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[2014] ZALCCT 33
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Sambo and Others v Steytler Boerdery (C592/13) [2014] ZALCCT 33; (2014) 35 ILJ 3235 (LC) (3 June 2014)
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
THE
LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, CAPE TOWN
JUDGMENT
REPORTABLE
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES
CASE
NO: C 592/13
In
the matter between:
DANIEL
SAMBO
FIRST
APPLICANT
JACQUES
JAFTHA
SECOND
APPLICANT
ANDRIES
AMBROSE
THIRD
APPLICANT
DAWID
JOOSTE
FOURTH
APPLICANT
SALMON
SWARTS
FIFTH
APPLICANT
DANIEL
JONAS
SIXTH
APPLICANT
LINDA
AFRIKA
SEVENTH
APPLICANT
ADEAN
BRUINTJIES
EIGHTH
APPLICANT
ESMERALDA
GROOTBOOM
NINTH
APPLICANT
DONOVAN
GROOTBOOM
TENTH
APPLICANT
CHRISTIAN
PAULSEN
ELEVENTH
APPLICANT
CSAAWU
TWELFTH
APPLICANT
and
STEYTLER
BOERDERY
RESPONDENT
Heard
:
2 June 2014
Delivered
:
3 June 2014
Summary:
Strike dismissal – dispute arising from dismissal on 21 Jan
2013 – that dispute not referred
to conciliation – case
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
JUDGMENT
STEENKAMP
J
Introduction
[1]
This
dispute arises from the protracted farmworkers’ strike in the
Western Cape during December 2012 and January 2013. It
is common
cause that the strike was unprotected. The 11 individual applicants
are former employees of the respondent, Steytler
Boerdery. They are
represented by their trade union
[1]
,
the Commercial, Stevedoring, Agriculture and Allied Workers’
Union (CSAAWU). The union played an active role in the strike.
The
employees were dismissed on 21 January 2013. They argue that their
dismissal was automatically unfair in terms of s 187(1)
of the
LRA
[2]
; alternatively, that it
was substantively and procedurally unfair.
[2]
At the commencement on the trial yesterday,
2 June 2014, Mr
Crowe SC
for the respondent raised a jurisdictional point
in
limine.
He argued that the dispute was
not properly before this Court. In their referral to the CCMA, the
applicants alleged that they were
dismissed on 8 January 2014. That
is the dispute that was unsuccessfully conciliated and that was
referred to this Court. But in
fact, they were only dismissed on 21
January 2013 after a disciplinary hearing.
Common cause facts
[3]
No evidence has yet been led. Yet there are
a number of facts that are common cause.
[4]
The
workers participated in an unprotected strike. They were represented
by CSAAWU. On 8 January 2013 at 07h00 they were addressed
by the
farmer, Dawid Steytler. A transcript of the address served before the
Court. It is not disputed. It reads as follows:
[3]
“
Steytler:
OK, ek het gisteraand om kwart oor sewe ‘n oproep van Jacques
[Jaftha – the second applicant] gekry waarin julle my
in kennis
stel dat julle môre vir ‘n onbeperkte tyd gaan staak. Is
dit nog julle amptelike posisie? Ja of nee? Jacques,
jy’t my
mos gebel – is dit nog julle amptelike posisie?
Jaftha:
Ja.
Steytler:
OK. Ek het gisteraand aan julle
verteenwoordigers dit duidelik gemaak weer eens, Jacques en Elroy
[[Paulsen – the eleventh
applicant] was by my in die kantoor.
Ek het dit weer eens aan julle verteenwoordigers duidelik gemaak dat
julle optrede strydig
is met die wet, die Wet op Arbeidsverhoudinge,
Wet Nr 66 van 1995 soos gewysig. Daar word dit baie duidelik gemaak
wat die prosedure
is wat julle moet volg indien julle aan ‘n
staking wil deelneem. Ek het dit ook aan julle verteenwoordigers
duidelik gemaak
dat julle nou reeds by sewe, sewe geleenthede
gewaarsku is oor jul onwettige optrede. Hierdie onregmatige oprede
kom op hierdie
stadium neer op niks anders as ekonomiese sabotasie
nie en ek kan dit nie verder duld nie. Dus laat julle aan my geen
ander keuse
as om julle
uit te sluit
nie. Weens julle onregmatige optrede word julle met onmiddellike
ingang uitgesluit. Julle sal derhalwe nie verder werk nie
en
die beginsel van geen werk, geen betaling sal geld. ...
Hierdie
uitsluiting sal geld totdat ek ‘n skriftelike onderneming van
julle verteenwoordigers ontvang het waarin julle julle
verbind
daartoe dat julle sal ophou met julle onregmatige, onwettige en
ondermynende optrede.
Alvorens ek so ‘n
onderneming ontvang het kan ek ongelukkig niemand toelaat om te werk
nie.
Of die uitsluiting dus vir een dag,
een week, een maand of een jaar geld – up to you.
En dis al wat ek vir julle wil sê.”
[5]
On
the same day at 11h47, CSAAWU wrote to Steytler. It said
[4]
:
“
RE:
Termination of contracts of all employees
Could please inform for
the reason of termination of employees contracts without following
due processes as per the Act prescribe.
We appeal to you to reinstate
these contracts today before close of business.”
[6]
Steytler responded an hour later, at 12h51.
He said:
“
Graag
wens [ek] u in te lig dat werkers se kontrakte nie beëindig is
soos u in die faks beweer nie. Daarom sou dit uit die
aard van die
saak nie nodig wees om hul kontrakte weer in te stel nie.”
[7]
Despite
that, CSAAWU referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the CCMA on the
same day on behalf of the workers. In the referral
form
[5]
it alleged under the heading, “Summarise the facts of the
dispute you are referring”:
“
On
the 8/01/2013 the employer terminated employees [
sic
]
contracts with the farm without reason or informing the union.”
[8]
The union alleged that the dispute arose on
8 January 2013; and in Part B (“additional form for dismissal
disputes
only”)
it alleged that the workers were dismissed on 8 January 2013.
[9]
Later
the same day, at about 18h07, the employer sent a bulk sms to all the
workers in these terms:
[6]
“
Dinsdag
8 Januarie om 18h07
U word almal daaraan
herinner dat u enige tyd die uitsluiting kan ophef deur by bestuur
vir werk aan te meld en ‘n onderneming
te onderteken dat u u in
die toekoms sal weerhou van enige verdere onregmatige of onwettige
arbeidsoptrede.”
[10]
The next day, 9 January, Steytler sent a
letter to CSAAWU in the following terms:
“
Graag
bring ek die volgende onder u aandag en vra u ingryping:
Die
werkers van River House is tans op ‘n onbeskermde staking.
Hierdie is reeds die sesde keer in die laaste twee maande dat
hulle
op ‘n onbeskermde staking is en hulle is reeds agt keer
gewaarsku om nie met hulle onwettige optrede voort te gaan
nie.
Indien hulle sou voortgaan met hulle onwettige en ondermynende
optrede sal dit aan my geen ander keuse laat as om dissiplinêr
teen hulle op te tree nie.
Die ‘shop steward’
het my eergister ingelig dat hulle bes moontlik reeds gister (8
Januarie) met hul staking wou begin.
Hulle het egter geweier om my in
te lig presies wanneer hulle sou begin staak. Weens hierdie optrede
en soortgelyke optredes die
afgelope twee maande het ek geen ander
keuse gehad om hulle uit te sluit nie.
Ek het dit egter aan hulle
baie duidelik gemaak dat hulle uitsluiting enige tyd weer opgehef sal
word indien hulle vir werk sal
aanmeld
en ‘n onderneming
gee dat hulle hulle van verdere onwettige optredes sal weerhou.
Ek vra
derhalwe dat u dit onder u lede se aandag sal bring dat hulle optrede
in stryd is met die wet en dat u hulle sal aanraai
om op te hou met
hulle onregmatige optredes en op die laatste môre (10 Januarie
2013)
sal aanmeld vir werk
.
Die onderneming strewe ten alle tye daarna om goeie verhoudings te
bevorder, maar die werkers se vreemde optrede is besig om verhoudinge
ernstig te benadeel. Hul optrede kom op niks anders as ekonomiese
sabotasie neer nie.”
[11]
On the same day at 17h44 Steytler sent
another bulk sms to the workers:
“
U
word hiermee herinner dat u welkom is om môre vir werk aan te
meld mits u bereid is om te onderneem om u van verdere onwettige
optrede te weerhou.”
[12]
The workers did not accept this invitation.
But in any event, on 10 January – two days after having imposed
the lockout --
the employer lifted the lockout. It issued and read
the following notice to the workers:
“
Kennisgewing
van beëindiging van uitsluiting
Na
aanleiding van die onregmatige kollektiewe optrede (onbeskermde
staking) deur julle het die bestuur besluit om julle uit te sluit
totdat ‘n oplossing vir die dispuut gevind kan word. Tot op
hede is geen griewe of dispuut verklaar nie. Bestuur gee hiermee
kennis aan u dat die uitsluiting beëindig word en dat alle
werknemers teen môre, 11 Januarie 2013, weer moet aanmeld
vir
werk op die normale invaltyd. Die bestuur beskou enige onregmatige
kollektiewe optrede in ‘n ernstige lig en enige verdere
kollektiewe aksie (onbeskermde staking) kan lei tot dissiplinêre
optrede.”
[13]
The workers did not return to work as
instructed. At 09h04 on 11 January the employer issued an ultimatum
in the following terms:
“
BAIE
BELANGRIK
ULTIMATUM OM TERUG
TE KEER WERK TOE
Hiermee word u in kennis
gestel dat u vandag (11 Januarie 2013) om 13h30 (halftwee) moet
terugkeer werk toe.
Indien
u sou weier om aan die ultimatum gehoor te gee sal daar dissiplinêr
teen u opgetree word.”
[14]
The workers ignored the ultimatum. At 18h30
on the same day the employer issued a final ultimatum:
“
UITERS
BELANGRIK!!
FINALE ULTIMATUM OM
TERUG TE KEER WERK TOE
“
U
het verkies om nie te reageer op die ultimatum om op Vrydag 11
Januarie om 13h30 terug te keer werk toe nie.
U word derhalwe in kennis
gestel dat u op Maandag 14 Januarie op die normale invaltyd moet
aanmeld vir werk.
Hierdie is ‘n
finale kennisgewing.”
[15]
Despite this unequivocal and final
ultimatum, and despite having had the weekend to reflect on it and to
seek advice from their
trade union, the workers persisted with their
unprotected strike. On 15 January they were issued with notices to
attend a disciplinary
hearing on 17 January. Steytler informed the
union on 15 January that the hearings would take place on 17 January.
The workers
did not attend. Neither did their trade union
representative. The hearings proceeded in their absence. It was
chaired by a human
resources practitioner, Andries Laker. He
recommended dismissal. The employer accepted the recommendation and
dismissed the workers
on 21 January 2013.
Evaluation
[16]
The respondent locked the workers out on 8
January 2013. As Mr Steytler explained to them, the lockout was in
response to their
unprotected strike. It was a protected lockout in
terms of s 64(3)(d) of the LRA.
[17]
It is quite evident – and indeed,
common cause – that the workers were not dismissed on 8
January, but on 21 January.
Ms
Isaacs
conceded as much. They were locked out on 8 January. The respondent
lifted that lockout two days later, on 10 January. Any misconception
that the workers and the union may have had that their services had
been terminated on 8 January, was quickly and unequivocally
dispelled
by the employer. Not only did Steytler make it clear to CSAAWU that
the workers should return to work, he also sent a
number of messages
to the workers directly, inviting them to return to work. Then
he issued ultimatums instructing them to
go to work. They could not
possibly have laboured under the impression that they had been
dismissed. They were represented and
advised by CSAAWU throughout.
Ms
Isaacs
conceded that the union conveyed to its members that they had not
been dismissed on 8 January. Yet the union did not withdraw the
referral of 8 January alleging an unfair dismissal on that date;
neither did it refer a fresh dispute to the CCMA after the actual
dismissal on 21 January.
[18]
The
Labour Appeal Court has made it clear that conciliation is a
prerequisite for this Court to entertain a dispute before it. If
it
has not been conciliated, this Court has no jurisdiction. In
Intervalve
(Pty) Ltd v NUMSA
[7]
Waglay JP commented:
“
The
dispute between the parties is one of dismissal based on
participation in a non-procedural strike. In terms of s191 of the
LRA, such disputes must firstly be referred to conciliation within 30
days of the date of the dismissal (although the non-compliance
with
the 30 days’ time limit may be condoned on good cause shown)
and, if the matter remains unresolved after conciliation,
the dispute
must be referred for adjudication to the Labour Court and this must
be done within 90 days after a certificate of non-resolution
of the
dispute at conciliation is issued.
...
Based
on the non-referral of the dispute for conciliation and relying on
the judgment of this Court in
National
Union of Metalworkers of South Africa v Driveline Technologies (Pty)
Ltd
(“
Driveline
”),
[8]
Intervalve
and BHR aver that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a
dispute between NUMSA and them. In
Driveline,
Zondo
AJP (as he then was) with Mogoeng AJA (as he then was) concurring
held that:
“…
the
wording of section 191(5) imposes the referral of a dismissal dispute
to conciliation as a precondition before such a dispute
can either be
arbitrated or referred to the Labour Court for adjudication.”
[9]
[19]
Waglay JP concluded that, absent a referral
of that dispute to conciliation (even though a dispute arising from
the same strike
involving other employers had been conciliated), the
Labour Court had no jurisdiction.
[20]
He
continued:
[10]
“
Finally,
on the issue of [a] constitutional right to have a day in court; this
right is not to be exercised at a litigant’s
pleasure. The Act
is clear. It makes provisions which must be complied with. There is
nothing unconstitutional about that. One
cannot fail to comply with
the steps that are required to be followed to enforce a right and
then complain that these steps which
you have failed to follow now
impinges your constitutional right, particularly when there is a
right to purge that failure and
no steps are taken or properly taken
to purge the failure. When NUMSA failed to refer the dispute to
conciliation timeously, it
applied for condonation for its late
referral which was not granted but NUMSA did not challenge this
refusal. In these circumstances,
it cannot be said they are being
denied their day in court.
... In the absence of
conciliation, [the trade union] is not entitled to refer its dispute
for adjudication to the Labour Court
as provided in s191(5). The
Labour Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the dispute, and
as such it serves no purpose
to consider whether the application for
joinder has merit.”
[21]
The same considerations apply to the case
before me. Ms
Isaacs
conceded
that the applicants allege that they were unfairly dismissed on 21
January 2013. That dispute has not been referred to
conciliation.
This Court has no jurisdiction to hear it.
Costs
[22]
This
Court has a discretion, in law and fairness, to award costs.
[11]
The applicants persisted with their referral when the point
in
limine
was raised by the respondent, albeit belatedly. Their counsel
conceded, quite properly, that her clients were dismissed, not on
8
January (as stated in their referral) but on 21 January. Yet they
persisted. This intransigent attitude is also clear from the
refusal
of the workers and the union to stop the unprotected strike. The
employer gave them numerous opportunities to return to
work. They
refused. There is no reason in law or fairness why the employer
should not be entitled to its costs. The workers may
be indigent. The
union is not. Should the workers be unable to pay, the union –
that has been actively involved and representing
the applicants
throughout – should do so.
Order
The
referral is dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction.
The
applicants are ordered to pay the respondent’s costs, including
the costs of counsel, jointly and severally, the one paying,
the
other to be absolved.
_______________________
A J Steenkamp
Judge
of the Labour Court of South Africa
APPEARANCES
APPLICANTS:
Yvette Isaacs
Instructed
by Brink & Thomas.
RESPONDENT:
Michael Crowe SC
Instructed
by Bagraims attorneys.
[1]
Cited as the twelfth respondent.
[2]
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995
.
[3]
My underlining.
[4]
Spelling and grammar as in the original.
[5]
LRA form 7.11.
[6]
My underlining.
[7]
[2014] ZALAC 10
(26 March 2014) paras [12] – [14].
[8]
(2000)
21
ILJ
142 (LAC).
[9]
At
160A.
[10]
At paras [23] – [24].
[11]
LRA
s 162.