S v Morten (300/90) [1991] ZASCA 23 (22 March 1991)

78 Reportability
Criminal Law

Brief Summary

Criminal Law — Robbery with aggravating circumstances — Attempted murder — Appellant and accomplice attacked complainant in his shop, inflicting multiple stab wounds and stealing cash and property — Appellant recognized by complainant during the attack — Conviction for robbery with aggravating circumstances and attempted murder upheld — Death sentence imposed for robbery — Court required to consider mitigating and aggravating factors in sentencing, with death sentence only appropriate if it is the only proper sentence — No mitigating factors found, and brutality of the attack justified the death sentence.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This judgment concerns an appeal in the Supreme Court of South Africa (Appellate Division) against the imposition of the death sentence following a conviction for robbery with aggravating circumstances. The appeal was directed only at sentence, not conviction.


The appellant, Jerry Morten, was the accused person at trial and the person sentenced to death on the robbery count. The respondent was the State. The matter came before the Appellate Division after the trial court convicted the appellant of robbery with aggravating circumstances (as defined in section 1 of Act 51 of 1977) and attempted murder, and imposed death for the robbery and seven years’ imprisonment for attempted murder.


The dispute on appeal concerned the appropriateness of the death sentence in light of the statutory approach introduced by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 107 of 1990, and the Appellate Division’s duty to consider whether death was “the only proper sentence” in all the circumstances.


2. Material Facts


In the early morning of 12 January 1988, the complainant, Mr Thakordas Dajie, proprietor of Bops Radio and T.V. Shop in Kinross, received a telephone call at home requesting that he open his shop early to receive a television set for repairs. He agreed to meet at 07h00 and drove to the premises.


On arrival, Dajie observed a yellow van outside and two men near the door. After he opened the shop and went inside, the two men followed. One of them, later identified as Piccanini Mlinyane (accused no. 2), engaged Dajie in conversation in the workshop area. The other man, the appellant, entered wearing a balaclava and armed with a reasonably large knife, demanded Dajie’s revolver and money, and then—while accused no. 2 restrained Dajie from behind—stabbed him in the ribs. The attack continued, with the appellant repeatedly stabbing Dajie and accused no. 2 assaulting him, until Dajie lost consciousness.


During the assault, Dajie pulled off the appellant’s balaclava and recognised him as “Jerry”, a person who had previously done odd jobs for him. The stabbing, however, began before this recognition and continued thereafter. The assailants took the safe keys, removed approximately R14 000 to R15 000 in cash and various unbanked cheques, and the appellant drove away in Dajie’s Datsun bakkie, which was never recovered. Dajie also reported that personal items (including a chain and wristwatch) were taken.


Medical evidence accepted by the court established that Dajie suffered numerous severe stab wounds, including 17 stab wounds to the chest, additional wounds elsewhere, bruises, and multiple rib fractures. His condition was critical and he survived due to prompt medical attention. The consequences were lasting: Dajie’s ability to work and run his business was seriously impaired, and he was compelled to sell the business.


The appellant’s version at trial conceded involvement in the incident to the extent that he admitted going to the shop with another man, assaulting Dajie (but only by slapping), taking the safe keys, stealing the money and cheques, and taking and driving away the bakkie. He denied stabbing Dajie and suggested that his companion was responsible for the injuries. The trial court rejected the appellant’s evidence, describing him as a poor witness. The appellant also made a confession admitting complicity in the robbery while denying the stabbing, and he attempted at trial to alter material aspects of that confession regarding the identity of his accomplice.


3. Legal Issues


The central question on appeal was a sentencing issue: whether, having regard to the applicable statutory framework and the facts found proved, the death sentence imposed for robbery with aggravating circumstances was the only proper sentence.


The issue required an evaluative application of legal principle to established facts. The court was required to identify aggravating and mitigating factors (as contemplated by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 107 of 1990) and to determine whether the statutory threshold for the imposition (and confirmation on appeal) of the death sentence was met. The appeal also raised, as part of the sentencing framework discussed by the court, the principle that sentencing must avoid duplication of punishment where overlapping facts underpin multiple convictions, although no separate argument was advanced on that point and there was no appeal against the attempted murder sentence.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the appeal within the framework created by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 107 of 1990, which altered the methodology for imposing the death sentence by requiring a finding on the presence or absence of mitigating and aggravating factors before death may be imposed. The Appellate Division reaffirmed its interpretation that the statutory phrase “the proper sentence” in this context means “the only proper sentence”, adopting the approach previously articulated in the reported authorities.


The court also emphasised that, in an appeal against a death sentence, it exercises an independent discretion. This means that, even while having due regard to the trial court’s findings, the appellate court must itself determine whether it would have imposed the death sentence, and if not, it may substitute such punishment as it considers proper in terms of the empowering provisions of the 1990 Act.


On the relationship between the two convictions, the court acknowledged that the same factual matrix may legitimately sustain convictions for both robbery with aggravating circumstances and attempted murder. However, in sentencing, courts must guard against duplicating punishment by counting the same facts twice across different sentences. The court reviewed the relevant authority on this point and noted that, in the present matter, the trial judge treated the robbery as the more serious offence warranting the death sentence, and the attempted murder sentence did not reflect the full severity of the injuries. The court further observed that there was no appeal against the attempted murder sentence and no submission on duplication, and therefore it did not need to decide the matter on that basis.


Turning to the aggravating circumstances, the court attached significant weight to the appellant’s long criminal record spanning more than three decades, including multiple convictions for housebreaking and theft, repeated periods of imprisonment, a declaration as an habitual criminal, and convictions for escaping from custody. The timing was treated as significant: the appellant had been released on parole in September 1986 and committed the present offences in January 1988. This history was used to support the inference that imprisonment had not had a reformative effect and that the appellant remained habitually inclined to criminal conduct.


The court also regarded the robbery as carefully planned, involving the luring of the complainant to the shop early in the morning before customers arrived, to enable a surprise attack in the workshop. The attack was characterised by extreme brutality and a wanton excess of violence. The court considered the appellant’s motive to be simple avarice coupled with a callous disregard for the complainant’s life and property. The severity and number of stab wounds, the complainant’s near-fatal condition, and the permanent disruption to his life and livelihood were treated as aggravating.


The court found no remorse, noting that the appellant sought in both his confession and evidence to shift blame onto others, including by implicating his co-accused and later positing an “imaginary” third person. It stated that it was unable to identify any mitigating factors worthy of consideration, and none were suggested in argument. It nevertheless made clear that the absence of mitigation was not, by itself, decisive; the statutory test remained whether death was the only proper sentence in all the circumstances.


In assessing whether any lesser sentence could adequately address the crime, the court considered the appellant’s demonstrated propensity to escape custody and concluded that even life imprisonment would not appear to provide adequate protection for society. In the evaluative balance, and with reference to the notion of retribution in particularly shocking cases (as expressed in earlier authority), the court concluded that the gravity of the appellant’s conduct was such that the death sentence was the only proper sentence.


5. Outcome and Relief


The Appellate Division held that the death sentence imposed for robbery with aggravating circumstances was, on the facts and in the statutory context, the only proper sentence.


The appeal was accordingly dismissed, with the result that the death sentence on the robbery count remained in force. No alteration was made to the sentence for attempted murder, which was not the subject of the appeal. The judgment, as reported, did not set out a separate costs order.


Cases Cited


S v Nkwanyana and Others 1990 (4) SA 735 (A).


S v Moloto 1982 (1) SA 844 (A).


R v Cain 1959 (3) SA 376 (A).


S v Mathebula 1978 (2) SA 607 (A).


S v Witbooi 1982 (1) SA 30 (A).


S v Matthee 1971 (3) SA 769 (A).


Legislation Cited


Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 1 (definition of robbery with aggravating circumstances).


Criminal Law Amendment Act 107 of 1990, section 4.


Criminal Law Amendment Act 107 of 1990, section 13(b).


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that, applying the post-1990 statutory approach to capital sentencing and exercising its independent discretion on appeal, there were no mitigating factors and substantial aggravating factors, including a carefully planned robbery, extreme violence resulting in life-threatening and lasting injuries, absence of remorse, and an extensive history of serious prior offending including escapes from custody.


It further held that, in the circumstances, the death sentence was the only proper sentence for the robbery with aggravating circumstances. The appeal against the death sentence was dismissed.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that, under the Criminal Law Amendment Act 107 of 1990, a court may impose the death sentence only after making a finding on mitigating and aggravating factors, and only if death is “the proper sentence”, interpreted by the Appellate Division to mean “the only proper sentence” in all the circumstances.


It confirmed that, on appeal against a death sentence, the Appellate Division exercises an independent discretion. Even where the trial court has made relevant findings, the appellate court must itself decide whether it would impose death; if it would not, it is empowered to substitute a sentence it considers proper.


The judgment also reaffirmed the sentencing principle that, while the same facts may support multiple convictions (such as robbery with aggravating circumstances and attempted murder), a sentencing court must guard against duplication of punishment by counting the same aggravating facts twice when imposing separate sentences, even though those facts may remain relevant to characterising the seriousness of the robbery as aggravated.

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[1991] ZASCA 23
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S v Morten (300/90) [1991] ZASCA 23 (22 March 1991)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH A
FRICA (
APPELLATE DIVISION
)
In the matter between:
JERRY MORTEN
Appellant
AND
THE STATE
Respondent
Coram
: NESTADT,
KUMLEBEN et EKSTEEN, JJ.A.
Heard
: 1 March 1991
Delivered
: 22
March 1991
JUDGMENT EKSTEEN
, J.A. :
At about 6.30 a.m. on 12 January 1988 Mr. Thakordas Dajie the proprietor of
Bops Radio and T.V. Shop in Kinross received a telephone
call at his home. His
early morning caller asked him whether he would come down to his shop at once,
as the call-er wanted to bring
his television set in for repairs. Dajie agreed
to meet him there at 7 o' clock. He drove down and as he approached the shop, he
noticed a yellow van parked in front of the premises and two people standing
near the door. He paid no particular attention to them
but simply opened the
door and walked in. The two men followed him, and
../2
2
one of them, who turned out to be Piccanini Mlinyane (to whom I shall refer
as accused no. 2) asked whether Dajie had finished fixing
his radio as he had
come to fetch it. Dajie replied that if it was ready he could have it. He then
switched on the lights in the
shop and followed accused no. 2 who had preceded
him into the workshop area. While they were in the workshop accu-sed no. 2's
companion,
who is the appellant, and who was wearing a balaclava cap, also came
in armed with "a reasonably big knife". He walked up to Dajie
and said "Where is
your revolver and where is your money?" Before Dajie could answer, accused no. 2
came from behind, put his arm
round Dajie's neck and held him while the
appellant stabbed him in the ribs. Dajie
../3
3
told them to take the money and to leave him alone. At the same time he
grabbed at the balaclava cap and pulled it away so that he
could see his
assailant's face. He recognized the appellant who had done odd jobs for him in
the past, and called him by his name,
saying "Jerry what are you doing?" He
again told them to take the money and leave him alone. Appel-lant however
continued to stab
him while accused no. 2 began hitting him with his fists until
Dajie lost consciousness.
Appellant then took Dajie's keys, opened the safe
and took Rl4,000 - R15,000 in cash, and a number of cheques which had not yet
been
banked. He also took the keys of Dajie's Datsun "bakkie", got into
.... /4
4
it, and drove off. Dajie says that a gold chain that he wore round his neck,
a wristwatch, a suit jacket and a waistcoat were also
taken.
Shortly after
the two robbers had left Dr. Geyser - who was Dajie's personal physician -
arrived on the scene. He says he found Dajie
lying on a couch covered in blood.
He appeared to be in a criti-cal condition, with numerous stab wounds in his
chest. He was breathing
heavily and when he inhaled one could hear air being
sucked into the lungs through the wounds in his chest. Similarly when he exhaled
air was ex-pelled through these wounds. His blood pressure was very low and his
pulse hardly discernible. He was taken to hospital
and when Dr. Geyser examined
him
../5
5
there he found 17 stab wounds in his chest and 5 more to other parts of his
body, as well as several scrath-es, lacerations and bruises.
He also found
multiple rib fractures. The doctor says that when he first saw Dajie he did not
expect him to live, and only the quick
medical attention saved his life. In fact
he has still not completely recovered from the incident, and says: "As a
technician I have
lost control of myself - even the usage of my expressions." He
is unable to continue with his work as a technician. He cannot run
his business
any more and has had to sell it.
The appellant, in his evidence, conceded
that he had gone to Dajie's shop on the day in question in
.... /6
6
the company of another man, but he says it wasn't accused no. 2. He also
concedes that he caught hold of Dajie and assaulted him,
but he says that he did
no more than to slap him in the face with his hand. He concedes that he took
Dajie's safe keys and that he
stole the money and cheques from the safe. In fact
he later took the police to the place where he had thrown the cheques away, and
some of them were recovered in the long grass. Appellant also con-cedes that he
took Dajie's "bakkie" and drove off with it. He later
took the police to the
place where he says he left the "bakkie", but it wasn't there any more. The
"bakkie" was not recovered. Appellant
could not explain how Dajie sustained
the
../7
7
multiple wounds and injuries, and suggested that his companion must have been
responsible for it.
The appellant also made a confession to a magistrate
admitting his complicity in the robbery, but again denying having stabbed Dajie.
In his con-fession he says that accused no. 2 was the person who was with him,
but at the trial he sought to substitu-te the name
"Alfred" for "Piccanini"
wherever it appeared in the confession.
Appellant was a bad witness. His
evidence was properly rejected by the trial court, and he was convicted of
robbery with aggravating
circumstances as defined in section 1 of Act 51 of
1977, and of attempted murder. The learned Judge a
quo
sentenced
.... /8
8
him to 7 years' imprisonment for attempted murder, and imposed the death
sentence for the robbery with aggra-vating circumstances.
The present appeal is
directed solely against this latter sentence.
Since the trial in this matter
the approach of courts to the imposition of the death sentence has been changed
by the provisions of
the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 107 of 1990. Section 4 of
this Act enjoins a court, before sentence of death may be im-posed, to
make a
finding on the presence or absence of mitigating and aggravating factors. The
trial Judge, having due regard to such finding,
will then only impose the death
sentence if he is satisfied that it is "the proper sentence" in all the
circumstances.
..../9
9
This phrase has been interpreted by this court to mean "the only proper
sentence". (
S. v. Nkwanyana and Others
[1990] ZASCA 95
;
1990 (4) SA 735
(A) at 745 A - G.)
More-over in considering an appeal against the imposition of a death sentence
this court exercises an inde-pendent
discretion in the sense that if it is of
the opinion that it would not itself have imposed the death sentence it may
impose "such
punishment as it considers to be proper" (sec. 13(b) Act 107 of
1990). In considering an appeal such as the present one this court
is therefore
required, having due regard to the findings of the trial court, and to such
miti-gating and aggravating factors as may
appear from those findings, to
consider whether in its opinion the
../10
10
death sentence is the only proper sentence in all the circumstances.
A
feature which presents itself in the pre-sent case is the fact that much of what
goes to con-stitute the offence of attempted murder
is also rele-vant to the
offence of róbbery with aggravating cir-cumstances. There is nothing
wrong in taking the same facts
into consideration when it comes to found-ing
convictions on these two counts. (
S. v. Moloto
1982 (1) SA 844
(A).)
However when it cqmes to punishment a court is enjoined to guard against a
duplication of punishment which would ensue if the
same facts were to be taken
into account in sentencing an accused for the two different offences. In
.../11
11
R. v. Cain
1959 (3) SA 376
(A) an armed robbery was
perpetrated and a person seeking to prevent the robbers
from getting away
was shot and wounded. The robbers
were subsequently convicted of robbery with
aggrava-
ting circumstances, and of assault with intent to
commit murder
in respect of the person shot. They
were sentenced to death on the first of
these counts
and to 10 years' imprisonment on the second. In the
course of
his judgment on appeal Ogilvie Thompson J.A.
remarked at p 383 D - E that
-
"Were a sentence other than death to be im-posed for the robbery, it would, no
doubt be ap-propriate, when assessing the sentence
to be im-posed for the
separate charge of shooting, to pay regard to the fact that such shooting had
already operated to make the
sentence on the robbery charge more severe; but
that would not affect
.../12
12
the 'presence' of the shooting as an aggravating circumstance in
robbery."
(See too
S. v. Mathebula
1978 (2) SA 607
(A) at
p 613
D - E;
S. v. Witbooi
1982 (1) SA 30
(A) at p 35 B - F;
S. v. Moloto
(
supra
) at p 854 E - G.)
In the present case the learned trial Judge
was
fully aware of the circumstances. He clearly
considered the robbery with
aggravating circumstance
the more serious of the two charges and deserving
of
the death sentence which he imposed. Many of the
same facts relevant to
the conviction of robbery were
also relevant to the conviction of attempted
murder.
The sentence he imposed for the latter conviction does
not, in my
view, reflect the full seriousness of the
..../13
13
injuries inflicted on the complainant, and there would not, on the face of
it, appear to have been any dupli-cation of punishment.
In any event there is no
appeal against the sentence for attempted murder, and no argument was advanced
before us on the question
of a possible duplication of punishment. I need
there-fore say no more about this.
The appellant is a man of 47 years of age.
An aggravating factor in this case is his long list of previous convictions
beginning as
far back as 1957. They include five for housebreaking with intent
to steal and theft, and a further six for theft. He was sentenced
to various
fairly lengthy periods of impri-sonment in respect of these offences before, in
1975,
.../14
14
being declared an habitual criminal. In the same year he was convicted of
escaping from custody and of robbery and the indeterminate
sentence was again
imposed. Then in May 1980 he was convicted of escaping and of using a motor
vehicle without the owner's permission.
This time he received sentences
amounting to 4 years' imprisonment. In August 1980 he was again convicted of
escaping and sehtenced
to another 12 months' im-prisonment. On 1 September 1986
he was released on parole and the offence before us was committed on 12
January
1988 - some 15 months after his release.
The robbery was obviously carefully
planned. The evidence does not disclose who made the telephone call early that
morning, but it
was clearly part of the
.../15
15
plan of appellant and his co-accused to lure Dajie to his shop before other
customers were likely to turn up, so that they could take
him by surprise in the
workshop. This diabolical plan was relentlessly carried out with savage
determination. The brutality and wanton
excess of the assault on the unfortunate
complainant needs no elabora-tion. He offered them no provocation or offence,
and the appellant's
motive seems to have been nothing more than personal avarice
and a callous disregard for the lives and property of others. The stabbing,
as
has been pointed out commenced before the complainant revealed to the appellant
that he had recognized him and was not merely
a reaction to that
disclósure. On Dr. Geyser's evidence the complainant is lucky to be
alive. The quality of
..../16
16
his life, however, has been shattered and he can no longer pursue his
vocation.
The appellant has shown no remorse for his deed. In fact both in
his confession to the magistrate and in his evidence he sought falsely
to put
the blame on somebody else - first on his co-accused, and then on an imaginary
third person.
I have been unable to find any mitigating factors worthy of
consideration nor were any suggested to us in argu-ment. It does not follow,
however, that for that reason the death sentence must stand. We are not called
upon sim-ply to weigh up aggravating factors against
mitigating factors to see
which weighs the heavier, but rather to con-sider whether, having due regard to
whatever aggravating
.../17
17
or mitigating factors there may be, the death sentence is the proper sentence
in all the circumstances.
If one has regard to the appellant's long list of
previous convictions stretching over more than 30 years it is apparent that even
the fairly long periods of imprison-ment he was compelled to undergo had no
reformative effect on him. He is and remains one who
is habitually inclined to
criminal behaviour and, as the present offence merely serves to emphasize, he is
a danger to a settled
and orderly society. In the light of his propensity to
escape from prison which is reflected in his list of previous convictions,
even
life imprisonment would not seem to be an adequate protection of society. Taking
all the circumstances into account it seems
to me that in this case it may well
be said that
.../18
18
the evil of the appellant's deed
"is so shocking, so clamant for extreme retribu-tion, that society would demand
his destruction as the only expiation for his
wrongdoing"
(
per
Holmes J.A. in
S. v. Matthee
1971
(3) SA 769
(A)
at p 771 D - E). In the light of this conclusion it
follows
that in my view the death sentence was the
only proper sentence to pass, and
the appeal cannot
succeed.
The appeal is dismissed.
J.P.G. EKSTEEN, J.A.
NESTADT, J.A. )
concur
KUMLEBEN, J.A. )