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[2015] ZALCD 15
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Sasol Nitro v National Bargaining Council and Others (D774/11) [2015] ZALCD 15 (19 February 2015)
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
THE
LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, DURBAN
JUDGMENT
Case
no: D774/11
DATE:
19 FEBRUARY 2015
Not
Reportable
In
the matter between:-
SASOL
NITRO
..........................................................................................................................
Applicant
And
NATIONAL
BARGAINING COUNCIL
FOR
THE CHEMICAL
INDUSTRY
..........................................................................
First
Respondent
COMMISSIONER
MOKGERE MASIPA
N.O
.....................................................
Second
Respondent
CLEMENT
REDDY
...................................................................................................
Third
Respondent
Heard:
8 January 2014
Delivered:
19 February 2015
Summary:
Application for review of arbitration award.
Judgment
HASLOP
AJ
[1]
The applicant has applied to this Court for the review and setting
aside of an arbitration award to the effect that its dismissal
of the
third respondent was procedurally and substantively unfair. It was
directed to reinstate the third respondent with effect
from 25 August
2011. The third respondent was not awarded back-pay.
[2]
The third respondent was employed by the applicant as a plant manager
in Durban. There was only one other permanent Sasol employee
at the
plant, an administrator. All other personnel were employed by
contractors. The third respondent had been employed by Sasol
for 18
years, although he had only spent the previous four with the
applicant division.
[3] The following
allegations of misconduct were levelled against him at a disciplinary
hearing:
‘
1.
Dishonest Conduct
5
(e) Incorrect application of company assets or property for reasons
of personal gain or any improper purpose, in that you used
the store
room for storing personal stuff viz. shin guards in boxes for sale in
the Sasol premises without authorisation.
You
also acted outside your responsibility, by appointing a temporary
employee (Xavin Dayal) without following an appropriate procedure
and
securing the employee contract [
sic
] with WLS without the
knowledge of your superiors.
2.
Gross Negligence
You
deliberately disregarded the Procurement Supply Management policy
(PSM), where you procured services and items outside the system.
Allowed
contractors to provide services without purchase orders viz. Ponen
Construction cc, invoice dated 12 October 2010; Q14 WLS-repairs
and
install work done on Ranco etc.
3
.
Disorderly conduct
6.5
(c) Improper / disgraceful conduct which are in conflict with the
accepted norms of behaviour vesting in the Sasol Values, the
Sasol
Code of Ethics and the Guidelines to the Code of Ethics, and/or the
commission of criminal offences, either within or external
to the
work situation, which can blemish the company’s image or bring
the Company into disrepute, where you used the company
laptop for
pornographic material.’
[4]
The three headings under which the behaviour in question is detailed
coincide with headings in the applicant’s disciplinary
code
under which more specific instances of possible misconduct are set
out.
[5]
The charge-sheet was obviously drafted by a lay person and one should
therefore not be unnecessarily pedantic about its exact
wording.
However, there are several issues in that regard that will require
comment, beginning with the fact that the third respondent
pleaded
guilty at his disciplinary hearing to the first part of the first
allegation, relating to the storage of private property
on the
company’s premises, as well as to the third allegation,
relating to the discovery of pornographic material on his
laptop. It
is important to determine precisely what portions of those charges
the third respondent admitted. I will return to this.
[6]
At the conclusion of his disciplinary hearing he was found guilty of
all of the allegations against him and dismissed. I will
also return
to the question of precisely what instances of misconduct he was
found to have committed.
[7]
The third respondent then lodged an internal appeal in terms of the
company’s disciplinary code and the appeal chairman
upheld the
decision to dismiss him. However, the appeal chairman found that the
third respondent was not guilty of certain of the
misconduct
attributed to him at the original disciplinary hearing.
[8]
Because the letter of outcome of the appeal hearing effectively
determines the reasons for the third respondent’s dismissal,
it
is worth quoting the body of that letter in full. It reads as
follows:
‘
After
due consideration of evidence and arguments pertaining to the appeal
hearing of Mr Clement Reddy, which I presided over on
Monday, 31
January and Tuesday, 2 February [
sic
]
2010, I have arrived at a decision to uphold the sanction of a
dismissal. Please note that two of the three charges addressed
in the
initial disciplinary hearing were not in dispute at the appeal
hearing.
As
far as the third charge is concerned, Mr Reddy was found guilty on
some of the allegations pertaining to the charge but also
cleared on
others. The nature of his transgressions, particularly when
considered as a collective, has informed my decision to
uphold the
sanction of a dismissal. This decision was further informed by Mr
Reddy’s level of responsibility in the organisation
when the
transgressions took place.’
[9]
What seems clear from this letter is that the third respondent was
considered to have been guilty of “dishonest conduct”
in
storing his personal collection of shin guards in a company store
room for sale on company premises without authorisation; “disorderly
conduct” in “using the company laptop for pornographic
material”; and some other allegations which are not specified
except that they “pertain” to a charge falling, according
to the charge-sheet, under the overall heading of “gross
negligence” in respect of which he had been cleared of certain
of the allegations.
[10]
The appeal chairman did not testify at the arbitration, but the third
respondent’s evidence was to the effect that, on
appeal, he had
been cleared of the Ponen Construction case and the Ranco case, which
are the only two matters specified in the
charge of gross negligence,
as well as of allegations that were made against him concerning
expenditure on a team-building exercise
at an external venue.
[11]
However, the abbreviation “etc” is added to those Ponen
Construction and Ranco allegations in the charge-sheet
and the
applicant did lead evidence of certain other alleged breaches of the
Procurement Supply Management policy. It seems that,
at the
disciplinary hearing, the charge “evolved” as evidence
was led to include allegations that had not been specified
in the
charge-sheet. Indeed, the third respondent based part of his argument
concerning procedural unfairness on this and the company’s
failure, he said, to furnish him with sufficient detail and/or
documentation. The additional complaints, not specified in the
charge-sheet, related to the purchase of a DVD writer, the purchase
of a printer and to the money that was spent on the team-building
exercise referred to above.
[12]
However, when the third respondent was requesting copies of relevant
documentation during his disciplinary hearing, the chairman,
Evenwell, is reflected in the record as having told him, referring to
Moropodi, the person who was presenting the company’s
case:
‘
Copies
of printer purchase and invoice … like I said … he’s
not even looking at that …or the DVD writer,
he’s not
looking at that … nor the team building thing.’
[13]
In addition, when Evenwell testified during the arbitration, he said
that, “I did not look at the DVD or the printer
as part of the
thing because Mr Moropodi didn’t lead evidence.” He later
conceded that Moropodi had indeed led evidence
on these matters,
though his attempts to explain this apparent contradiction were
unconvincing. His difficulty appeared to involve
trying to explain
the fact that the third respondent had not timeously been provided
with details and/or documentation relevant
to those issues.
[14]
Nevertheless, we are left with the clear statement by the
disciplinary chairperson that he did not consider the DVD or printer
issues, nor, apparently, the team building issue – all of which
the company appeared to attempt to include under the general
heading
in the charge-sheet of “etc”.
[15]
Now, if the disciplinary chairperson did not consider those matters,
and the appeal chairperson cleared the third respondent
of the Ponen
Construction and Ranco allegations, and, it seems, the team-building
expenditure, then there is nothing left of the
second charge, even
allowing for the initially unspecified complaints that appear to have
been incorporated by the applicant into
the term “etc”.
[16]
This leaves the first charge, which consists of two elements, and the
third charge.
[17]
The second part of the first charge, relating to the securing of an
employment contract for Dayal with WLS, appears to have
been
deliberately distinguished from allegations concerning a breach of
the PSM. The charge merely claims that the third respondent
did this
without following “an appropriate procedure”. However, it
is not clear from the evidence on what basis the
applicant considered
that this behaviour constituted dishonest conduct.
[18]
WLS is a service provider engaged by the applicant. There appears to
be an inherent contradiction in the allegations that the
third
respondent appointed Dayal as a temporary employee and that he
secured an employment contract for Dayal with WLS, which seems
to be
what the charge actually means. The evidence suggested that the third
respondent had secured employment for Dayal with WLS,
but that his
work had been performed for the applicant. On the face of it, Dayal
was probably a temporary employment service employee,
although that
might not necessarily have been the case having regard to the fact
that it appears as if it was the applicant, through
the third
respondent, rather than WLS, who actually procured Dayal’s
services.
[19]
Nothing turns on this, though, except by way of an explanation for
the confusing nature of the charge.
[20]
The third respondent admitted that he had procured Dayal’s
services, but said that he had received authority from his
seniors to
do so. The authority to engage assistance on a temporary basis when
it was needed was given, he said, after his request
for a 2IC was
turned down. In any event, he said – and this was not disputed
by Moropodi – that it was the norm to
take on additional
employees (presumably through WLS) at busy times.
[21]
The applicant’s primary complaint in this regard was that the
third respondent had not followed an appropriate procedure
in doing
so, which would constitute misconduct if the third respondent was
aware that he was required to follow a different procedure,
and knew
the details of that different procedure. He said that he was not and
did not. The applicant’s response was that
he could have found
the “appropriate procedure” on the company’s
Intranet. The third respondent’s evidence
in that regard
suggested that there were a large number of documents on the Intranet
and that it was difficult to find one’s
way around these.
[22]
But, even if the third respondent was aware of the procedure, or
perhaps ought to have been able to navigate his way around
the
Intranet sufficiently competently to find it, there was no evidence
that his failure to do so constituted dishonesty, under
which heading
this allegation resided in the charge-sheet, or even gross
negligence, which is where the other allegations concerning
a failure
to follow procedures were placed.
[23]
Although the third respondent had pleaded guilty to the first part of
the first charge it was obvious that he did not admit
all of the
elements of the allegation. He admitted storing, for several months,
a large number of shin guards that he had purchased
in his personal
capacity in a store room belonging to the third respondent, but he
did not admit that these were “for sale
in the Sasol premises”
whether with or without authorisation. In fact, he denied that he had
offered the shin guards for
sale on the applicant’s premises.
[24]
The applicant led no direct evidence, in the face of that denial, to
the effect that the shin guards were for sale on its premises.
The
essence of this charge, as it was ultimately proved, therefore, is
that the third respondent stored his personal property on
his
employer’s premises without authorisation. One assumes that the
“personal gain” referred to in the charge-sheet
was that
he did not have to pay for the storage costs, or find space for the
shin guards at his own residence or elsewhere and,
perhaps, that they
were eventually moved by people who were meant to be performing
duties for Sasol and not for the third respondent.
[25]
There was no evidence that the third respondent had attempted to
conceal this storage from his employer and it seems that he
did not
personally specify the method by which they should be moved. The
identification of this storage as “dishonest conduct”,
despite the fact that it did involve the “incorrect application
of company property” seems, in my view, to be something
of a
stretch. It does, nevertheless, constitute misconduct.
[26]
As far as the third charge is concerned, it is once again necessary
to establish exactly what misconduct was encompassed by
the third
respondent’s guilty plea at his disciplinary hearing. In that
regard, Evenwell testified at the arbitration that
the third
respondent had pleaded guilty to the fact that there was pornographic
material on his laptop computer and that no further
evidence had been
led regarding the nature or extent of the material, how it came to be
on his computer, whether it was accessed
while he was at work and so
forth.
[27]
A document in the bundle presented at the arbitration reflected the
fact that there was a significant amount of pornographic
material,
reckoned by file size, on the computer, but Evenwell conceded that he
had not been in possession of that document. Nevertheless,
since this
arbitration is a fresh hearing, that document constituted part of the
evidence before the arbitrator.
[28]
The third respondent said that the material had come onto his
computer by way of emails received from other people and that
he had
not personally downloaded it. It was, however, stored on his
computer, and this also constitutes misconduct.
[29]
It is clear that there are might be various degrees of seriousness
involved in a charge concerning the possession of pornographic
material. The applicant’s disciplinary code envisages, at item
6.5 (c) – which is the portion of the code specified
in the
charge-sheet – that such misconduct, which is categorised as
“improper/disgraceful conduct”, might warrant
a serious
warning for a first offence and dismissal only at the third time of
asking. Disciplinary codes are generally only guidelines,
but the
sanction specified in the code is clearly the recommended one for
what might be termed standard deviations from the disciplinary
norm.
[30]
There was no evidence to suggest that the third respondent’s
possession of the pornographic material was especially egregious
beyond the fact that it was a breach of a company rule of which the
employee was, on a balance of probabilities, aware.
[31]
Indeed, it was clear from the evidence of Evenwell, as well as the
appeal chairperson’s letter referred to above, that
it was the
cumulative effect of the third respondent’s misconduct that led
to his dismissal, rather than the extreme seriousness
of any one of
the charges on its own. In that connection, the code provides for a
final warning as the recommended sanction for
a contravention of item
5 (e), the unauthorised use of company property to which the third
respondent had pleaded guilty.
[32]
Now there is no problem with applying the cumulative effect of a
number of disciplinary charges to increase a recommended sanction,
even to the point of dismissal, but one must, of necessity, consider
what is being accumulated.
[33]
In this case, it turns out to have been the unauthorised storage of
shin guards, without evidence that they were being sold
on the
employer’s property; the possession on his laptop of
pornographic material of a nature that would usually attract
a
serious warning; and, even if one allows the applicant the benefit of
the doubt in this regard, the securing of a temporary employment
contract with a temporary employment service in respect of services
that the company required, for which there was a clear precedent
and
which the third respondent believed had been authorised by his
seniors, albeit that all of this happened without compliance
with a
specific company procedure.
[34]
It would appear that, in deciding not to award the third respondent
back-pay, the arbitrator took into account the fact that
he had
committed misconduct, although not, in her view, dismissible
misconduct.
[35]
In my view, the cumulative effect of these charges did not warrant
dismissal.
[36]
But that is only my view, and this is a review, not an appeal, so it
is the arbitrator’s conclusion that matters, and
the method by
which she arrived at that conclusion.
[37]
Before I deal with the arbitrator’s award, and despite the fact
that counsel focused principally on substantive matters
during
argument before me – unsurprisingly since it is substantive
unfairness that opens the door to reinstatement –
I must
consider the third respondent’s procedural complaints in the
light of the applicant’s contention that the arbitrator’s
finding was not one at which a reasonable decision-maker could have
arrived.
[38]
In her award the arbitrator found that the dismissal was procedurally
unfair. The conclusion she arrived at was that “the
chairperson’s conduct during the hearing did not appear
neutral”. She enumerates a number of procedural issues in the
award, some of which, raised by the third respondent, she finds did
not constitute unfairness. The applicant argues that her findings
in
this connection are contradictory.
[39]
The arbitrator found that the fact that the chairman mentioned the
need to ensure procedural fairness in case the matter ended
up at the
CCMA, and the fact that he wanted to speak to his superior before
finally deciding on the sanction, were satisfactorily
explained. I
agree. But this not the full extent of the third respondent’s
procedural complaint.
[40]
The applicant complained that the chairman said at a very early stage
of the proceedings that he was ready to deliver a verdict.
It seems
that this was in the light of the fact that the third respondent had
pleaded guilty to two of the allegations. However,
as matters turned
out, the applicant had apparently not admitted the allegations in
their entirety and it appears that the chairman
may have prejudged
the matter without identifying precisely what it was that the third
respondent admitted.
[41]
There was also a complaint that he frequently discussed the matter
with the company representative and the arbitrator found,
in
addition, that the minutes reflected that he “used a tone that
could be seen as intimidatory”.
[42]
The record reflects, by way of example, that, during one particular
caucus, the company HR representative tells the chairman
that the
third respondent “used this other way instead of the given
procedure. He used, he actually purchased those things
out of our
system”, to which the chairman responds, “And you can’t
do that.”
[43]
Since her findings regarding the chairman were not restricted to the
comments about the CCMA and the need to discuss the sanction
with his
superior, I cannot agree that those findings were contradictory.
[44]
There was a further procedural complaint by the third respondent. He
complained several times that he was not given full details
of the
charges and/or documentation relating to them in order to enable him
to prepare properly. This was especially the case in
relation to
charge 2. Much of this problem concerns that abbreviation, “etc”,
at the end of the charge. Whether or
not the chairman considered them
to be part of the charges, evidence was led relating to the printer,
the DVD writer – where
the somewhat specious suggestion was
made, in the face of the third respondent’s evidence that it
was required for company
purposes, that he may have needed it in
connection with the pornography on his laptop – and the
expenditure on the team-building
exercise. No matter how much
leniency one allows for the fact that the charges were probably
drafted by a lay person, none of these
complaints is foreshadowed in
the charge-sheet.
[45]
The recording device was left on during a caucus between the chairman
and the company HR representative. It reveals that the
chairman’s
response to a request for the relevant purchasing procedure appears
to be entirely unsympathetic. He commented
that, since the procedure
was available on the company Intranet, “he could have drawn it
himself”.
[46]
Later, when the hearing reconvened, and the third respondent
complained about the lack of clarity in the charges, the HR
representative
said the following, and I quote his exact words from
the transcript:
‘
Ja
sorry Mr Chair, if I may come in from ER point of view. We, it is our
practice. We do not put all the information here on the
charges. The
reason why we’re sitting here, that is when you’re going
to get everything. Here is a, we only indicate
to people in terms of
what has happened, why are the people charged. That’s it. That
is our practice.’
[47] The chairman
accepted that and the matter proceeded.
[48]
That kind of approach is rife with potential procedural pitfalls. It
may be just about acceptable if the charge is a simple
one and the
alleged misconduct itself is clearly described, but when the examples
of a failure to comply with a policy are encompassed
entirely,
without any hint of detail, by the word “etc”, it is
certainly not.
[49]
I cannot hold, in the circumstances, that the arbitrator’s
finding that the dismissal was procedurally unfair was one
that a
reasonable decision-maker could not have reached.
[50]
The applicant listed a number of grounds of review in its
application. These may be summarised as follows:
1
The arbitrator failed to take into account the totality of the
circumstances and the importance of the rules that had been breached.
It is worth pointing out in this regard that the applicant’s
own witnesses, including the chairman of the disciplinary hearing,
seemed unsure of precisely what rules had been breached or, indeed,
what complaints formed part of the charges.
2
The arbitrator failed to take into account the calculated manner in
which the third respondent went about contravening the procurement
rules. Of course, one must take into account in that regard the fact
that the appeal chairman exonerated him on three of these
instances
and the enquiry chairman did not consider that the other two formed
part of the charges.
3
The arbitrator failed to consider the fact that the most senior
employee in the Durban terminal had acted without integrity and
honesty. Without wishing in any way to diminish the seriousness of
managerial behaviour that does not set an example to fellow
employees, one must remember that, grammatically correctly, the third
respondent was the more, as opposed to the most, senior employee,
since there was only one other employee of the applicant at the
terminal. The charges relating to honesty have already been dealt
with above.
4
The arbitrator failed to consider the importance of the breach of the
procurement rules and the viewing of pornographic material
during the
third respondent’s working hours. I have dealt with the
procurement rules above, and no evidence was led that
the third
respondent viewed pornographic material during his working hours, an
allegation that he specifically denied.
5
The arbitrator imposed her own outcome on the process rather than
considering whether the employer’s sanction was fair.
Although
it is not clear to me how the two complaints are related, the
applicant also complained under this heading that the arbitrator
had
made contradictory findings. I will deal with this below when dealing
with the test on review and how it is to be applied.
6
The arbitrator failed to appreciate that the breach of procurement
rules and the viewing of pornographic material constitute dismissible
misconduct in the applicant’s business. I have dealt with this
above.
7
The seventh ground consists of a repetition of the complaint about
the arbitrator’s contradictory findings.
8
The arbitrator failed to take into account the fact that the third
respondent admitted to viewing pornographic material on the
company’s
laptop. The charge in this regard was that he “used the laptop
for pornographic material” and his admission
was that it was on
the laptop, having arrived by way of email. I have dealt with this
charge above.
9
The ninth ground repeats previous grounds in different words.
10
The tenth ground refers to the alleged contradictory findings
relating to procedural fairness and the conduct of the chairman.
I
have dealt with this above.
11
The eleventh ground once again repeats previous complaints.
12
The twelfth ground is that the arbitrator’s award is
unreasonable and the thirteenth simply repeats that allegation.
[51]
The question to be answered by this Court is not whether the
arbitrator was right or wrong in coming to the conclusion to which
she did, because, as I have pointed out above, this is a review, not
an appeal. The question that I must answer, as formulated
in
Sidumo
and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others
[2007] 12
BLLR 1097
(CC), is whether the conclusion she reached was one that a
reasonable decision-maker could not have reached. It is a relatively
stringent test.
[52]
In
Herholdt
v Nedbank Ltd
and Others
[1]
, the Supreme Court
of Appeal had the following to say about this test and its
application at paragraph 12 of that judgment:
‘
That
test involves the reviewing court examining the merits of the case
‘in the round’ by determining whether, in the
light of
the issue raised by the dispute under arbitration, the outcome
reached by the arbitrator was not one that could reasonably
be
reached on the evidence and other material properly before the
arbitrator. On this approach the reasoning of the arbitrator
assumes
less importance than it does on the SCA test, where a flaw in the
reasons results in the award being set aside. The reasons
are still
considered in order to see how the arbitrator reached the result.
That assists the court to determine whether that result
can
reasonably be reached by that route. If not, however, the court must
still consider whether, apart from those reasons, the
result is one a
reasonable decision-maker could reach in the light of the issues and
the evidence.’
[53]
Of course, an award is reviewable under section 145(2) (a) of the LRA
if the commissioner committed a gross irregularity in
the conduct of
the arbitration proceedings. In
Herholdt
[2]
,
the SCA considered what this means and summarised the position as
follows in paragraph 25:
‘…
For
a defect in the conduct of the proceedings to amount to a gross
irregularity as contemplated by s 145(2)(a)(ii), the arbitrator
must
have misconceived the nature of the inquiry or arrived at an
unreasonable result. A result will only be unreasonable if it
is one
that a reasonable arbitrator could not reach on all the material that
was before the arbitrator. Material errors of fact,
as well as the
weight and relevance to be attached to particular facts, are not in
and of themselves sufficient for an award to
be set aside, but are
only of any consequence if their effect is to render the outcome
unreasonable.’
[54]
In
Gold
Fields Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Kloof Gold Mine) v CCMA and
Others
[3]
, Waglay JP said the following, from paragraph 15 to paragraph 18 of
his judgment, about the correct approach to review proceedings
where
the arbitrator is alleged to have committed a gross irregularity:
[15]
‘… What is required is first to consider the gross
irregularity that the arbitrator is said to have committed
and then
to apply the reasonableness test established by
Sidumo
. The
gross irregularity is not a self-standing ground insulated from or
standing independent of the
Sidumo
test. That being the case,
it serves no purpose for the reviewing court to consider and analyse
every issue raised at the arbitration
and regard a failure by the
arbitrator to consider all or some of the issues albeit material as
rendering the award liable to be
set aside on the grounds of
process-related review.
[16]
In short: A reviewing court must ascertain whether the arbitrator
considered the principal issue before him/her; evaluated
the facts
presented at the hearing and came to a conclusion that is
reasonable...
[17]
The fact that an arbitrator committed a process-related irregularity
is not in itself a sufficient ground for interference
by the
reviewing court. The fact that an arbitrator commits a
process-related irregularity does not mean that the decision reached
is necessarily one that a reasonable Commissioner in the place of the
arbitrator could not reach.
[18]
In a review conducted under section 145(2)(a)(c)(ii) [
sic
] of
the LRA, the reviewing court is not required to take into account
every factor individually, consider how the arbitrator treated
and
dealt with each of those factors and then determine whether a failure
by the arbitrator to deal with one or some of the factors
amounts to
a process-related irregularity sufficient to set aside the award.
This piecemeal approach of dealing with the arbitrator’s
award
is improper as the reviewing court must necessarily consider the
totality of the evidence and then decide whether the decision
made by
the arbitrator is one that a reasonable decision-maker could make.’
[55]
Applying the principles enunciated in these judgments I am of the
view that it cannot be said that the arbitrator in this case
misconceived the nature of the inquiry or that she arrived at an
unreasonable result. Consequently it cannot be said that her award
is
one that a reasonable decision-maker could not have made.
[56]
I am empowered, by section 162 of the LRA, to make an order for the
payment of costs, according to the requirements of the
law and
fairness. In my opinion it is in accordance with the requirements of
the law and fairness that the costs in this matter
should follow the
result.
[57]
I therefore make the following order:
The application to
review and set aside the second respondent's arbitration award in
this matter is dismissed with costs.
Haslop,
AJ
Acting
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
APPEARANCES:
F
or
the Applicant
:
X Matyolo
Instructed
by: Maserumule Inc Attorneys, Braamfontein
For
the Third
Respondent:
L Naidoo
Instructed
by: T Gyapersad & Associates, Umhlanga
[1]
[2013] 11 BLLR 1074
(SCA) at para 12.
[2]
Ibid
[3]
[2007] ZALC 66
;
[2014] 1 BLLR 20
(LAC)