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[2015] ZALCJHB 137
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Kabe v Chiba Attorneys (J395/15) [2015] ZALCJHB 137 (26 February 2015)
IN THE LABOUR COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
HELD AT BRAAMFONTEIN
CASE NO: J395/15
DATE: 26 February 2015
In the matter between
NE
KABE
...................................................................................................................................
Applicant
And
CHIBA
ATTORNEYS
..........................................................................................................
Respondent
JUDGMENT
STEENKAMP J:
The applicant in this matter, Ms
Nkgadimeng Eugenia Kabe, seeks relief on an urgent basis against her
employer, Chiba Attorneys,
staying a disciplinary hearing originally
set down for hearing today that has been postponed until tomorrow,
pending the findings
of the Law Society of the Northern Province into
certain allegations between her and her employer.
She was given notice of the
disciplinary hearing on the 24th of February 2015 to commence today.
And as I have said, that has now
been postponed until tomorrow. I
accept that the application is urgent.
The requirements for urgent interim
relief has been reiterated many times. This court recently dealt with
those requirements in
the
context of the stay of a disciplinary
hearing in Golding v HCI Managerial Services (Pty) Ltd
[2015] 1 BLLR
91
(LC). The requirements are well-known. If one accepts that this is
an application for interim relief pending the findings of the
Law
Society they are those set out in Webster v Mitchell
1948 (1) SA 1186
(W) and in Setlogelo v Setlogelo
1914 AD 221
, recently confirmed by
the Constitutional Court in National Treasury and Others v Opposition
to Urban Tolling Alliance
[2012] 11 BCLR 1148
(CC).
As I have debated with Ms Kabe, the
applicant must show at least a prima facie right in the context of an
interim interdict. In
the case of a final interdict, it would have to
be a clear right; secondly, an apprehension of irreparable harm.
Then, the balance
of convenience in the context of an interim
application; and lastly, the absence of any other satisfactory
remedy. Ms Kabe has
not set out any of those requirements in her
founding affidavit. Neither did she do so in her oral argument.
In HCI (supra) the court referred to
the well-known case mentioned by Mr Whittington, that is Booysen v
Minister of Safety and Security
(2011) 32 ILJ 112 (LAC) at paragraph
54, where the Labour Appeal Court made it clear that it is only in
the most exceptional circumstances
that this court will order the
suspension of an internal disciplinary enquiry.
Whatever may happen with the
investigation of the Law Society, quite obviously an employer has the
right to take disciplinary action
against an employee. Ms Kabe has
not been able to show why there are any exceptional circumstances why
in the case before me that
should not be so.
Despite being a candidate attorney, it
does not appear as if the applicant has made any effort to research
the requirements for
an interdict that she had to satisfy before
court today. The application was ill-conceived. The respondent has
been brought to
court on a meritless application. The application is
dismissed with costs.
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