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[2015] ZALCJHB 206
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First National Bank (A Division of Firstrand Bank Limited) v Nduzulwana NO and Others (JR1597/09) [2015] ZALCJHB 206 (16 July 2015)
THE
LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
JUDGMENT
Not
Reportable
Case
no: JR 1597/09
FIRST NATIONAL BANK
(A DIVISION OF FIRSTRAND BANK LIMITED)
Applicant
and
M NDUZULWANA
N.O
COMMISSION FOR
CONCILIATION, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION
NOMSA PATRICIA MAKI
First Respondent
Second Respondent
Third Respondent
Delivered:
15 July 2015
JUDGMENT
TLHOTLHALEMAJE,
AJ
Introduction:
[1]
In
this application, the applicant seeks to review, set aside and/or
correct the arbitration award dated 12 May 2010, issued under
case
number ECEL1343-09 by the first respondent (Commissioner), acting
under the auspices of the second respondent (the CCMA).
In the award,
the Commissioner found that the dismissal of the third respondent
(Maki) was procedurally and substantively unfair,
and ordered her
reinstatement with retrospective effect.
[2]
The
applicant further seeks an order to the effect that the dismissal of
Maki was procedurally and substantively fair, alternatively
a
referral of the matter back to the CCMA for a fresh hearing with
whatever directions the court deems appropriate.
Preliminary
point:
[3]
In her
answering affidavit, Maki raised a preliminary point to the effect
that the deponent to the founding affidavit, Tawanda Madzivadondo,
who is the applicant’s Industrial Relations Manager was not
duly authorised to depose to the affidavit. At the initial hearing
of
this matter on 31 January 2014, Mr Mlonyeni on behalf of Maki
persisted with this preliminary point despite Madzivadondo’s
assertions in the replying affidavit that he was so duly authorised,
and also despite proof of such authority in the form of a
resolution
and certificate of delegation having been produced at the hearing.
This had necessitated a postponement of the matter
at the behest of
Maki, in order for the applicant to properly formulate a response to
this preliminary point and for Maki or her
attorneys of record to
analyse the documentation handed in support of Madzivadondo’s
authority.
[4]
In
seeking a dismissal of the review application on this ground, the
essence of the preliminary point is that the applicant has
never made
a decision or passed a resolution authorising Madzivadondo to
institute the review proceedings challenging the Commissioner’s
award. In this regard, the contention was that the applicant has not
produced proof of any resolution passed by its board of directors
or
Shareholders authorising Madzivadondo to depose to legal documents on
its behalf.
[5]
Subsequent
to the postponement of the proceedings, Madzivadondo filed a
supplementary affidavit to further clarify his status. He
is employed
as a manager in FNB’s Industrial Relations Department and is
responsible for handling labour related litigation.
He appears at the
CCMA on behalf of the applicant, signs and deposes to affidavits on
its behalf. Maki never questioned his authority
to represent the
applicant during the arbitration proceedings. In view of Maki’s
persistence with the preliminary point,
he had approached Daniel
Armstrong, the applicant’s Executive Officer of People
Governance who has in terms of a certificate
dated 10 September 2012,
been formally delegated by FNB’s Company Secretary to institute
legal proceedings concerning the
affairs of FNB. Armstrong in return
has the authority to delegate such powers and authority to any
officer of the FNB. Armstrong
had then on 28 January 2014, signed a
certificate in which Madzivadondo was formally delegated authority to
sign and depose to
all the necessary documents or affidavits, and to
take all necessary steps on behalf of FNB in the review application.
[6]
In
response to Madzivadondo’s supplementary affidavit, Maki had
contended that the basis upon which she challenges Madzivadondo’s
authority is that upon receipt of the arbitration award and when she
attempted to report back for duty she was informed that FNB
intended
to take the award on review. During discussions with some of her
former colleagues she was also informed that FNB’s
Industrial
Relations Department had a tendency of sometimes taking arbitration
awards on review without first obtaining the necessary
legal
authority to do so. She contended that even if it were accepted that
the decision to take the matter on review as was part
of
Madzivadondo’s job function, that did not take away the legal
requirement that he had to take a further step in obtaining
a legally
valid delegation or company resolution to initiate the review
proceedings as well as prosecute them to finality.
[7]
The
suggestion from Maki in persisting with this preliminary point is
that Madzivadondo in instituting these proceedings acted on
a frolic
of his own. This preliminary point raised clearly has no merit and I
fail to appreciate the reason it was pursued with
such vigour by Mr.
Mlonyeni, to the extent that this necessitated a postponement on 31
January 2014 at great costs to his client
and to the applicant.
[8]
The
persistence with this point is based on unsubstantiated discussions
held with Maki’s colleagues that Madzivadondo’s
department “sometimes took awards on review without first
obtaining the necessary authority to do so from the board of
directors
either in the form of a company resolution or a properly
conferred mandate”. It was not in dispute that Madzivadondo in
his
capacity as Industrial Relations Manager of the applicant had
represented it at the CCMA arbitration proceedings in this dispute.
It does not appear that Maki had taken issue with his representation
at that level. It is therefore surprising that for the purposes
of
this review application, she should question Madzivadondo’s
locus
standi
.
[9]
I am
satisfied that Madzivadondo is duly authorised to act on behalf of
the applicant in matters pertaining to this application.
There is no
basis for a conclusion to be reached that in instituting these
proceedings, and deposing to affidavits, he had acted
on a frolic of
his own. A certificate signed by Armstrong was attached to the
supplementary affidavit in support of Madzivadondo’s
authority,
and on 31 January 2014, a copy of the resolution was furnished to
Maki and her attorney of record.
[10]
As
already stated, I fail to appreciate what informed Maki that
Madzivadondo had no
locus
standi
to
act on behalf of the applicant. This preliminary point was
ill-conceived even if first brought about in the answering affidavit
to the review application. It was clearly frivolous and vexatious on
the part of Maki and her attorney of record to persist with
this
point merely on the basis of unconfirmed discussions surrounding the
workings of the applicant’s IR department. To this
end, the
preliminary point should be dismissed, and Maki should be burdened
with the wasted costs of 31 January 2014, as that postponement
was
clearly unnecessary.
The
review application:
Background:
[11]
Maki
was employed with effect from 1 October 2007. At the time of her
dismissal on 31
st
of
March 2009 she was employed as an external sales consultant. Part of
her duties included opening new bank accounts which also
involved
compiling signature cards and obtaining signature mandates from new
account holders. Maki was dismissed following upon
a disciplinary
enquiry into allegations that she had linked accounts on an entity
called Nnite Trading CC which belonged to one
Nyaniso Maqokolo to
four different accounts without verifying the signature of the
account holders against eGami, thus contributing
to the loss of R355
000.00.
[12]
According
to the applicant, as a result of risks inherent to its business, it
has in place, procedures designed to ensure the security
of all
monies and negotiable instruments in its custody. Key to that
security is the set of prescribed internal rules known as
the “Golden
Rules”. The linking of accounts has been identified by the
applicant as a particular area of risk in that
once an account is
linked without authority, it is a licence to commit almost unlimited
fraud. Fraudsters generally open accounts,
linked them to other FNB
customer accounts and are then able to access the linked accounts and
transfer funds using internet banking.
The fraudsters are then able
to withdraw stolen funds from their accounts. It is in the light of
these problems that the Golden
Rules prescribe a strict verification
process, prior to the authorising of the linking of accounts. The
Rules require the employee
to
inter
alia;
(a)
request and obtain
the customer’s identity document and verify the face of the
customer against the identity document.
(b)
check the
authenticity of the identity document.
(c)
access CIS
Efficiencies and ask the customer some security questions.
(d)
access the eGami to
view the customer’s imaged signature card.
(e)
if eGami is down or
the image of signature card is not available, obtain customer file or
signature card or mandate.
[13]
Thus
employees were required to verify the identity of the customer by
checking his or her identity document, asking some security
questions
relating to the customer and his or her account and verify his or her
signature. Where a customer cannot be identified
in terms of the
Golden Rules, an employee cannot continue with his or her
instructions.
[14]
The
allegations against Maki followed investigations after a customer
reported a number of fraudulent transactions having taken
place on
the account of Nnite Trading CC. The investigations had revealed that
money had been transferred from that account into
four different
accounts. It was also established that Maki had processed the linking
of the Nnite Trading account to these other
four accounts, and that
the signature verification procedure as laid out in the Golden Rules
had not been performed. It was further
discovered that on examination
of the signature card, it was apparent that the signature of the
customer differed materially from
that of the specimen signature.
This had led to the charges against her as indicated above.
[15]
According
to the applicant, Maki had at the internal disciplinary enquiry
admitted that she had failed to verify the signature of
the customer
in accordance with the Golden Rules and her only excuse was that she
was not properly trained. Her further explanation
was that she was
trained to ask that the customer signs in front of her and that this
would constitute signature verification.
The
arbitration proceedings and the award:
[16]
The
parties had completed a pre-arbitration conference and submitted a
signed minute in that regard. Evidence of two witnesses,
Ms. Rosemary
Quayle who was the chairperson of the enquiry and Mr. L Khoza was led
at the arbitration proceedings. Maki did not
call any witnesses.
[17]
The
evidence for the applicant as summarised by the Commissioner was that
the signature verification is done by comparing the customer
signature against the signature held by the bank either in the
customer’s card or files or signature reflected in the eGami
system. If an employee is not sure of the procedure to be followed,
that the employee must consult the Golden Rules for direction.
This
rule is accessible to all employees, and its paragraph 3.2.1
stipulate that the employee must identify the customer, and access
eGami to view the customer’s imaged signature card. If eGami is
down or the image of signature card/identity document is
not
available the employee must obtain customer file of signature card or
mandate.
[18]
According
to Quayle, the signature of the customer Mr Maqokolo which was signed
on 15 October 2008 in front of Maki was different
to that held by the
bank. Had Maki compared the signature signed in front of her with the
signature in the eGami, or card or customer
file, she would have seen
that the signatures were different and would have declined to link
the two accounts. If Maki was in doubt
she knew that that should have
referred to the Golden Rule. Even though Maki was an external sales
consultant she was experienced
coming from Standard Bank where the
same rules had applied. According to Quayle, Maki’s failure to
refer to the Golden rules
had resulted in the beach of the trust
relationship between her and the employer.
[19]
Under
cross-examination Quayle had confirmed that the money was transferred
from Nnite Trading electronically by means of cell phone
or internet
transaction. She also confirmed that Maki did not change the mandate
and that it was not practice before the introduction
of eGami to go
to the file each time she needed to compare signatures. Where the
customer was known to an employee, she would authorise
the
transaction without comparing the customer signature with that held
with the bank in the file.
[20]
Maki’s
evidence as summarised by the Commissioner was that in linking the
accounts of Maqokolo and Nnite Trading on 15 October
2008, the method
she had used to verify the signature was to ask the customer for
his/her identity document or driver’s license.
She would then
ask the customer to sign in front of her to make sure that it was the
customer’s signature and then endorse
it. She would further ask
the customer some personal questions and details in order to
ascertain that she was dealing with the
correct person.
[21]
In the
analysis, the Commissioner made reference to section 188 (1) of the
Labour Relations Act in regards to the question of the
onus and the
provisions of Schedule 8 – Code of Good Practice. In regards to
procedural fairness, the Commissioner found
that there was a
procedural defect in that Quayle had conceded during
cross-examination that she had informed Maki that she will
refer the
matter to the applicant’s Johannesburg Industrial Relations
Department, which will then decide whether she was
guilty or not and
then decide on the appropriate penalty. In this regard, the
Commissioner concluded that since the Johannesburg
IR department was
not part of the disciplinary tribunal it could not have decided on
the guilt of Maki, and that Quayle by deferring
the decision to
dismiss to the IR department neglected her duties as the chairperson
of the enquiry, thus rendering the process
defective.
[22]
The
Commissioner also found that the decision to deny Maki legal
representation at the internal disciplinary enquiry rendered the
process defective. The reasoning behind this finding was that Quayle
refused to grant legal representation at the instruction of
the IR
department and she had accordingly failed to exercise her discretion
as the chairperson of the enquiry.
[23]
In
regards to the substantive fairness of the dismissal, the
Commissioner held that the applicant in this case had failed to prove
that Maki was taught during her training that signature verification
was done by comparing the customer’s signature against
the
signature held by the bank either in the customer card/file or
signature reflected in the eGami system.
[24]
The
Commissioner accepted as being common cause that Maki was trained in
accounts linkage by Speelman, Leonard, Paterson and Gida.
However
these individuals had taught Maki something different to the Golden
Rules, and she had not been in doubt about the procedures
when
effecting the transaction in question. The Commissioner further
concluded that there was no need for her to refer to the Golden
Rules
or eGami.
[25]
The
Commissioner in the absence of contradictory evidence from the four
individuals who taught Maki on the bank procedures, also
held that
the applicant had failed to prove that the said rule or standard as
testified to by its two witnesses was correctly communicated
to Maki.
Essentially, the Commissioner held that the applicant’s
unchallenged evidence that that it had applied the rule
consistently
and that the dismissal was appropriate sanction for contravention of
the rule was rendered superfluous as it had failed
to prove that the
rule concerning the procedures for linking accounts was communicated
to Maki.
The
legal framework in respect of review applications:
[26]
The review test is that
as set out in
Sidumo
and another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and others
[1]
,
and in this regard, the question to be posed is whether the decision
reached by the Commissioner is one that a reasonable decision-maker
could not reach on the material placed before him or her.
[27]
The
Sidumo
test as explained by the
Supreme Court of Appeal in
Herholdt
v Nedbank Ltd
[2]
,
“…
involves the reviewing court examining
the merits of the case ‘in the round’ by determining
whether, in the light of
the issues raised by the dispute under
arbitration, the outcome reached by the Commissioner was not one that
could reasonably be
reached on the evidence and other material
properly before the Commissioner. ... The reasons are still
considered in order to see
how the Commissioner reached the result.
That assists the court to determine whether that result can
reasonably be reached by that
route. If not, however, the court must
still consider whether apart from those reasons, the result is one
that a reasonable decision-
maker could reach in the light of the
issues and the evidence.”
And.
“
In
summary, the position regarding the review of CCMA awards is this: A
review of a CCMA award is permissible if the defect in the
proceedings falls within one of the grounds in s 145(2) (a) of
the LRA. For a defect in the conduct of the proceedings to
amount to
a gross irregularity as contemplated by s 145(2) (a) (ii), the
Commissioner must have misconceived the nature of
the inquiry or
arrived at an unreasonable result. A result will only be unreasonable
if it is one that a reasonable Commissioner
could not reach on all
the material that was before the Commissioner. Material errors of
fact, as well as the weight and relevance
to be attached to
particular facts, are not in and of themselves sufficient for an
award to be set aside, but are only of any consequence
if their
effect is to render the outcome unreasonable.”
[3]
[28]
The net effect of the interpretation of the
Sidumo
test
in
Herholdt
is
that even where the reasons given by a Commissioner may be wrong and
there has been some irregularity, the decision may not necessarily
be
set aside, if on the basis of the material placed before the
Commissioner, the outcome was a reasonable one. However, in
accordance
with the
Sidumo
test,
there will be cause to set aside the award on review, if that
decision was “entirely disconnected with the evidence”
or
is “unsupported by any evidence” and involves speculation
by the Commissioner
[4]
.
The
grounds for review and evaluation:
(a)
Finding on procedural fairness:
[29]
In attacking the award, the applicant contended that the
Commissioner’s finding of procedural
unfairness amounted to a
gross irregularity on the grounds that the issue of procedural
fairness was confined by the parties in
the pre-arbitration minute to
the question of the partiality of the chairperson of the disciplinary
hearing. No other issue was
raised in evidence or argument.
[30]
In terms of the parties’ signed pre-arbitration minute, the
issue that the Commissioner
was required to determine in regards to
the procedural fairness of the dismissal was “
whether or not
the disciplinary chairperson had approached the applicant’s
(Maki’s) disciplinary proceedings with an
open mind and/or
impartiality or without bias”
[31]
In the award, the Commissioner had considered the question whether
the chairperson of the enquiry
was biased or not. It was Maki’s
contention at the arbitration proceedings that the chairperson was
biased as she had asked
the initiator to read statements in his
possession and she (Maki) took that as an indication that the
chairperson must have read
or seen the statement. In this regard, the
Commissioner concluded that there was no indication that the
chairperson had prior knowledge
of the matter. Effectively with this
conclusion, the Commissioner had disposed of the question of
procedural fairness he was required
to determine and that should have
been the end of the matter.
[32]
By considering whether legal representation should have been allowed
and whether the referral
of the decision on the question of guilt and
sanction to the Johannesburg IR department by the chairperson was
procedurally fair
the Commissioner clearly went beyond the mandate
given by the parties in accordance with their signed pre-arbitration
minute. A
pre-arbitration minute serves a purpose of confining the
issues a Commissioner is required to determine. The fact that the
arbitration
proceedings are not akin to normal Court processes does
not imply that the Commissioner must consider issues not placed
before
him or her in accordance with a signed pre-arbitration minute.
To allow Commissioners to go beyond the mandate given to him or her
by the parties in accordance with that minute would render the
process of holding pre-arbitration conferences superfluous if not
futile. To a large extent then, the Commissioner by considering
issues he was not mandated to consider committed a gross
irregularity.
To the extent that he had answered the primary question
of procedural fairness in the negative, his finding that the
dismissal
of Maki was procedurally unfair is one that a reasonable
Commissioner could not have reached.
(b)
Finding on substantive fairness:
[33]
The issues to be determined in this regard were whether or not the
employer had adduced evidence
at all and/or sufficient evidence to
prove on a balance of probabilities, commission of the offences that
the employee had been
charged with, and whether or not the dismissal
sanction imposed by the employer had been fair in the circumstances.
[34]
In arriving at the conclusion that the dismissal of Maki was
substantively unfair, the Commissioner
found that the applicant in
this case had failed to prove that Maki was taught during training
that signature verification was
done by comparing the customer’s
signature against the signature held by the bank either in the
customer’s card/file
or signature reflected in the eGami
system. The Commissioner had accepted Maki’s version or sole
defence to the charge that
she was trained in signature verification
in a different manner. Furthermore, the Commissioner had accepted
that since Maki was
not in doubt about the procedure for linking of
accounts, it did not occur to her to refer to the Golden Rules or
eGami at the
time of authorising the transaction in question.
[35]
The applicant attacked the above findings on the grounds that the
process by which the Commissioner
had reached that conclusion was
grossly irregular in that firstly, the Commissioner failed to deal
with the probabilities of Maki’s
version that she was trained
to verify signatures when linking accounts by merely confirming that
the person in front of her signed
the documents. This version had
been described by the applicant’s witnesses as ‘ridiculous’
and ‘illogical’.
In this regard, it was contended that
the Commissioner had merely accepted Maki’s version on the
basis that no rebutting
evidence was led.
[36]
The second ground of attacking the Commissioner’s findings was
that in dealing with the
Golden Rules, the Commissioner committed
gross irregularities in that it was found that these rules were only
to be referred to
when an employee was unsure of the procedures, yet
there was no evidence before the Commissioner to this effect.
Furthermore, it
was submitted that in coming to the finding that the
applicant had failed to communicate the Golden Rules to Maki, the
Commissioner
ignored the common cause evidence that she had access to
these rules, and had given written commitment to familiarise herself
with
bank procedures.
[37]
In defending the award, it was submitted on behalf of Maki that it
should be accepted from the
available evidence that the applicant had
proven that there was a rule which provides that employees dealing
with the transactions
should refer to eGami when doing verification
of clients’ signatures. However, this was not the end of the
enquiry in that
the issue was whether the employee (Maki) was aware
of the rule or could reasonably be expected to have been aware of the
rule.
In this case, Maki’s defence was that she was not aware
that she was supposed to refer to eGami when doing linkages.
[38]
Amongst the issues agreed upon as being common cause as per the
parties’ pre-arbitration
minute were;
(a)
before performing
any transaction, all the employees have to be aware of the applicable
rules regulating the performance of any
transaction that they are
required to perform;
(b)
that a signature of
the account holder or customer is an important security mechanism in
the banking sector;
(c)
that the purpose of
having a signature mandate is to have the signature of the account
holder in the bank records and to know the
signing arrangements where
the account is a business account, in applicable
transactions/circumstances;
(d)
Maki had on 15
October 2008 without accessing eGami to view the customer’s
Imaged Signature, linked Nayaniso Maqokolo’s
Nnite Trading CC
account to four other accounts belonging to Golden Rewards, Zintle
Nogela, Sakhiwo Bululu and Phumlani Pub and
Restaurant.
[39]
In the light of the common cause facts as illustrated above, it is my
view that the decision
arrived at by the Commissioner cannot be said
to be one that a reasonable decision maker would have arrived at.
Maki’s sole
defence to the allegations was that she was taught
to perform the verification procedures differently, and the
Commissioner bought
into that argument on the basis that the
applicant had not called upon the individuals who had purportedly
trained Maki differently
in relation to the established and standard
procedures.
[40]
In dealing with matters where a Commissioner is confronted with
disputing versions, the
proper approach, as set out by Van
Niekerk J in
Sasol
Mining (Pty) Ltd v Ngqeleni NO & Others
[5]
is to conduct an
‘
. . .
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, a consideration of
the inherent probability or improbability of the version
that is
proffered by the witnesses, and an assessment of the probabilities of
the irreconcilable versions before the commissioner.
As Cele AJ (as
he then was) observed in
Lukhnaji
Municipality v Nonxuba NO & others
[2007]
2 BLLR 130
(LC), while the LRA requires a commissioner to conduct an
arbitration hearing in a manner that the commissioner deems
appropriate
in order to determine the dispute fairly and quickly,
this does not exempt the commissioner from properly resolving
disputes of
fact when they arise.’
[6]
[41]
In this case, the Commissioner not only blatantly
disregarded
the common cause facts as pointed out above, but also failed to
consider the inherent probability or improbability of
the version
that was proffered by Maki. Furthermore, the Commissioner failed to
assess the probabilities of the irreconcilable
versions before him.
As it was correctly pointed out on behalf of the applicant, if Maki’s
version was to be believed, the
signature verification procedure she
had adopted as allegedly trained would not have served any purpose
insofar as its security
measures were concerned. Furthermore, it
would not have made sense for Maki to have been trained in any
different manner as opposed
to other employees, and the fact that
those who had allegedly trained her were not called upon to testify
otherwise was not a basis
for the Commissioner to accept her version.
On the contrary, since she had alleged that she was trained
differently by those individuals,
the onus was upon her to call upon
them to corroborate her version. To this end, the Commissioner also
misconstrued the issue of
onus.
[42]
The Commissioner further failed to take into account the common cause
fact that Maki had access
to the Golden Rules, and the conclusion
that these rules were not properly communicated to Maki were not
supported by evidence.
It is inexplicable that the Commissioner could
have come to this conclusion in the light of the common cause fact
that the only
way that verification worked was to compare signatures
in accordance with the eGami, and further that employees should be
aware
of all transaction procedures prior to effecting any.
[43]
It therefore follows that contrary to submissions made on Maki’s
behalf, she was indeed
aware of the rules, and the issue of her
having been trained differently is mere red herring. It is accepted
that the weight and
relevance to be attached to particular facts, are
not in and of themselves sufficient for an award to be set aside. In
this case
however, the failure to attach weight to the common cause
facts and to assess the improbabilities in Maki’s version as
against
the material placed before the Commissioner and the common
cause facts had the consequences of rendering the outcome arrived at
unreasonable.
[44]
It is apparent that the Commissioner failed to apply his mind to all
the material before him
and as a result he committed gross
irregularities in the conduct of the arbitration. The conclusion he
had arrived at that the
applicant had not proven the charges on a
balance of probabilities is not one which can be said to fall within
a range of reasonableness.
[45]
It was submitted on behalf of the applicant that the record before
the Court is sufficient for
a substitution to be made and there was
no need to refer the matter back to the CCMA in view of the dismissal
being substantively
and procedurally fair. I am in agreement with
these submissions in the light the totality of the circumstances of
this case, and
the harm caused to the applicant as a consequence of
the misconduct in question. In the circumstances, the following order
is made:
Order:
i.
The
preliminary point raised on behalf of the third respondent is
dismissed.
ii.
The
third respondent is ordered to pay to the applicant, wasted costs
occasioned by the postponement of this matter on 31 January
2014.
iii.
The
arbitration award dated 12 May 2010 and issued under case number
ECEL1343-09 by the first respondent is reviewed, set aside,
and
substituted with an order that;
“
The
dismissal of Nomsa Patricia Maki by First National Bank (A division
of First Rand Limited) was procedurally and substantively
fair.”
iv.
There
is no order as to costs in respect of the review application.
_________________
Tlhotlhalemaje, AJ
Acting
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
APPEARANCES:
On
behalf of the Applicant:
Adv. C Orr
Instructed
by:
Webber Wentzel
On
behalf of the Respondent:
Mr SS Mlonyeni of Mlonyeni & Lesele Inc
[1]
[2007] 12 BLLR 1097
(CC), held that
[at par 110]:
[2]
At para [12]
[3]
2013 (6) SA 224
(SCA) at para [25]
[4]
At par [13]
[5]
(2011) 32 ILJ 723
(LC)
[6]
at 727C-F.