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[2015] ZALCJHB 140
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Maponya v South African Local Government Bargaining Council (SALGBC) and Others (JR 2452/2008) [2015] ZALCJHB 140 (28 April 2015)
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
JUDGMENT
Case no.: JR 2452/2008
DATE: 28 APRIL 2015
Not Reportable
In
the matter between:
MAISHE
MAPONYA
...............................................................................................................
Applicant
And
THE
SOUTH AFRICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT
BARGAINING
COUNCIL
(“SALGBC”)
..................................................................
First
Respondent
JAFTA
MPHAHLANI
N.O
......................................................................................
Second
Respondent
CITY OF
JOHANNESBURG METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY
........................................................................................................
Third
Respondent
Heard: 13 DECEMBER 2012
Delivered: 28 April 2015
Summary: Review proceedings – gross
irregularities as grounds of review. The test on review considered
and applied –
grounds lacking merit to sustain review based on
material before Arbitrator – review dismissed.
JUDGMENT
WOODHOUSE AJ
Introduction
[1]
This matter came before
this Court as an application for the review and setting aside of the
arbitration award of the Second Respondent
(“the Arbitrator”),
handed down under the auspices of the First Respondent (“the
SALGBC”) on 30 September
2008, under case number
216/JDBC/07/05/03.
[2]
The
Applicant party
(“Maponya”) brought the current application before the
Court seeking the review and setting aside of
the abovementioned
arbitration award on various grounds as will be dealt with herein
below. The Third Respondent (“The City”)
has opposed this
application.
[3]
Accompanying the review application, and as a preliminary issue for
the Court’s determination, was an application for
the
condonation of the late service and filing of the City’s
answering affidavit in the review application.
Background of material facts
[4]
This matter arises from the employment of Maponya by the City, for
present purposes, as a Director: Arts, Culture and Heritage
on 1
April 2001.
[5]
Pursuant to pre-dismissal arbitration proceedings conducted by the
City in
absentia
on
24 – 27 March
2003 before Commissioner Larry Shear (“Commissioner Shear”),
Maponya was dismissed on 3 April 2003
for various allegations of
misconduct
.
[6]
In proceedings subsequently launched by Maponya before this Court, my
brother Francis J (as he then was in this Court) held
that Maponya
had the right to challenge the fairness of his dismissal through
arbitration proceedings in the normal course.
[7]
Maponya subsequently, on 7 May 2003, referred an alleged unfair
dismissal dispute to the SALGBC for conciliation and, failing
that,
arbitration.
[8]
On 22 March 2006, a certificate of non-resolution was issued
indicating that, as at that date, the alleged unfair dismissal
dispute referred by Maponya remained unresolved.
[9]
The matter was subsequently referred to arbitration, which took place
on various dates commencing from 25 May 2006 until around
23 April
2008.
[10]
As already indicated above, on or around 30 September 2008, the
Arbitrator issued his arbitration award.
[11]
Briefly, in his arbitration award, the Arbitrator found that the
dismissal of Maponya had been procedurally and substantively
fair,
and dismissed his referral, with no order as to costs.
[12]
The charges preferred against Maponya were damning and related,
inter
alia
, to his alleged irregular conclusion of a contract of
employment with one Reggie Zikalala (“Zikalala”); the
irregular
conclusion of a contract with Zikalala for a transport
allowance; the irregular appointment of 21
st
Century
Communications CC and Marinsky Promotions and Productions CC, as well
as the effecting of payments to these entities; the
alleged irregular
appointment of Khulekani Security Services CC and Fanya Fujo U Wone
Security and Cleaning Services CC, as well
as the irregular effecting
of payments to these entities; the alleged irregular appointment of
South African Promoters Association,
of which Zikalala was a
director, as well as authorising payments to be made to this entity;
the alleged irregular making of payments
to Jaja CC; the alleged
irregular appointment and effecting of payments to 707i
Entertainment; and misrepresentation with respect
to payments of
loans taken by Maponya from the City.
[13]
Subsequently, on or around 14 November 2008, Maponya launched the
current proceedings. On 25 November 2008, the City served
and filed
its notice of opposition.
[14]
On 13 August 2012, the City served and filed its answering affidavit
in opposition to the review application accompanied by
an application
for the condonation of the late filing thereof.
[15]
On 21 August 2012, Maponya served and filed his replying affidavit.
Heads of Argument were subsequently served and filed by
the parties
on 1 November 2011 and 26 November 2012 respectively.
[16]
The matter was subsequently scheduled for argument before this Court
on 13 July 2012, at which point an order directing Maponya
to serve
and file the missing portions of the record was issued. The missing
portions of the record were then served and filed
on 27 July 2012.
[17]
The matter was then scheduled for argument on the merits on
13 December 2012, after which Judgment was reserved.
The condonation application
[18]
After perusing the file and the papers in the application for
condonation, it became clear that condonation was, in fact, not
necessary in the matter as, in truth, the answering affidavit was not
served and filed out of time. Even if I am wrong in coming
to this
conclusion, I am satisfied that the City has provided a plausible
explanation for the delay and that it, coupled with the
good
prospects of success and relative prejudice, militate in favour of
the granting of condonation in this matter for the following
brief
reasons:
18.1
the review application was served and filed on 14 November 2008;
18.2
it is not clear when the record was initially filed;
18.3
Maponya then served and filed a Notice in terms of Rule 7A(8)(a)
accompanied by a supplementary affidavit dated 31 August 2010;
18.4
the City served and filed its Notice of Opposition on
25 November 2011;
18.5
it appears that, the record of the arbitration proceedings having
been found to be incomplete, a reconstruction meeting was
held
between the parties on 5 May 2011;
18.6
it is unclear what the parties’ representatives agreed to at
such a reconstruction meeting, but it appears that some
agreement for
Maponya not to serve the outstanding portions of the record (the
bundles of documents relied upon at arbitration)
was reached. Insofar
as Maponya alleges that agreement was also reached that he not serve
or file a Notice in terms of Rule 7A
(6), as well as not file the
missing record in Court, this is disputed by the City;
18.7
be that as it may, Maponya did not, at any stage prior to being
directed by order of this Court dated 13 July 2012, serve or
file a
Notice in terms of Rule 7A(6). Nor did he, in fact file the
outstanding portions of the record with the Court before that
–
the Notice in terms of Rule 7A(6) accompanying the outstanding
portions of the record were only subsequently filed on 27
July 2012;
18.8
Maponya filed (but did not serve) heads of argument in the matter on
1 November 2011;
18.9
on 13 August 2012, the City served and filed its answering affidavit
accompanied by its application for the condonation of
the lateness
thereof;
18.10
Maponya’s replying affidavit was served and filed on 21 August
2012;
18.11
the matter had at that stage been scheduled for argument on the
opposed motion roll before me on 13 July 2012, at which point
the
order mentioned at paragraph 18.7 above was issued;
18.12
briefly, that Court order directed Maponya to serve and file the
outstanding portions of the record within 10 days, after
which the
parties would serve and file their subsequent pleadings within the
applicable time periods in terms of the Rules of this
Court;
18.13
the City’s Heads of Argument were subsequently served and filed
on 27 November 2012 and the matter was then re-scheduled
for argument
on the merits before me on 13 December 2012.
18.14
the above being the case, and noting that an Answering Affidavit only
falls due once a complete record of the arbitration
proceedings has
been served and filed by an applicant party, the Answering Affidavit
filed on 3 August 2012, in circumstances where
the complete record
was only served and filed on 27 July 2012, in this matter was clearly
not filed out of time.
[1]
At that stage, the answering affidavit was filed 5 days after the
Notice in terms of Rule 7A (6) and the events that had transpired
had
rendered Maponya’s Notice in terms of Rule 7A(8) filed on 31
August 2010 clearly premature. For these reasons, there
is no delay
in the filing of the Answering Affidavit that requires condonation by
this Court.
18.15
as already concluded earlier, even if this conclusion is wrong, I am
satisfied that condonation stands to be granted having
regard to the
plausible explanation given, the City’s good prospects of
success on review, the balance of convenience and
the importance of
the case.
[2]
[19]
For these reasons, and insofar as necessary, condonation for the late
filing of the Answering Affidavit stands to be granted.
The review application
[20]
Maponya has attacked the arbitration award on various grounds, the
essence of which is the following:
20.1
the Arbitrator disregarded relevant and material evidence and
abrogated his duty to assess the totality of the evidence in
a fair
and balanced manner, which resulted in him denying Maponya his right
to a fair hearing;
20.2
had the Arbitrator regarded the evidence before him he would have
come to the conclusion that Maponya was not guilty of the
allegations
of misconduct preferred against him;
20.3
the Arbitrator effectively ignored or misconstrued all the evidence
that sought to indicate that Maponya exercised his duties
in
accordance with his contract of employment;
20.4
the Arbitrator acted in a grossly unreasonable and unjustifiable
manner in coming to the conclusion that Maponya’s dismissal
was
fair, which was indicative of his failure to apply his mind to the
evidence before him;
20.5
the Arbitrator failed to have any or adequate regard to the evidence
of Maponya;
20.6
the Arbitrator arrived at conclusions that were not rationally
connected with or sustainable on the evidence properly before
him;
20.7
the Arbitrator failed to properly conceptualise the nature of the
legal issues to be determined;
20.8
the Arbitrator failed to take proper account of the circumstances
surrounding Maponya’s dismissal in
absentia
, which
included the fact that the pre-dismissal arbitration proceedings were
conducted unlawfully, that the ruling made in
absentia
was
unfair, that Maponya was not afforded an opportunity to make
representations on guilt or mitigating circumstances before a
final
conclusion was made on the issue of sanction;
20.9
the Arbitrator misdirected himself in coming to the conclusion that a
negative inference should be drawn from the fact that
Maponya failed
to call Zikalala as a witness at the arbitration but failed to draw a
similar inference in respect of the City’s
failure to call
Zikalala, as the onus of proof rested on it;
20.10
the Arbitrator failed to make a finding on whether a duty rested on
Maponya to ensure that the car loan was deducted from
his salary and
whether, in failing to do so, Maponya breached a rule regulating
conduct in the City’s workplace;
20.11
the Arbitrator failed to take into account the circumstances
surrounding the car loan, including the restructuring that took
place
and the fact that the insurance was still being deducted from his
salary;
20.12
the Arbitrator descended into the arena on numerous occasions and
allowed inadmissible evidence to be adduced (hearsay evidence)
as
well as allowed the City’s representative to ask leading
questions in both examination-in-chief and the re-examination
of the
City’s witnesses;
20.13
the Arbitrator failed to take proper account of the circumstances
surrounding the car hire issue and, in particular, that
Zikalala made
representations to Maponya which were untrue, which, together with
the urgency of the matter at the time, led to
Maponya arranging for
payment of a car for Zikalala; and
20.14
for all of the above reasons, so Maponya submits, the Arbitrator’s
award stands to be reviewed, corrected or set aside
as it is not
justified and rationally connected to the evidence before him.
[21]
Despite no prayer in the Notice of Motion and Founding Affidavit to
this effect being sought, the parties are
ad idem
that the
Court should substitute the Arbitrator’s award with its own
order should it find that the award stands to be reviewed
and set
aside.
The test on review
[22]
Arbitration awards issued by commissioners of the CCMA and
arbitrators of various bargaining councils are reviewable in terms,
inter alia
, of section 145 of the Labour Relations Act, 66 of
1995 (“the LRA”) on any of the specific grounds set out
therein.
These grounds are:
22.1
where the Commissioner commits misconduct in relation to his duties
as an arbitrator;
22.2
where the Commissioner commits gross irregularities in the conduct of
the arbitration proceedings;
22.3
where the Commissioner acts out of his powers as an arbitrator, or
where the Commissioner’s ruling/award was improperly
obtained.
[23]
The test to be applied by this Court in deciding on the reviewability
or otherwise of an arbitration award has been settled
by the
Constitutional Court in
Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg Platinum
Mines Ltd and Others
[2007] 12 BLLR 1097
(CC). This test is based
on the Constitutional standard of reasonableness which, as the
Constitutional Court held in
Sidumo
, now suffuses the grounds
of review set out in section 145 of the LRA précised above.
[24]
Insofar
as any controversy may have emerged
on the full extent of this Court’s powers on review, it has
been finally settled by the
Supreme Court of Appeal (“the SCA”)
in
Herholdt v Nedbank Limited and
Others
.
[3]
[25]
In the
Herholdt
decision,
the SCA recognised the continued applicability of the gross
irregularity ground of review.
[4]
The SCA, however, considered that the upper ground of review (based
on unreasonableness) should apply a little more narrowly than
certain
Judgments of the LAC and this Court had previously found. The key
paragraph of the SCA decision is the following:
‘
In
summary, the position regarding the review of CCMA awards is this: a
review of a CCMA award is permissible if the defect in the
proceedings falls within one of the grounds in s 145(2)(a) of the
LRA. For a defect in the conduct of the proceedings to amount
to a
gross irregularity as contemplated by Section 145(2) (a) (ii), the
arbitrator must have misconceived the nature of the enquiry
or
arrived at an unreasonable result. A result will only be unreasonable
if it is one that a reasonable arbitrator could not reach
on all the
material that was before the arbitrator. Material errors of fact, as
well as the weight and relevance to be attached
to particular facts,
are not in and of themselves sufficient for an award to be set aside,
but are only of any consequence if their
effect is to render the
outcome unreasonable.’
[5]
[26] In
my view, the effect of the SCA decision is important, but hardly
extraordinary. It is not open to an applicant to seize
upon errors of
fact or law (gross irregularities) made by a commissioner/arbitrator
and regard these as being sufficient to sustain
a review application.
The errors must have led to an unreasonable result (i.e. ultimate
decision). But this does not mean that
errors of fact or law by
commissioners will not make for a successful review challenge in
appropriate cases. I consider the following
observations by Murphy
AJA in the LAC Judgment in
Herholdt v Nedbank Limited
[2012] 9
BLLR 857
(LAC), to remain instructive:
‘…
I
imagine, few decisions that are wrong are likely to be upheld as
reasonable. Leaving aside the moral hazard of a message to
commissioners
that there is no need to get their decisions right, it
being enough if they act reasonably, commissioners who get it wrong
on the
facts will usually commit the concomitant irregularity of not
taking full or proper account of material evidence, and where they
erred on the law, they will fall short in not having properly applied
their minds to the issues and thereby having denied the parties
a
fair trial. The inexorable truth is that wrong decisions are rarely
reasonable….’
[6]
[27]
The above notwithstanding, I am of the view that none of the grounds
of review raised by Maponya have any merit in this matter.
At the
outset, most of the grounds (i.e. paragraphs 1 – 7) raised by
Maponya are cast in unacceptably general terms without
specific
reference being made to precisely how it is alleged that the
Arbitrator committed reviewable irregularities with regard
to the
material before him in each instance. In my view, it is not enough
for a review applicant to set out grounds of review that,
in effect,
constitute general complaints/conclusions about some or other conduct
by an arbitrator without specific details being
provided of the
material giving rise to such alleged reviewable irregularities. It is
not for this Court to guess what each general
complaint might
possibly relate to. Maponya’s grounds of review are more akin
to grounds of an appeal. They are not satisfactory
for the purposes
of an application in terms of section 145 of the LRA.
[28]
Be that as it may, it cannot be said, in the circumstances of this
case, that the Arbitrator either disregarded material evidence
and
abrogated his duties, thereby denying Maponya a fair hearing; or
acted unreasonably in finding Maponya guilty of the charges
against
him; ignored or misconstrued evidence; failed to apply his mind to
evidence; failed to have any or adequate regard to Maponya’s
evidence; arrived at conclusions which were not rationally connected
to the evidence; or failed to conceptualise the contentious
legal
issues; or produced an award that was unreasonable in the
Sidumo
sense.
[29]
As to the review ground set out at paragraph 20.8 above, this Court
cannot fault the Arbitrator’s findings on procedural
fairness
as they we properly founded on the material before him. In this
regard, it was common cause that proper notification to
attend the
pre-dismissal arbitration / disciplinary enquiry had been given to
Maponya extending, as it was supposed to, all the
necessary rights to
him in terms of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal and that he, of
his own accord, decided not to attend
that hearing. Furthermore, the
Arbitrator’s finding that, despite being held by this Court to
not constitute proper pre-dismissal
arbitration proceedings conducted
in accordance with a valid pre-dismissal clause, the purported
pre-dismissal arbitration proceedings
still constituted a hearing
(i.e. a valid disciplinary enquiry) as required by the Code of Good
Practice: Dismissal is beyond reproach.
The Arbitrator also took
account of the provisions of section 138 of the LRA and the
well-established jurisprudence of this Court
[7]
to the effect that arbitrators ought not to adopt an overly technical
/ legalistic approach in conducting arbitration proceedings
or
determining procedural fairness. The fact that arbitration
proceedings are proceedings
de
novo
was also
considered in support of the Arbitrator’s findings. For these
reasons, I am of the view that Maponya’s ground
of review in
this regard is without merit as it cannot be said that the
Arbitrator’s reasoning and conclusion on procedural
fairness
are decisions that fall outside the band of reasonable decisions
having regard to the material before him. The fact that
Maponya’s
case was not heard at the disciplinary stage was due to his own
conduct in choosing not to attend.
[30]
As to the review ground set out at paragraph 20.9 above, it was
Maponya himself who was alleged to have entered into a contract
of
employment with Zikalala, to have had knowledge of Zikalala’s
involvement (Principalship) in 21
st
Century and to have authorised payments to 21
st
Century, the result of which would benefit Zikalala personally. The
City’s evidence established, on a balance of probabilities,
that Maponya was guilty of these charges, i.e. he, with full
knowledge of Zikalala’s involvement in 21
st
Century, entered into an employment contract with Zikalala and
authorised the payment to 21
st
Century and, thus, extended the personal benefit to Zikalala. Despite
his denial of it, evidence was placed before the Arbitrator
that, in
my view, clearly established that Maponya was well aware of
Zikalala’s Principalship of 21
st
Century and which established his guilt of the above charges.
[8]
This clearly established a
prima
facie
case, and
resulted in a shift of the evidentiary burden to Maponya to disprove
by adducing some material evidence. He failed
to do so.
[9]
His failure to call Zikalala exacerbated his position in this regard,
and not that of the City. Accordingly, the Arbitrator’s
findings in this regard, being supported as they are by the material
properly before him, are unassailable.
[31]
Notwithstanding the above, I am of the view that the Arbitrator was
entitled and even enjoined to have regard to the evidence
of Zikalala
presented at the pre-dismissal arbitration proceedings in keeping
with the provisions of section 138 of the LRA,
section 3
of the
Law
of Evidence Amendment Act, 45 of 1988
, and the Judgments of this
Court in
Tshongweni
v Ekurhuleni
Metropolitan Municipality
[2010]
10 BLLR 1105
(LC)
and
Naraindath v CCMA
and Others
[2000] 6
BLLR 716
. This was
particularly so because the City had made every attempt to bring
Zikalala before the arbitration proceedings, including
having a
subpoena validly issued for him, but was simply unable to.
[32]
As to the review grounds set out at paragraphs 20.10 – 20.11
above, the undisputed evidence before the Arbitrator was
that Maponya
was obliged, in terms of a written loan agreement, to repay, in 72
instalments, the loan extended to him by the City.
The Arbitrator
found, again through undisputed evidence presented, that Maponya had
failed to make and/or to ensure that instalment
payments were made
from his bank account over a period of 4 years.
[33]
To explain this failure, Maponya referred to a letter he had written
to the City dated 20 September 2002 in which he asserted
that the he
”
had had deductions made from [his] salary since October
1996”
, which was clearly untrue. Once that explanation was
proven to be misleading, Maponya proffered a second one – he
alleged
that he had assumed, from the then Municipal Manager’s
itemisation of his package and deductions, that the car loan he owed
and had not repaid in 4 years had been “
written off”
by the City subsequent to some restructuring exercise. He,
however, did not bother to confirm his assumptions with the Municipal
Manager. From the evidence before the Arbitrator, it was clear that a
positive obligation rested on Maponya, as a senior member
of the
City’s management and a Director, to take steps to ensure that
his loan was repaid. He failed to do so, and his explanations
for not
doing so appeared to be flawed and contrived. The explanations he did
tender were either unsatisfactory or false. It was,
therefore, not
unreasonable, in the
Sidumo
sense, for the Arbitrator to
conclude that Maponya was guilty of this charge.
[34]
As to the review ground set out at paragraph 20.12 above, after
perusing the copious record of the arbitration proceedings,
I have
found no instance of the Arbitrator acting improperly by descending
into the arena of the dispute thereby disadvantaging
Maponya or
effectively denying him the opportunity of having his dispute fully
and fairly determined. In keeping with
section 138
of the LRA, the
Arbitrator was empowered to conduct the arbitration proceedings as he
deemed fit, including choosing to adopt either
an inquisitorial or
adversarial approach to the proceedings. I have not found any conduct
by the Arbitrator that went beyond the
bounds of either approach,
nor, in fact, has Maponya pointed out any such conduct with the
required specificity. For these reasons,
the ground of review raised
in this regard also stands to fail.
[35]
As to the review ground set out at paragraph 20.13 above, I am of the
view that this ground lacks any merit as well. In this
regard, the
common cause evidence before the Arbitrator was that Maponya incurred
an expense on the City’s behalf of R3,
923.60 towards a car
rental for Zikalala’s benefit, which was impermissible in that
Zikalala was already a beneficiary of
a car allowance at the City’s
expense. This was also done without the proper procedures being
followed by Maponya. The fact
that Dlamini testified that Maponya
neither informed him nor sought and acquired his consent to hire the
car for Zikalala during
a JOC meeting between the two, coupled with
Dlamini’s testimony, which was corroborated by Mulaudzi,
Rechter, Britz, and
Mazibuko, that the City kept a pool of cars to be
utilised in cases such as Zikalala’s, meant that Maponya’s
decision
in this regard was flagrantly improper. Maponya was directly
responsible for the car hire and for taking the decision on behalf
of
the City - it did not lie in his mouth to blame Zikalala for any
false representations allegedly made to him by the latter.
For these
reasons, the Arbitrator’s conclusions in this regard, being
fully supported by the evidence, do not constitute
a reviewable
irregularity.
[36]
In the above circumstances, I am satisfied that the Arbitrator’s
award passes muster in the
Sidumo
and/or
Herholdt
sense
in that it embodies a decision that falls within the band of
reasonable decisions that could be reached in the circumstances
of
this case. I am, furthermore, satisfied that the Arbitrator committed
no material irregularities and/or acts of misconduct the
result of
which were to render his overall outcome unreasonable.
[37]
Finally, both parties’ representatives argued that costs should
follow the result. There are no reasons why the City
should not be
entitled to its costs, both in law and in fairness.
[38] In light of the above, I make the following Order:
38.1
insofar as necessary, condonation for the late service and filing of
the City’s Answering Affidavit is hereby granted;
38.2
the application for the review and setting aside of the Arbitrator’s
Award dated 30 September 2008 is hereby dismissed;
38.3
Maponya is to pay the City’s costs.
Woodhouse, AJ
Acting Judge of the Labour Court
APPEARANCES
For the Applicant: Mr C Mogane of
Mohlaba and Moshoana Attorneys
For
the Respondent: Advocate F A Boda
Instructed
by: Bowman Gilfillan Attorneys
[1]
See:
Rule 7A
(9) read with
Rules 7A(6)
and
7A
(8)
of the Rules. See also:
Lifecare
Special Health Services (Pty) Ltd t/a Ekuhlengeni Care Centre v CCMA
and Others
[2003] 5 BLLR 416
(LAC).
[2]
See:
Melanie v
Santam Insurance Co Ltd
1962 (4) SA
531
(A) and
NUM v Council for Mineral
Technology
[1999] 3 BLLR 209
(LAC).
[3]
See:
Herholdt v
Nedbank Limited
(Congress
of South African Trade Unions as amicus curiae)
[2013]
11 BLLR 1074
(SCA)
.
[4]
See:
s145
(2)(b) of the LRA.
[5]
At para 25.
[6]
At para 55 of the LAC Judgment.
[7]
See:
Avril Elizabeth
Home for the Mentally Handicapped v CCMA and Others
[2006]
9 BLLR 833
(LC).
[8]
The evidence included,
inter
alia
, the written contract entered
into with Zikalala, Zikalala’s testimony before Commissioner
Shear to the effect that he
knew Maponya from the University of the
Witwatersrand and that there was no way that Maponya would have been
unaware of his involvement
in 21
st
Century taking into account that he (Zikalala) had previously
presented a proposal to Maponya on behalf of 21
st
Century. Maponya’s own testimony that he knew about 80% of all
the people in the industry and that he had, at some point,
become
close friends with Zikalala further confirmed the City’s
version in this regard.
[9]
See:
Woolworths
(Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others
[2011] 10
BLLR 963
(LAC).