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[2015] ZALCJHB 56
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Communications Workers Union and Another v Commission for Conciliation Mediation And Arbitration and Others (JR 1482/11) [2015] ZALCJHB 56 (24 February 2015)
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
JUDGMENT
Case no: JR 1482/11
DATE: 24 FEBRUARY 2015
Not Reportable
In the matter between:
COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS
UNION
.................................................................
First
Applicant
I
KHALA
.......................................................................................................................
Second
Applicant
And
COMMISSION FOR CONCILIATION
MEDIATION AND
ABRIBRATION
..........................................................................
First
Respondent
A H SWANEPOEL N.O
(Commissioner)
...............................................................
Second
Respondent
TELKOM
....................................................................................................................
Third
Respondent
Date: 24 February 2015
Summary:
Late filing of submissions regarding application for leave to
appeal. Time periods in Rules and Practice Manual considered.
Basis for condonation considered. Ignorance of the provisions
of the Practice Manual not a valid excuse.
JUDGMENT:
LEAVE TO APPEAL
LEPPAN
AJ
[1]
This is an application for leave to appeal against the whole of the
judgment handed down by this Court on 22 August 2014. In
the matter,
the First and Second Applicants (the "Applicants") applied
jointly to have the decision of the Commission
for Conciliation,
Mediation and Arbitration ("CCMA") and related Arbitration
Award
[1]
,
reviewed and set aside in accordance with the provisions of section
145 of the Labour Relations Act
[2]
("LRA").
Background information
[2]
The review application was heard on 10 July 2014 and, on conclusion
of the proceedings, judgment was reserved. After a thorough
consideration of the issues, judgment was handed down on 22 August
2014.
[3]
The review application of the Applicants was dismissed for the
reasons set out in that judgment. The Applicants were also ordered
to
pay the costs.
[4]
On 5 September 2014, the Applicants served a notice of their
intention to apply for leave to appeal against the whole judgment
and
Order of this Court. On 9 September 2014, the Third Respondent served
notice of its intention to oppose the Applicants' application
for
leave to appeal.
[5]
On 3 November 2014, some 40 days later, the Applicants served their
further submissions.
[3]
Same was not served on the Third Respondent. The Third Respondent
served its submissions in response to the Applicants' written
submissions on 04 December 2014. This was also accompanied by an
explanatory affidavit setting out the reasons for the delay in
serving their submissions, including the fact of lack of service and
that such delay had not been through any fault on their part.
If it
had not been for their endeavours to obtain a copy of the Applicants'
written submissions, same would not have come to their
attention.
[6]
The First and Second Respondents did not respond to the application
for leave to appeal, nor to the further submissions made
by the
Applicants.
Point
in limine
[7]
The process to be followed, should an applicant wish to lodge an
application for leave to appeal the decision of the Labour
Court, is
prescribed by Rule 30 of the Rules of Conduct of Proceedings in the
Labour Court ("Labour Court Rules") and
paragraph 15 of the
Practice Manual of the Labour Court of South Africa
[4]
("Practice Manual
"
).
Strict adherence to the requirements imposed by the Court Rules is
axiomatic.
[8]
In the recent judgment of
3G
Mobile (Pty) Ltd v Raphela NO and Others
[5]
("3G Mobile (Pty) Ltd
")
Snyman AJ confirmed the binding nature of the Practice Manual. Its
purpose is not simply to act as a guideline for parties
who institute
proceedings at the Labour Court, but is a document geared at
expediting the judicial process. Should an applicant
act outside the
timeframes provided for in the Practice Manual they are effectively
required to request the Court to condone a
delay on good cause shown.
Similar considerations applicable to applications for condonation
equally apply when the Court considers
a failure to comply with the
processes provided for in the Practice Manual.
[6]
[9]
Rule 30(3) which finds application in the present circumstances,
requires an applicant, who applies for leave to appeal, to
serve its
notice of intention to do so within 10 days of the judgment having
been handed down. Such period can be extended, should
the applicant
show good cause why a late submission ought to be condoned. Rule
30(3A), in expansion, requires that the applicant
tender further
submissions in which the reasons for, and prospects of success on
appeal, should be explained. Notably the Court
Rules do not expressly
identify the time period within which such documents are to be
served. Clearly the purpose of these submissions
would be to
emphasise the prospects of success on appeal.
[7]
[10]
Paragraph 15 of the Practice Manual expands on the processes that
must be followed should an applicant wish to file leave to
appeal.
Paragraph 15.2, in relation to the further submissions, requires that
such an applicant deliver further submissions within
10 days of
filing the application. This requirement is peremptory. The paragraph
requires that the applicant "must file its
submissions in terms
of Rule 30(3A
)
." Failure to do such will be to the
detriment of the applicant.
[11]
Paragraph 15.2 also entitles the parties opposing the application for
leave to appeal to file replying submissions within 5
days.
[12]
In the present application the Applicants served and filed their
intention to appeal the decision of this Court on 5 September
2014.
The further submissions made in terms of paragraph 15.2 of the
Practice Manual were only served on 3 November 2014. The Applicants'
further submissions were filed 40 days after the original notice of
intention to appeal the decision was served, and 30 days later
than
is prescribed by the Practice Manual.
[13]
To determine whether the Applicants are entitled to have the Court
consider the late submissions, requirements similar to normal
condonation applications must be met. Generally speaking applicants
are required to show good cause why the Court should consider
such
late submissions that disregard the prescribed time periods. Such an
evaluation must include a consideration of the degree
of lateness
[8]
,
reasons for the lateness
[9]
,
prospects of success should condonation be granted
[10]
,
prejudice to be suffered by the other party
[11]
and any other factor that the Court deems relevant.
[12]
[14]
The Applicants have addressed condonation in paragraph 5 of their
further submissions. The application for condonation commences
by
identifying that the submissions are 27 days late. This is not
correct. The Applicant also incorrectly identifies 24 September
2014
as the date on which such submissions were due. The identification of
24 September 2014 is wrong for two reasons: the submissions
were due
on 19 September 2014, which is the 10
th
day after the date
on which the original notice of intention to appeal was filed, and 24
September 2014 is Heritage Day, a national
public holiday, and
therefore could not be the date on which the submissions were due, it
being excluded from Court days.
[15]
The reason for lateness tendered by the Applicants is that they ‘were
of the view that the Court will give directions
as to when the
submissions will be made’ (sic). According to the Applicants,
it was only upon them enquiring when the further
submissions were due
that they were informed that Judge's directives are no longer
practice, and that the process is now regulated
by the "new
directive". The good cause that the Applicant intends to rely
upon is that they were not familiar with the
content of the Practice
Manual, and that this should be considered as to why their lateness
should be condoned.
[16]
Plainly this is not a reason that this Court can accept and is not
good cause for condonation. The Practice Manual came into
effect on 2
April 2013, which is more than a year before the Applicants lodged
their notice of intention to apply for leave to
appeal. The lack of
knowledge on the part of the Applicants' legal practitioners is not a
good reason at all.
[17]
Upon a consideration of the Applicants’ further submissions,
they were found to be verbatim the grounds listed and identified
in
the notice of intention to appeal. The further submissions, with the
exception of paragraph 5 (which is the request for condonation)
is an
exact replica of the notice. The submissions are completely
superfluous and do not provide any clarification.
[18]
The Applicant therefore fails in all respects to provide good cause
why the late filing should be condoned.
Right of leave to appeal
[19]
Principally all parties to a dispute are entitled to make application
for leave to appeal a decision of this Court.
[13]
In the application for leave to appeal the appellant is required to
substantively make out a case on identifiable grounds as to
why the
decision of the Court should be set aside.
[20]
In
National Union of
Metalworkers of SA & others v Fry
’
s
Metals (Pty) Ltd
[14]
,
it was held that an Applicant is required to identify both the
grounds upon which the appeal will be brought and to clearly indicate
why such grounds give rise to a reasonable prospect of success on
appeal. Should the Applicant identify the grounds but fail to
substantiate why such grounds indicate a reasonable prospect of
success, the application for leave to appeal must fail.
Grounds of appeal
[21]
In its application for leave to appeal, the Applicants collectively
identify 19 grounds upon which they intend to rely. Having
merely
regurgitated the grounds in its further submissions, the greater
majority of the grounds relied upon are vague and in many
instances
fail to identify in succinct, clear and unambiguous language what the
grounds are. The last 7 grounds, furthermore, are
not grounds, upon
which leave to appeal is sought, but rather statements of what the
Court ought to have decided.
[22]
The Applicants divided the grounds into two categories: the failure
of the Court in fact and law, and what the Court ought
to have done.
[23]
The errors of fact and law upon which the Applicant relies are that
the Court erred in finding that:
23.1
the sanction of dismissal was appropriate within the circumstances
due to gross insubordination being a serious
offence, and which is
"fatally detrimental" to the trust relationship, and that
the sanction of dismissal is permitted
by the disciplinary code;
23.2
the alleged disruptive behaviour of the Second Applicant subsequent
to his dismissal and during the arbitration
proceedings which had a
destructive effect on the trust relationship that existed between the
Second Applicant and the Third Respondent,
and the fact that the
Second Applicant's owed a duty to his employer;
23.3
the Second Respondent applied her mind to the evidence that she had
at her disposal and that the conclusions
she reached were sound and
reasonable;
23.4
the Second Respondent satisfied herself that the Second Applicant was
indeed guilty of the misconduct of
which he was accused;
23.5
that there was no objection to the arbitration proceedings set down
for 28 March 2011;
23.6
the dispute was set down for a process of Con/Arb on 28 March 2011,
and that it was combined with another
dispute for which a certificate
of outcome had already been issued;
23.7
the key issues were not whether the matter was the subject of a
conciliation process, but whether it was
correct to proceed with
arbitration proceedings on 28 March 2011;
23.8
the Second Applicant's objection to the arbitration process was due
to an outstanding issue that still had
to be conciliated; when the
true contention was that the arbitration had not yet been set down;
23.9
the Third Respondent "dropped the objection" in order to
continue with the arbitration proceedings,
and that this was never
canvassed in the arbitration or review proceedings;
23.10
it can rely on the certificate of outcome for the matter with case
number "1034/11", the matter never having
been set down for
arbitration from the outset;
23.11
the attorneys for the Applicants made a conscious decision not to
have the record of the arbitration proceedings reconstructed
and is
therefore not entitled to raise objections at such a late stage;
23.12 the failure of reconstruction was due to the
Applicants attorneys when in reality the reason of failure to
reconstruct
the record was because of the uncooperative conduct of
the Second Respondent.
[24]
The Applicants are of the opinion that the Court ought to have found
that:-
24.1
the dismissal of the Second Applicant was unfair and ought to have
ordered re-instatement;
24.2
the Third Respondent failed to prove that the Second Applicant was
indeed guilty of the misconduct of which
he was accused, due to there
being no direct instruction by the Third Respondent to the Second
Applicant;
24.3
Second Applicant had the necessary permission to attend the workshop
due to not having been expressly prohibited
from doing so;
24.4
Third Respondent sent a letter to the Second Respondent when the
offices of the First Applicant were closed
and that the Second
Respondent did not have access to an email account;
24.5
the matter be remitted to the CCMA to be heard by a different
commissioner;
24.6
the Second Applicant be reinstated; or
24.7
First Respondent should bear the costs of the review application.
24.8
these grounds of appeal will each be dealt with separately below.
Severe insubordination and
dismissal as a sanction
.
[ad para 1.1]
[25]
It is common cause that the Second Applicant was disciplined for an
offence in terms of clause 2.17 of the Third Respondent’s
Disciplinary Code, which expressly identifies insubordination as a
ground of misconduct. It is furthermore common cause that clause
2.17
has to be read with note 4 of the Disciplinary Code, which
unambiguously states that any first time misconduct on the part
of an
employee which is sufficiently serious can be appropriate grounds for
dismissal.
[26]
From the outset the charge against the Second Applicant was couched
in a manner that clearly illustrated the severity of the
misconduct
of which he was accused. Such conduct could warrant dismissal in
accordance with the prescripts of the Disciplinary
Code.
[27]
The Applicants assert that the trier of fact failed to appreciate the
requirements imposed by the Third Respondent's disciplinary
code.
This is not correct. The assertion is raised without identifying a
particular clause in the disciplinary code upon which
the Applicants
rely. In stark contrast, the Third Respondent quotes Note 4 of its
Disciplinary Code verbatim. The ground as asserted
by the Applicants
therefore is without merit.
[28]
In the greater employment law framework gross insubordination has, on
a number of occasions, been held to be a justifiable
ground upon
which an employee can be dismissed.
[15]
It is uncertain whether the Applicants in the present matter are
asserting that the Second Applicant was not guilty of insubordination
or that insubordination is not a ground upon which an employee can be
dismissed.
[29]
Not having elucidated the ground in the further submissions, and
severe misconduct and gross insubordination both being grounds
upon
which the Second Applicant could justifiably have been dismissed, the
ground is without merit and must fail.
The
conduct of the Second Applicant subsequent to his dismissal
.
[ad para 1.2]
[30]
The very nature of the employment relationship is premised on good
faith and the
ex
lege
fiduciary
relationship that must exist between the employer and its
employees.
[16]
The centrality of the trust relationship cannot be over emphasised.
[31]
The Applicants assert that this Court incorrectly found that the
Second Applicant in the period following his dismissal behaved
in a
manner that was destructive of the trust relationship existing
between the Second Applicant and Third Respondent. The Applicants
fail to provide any further information in support of this bald
assertion or any reason why this observation by this Court was
incorrect.
[32]
The Third Respondent, in stark contrast to the Applicants in their
submission, at paragraphs 1.1 to 1.11, detail the conduct
of the
Second Applicant before and after his dismissal. From the assertions
made by the Third Respondent it is clear that the Second
Applicant
showed a reckless disregard for the authority of the Third
Respondent. The persistent conduct of the Second Applicant
evidences
that the required mutual respect between the parties was lacking and
that the relationship had reached a stage of irretrievable
breakdown.
[17]
[33]
The failure of the Applicants to bolster the assertion and to prove
that this relationship could be restored, or that the Second
Applicant never behaved in the manner identified by the Third
Respondent, results in this ground being without merit. This ground
accordingly has to fail.
[18]
Reviewability of the decision of the Second
Respondent [ad para 1.3, 1.4]
[34]
Section 145 of the LRA permits a party to arbitration proceedings at
the CCMA to apply to have the decision of the Commissioner
set aside.
To do so, an applicant is required to identify a defect either in the
manner in which the award was made, or in the
substance of the award
itself. The ambit of such grounds are, however, expressly restricted
in the LRA to misconduct on the part
of the Commissioner
[19]
,
the Commissioner committing a gross irregularity
[20]
,
or instances where the Commissioner exceeded his or her powers.
[21]
In essence an applicant in review would have to prove that the Second
Respondent had misconceived the nature of the enquiry or
arrived at
an unreasonable result.
[22]
[35]
In the notice of intention to appeal, the Applicants assert that the
Second Respondent failed to apply her mind to the evidence
that she
had at her disposal, and in the alternative that this Court failed to
satisfy itself that the Second Applicant had committed
the misconduct
of which he was accused. The Applicants do so without providing any
further material evidence in pursuance thereof.
[36]
In my judgment, based on the evidence that the Court had at its
disposal, it was reasoned that the Commissioner
in
casu
applied her
mind to the evidence and was satisfied that the Second Applicant
committed the misconduct of which he stood accused.
[23]
The conclusion reached by the Second Respondent was not a decision
that a reasonable decision maker could not have reached.
[24]
[37]
This ground is without merit and that the decision of the Court must
stand.
The
issue that still had to be subjected to a process of conciliation.
[ad paras 1.6 – 1.11]
[38]
The Applicants assert that this Court erred in finding that the
dispute was set down for a process of Con/Arb on 28 March 2011,
due
to an outstanding objection of the Third Respondent who objected to
the second unfair dismissal dispute. It is alleged that
the processes
were never joined, and that a procedural irregularity occurred when
the parties entered into a process of arbitration
while the second
unfair dismissal dispute had not yet been subjected to a process of
conciliation.
[39]
In this regard specific reference is made to paragraphs 43 and 44 of
the judgment of this Court. In these paragraphs it is
clearly set out
that the parties to the dispute reached agreement and that the
processes were joined. The matters were consolidated
and set down
under case number GAJB 1034/11.
[40]
Should the Applicants wish to assert that the objections persisted,
evidence to that effect should have been adduced. [41]
Based on
the evidence before this Court there is no reason to believe that any
procedural irregularity occurred.
[42]
The Applicants not providing any further reasons, apart from the
assertions which were considered by the Court and found to
be without
merit, leaves this ground of appeal baseless.
[43]
This ground of appeal therefore fails.
Reasonableness of the reward
[44]
By applying the test as delineated in
Sidumo
[25]
,
the court
in casu
came to the
conclusion that the award made by the Commissioner was one that a
reasonable decision maker could have reached, and
therefore upheld
that decision.
[26]
The function of the Court cannot and has never been to set aside
awards because the presiding officer prefers a different result.
Should the Court do so, it would be acting as an appeal body which it
is not.
[45]
The Applicants list 7 conclusions which the Court ought to have
reached. Two of the findings listed call for relief that can
only be
grated in very exceptional circumstances. Not having been provided
with any reasons why the Applicants are of the opinion
that the award
is one which a reasonable decision maker could not make nor why
exceptional circumstances exist, the suggested findings
are without
merit, and must fail.
The decisions which the Court ought to have made
[46]
As has been confirmed on multitude occasions, it is not the function
of the Court to decide whether in the opinion of the Court
[27]
the Commissioner made the correct decision, but only whether the
decision made by the Commissioner is one that a reasonable
Commissioner
could have made.
[28]
This would require that the Court consider whether the Commissioner
came to the conclusion by having regard to the totality of
the
evidence that the Commissioner had at his or her disposal. Such
evidence would have to be evaluated in the context of the legal
issues in dispute. A central consideration of the Court is whether
the Commissioner applied his/her mind.
[29]
Without a positive finding in this regard, it cannot be reasoned that
the decision meets the Constitutional standard
[30]
of lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness.
[31]
[47]
If it is found that the Commissioner did indeed apply his/her mind,
it does not denounce the possibility that the same evidence
and
evaluation process could result in another award being possible. The
investigation and determination of the existence of alternative
outcomes is, however, not the function of this Court.
[48]
One of the primary differences between a review and an appeal, is the
power that the Court has in terms of the relief that
it can
grant.
[32]
The power of the reviewing Court is circumscribed and restricted to a
determination whether the decision is lawful, reasonable
and
procedurally fair.
[33]
Should the presiding officer be of the opinion that the standard
required for same is not met the Court has the discretion to decide
what relief, if any, to award.
[34]
[49]
The relief that the providing officer could order, should be relief
premised on deference. It would be incorrect for this Court
to make
an order on the premise that it is in a better decision, subject to
the facts
in casu
. The only exception where this Court can
make an order other than remitting the dispute to the CCMA is when
the circumstances and
the dictates of justice require such.
[50]
In the present circumstances, the Applicants do not provide a reason
why the Order of this Court is incorrect, why this Court
should have
made the seven findings that it suggests or why the Applicants are
entitled to that relief sought. One should appreciate
that the
Applicants' assertions are without merit.
[51]
The seven grounds, being unsubstantiated and without merit fail and
cannot serve as a basis upon which leave to appeal should
be granted.
Cost order
[52]
The decision to award costs is not an aspect of the judgment that is
generally susceptible to appeal.
[35]
The costs in a judgment can only be appealed should the applicant for
leave to appeal provide grounds indicating that the Court
in awarding
the costs had misdirected itself.
[36]
[53]
In the present application, the ground of appeal is restricted to an
unsubstantiated claim by the Applicants stating that
the Court erred
in making a cost order against the Applicants. Not having provided
any indication as to why the Court misdirected
itself in making such
cost order against the Applicants, the ground of appeal is without
merit. The ground of appeal therefore
does not succeed.
Conclusion
[54]
In the judgment that the Applicants wish to appeal, in reliance on
Herold v Nedbank Ltd
(Congress of South African Trade Unions Amicus Curiae)
[37]
only the narrowest possible grounds exist upon which awards made by
the CCMA can be taken on review, and even then the powers of
this
Court are circumscribed. The whole purpose of this approach is to
ensure that labour disputes are resolved in a speedy and
effective
manner.
[55]
The current application stands in stark contrast with the
requirements imposed. It is a shot gun approach whereby the
Applicants
rely on every possible avenue of appeal to have the
decision of this Court set aside, without any consideration of the
merits upon
which they rely. In many instances the Applicants raised
grounds but had no regard to the main judgment before identifying any
grounds and lodging the appeal.
[56]
For the reasons set out above none of the grounds are sufficiently
cogent to persuade the Court to grant leave to appeal. For
these
reasons the
application
for
leave
to
appeal
is refused
.
Order
[57]
On these premises, I make the following order:
57.1
Condonation for the late filing of the further submissions is
refused.
57.2
Leave to appeal to the Labour Appeal Court is dismissed and the
Applicants' attorneys are required to pay
the costs of this
application.
Leppan, AJ
Acting
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
[1]
Granted under case number GAJB 2276-11.
[2]
Act No 66 of 1995.
[3]
Published by the Rules Board in terms of s 159(3)
of the LRA and published under Government Notice 1665 in Government
Gazette
17495 of 14 October 1996, as amended.
[4]
Paragraph 15.2
[5]
Case no.JR1910/2013
[6]
Moraka v National Bargaining Council for the
Chemical Industry and Others
(2011) 32
ILJ
667
(LC) at paras 20 – 21
[7]
National Union of Metalworkers of SA and
Others v Fry
’
s
Metals
(
Pty
)
Ltd
2005
(5) SA 433
(SCA); also see
FAWU obo
Mbatha andOthers v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd t/a Sasko Milling &
Baking and Others
[2012] 4 BLLR 317
(SCA).
[8]
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v
Burger
1956 (4) SA 446
(A) at 449G.
[9]
National Union of Mineworkers v
Council for Mineral technology
[1999]
3 BLLR 209 (LAC).
[10]
Ibid.
[11]
Academic & Professional Staff
Association v Pretorius NO and Others
(2008)
29
ILJ
318 (LC).
[12]
Melanie v Santam Insurance Co Ltd
1962
(4) 531 (A).
[13]
Rule 30 of the Rules For The Conduct Of
Proceedings In The Labour Court published under Government Notice
1665 in
Government Gazette
17495 of 14 October 1996, as amended.
[14]
2005 (5) SA 433
; also see
FAWU
obo Mbatha and Others v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd t/a Sasko Milling
and Baking and Others
[2012] 4 BLLR
317 (SCA).
[15]
FAWU v Rainbow Chicken Farms
2000 1 BLLR 70
(LC) (unauthorised absence);
Drake
v Professional Career Services (Pty) Ltd
2001
ILJ
2658 (LC) (insubordination);
Nedcor
Bank Ltd v Frank
2002
ILJ
1243 (LAC);
SACCAWU v Mahawarane
Country Club
2002
ILJ
902 (LAC
); Papane v Van Aarde
NO 2007
ILJ
2561 (LAC) (disobedience);
Maneche and
Others v CCMA
2007
ILJ
2594 (LC) (justifiable refusal);
NUMSA
v Kromberg and Schubert (East Cape
)
2008
ILJ
1343 (BCA) (refusal not justified); Mischke 1999 CLL 41
[16]
Humphries and Jewell
(
Pty
)
Ltd v FCRAWU and Others (
1991)
ILJ
1032
(LAC);
Baudach v United Tobacco Co Ltd
2000 3 All SA 153
(A);
2000 4 SA 436
(SCA); 2000
ILJ
2241
(SCA); Van Jaarsveld
The Interplay
between Common Law and Statutory Law in South African Labour Law
(2007) thesis 220 et seq
[17]
See paragraphs 32 and 33 of the judgment.
[18]
See specifically paragraph 31 of the
judgment.
[19]
Section 143(2)(a)(i) of the LRA.
[20]
Section 143(2)(a)(ii) of the LRA.
[21]
Section 143(2)(a)(iii) of the LRA.
[22]
Herold v Nedbank (Congress of South African Trade Union Amicus
Curiae)
2013 (6) SA 224
(SCA).
[23]
See specifically paragraphs 16 and 17 of the main judgment.
[24]
See specifically paragraphs of the
judgment.
[25]
Supra.
[26]
See paragraph 34 of the main judgment.
[27]
See per example
Lekota
v First National Bank of SA Ltd
[1998]
10 BLLR 1021
(LC) at para 16.
[28]
Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd
[2007]
28
ILJ
2405 (CC).
[29]
CUSA v Tao Ying Metal Industries and Others
(2008) 29
ILJ
2461 (CC) at para
134
[30]
Section 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa, 1996.
[31]
Fidelity Cash Management Service v CCMA and
Others
(2008) 29 ILJ 964 (LAC) at para
96.
[32]
Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO and
Others
1998 (10) BCLR 1326 (LAC)
[33]
Section 33 of the Constitution, 1996;
Sidumo and Another V Rustenburg
Platinum Mines Ltd and Others
2008 (2)
SA 24 (CC).
[34]
Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of
Cape Town and others
[2004] 3 All SA 1
(SCA)
[35]
Masuku v Score Supermarkets (Pty) Ltd
(2013) 34
ILJ
147 (LC).
[36]
Ibid.
[37]
2013 (6) SA 224
(SCA).