantage. The City has not made any averments, apart from a
statement of patent dishonesty,
to prove that the Applicant acted
with a fraudulent intent and with an intent to mislead.
[39]
The City further has to prove that the
facts placed before Court in the section 158(1)(c) application
diverged to such an extent
from the true facts that the Court would,
if the true facts had been placed before it, have given a judgment
other than that which
it was induced by the incorrect evidence to
give.
[40]
The Court (Pillay J) granted an order
wherein the portion of the arbitration award that reinstated Erasmus
and Craukamp was made
an order of Court. The City’s case is
that Erasmus and Craukamp were not in a position to lawfully tender
their services
as a consequence of them having been struck off the
roll by the HPCSA with effect from 2 February 2006.
[41]
The City’s argument is that Erasmus
and Craukamp were employed as firefighters and medical technicians
and as they were struck
off the roll, they could not perform basic
ambulance services. In seeking reinstatement, they must be in a
position to tender services
fully as a partial tender of services is
insufficient when seeking specific performance.
[42]
In their opposing papers Erasmus and
Craukamp explained that they were initially employed as firefighters
and their employment subsequently
changed to that of firefighter/EMT,
but the bulk of the services they rendered (80%) was in the capacity
of firefighters. Firefighters
do not need to be registered with the
HPCSA and nothing precluded or prevented the City from reinstating
them.
[43]
The question then should be whether the
Court would have granted the order on 7 March 2007 had it been aware
that Erasmus and Craukamp
were not in a position to tender their
services fully as medical technicians but only partially as
firefighters.
[44]
Paragraph 7.3 of the arbitration award that
was made an order of Court provided that the City should reinstate
Erasmus and Craukamp.
There is no specification into which position
and the Court merely made that an order of Court. It is not specified
that Erasmus
and Craukamp should be reinstated as medical technicians
and firefighters and in my view, even if the Court was aware of the
fact
that they were struck off the roll by the HPCSA, the Court could
still order their reinstatement.
[45]
The Court is not to act as an employer’s
human resources manager and anticipate problems an employer may
experience when it
is ordered to reinstate employees. In the event
that an employee is reinstated and he or she is unable to perform his
or her functions,
an employer is not without remedy and can explore
any of the appropriate remedies available which may include a
transfer, demotion,
disciplinary action or retrenchment, to list but
a few.
[46]
The City is expecting the Court in
considering an unopposed section 158(1)(c) application to anticipate
difficulties that may arise
in respect of reinstatement, when the
employer itself failed to place those facts before the Court.
[47]
Be that as it may, in my view the fact that
Erasmus and Craukamp were struck off the Board’s roll in March
2007, could not
have been a bar to their reinstatement, given the
fact that the striking off the roll was temporary and they could
still perform
firefighting functions and possibly other functions
that could be allocated to them.
[48]
The City must also show that it was unaware
of the fraud until after judgment was delivered, as it is not
sufficient for the applicant
for rescission to prove merely that a
fraud was practiced on the Court. Even this hurdle the City is unable
to cross as it was
aware in December 2006 when the section 158(1)(c)
application was filed that Erasmus and Craukamp were struck off the
roll by the
HPCSA in February 2006. The City simply did nothing to
oppose the said application.
Delay
[49]
This brings me to another important factor
to be considered namely the delay in filing the rescission
application. The City filed
a rescission application in August 2011
in respect of a Court order that was granted in March 2007, thus more
than four years after
the Court order was granted and that the City
was aware of such order.
[50]
The City’s argument is that the
rescission application is brought in terms of the common law on
grounds of fraud and therefore
there is no time period prescribed
within which the rescission application should be brought.
[51]
Unlike a rescission application brought in
terms of section 165 of the Act or Rule 16A of the Rules of the
Labour Court which prescribes
that such application should be brought
within 15 days of acquiring knowledge of the order or the judgment or
within a reasonable
time, there is no time period prescribed for a
common law rescission application.
[52]
This, however does not mean that the period
within which a rescission application in terms of the common law is
to be filed is indefinite
and open ended. The application of the
common law in the context of labour disputes cannot be divorced from
the purpose and the
application of the Act.
[53]
The
maxim
vigilantibus
non dormientibus lex subvenit
has found application in the Labour Court in a number of judgments
dealing with undue delays in prosecuting applications. The
elimination of unjustified and undue delays is imperative when it
comes to employment law disputes, considering the fundamental
principle and purpose of the Act that such disputes must be
expeditiously resolved. In
Khumalo
and another v Member of the Executive Council for Education:
KwaZulu-Natal
[8]
the Constitutional Court said:
'The
importance of resolving labour disputes in good time is thus central
to the LRA framework.'
Further
authorities in this regard are
Aviation
Union of SA and another v SA Airways (Pty) Ltd and others
[9]
where it was held:
'Speedy
resolution is a distinctive feature of adjudication in labour
relations disputes…”
and
National
Education Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town
and others
[10]
where it was held:
'By
their very nature labour disputes must be resolved expeditiously and
be brought to finality so that the parties can organize
their affairs
accordingly. They affect our economy and labour peace. It is in the
public interest that labour disputes be resolved
speedily ... .'
[54]
It is in this context
that the question should be asked whether an application for
rescission in terms of the common law could be
filed more than four
years after the judgment sought to be set aside was issued.
[55]
The
Labour Court has not shied away from disposing of applications on the
basis of a failure diligently to prosecute the same. In
Bezuidenhout
v Johnston NO and others
[11]
the court said:
'If
applicant parties have unduly delayed prosecuting their applications,
and fail to provide acceptable reasons for the delays,
the ultimate
penalty of dismissing such applications should be used in appropriate
cases. This will hopefully help creating a culture
of compliance and
ensure that disputes are expeditiously dealt with.'
Similarly, and in
Autopax
Passenger Services (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Bargaining Council and
others
[12]
it was held: “
The
rule that the court has the power to dismiss proceedings due to a
delay in the prosecution thereof lies in the court's inherent
power
to prevent an abuse of its own process.
”
[56]
From
a policy perspective there are two principal reasons to dismiss a
claim where there is an unreasonable delay. In
Radebe
v Government of the Republic of SA
[13]
,
the court held that:
"The
first is that unreasonable delay may cause prejudice to the other
parties. ... The second reason is that it is both desirable
and
important that finality should be reached within a reasonable time in
respect of judicial administrative decisions. ..."
[57]
In
Bernstein
v Bernstein
[14]
it
was held that "it is in the discretion of the Court to allow
proceedings to continue where there has been this lapse of
time".
[58]
I see no
reason why these same considerations and principles should not apply
to rescission applications brought in terms of the
common law.
In
casu
a
period exceeding four years for filing an application for rescission
cannot be said to be a reasonable period. In fact, the period
is
excessive with no explanation for the delay. Considerations of
justice (or injustice for that matter) and prejudice also play
an
important role.
[59]
The City
explained the late filing of the answering affidavit in the compel
application, but took the view that there is no need
to apply for
condonation for the rescission application brought in terms of the
common law. Once fraud is demonstrated, the judgment
cannot stand.
[60]
In his heads
of argument Mr Boda for the Respondents submitted that if fraud was
committed, condonation for the late filing of the
rescission
application should be granted because it would be in the interest of
justice to do so as the enforcement of a Court
order obtained
fraudulently would bring the administration of justice into
disrepute. I agree with the submission.
[61]
The relevant
and crucial finding however is that fraud was indeed committed, which
I have found was not the case
in
casu
.
There is no risk that the administration of justice would be brought
into disrepute if the Court order of 7 March 2007 is enforced.
[62]
The City’s argument that the
late filing of the rescission application should be condoned cannot
be entertained.
[63]
The City’s failure to
prosecute its rescission application for a period of more than four
years cannot be condoned and must
have the effect that the
application must fail for this reason alone, based on the maxim
vigilantibus non dormientibus lex
subvenit.
[64]
In
Pathescope
(Union) of South Africa Ltd v Mallinick
It was held that:
“
That
a plaintiff may, in certain circumstances, be debarred from obtaining
relief to which he would ordinarily be entitled because
of
unjustifiable delay in seeking it is a doctrine well recognised in
English law and adopted in our own Courts. It is an application
of
the maxim. "
Vigilantibus non
dormientibus lex subvenit
." The
very nature of the doctrine necessitates its being stated in general
terms. I take the following apt extract from the
judgment in
Lindsay
Petroleum Company v. Hurd
(L.R. 5 P.C.
239)
quoted in the court below: — "The doctrine of laches
in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine.
Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because
the party has by his conduct done that which might fairly
be regarded
as equivalent to a waiver of it or where, by his conduct and neglect
he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy
yet put the other
party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him
if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted,
in either of these
cases lapse of time and delay are most material.”
[65]
In
Toyota
SA Motors (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and
Arbitration and others
[15]
the
Constitutional Court held that:
“
Excessive
delays in litigation may induce a reasonable belief, especially on
the part of a successful litigant, that the order or
award had become
unassailable. This is so all the more in labour disputes. Mr Makhotla
was entitled to approach the Labour Court
for the relief he sought in
D order to have closure and get on with his life.”
[66]
In my view the application for
rescission has to fail for two reasons.
Firstly,
because the City failed to make out a case that the Court order
obtained on 7 March 2007 was obtained by some fraudulent
conduct.
Secondly, the City waited for more than four years to approach this
Court for the rescission of a Court order, with no
detailed
explanation or application for condonation for such delay. The City
explained the late filing of the answering affidavit
in the compel
application in detail and throughout took the view that it was not
necessary to apply for condonation for the late
filing of the
rescission application.
[67]
The City had to apply for
condonation. Apart from the fact that no proper case was made out for
condonation for the late filing
of the rescission application, the
delay of more than four years is excessive.
[68]
Erasmus and Craukamp were entitled
to accept that the Court order became unassailable and they are
entitled to closure on this matter.
It would, ten years after the
Court order was granted, not only undermine the object of the Act
regarding the expeditious and effective
resolution of labour
disputes, but would also not be in the interests of justice to set
aside the Court order of 7 March 2007.
The compel application
[69]
What remains is to consider IMATU’s
application to compel the City to comply with the Court order of 7
March 2007. The application
to compel was filed in March 2009, more
than two years before the City filed its rescission application.
[70]
Section 165(5) of the Constitution
reads:” An order or decision issued by a court binds all
persons to whom and organs of
State to which it applies.”
[71]
It is trite that it is not for a
party to litigation unilaterally to elect whether or not to comply
with orders of court. In the
absence of an application for rescission
or appeal, court orders must be complied with.
[72]
The City’s application for
rescission failed and it is therefore compelled to comply with the
order of this Court issued on
7 March 2007.
[73]
In the event of non-compliance,
IMATU’s remedy is an application for contempt of Court. The
Practice Manual for the Labour
Court prescribes the process to be
followed in an application for contempt.
[74]
The interest of justice was severely
compromised where Erasmus and Craukamp were reinstated more than 10
years ago and to this date
such order had not been complied with. It
is of grave concern that matters that require a speedy resolution
remained unresolved
for a decade.
[75]
I can only express the hope that the
parties would now have finality and that they would close this matter
and start to engage in
a meaningful manner on the way forward.
Costs
[76]
Costs should be considered against
the requirements of the law and fairness.
[77]
The requirement of law has been
interpreted to mean that the costs would follow the result. Both Mr
Boda and Mr Glendinning argued
for a cost order to be made and I can
see no reason to deviate from the general rule that cost should
follow the result.
[78]
In view of the history of this
matter, such a cost order is also fair.
[79]
In the premises I make the following
order:
Order
1.
The Respondents’ rescission
application is dismissed;
2.
The Respondents are ordered to comply with
the Court order issued on 7 March 2007 under case number J 2505/06;
3.
The First Respondent is to pay the costs.
______________
Connie Prinsloo
Judge of the Labour Court
Appearances:
Applicant: Advocate A
Glendinning
Instructed by: Otto
Krause Inc Attorneys
Third Respondent:
Advocate F Boda SC
Instructed by: Norton
Rose Fulbright Attorneys
[1]
Act
66 of 1995.
[2]
Herbstein
and Van Winsen ‘The Civil Practice of the High Courts of South
Africa’ Fifth edition, Volume 1, page 938.
[3]
Erasmus
‘Superior Court Practice’ Rule 42 discussion. Also
Swart
v Wessels
1924
OPD 187
at 189 – 190.
[4]
Rowe
v Rowe
[1997] ZASCA 54
;
1997
(4) SA 160
(SCA) at 166 I.
[5]
Herbstein
and Van Winsen p 939 – 941,
Schierhout
v Union Government
1927
AD 94
at 98.
[6]
(1999)
20 ILJ 2393 (LC).
[7]
Herbstein
and Van Winsen p 939 – 941,
Schierhout
v Union Government
1927
AD 94
at 98.
[8]
(2014)
35
ILJ
613 (CC)
at
para
42
.
[9]
(
2011)
32
ILJ
2861 (CC)
at
para
76
.
[10]
2003
(3) SA 1 (CC)
;
(2003)
24
ILJ
95 (CC)
at
para
31
.
[11]
(2006)
27
ILJ
2337 (LC)
at
para
31
.
[12]
(2006)
27
ILJ
2574 (LC)
at
para
14
.
[13]
1995
(3) SA 787
(N)
.
[14]
1948
(2) SA 205
(W)
.
[15]
(2016)
37 ILJ 313 (CC)