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[2015] ZALCCT 64
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Innovation Maven (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (C976/2014) [2015] ZALCCT 64; (2016) 37 ILJ 465 (LC) (29 October 2015)
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Reportable
THE
LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, CAPE TOWN
JUDGMENT
C
ase
no: C 976/2014
In
the matter between:
INNOVATION
MAVEN (PTY) LTD
Applicant
and
COMMISSION
FOR CONCILIATION, MEDIATION
AND
ARBITRATION
First
Respondent
COMMISSIONER
BELLA GOLDMAN
N.O
Second Respondent
MICHELLE
FILIPPINETTI
Third respondent
Heard
:
16 September 2015
Delivered
:
29 October 2015
JUDGMENT
VAN
NIEKERK J
Introduction
[1]
This is an application to review and set aside an arbitration award
issued by the
second respondent (the commissioner) on 22 September
2014.
[2]
The dispute that gave rise to the present proceedings concerned a
contention by the
third respondent (the employee) that she had been
unfairly dismissed in circumstances where she resigned from her
employment with
the applicant and claimed what is referred to as
constructive dismissal. The arbitration proceedings commenced on 6
June 2014 and
thereafter on 2, 3 and 4 September 2014. The second
respondent (the commissioner) found that the employee had been
unfairly dismissed
and awarded her compensation in an amount of some
R140 000, the equivalent of four months’ remuneration. I
venture to guess
that the costs incurred in the conduct of the
arbitration and the present proceedings far outstrip the value of the
award.
[3]
In its founding papers, the applicant raised 14 grounds of review. At
the hearing
of the application, the applicant’s counsel relied
on only one of those grounds – that the commissioner descended
into
the arena of the conflict between the parties and that she thus
disabled herself from assessing with due impartiality the credibility
of the witnesses and the probabilities relating to the issues. In
addition, the applicant contends that the commissioner’s
intervention has clearly created the impression, at least in the
minds of the applicant and its representative at the hearing,
that
the commissioner had so disabled herself that she was favouring or
promoting the third respondent’s cause and prejudging
the case
against the applicant.
Factual
background
[4]
Given the basis on which the review is brought, it is not necessary
to canvass all
of the facts that are material to the dispute. It is
sufficient to record for present purposes that the employee was
employed by
the applicant as a business development manager in 2011,
and that she resigned on 7 March 2014. At issue in the proceedings
under
review were a limited number of disputes of fact – the
employee contended that the targets that she had been set could not
reasonably be met; the applicant contended that the employee had
failed to meet the reasonable and required performance standards.
What was at issue particularly was a meeting held on 3 January 2014
at which the employee says that she was given an ultimatum
to resign
and be paid two months’ salary, or face a performance
management process. The subsequent engagements between the
employee
and the applicant’s representatives are also disputed but the
case advanced by the applicant was that the employee
was
opportunistically seeking to negotiate an enhancement of the
severance package on offer and that this could never amount to
a
constructive dismissal. In any event, by the end of February 2014, it
was clear that the employee had rejected any possible settlement
and
she was presented with a performance management plan. It was common
cause that the employee did not participate in this process
and that
she resigned on 7 March 2014 and then referred a dispute to the
CCMA contending that the applicant had made her
continued employment
intolerable.
Relevant
legal principles
[5]
The Labour Relations Act (LRA) sought to introduce a dispute
resolution system that
would resolve labour disputes expeditiously,
informally and inexpensively. Section 138 (1) of the Act
promotes this purpose
and in relation to the conduct of arbitration
hearings under the auspices of the first respondent (the CCMA)
provides the following:
The
commissioner may conduct of the arbitration in a manner that the
commissioner considers appropriate in order to determine the
dispute
fairly and quickly, but must deal with the substantial merits of the
dispute with the minimum of legal formalities.
[6]
The application of the statutory injunction to determine a dispute
fairly and quickly,
having regard to the substantive merits but
without legal formality, may often be fraught with internal tension.
To determine a
dispute quickly might require robust intervention by a
commissioner, but the obligation to act fairly to both sides must not
be
compromised and may serve to limit the nature and extent of any
intervention. Similarly, the injunction to conduct the proceedings
with the minimum of legal formality may justify a decision by a
commissioner to conduct proceedings with less regard for the
formality
that ordinarily characterises a trial in this court or any
other civil court, but it is not an invitation or a license to
disregard
the parties’ right to a fair hearing. The broad
principle that emerges from the case law is that commissioners (and
judges)
ought to exercise caution when they intervene in the
proceedings over which they preside.
[7]
In
Solomon & another NNO v De Waal
1972 (1) 575 (A)
Potgieter JA said the following:
However,
by descending into the area of the conflict between the parties in
that manner the learner judge might well have disabled
himself from
assessing with due impartiality the credibility of the witnesses, the
probabilities relating to the issues, and the
amount of the general
damages sustained by the plaintiff. Even if that were not so, such
interventions might well have created
the impression, at least in the
mind of defendants, that he had so disabled himself that he was
favouring or promoting the plaintiff’s
cause and prejudging the
case against defendants. In that regard it must be borne in mind that
justice should not only be done
but should manifestly and undoubtedly
be seen to be done.
[8]
In
Greenfield Manufacturers (Temba (Pty) Ltd v Royton Electrical
Engineering (Pty) Ltd
1976 (2) SA 565
(A), the same court dealt
with a submission to the effect that a trial court had acted
irregularly in unduly by interfering in
the conduct of the case and
putting a leading question to a witness in respect of a vital issue.
The court noted that what mattered
was the nature rather than the
frequency of a trial judge’s intervention. The court held:
Whilst
the true role of a trial judge in civil proceedings is not
necessarily that of a ‘silent umpire’, he must
studiously
avoid any form of intervention which is calculated to create the
impression that he is descending into the arena which
is ordinarily
reserved for the litigants. Failure to do so, might have unfortunate
consequences, e.g., an impression (albeit mistaken)
might be created
that his intervention evidence as bias or that he is prejudging the
matters which are to be considered only at
the end of the trial.
[9]
In
National Union of Security Officers and Guards v Minister
of Health and Social Services (Western Cape)
[2005] 4 BLLR
373 (LC) this court said the following regarding a commissioner’s
conduct during the questioning of witnesses:
I
do not wish to refer to each and every sentence uttered by the
arbitrator or each and every question she had asked the applicant.
Suffice to say that, in my view, she exceeded the bounds of the
enquiry and created an impression that she was biased in favour
of
the first respondent. This is supported by the fact that I found that
the manner in which she dealt with certain witnesses to
be
deferential to them as a result of their political positions or for
any other reason she may have had. Her generosity in respect
of those
witnesses did not extend to the applicant and, in my view, he was
entitled to hold the view that she was biased
And
further:
Courts
have warned on several occasions the trial judges or arbiters often,
and unfortunately quite unwarrantedly, intervene in
proceedings
while, for instance the defendant’s counsel is cross-examining
certain witnesses and during the hearing of argument.
..For this
reason alone the award falls to be set aside.
[10]
In
Vodacom Service Provider Co (Pty) Ltd v Phala No & others
(2007) 28 ILJ 1335 (LC), this court reviewed and set aside an
arbitration award in circumstances where the court held that amongst
other things, that the commissioner concerned had questioned a
party’s witnesses in a way that amounted to cross-examination
and thus overstepped the boundaries of fair procedure in the conduct
of arbitration proceedings. The court went on to note that
a
commission has a discretion about how an arbitration should be
conducted and that the commissioner may decide to adopt an
adversarial
or an inquisitorial approach but that irrespective of the
approach adopted, the commissioner is required to conduct arbitration
proceedings in a fair, consistent and even-handed manner. At
paragraph 15 of the judgment, the court said the following:
A
commissioner cannot assist or be seen to assist, one party to the
detriment of the other. A commissioner cannot put to witnesses
his
propositions, should not interrupt the witnesses answers, challenge
the consistency of a witness with his own evidence, indicated
that he
doubted the witnesses credibility, or make submissions regarding the
construction of evidence.
Analysis
[11]
The starting point in any assessment of the applicant’s
submissions is the constitutional
basis of the right to a fair
hearing in statutory arbitration proceedings. The Constitutional
Court has held that when commissioners
conduct arbitration hearings,
they perform an administrative function. While there are awards the
requirements of fairness, consistent
with the LRA and the
Constitution, dictate that CCMA arbitration proceedings should be
conducted in a fair manner are not reviewable
in terms of the
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 3 of 2000
the CCMA is an
administrative body (see
Sidumo & another v Rustenburg
Platinum Mines Ltd & others
2008 (2) SA 24
(CC). Ngcobo J
made the point in the following way:
[266]
The requirement of fairness in the conduct of arbitration proceedings
is consistent with the LRA and the
Constitution. First, a CCMA
commissioner is required by s 138 (1) of the LRA ‘to determine
the dispute fairly and quickly’.
Second, in terms of s 34 of
the Constitution, everyone has the right to have any dispute that can
be resolved by the application
of the law decided in a fair public
hearing before a court of law or an independent and impartial
tribunal. The CCMA and Labour
Court is well-established to resolve
labour disputes. CCMA arbitrations provide independent and impartial
tribunals contemplated
in s 34 of the Constitution. The right to fair
hearing before a tribunal lies at the heart of the rule of law. And a
fair hearing
before a tribunal is a pre-requisite for an order
against an individual and this is fundamental to a just and credible
legal order.
A tribunal like the CCMA is obliged to ensure that
proceedings before it always fair. And finally, 23 of the
Constitution guarantees
to everyone the right to fair labour
practices.
And
further:
[267]
It is plain from these constitutional and statutory provisions that
CCMA arbitration proceedings should
be conducted in a fair manner.
The parties to CCMA arbitration must be afforded a fair trial.
Parties to the CCMA arbitrations
have a right to have their cases
fully and fairly determined.
[12]
The LRA spells out the nature and content of the right to a fair
hearing in CCMA arbitration
proceedings – these are established
primarily by s 138(1), referred to above. A commissioner is
required to conduct
the arbitration in a manner that the commissioner
considers appropriate in order to determine the dispute fairly and
quickly, but
must deal with the substantial merits of the dispute
with the minimum of legal formalities. Subsection (2) provides that
subject
to the discretion of the commissioner as to the appropriate
form of the proceedings, a party to the dispute may give evidence,
call witnesses, question the witnesses of any other party, and
address concluding arguments to the commissioner. In
CUSA v Tao
Ying Metal Industries & others
[2009] 1 BLLR 1
(CC), the
Constitutional Court (per Ngcobo J) placed the following gloss on s
138:
[65]
Consistent with the objectives of the LRA, commissioners are required
to ‘deal with the
substantial merits of the dispute with the
minimum of legal formalities’. This requires commissioners to
deal with the substance
of a dispute between the parties. They must
cut through all the claims and counter claims and reach for the real
dispute between
the parties. In order to perform this task
effectively, commissioners must be allowed a significant measure of
latitude in the
performance of their functions. Thus the LRA permits
commissioners to conduct the arbitration in a manner that the
commissioner
considers appropriate’. But in doing so,
commissioners must be guided by at least three considerations. The
first is that
they must resolve the real dispute between the parties.
Second, they must do so expeditiously. And, in resolving the labour
dispute,
they must act fairly to all the parties as the LRA enjoins
them to do.
[13]
The CCMA’s practice and procedure manual advises arbitrators
generally to opt for an inquisitorial
approach or an adversarial
approach in arbitration proceedings. The manual goes on to advise
commissioners (at paragraph 12.3.5)
that irrespective of the approach
adopted, an arbitrator must conduct the arbitration impartially and
not engage in conduct that
might reasonably give rise to a party
forming a perception of bias.
[14]
The CCMA guidelines and misconduct arbitration (at paragraph 33)
suggests that when the parties
are primarily responsible for calling
witnesses and presenting their evidence and cross-examining the
witness of other parties
an adversarial approach is to be
recommended. An inquisitorial approach, on the other hand, he
suggested if one or both parties
is unrepresented, or where a
representative is not experienced. The guidelines warn that
arbitrators adopting an inquisitorial
approach must be careful to
ensure that the parties are aware of and have the opportunity to
exercise their rights under s 138
(2).
[15]
The guidelines go on to suggest that when an arbitrator questions
witnesses, whether in an inquisitorial
or adversarial process, the
arbitrator should explain to the parties the reason for seeking the
information sought and must allow
the parties to address questions to
witnesses on any issues raised by the additional evidence. In short,
when an arbitrator adopts
an inquisitorial role in arbitration
proceedings, the commissioner may not abandon the well-established
rules of natural justice.
On the contrary, it calls for greater
vigilance on the part of the commissioner particularly since the
interventionist role that
he or she adopts might easily lead to a
perception or apprehension of bias, especially on the part of a lay
litigant (
Mutual & Federal Ins Co v Commission for
Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & others
[1997] 12
BLLR 1610
(LC)).
[16]
The guidelines are consistent with judgments of this court and in
particular, the judgment in
Vodacom Service Provider Co (Pty) Ltd
v Phala & others
(
supra
). That decision, it will be
recalled, specifically contemplated that the objective of fair,
consistent and even-handed proceedings
precluded commissioners from
assisting the party to the detriment of the other, putting
propositions to witnesses, interrupting
witnesses answers,
challenging the consistency of a witness, indicating doubt as to
witnesses credibility or making submissions
regarding the
construction of evidence.
[17]
In the present instance, in my view, and after a careful perusal of
the record, the commissioner’s
conduct was such that she
overstepped the mark. It is difficult to convey the magnitude of the
extent to which the commissioner
actively engaged in the proceedings,
but read as a whole, the transcribed record reflects that the
commissioner failed to respect
the roles of the parties’
respective representatives and assumed to herself the role of leading
evidence and conducting cross-examination.
[18]
I do not intend to traverse each and every instance of in appropriate
intervention by the commissioner;
a few examples will suffice.
[19]
After the applicant’s first witness had been sworn in, the
applicant’s representative,
Mr. Pienaar, asked a single
question before the commissioner took over his examination in chief.
Some five pages later, Pienaar
asks a second question, after which
the commissioner again interrupts and poses a series of question of
her own to Taylor. This
pattern continued throughout Taylor’s
examination-in-chief, with some of her questions amounting to a
cross-examination of
Taylor (see, for example, pages 371, 376 and 379
of the transcribed record. During Taylor’s cross-examination,
the commissioner
intervened by assuming the role of cross-examiner.
The following is a typical example, the context being whether the
third respondent’s
colleague, Ayesha, had met her monthly
targets:
MR
TAYLOR:
I have said she is
meeting all of her targets.
MR
O’DOWD
: What does
that mean? If it does not mean she is achieving (indistinct) …
(intervenes)
COMMISSIONER
:
I will tell you how to, I will tell you how to… you are not,
you are actually being quite evasive, because I am not getting,
we
are not getting answers.
MR
TAYLOR:
I said she is
meeting her monthly target.
COMMISSIONER:
Okay, but then she is not on her way
to meeting the target.
MR
TAYLOR:
That what I said, I
said she is meeting her targets.
COMMISSIONER:
No, you did not say that.
MR
TAYLOR:
I did.
COMMISSIONER
:
She said, you said, you said she is on her way to meeting targets, so
did I understand correctly, let us go to your bundle C,
B, C, is it
not, the last page, the last page is, so therefore, on the last page,
if you have got it in front of you, so that,
would that mean, let us
say, for every month of 2014, she scored 100%? Have you got the
bundle, has he got the bundle in front
of him?
MR
TAYLOR:
This is Michelle’s
targets.
COMMISSIONER:
I understand that, but she would have
a similar one.
MR
TAYLOR:
You do not look it
on a year to day basis, so as long as … (intervenes)
COMMISSIONER:
Sorry?
MR
TAYLOR:
On a year to day
basis (indistinct) to make the target (indistinct)
COMMISSIONER:
Sorry, now I am really confused
because now she was measured, Michelle measured on a monthly target …
(intervenes)
MR
TAYLOR:
Yes, but they are.
COMMISSIONER:
Sorry, sorry just stay with me.
MR
TAYLOR:
She is measured,
she is measured on a (indistinct) … (intervenes)
COMMISSIONER:
Alright, and that is what, and that…
MR
TAYLOR:
So month one, 102%,
month two, 98%, month three, 101%, month four (indistinct), we add it
up as well
COMMISSIONER:
So what she was, what she was,
performance, going to be performance manage on was the fact, and we
had a big debate on that, in
fact, it was a big debate and she said,
she understood it was yearly and that, in fact, it was a big debate
and she said, she understood
it was yearly and that it was monthly
and your representative really grilled her on that, so right, so now
I am getting really
confused. So now, actually I cannot understand
why it was not monthly, yearly, divided by 12, but in any event, so
are you saying
that for every month, because that was what the
measure of Michelle was, that Ayesha is getting 100% every month.
MR
TAYLOR:
I have not got
those specific targets in front of me because I keep reminding
everyone here, we are absolutely sure that Ayesha
will meet her
target for 2014.
COMMISSIONER
:
But then she, then she is not being measured the same way as Michelle
was?
MR
TAYLOR:
Yes.
MR
PIENAAR:
Madam
Commissioner, with all due respect, the correct person will come to
testify, he asked for the figures, we will have the figures
here …
(intervenes)
[20]
The commissioner adopted the same approach in relation the
examination-in-chief and cross-examination
of the applicant’s
witness Ms Ramos, and treated the third witness, Ms Sproates, in the
same way, and the fourth, a Ms. Sayed.
An example extracted from the
record of Sayed’s cross-examination by the third respondent’s
representative, Mr O’Dowd,
and which includes an instance where
the commissioner accuses Sayed of being untruthful, reads as follows:
COMMISSIONER
:
Yes, but nobody says: Listen guys, we have been very lacks (sic) with
you, you have not achieved your targets in the past and
now we are,
you know, I just want to warn you that this is what we are going to
put I place, we are going to help you, blah-blah-blah,
there is none
of that.
MS
SAYED
: There is, and it is
in the minutes of the meeting where it says things are going to
change (indistinct) … (intervenes)
COMMISSIONER:
Yes, but that is not really, that is
not saying things are going to change, but not what we are now going
to like hammer you on
performance.
MS
SAYED:
Ja, and then, but
Andy also said it in the mail and Lizelle said it in her mail that
she sets targets … (intervenes)
COMMISSIONER:
Your are not listening to me. You are
not listening to me.
MS
SAYED:
Okay.
COMMISSIONER
:
That nobody says to, well, to Ayesha, that I have come across, we
have, we have been lacks on you on … This is what would
normally happen in a company, we have not really taken much note, you
have not reached your targets, you have only got to 50% or
60% of
them and we are allowed it up to now, but things are now going to
change and we are expecting you to get to 80% or whatever
the figure
is. Andy said the figure was 100% and if my memory serves me
correctly, Lizelle said it was about 80%. I do not know,
what is the
figure?
MS
SAYED:
I is about 80%.
COMMISSIONER:
Okay
MS
SAYED:
(Indistinct) said
Andy it is a maximum, but it is about 80%.
COMMISSIONER:
Ja, but nobody tells them that but
nowhere is the standard, In order to get a standard. In order to get
to a standard, so even in
the performance evaluation, it does not
say: We expect you to get 80%, it is actually, there is no standard
that is even told to
them and all of a sudden, you hit them, so they
do not even know what standard they are supposed to be getting to.
MS
SAYED:
No, no, because in
our mind, they have to reach (indistinct)… (intervenes)
COMMISSIONER:
Well, it cannot be in your mind,
MS
SAYED:
This is why in the
discussions we have with them, is no target … (intervenes)
COMMISSIONER:
Ja, where they say 80%.
MS
SAYED:
It does not say 80%,
it says you have to reach your target, the full target.
COMMISSIONER:
But that is not the truth. It is a
target, sorry, nobody expects anyone to get their target because that
is what you aim to. It
is always like 75%, 80%, like we have
settlement rate that you have to get to, we get measured, that is
why, we get measured on
our settlement rate, but nobody expects you
to get hundred percent of it, sorry, I think it is 75% or
something, 75% , 80%,
whatever it is, it is a target. Okay.
MS
SAYED:
I just looked on
(indistinct), so … (intervenes)
COMMISSIONER:
Okay, that was page 40, what was it?
MS
SAYED:
That is 45 of C.
COMMISSIONER
:
45 of C, did not get to target, let me just write that, did not get
to target in 2012, 2014, getting stricter this year.
No, so no
correspondence. So you the correspondence, the only correspondence
you can find was in the meeting of 10 January?
MS
SAYED:
It happened
(indistinct), the 10
th
so…
COMMISSIONER:
Sorry, correspondence is Lizelle, 10
January, and, okay, okay
MR
O’DOWD
: Can I ask her
a few questions?
COMMISSIONER
:
Yes, you can.
CROSS
EXAMINATION BY MR O’DOWD (Continued):
So
Michelle … (intervenes)
MR
PIENAAR
: You must do the
re-examine after the Commissioner has cross-examined her. [Laughter]
COMMISSIONER
:
But I am trying, but, maybe you can call it cross-examining, but I
was just trying to clarify this.
[21]
I stress that these are not isolated examples, nor are they drawn out
of context. What the record
illustrates is a pattern where the
commissioner dominates the arbitration process, repeatedly assumes
the role properly reserved
for representatives, puts questions to
witnesses to the extent that she leads their evidence and actively
engages in their cross-examination.
By any standard of conduct
referred to in the
Vodacom Service Provider
judgment, the
commissioner crossed the line.
[22]
The CCMA guidelines referred to above suggest that where parties are
represented (as they were
for the larger part of the proceedings
under review) a commissioner must respect the role of the
representatives and not seek to
assume or undermine them. Of course,
there can be no harm in a commissioner asking questions in
clarification of any responses
given by a witness during the course
of his or her evidence, but these should ordinarily be confined to
the end of the witness’s
evidence and the parties afforded an
opportunity to put further question to the witness following on those
posed by the commissioner.
[23]
To the extent that it might be suggested that the commissioner’s
interventions were consistent
with the statutory obligation to
conduct arbitration proceedings quickly, this is simply not the case.
It should be recalled that
the proceedings under review, which
extended over four days (excluding a day on which a postponement was
garnted), concerned an
individual dismissal in circumstances where
there was a relatively uncomplicated dispute of fact that required
determination. Far
from curtailing the proceedings and focusing the
parties’ representatives on the material issues in dispute, the
commissioner’s
intervention served unnecessarily to protract
the proceedings. I have no doubt that had she left the parties’
representatives
to present their cases and confined her intervention
to genuine attempts to seek clarity on any particular issues that
emerged
from the evidence, the proceedings would have been completed
sooner than they were. For the reasons referred to below, the only
remedy available to the applicant in the present circumstances is to
have the matter remitted to the CCMA for rehearing. The further
delay
in the determination of this dispute and the additional costs that
may be incurred are directly a consequence of the
commissioner’s conduct.
[24]
There is another matter that is a cause for concern, one to which I
have already alluded. When
parties appoint representatives to act on
their behalf, that is their prerogative. The parties’
representatives must be afforded
both courtesy and respect by a
commissioner, and their role in the arbitration process must be
respected. It is disrespectful for
a commissioner to conduct the
proceedings as if one or both parties’ representatives were not
there, or have some minimal
role to play. Even when a commissioner
decides to adopt an inquisitorial approach, this does not entitle the
commissioner to reduce
the role of a party’s representative to
that of an observer.
[25]
In short, the nature and scope of the commissioner’s
interventions were such that she failed
to afford the parties a fair
hearing, and her conduct gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of
bias. Her award therefore stands
to be reviewed and set aside.
[26]
To the extent that the notice of motion seeks to have the court
substitute the commissioner’s
award, it seems to me that where
a complaint of having been denied a fair trial is upheld, it follows
that the matter should be
remitted to the CCMA for rehearing before a
different commissioner. The applicant cannot have it both ways –
to seek to have
arbitration proceedings set aside on the basis that
it was denied a fair trial and then to rely on the tainted record of
those
proceedings to have the commissioner’s award substituted
by one in its favour.
[27]
Neither the CCMA nor the commissioner have opposed these proceedings.
To the extent that the applicant
has been successful, I must
necessarily take into account the host of grounds for review that it
raised initially and the fact
that late in the day, it reduced these
to the single ground that forms the substance of this judgment. In
these circumstances,
in my view, it is appropriate, having regard to
the requirements of the law and fairness, that each party bears its
own costs.
I
make the following order:
1.
The
arbitration award issued by the second respondent on 22 September
2014 is reviewed and set aside.
2.
The matter
is remitted to the first respondent for a fresh hearing before a
commissioner other than the second respondent.
ANDRÉ
VAN NIEKERK
JUDGE
OF THE LABOUR COURT
APPEARANCES
For
the applicant: Adv G Elliott, instructed by Abrahams Gross Inc.
For
the third respondent: Mr B O’Dowd, Brendan O’Dowd
Attorney