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[2014] ZALCJHB 110
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South African Police Services v Safety And Security Sectoral Bargaining Council and Others (JR215/12) [2014] ZALCJHB 110; (2014) 35 ILJ 2269 (LC) (28 March 2014)
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE LABOUR COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
JUDGMENT
Reportable
Case
no: JR 215/12
In
the matter between:
SOUTH
AFRICAN POLICE
SERVICES
Applicant
and
SAFETY
AND SECURITY SECTORAL
BARGAINING
COUNCIL First
Respondent
ADV
SIRKHOT
N.O Second
Respondent
POLICE
AND PRISON CIVIL RIGHTS
UNION Third
Respondent
SOUTH
AFRICAN POLICE
UNION Fourth
Respondent
Heard:
10 February 2014
Delivered:
28 March 2014
Summary: Application
in terms of section 145 of the LRA to review and set aside an
arbitration award. The court finding that the
conclusion reached by
the commissioner was unreasonable in that the commissioner’s
interpretation of clause 5 of SSSBC Agreement
1 of 2010 not only
ignored the plain grammatical meaning of that clause but also failed
to take into account the context and purpose
of that collective
agreement which was to dispense with the administrative burden of
capturing hours worked in respect of overtime.
That, on proper
interpretation, both the plain and grammatical meaning of the clause
5 of agreement 1 of 2010 as well the context
and purpose of that
agreement pointed to the fact that officers who work overtime during
special events must be paid the converted
non-pensionable special
daily overtime allowance regardless of whether or not such special
event falls on a public holiday. That
therefore the interpretation
adopted by the commissioner was so unreasonable that no reasonable
decision maker could have reached
it. In the result, the award is
reviewed and set aside.
JUDGMENT
ZONDO
AJ
Introduction
[1]
This is an application to review and set
aside an arbitration award handed down by the second respondent (“the
commissioner”)
on 13 November 2011 under case number: PSSS
87-11/12.
Factual background
[2]
Sometime in December 2007, the applicant
(“SAPS”) concluded a collective agreement referred to as
agreement 4 of 2007
with the third and fourth respondents, (“the
2007 agreement”), with the sole purpose of regulating overtime
in terms
of a single agreement. Clause 3 of the 2007 agreement made
reference to three types of overtime, namely, normal overtime;
overtime
for duties performed on Sundays as well as overtime for
duties performed on a public holiday.
[3]
In terms of the normal overtime, as defined
in clause 3.2.5 of the 2007 agreement, all overtime duties performed
from Monday to
Saturday, regardless of whether such duties are
performed during the day or night, members of the SAPS performing
such duties are
to be paid at a rate of one and a half times the
member’s wage for overtime worked. As for overtime performed on
a Sunday
and public holiday, members of SAPS performing such duties
are to be paid at a rate of double the employee’s wage for
overtime
worked.
[4]
Under the 2007 agreement, payment of all
types of overtime, as outlined above, is calculated on the basis of
the actual number of
hours of overtime performed and for that reason
and for administrative purposes, employees performing overtime duties
are required
to record the actual number of hours worked. The number
of overtime hours worked by an employee must further be verified by
that
employee’s commander and a claim for overtime to be
accompanied by a time sheet.
[5]
This administrative process of recording,
verifying and capturing of overtime soon proved to be quite
cumbersome for the SAPS, especially
during major sporting events,
conferences, summits and other events of national importance
(“special events”) where
a large contingent of employees
were required to perform overtime duties. As a solution to this
administrative headache, on 14
April 2009, SAPS and the respondents
concluded agreement 4 of 2009 which introduced a special daily
allowance for policing duties
at special events.
[6]
On 17 May 2010, SAPS and the respondents
concluded a further agreement, agreement 1 of 2010 (“the 2010
agreement”) which
replaced agreement 4 of 2009, entitled:
“Agreement on a special daily overtime allowance for policing
duties at special events”.
The 2010 agreement made provision
for the payment of R 700-00 per day for duties performed at a special
event. In terms of the
2010 agreement, employees performing duties at
special events were no longer required to record the number of hours
of overtime
worked and, conversely, regardless of the number of hours
worked, employees would be entitled to the daily overtime allowance
of
R700-00. For all intents and purposes, the 2010 agreement mirrored
its 2009 predecessor which had the same provisions save for the
difference in the daily overtime allowance.
[7]
Clause 5 of the 2010 agreement (“clause
5”) provides thus:
‘
This
agreement neither repeals nor replaces SSSBC Agreement 4 of 2007.
However, in instances where the converted non-pensionable
special
daily overtime allowance is payable,
the
normal overtime prescripts relating to the payment of overtime are
not applicable’.
(My emphasis).
[8]
This is the clause at the very heart of the
dispute and I return to it later in this judgment. Ahead of the
Municipal elections
in May 2011, the President of the Republic of
South Africa proclaimed the 18
th
of May 2011 a public holiday, being the day on which the Municipal
elections were going to be held. Following this proclamation,
SAPS
then declared 17, 18 and 19 May 2011 as special events days, which
are the day preceding the elections, the day of the elections
and the
day after the elections.
[9]
Apart from the 18
th
which also happened to be a public holiday, all parties understood
the 17
th
and the 19
th
to be the special events days and for which employees would be paid a
special daily overtime allowance in keeping with the 2010
agreement.
The dispute then centred around the 18
th
of May, whether, seeing that it was a public holiday, which happened
to be classified as a special event, employees were entitled
to be
paid according to the overtime provisions as set out in the 2007
agreement in so far as they relate to public holidays or
in
accordance with the 2010 agreement in so far as the 18
th
was classified as a special event, regardless whether same happened
to be a public holiday.
[10]
The applicant contended that, because the
18
th
was classified as a special event, employees who performed duties on
that day were entitled to a special daily overtime allowance
in line
with the 2010 agreement regardless of whether the 18
th
was a public holiday. The respondents on the other hand contended
that their members were entitled to be paid double their wages
for
overtime worked on the 18
th
as this was a public holiday the compensation for which was regulated
by the 2007 agreement. For this contention, the respondents
relied on
the interpretation of clause 5, and more specifically, the phrase
“
normal overtime”.
They further contended that the 2007 agreement specified three types
of overtime, that is, normal overtime, overtime for duties
performed
on a public holiday and lastly, overtime for duties performed on a
Sunday.
[11]
According to the respondents, the use of
the phrase “
normal overtime”
in the 2010 agreement is in reference
to the type of overtime as contained in the 2007 agreement and, as
opposed to an overtime
for duties performed on a Sunday and public
holiday. They then contended that, read in that way, clause 5 only
excludes normal
overtime where converted non pensionable special
daily overtime allowance is payable. That because clause 5 only
excludes normal
overtime and not the other two types of overtime as
set out in the 2007 agreement and since the 18
th
was a public holiday, employees are entitled to be paid double their
wages for overtime worked in line with the 2007 agreement.
[12]
The applicant on the other hand, contended
that the phrase “
normal overtime”
,
as contained in clause 5, cannot be interpreted to mean the type of
overtime as stipulated in the 2007 agreement but rather that
the word
“
normal”
should
be given its plain grammatical meaning as a synonym of the word
“usual or customary” as defined in the Oxford
English
Dictionary. Further, the applicant contended that, quite apart from
the plain grammatical meaning of clause 5, the context
and purpose of
the entire collective agreement dictated that it could never have
been the intention of the parties to retain the
other types of
overtime as contemplated in the 2007 agreement as this would defeat
the very purpose of concluding the 2010 agreement
which was, to
alleviate the administrative burden of having to record, verify and
capture the number of overtime hours worked by
an employee. Unable to
resolve their dispute as they adopted different interpretations, the
parties then referred the matter to
the first respondent for
interpretation of clause 5.
The award
[13]
In his award, the commissioner made the
following findings:
13.1
The interpretation preferred by SAPS to
clause 5 would result in injustice, unfairness to the respondents and
amount to absurdity;
13.2
SAPS by their conduct were seeking to
change the character of the Public Holiday by calling it a special
event;
13.3
It is the date itself that is relevant and
on that basis it is declared a Public Holiday and not its possible
classification as
a special event by SAPS;
13.4
The most reasonable interpretation is that
the parties have agreed that employees who work on public holidays
that are declared
special events will not be entitled to the special
daily overtime allowance of R 700,00 but the agreed overtime rate for
duties
performed on a public holiday at double the employee’s
wages in terms of clause 3.4.1 of SSSBC Agreement 4 of 2007;
13.5
The compensation payable to employees who
work on special events as opposed to Public Holidays are markedly
different and it is
therefore highly unlikely and improbable that the
respondents would have been signatories to SSSBC Agreement 1 of 2010
on the understanding
that they would be prepared to accept a lesser
remuneration where public holidays have been declared special events
as opposed
to the higher remuneration already agreed upon in terms of
clause 3.4.1 of SSSBC Agreement 4 of 2007.
The review
[14]
The
test for review of awards is by now well established and hardly
requires restating.
[1]
Notwithstanding the well-established review test, there has been some
confusion in so far as the proper interpretation of the
Sidumo
decision resulting in the so called process related review.
Fortunately, sanity has finally prevailed and that confusion has now
been put to bed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the
Herholdt
decision and accordingly, there is now certainty as to how far this
Court can go when faced with a an application to review and
set aside
an award.
[2]
[15
]
In this case, therefore, like in all
reviews concerning the awards, the starting point ought to be whether
the award is a decision
which a reasonable decision-maker could have
reached. Concomitant to this enquiry is whether, there exists a
defect in the award
and if so, whether such defect amounts into a
gross irregularity in that either the commissioner misconceived the
nature of the
enquiry or he arrived at an unreasonable result and
thus rendering his award reviewable.
[16]
At the heart of the review is the
interpretation that the commissioner gave to clause 5, whether same
is a reasonable one taking
into account the plain grammatical meaning
of clause 5 as well as the context and purpose with which the 2010
agreement was concluded.
It was submitted by counsel for the
applicant that, in the wake of the
Herholdt
decision, the commissioner appears to have misconceived the nature of
the enquiry in making his award. I am not persuaded that
this is
indeed the case, as a matter of fact, I think the commissioner had a
clear understanding of what was required of him when
regard is had to
his reasoning which of course, informed his conclusion.
[17]
The
fact that he adopted a different interpretation to that favoured by
the applicant is no reason to suggest that he may have misconceived
the nature of the enquiry. It is apparent from the award that the
commissioner adopted a literal interpretation to clause 5 as
he
sought to discern the intention of the parties from the words and
phrases used in that clause.
[3]
[18]
The
approach to the interpretation of contracts was best summarized in
the
Coopers
decision and same should guide us in interpreting clause 5.
[4]
In our law, the object of the Court in interpreting a contract is to
seek the common intention of the parties and to employ the
grammatical and ordinary meaning of the words as a means to that
end.
[5]
The commissioner was
therefore correct, as a starting point, in seeking to discern the
parties’ intention by attempting to
give effect to the plain
grammatical language used in clause 5.
[6]
However, if one has to discern the intention of the parties by giving
effect to the words used in clause 5, one arrives at a completely
different conclusion. Quite clearly, when the parties made reference
to “
normal
overtime”
their
intention was for that phrase to bear a grammatical meaning akin to
“usual or customary or ordinary” as defined
in the Oxford
English Dictionary when that phrase is not read in isolation but is
read within the context of the entire clause
5.
[7]
[19]
In
the event that the commissioner felt that giving effect to the words
in clause 5 would lead to absurdity, then he would have
had to modify
such words sufficiently so that they accord with the intention of the
parties.
[8]
The commissioner may
therefore have adopted a correct approach to interpretation but the
conclusion that he reached is not supported
by the approach he
adopted. Clearly the commissioner was not happy with the choice of
words in clause 5 thus:
‘
This
matter underscores the need for the parties to negotiate agreements
carefully and to record them in clear and precise terms,
as there is
no specific reference to payment of overtime on Public Holidays
contained in SSSBC Agreement 1 of 2010.’
[20]
This
is where the commissioner ought to have stepped in and modified the
phrase “
normal
overtime”
so
that it accords with the intention of the parties and that is, for
such phrase to mean “
usual
overtime”
when
read in the entire context of clause 5 and not in isolation.
[9]
It is clear that, in view of the fact that the 2007 agreement uses
the phrase “
normal
overtime”
as one of the three types of overtime, the choice of the same word in
clause 5 with the intention to exclude all three types of
overtime
was disingenuous as it only serves to create confusion which could
have been avoided by the use of a different phrase
such as “
usual
or ordinary overtime”.
Be
that as it may, I am more than satisfied that, as unfortunate as it
is, that phrase could still have been modified so that it
accords
with the intention of the parties.
[21]
Perhaps the very fact that, as the
commissioner observed, there is no reference to payment of overtime
on public holidays and, I
would add, nor reference to payment of
overtime for duties performed on Sundays, ought to have fleshed a red
light to the commissioner
as then the only reasonable inference would
be that the use of the phrase “
normal
overtime”
was not in reference to
the type of overtime as contemplated in the 2007 agreement but
intended to convey the exclusion of usual
or ordinary overtime
including all forms of overtime. The commissioner could have done
better.
[22]
In fact, a careful reading of clause 5
reveals something more. I could not help but to observe that the
phrase in dispute reads
“
the
normal overtime prescript(s) relating to the payment of overtime are
not applicable”.
Prescript is in
plural rather than singular and I would imagine that if the parties
intended to exclude only normal overtime they
might as well have used
a singular “
normal overtime
prescript”
as then it could be
argued that the phrase was in reference to the type of overtime
contemplated in the 2007 agreement. So the use
of a plural as opposed
to a singular might very well denote the exclusion of all three types
of overtime and not just one. I must
hasten though to point out that
this is a mere observation and does not in any way form part of my
reasoning as it was not advanced
in argument. It is further
unnecessary for me to decide this point in light of the view I have
taken on the interpretation of the
phrase ‘
normal
overtime’
.
[23]
In my view, there is no uncertainty with
regard to the words and phrases used in clause 5, there is certainly
no ambiguity that
I can even possibly imagine unless I, like the
commissioner, were to read the phrase ‘
normal
overtime’
in isolation and I
refuse to do so. But as I have already said, even if that phrase was
not so clear, there was nothing preventing
the commissioner from
modifying the phrase to accord with the intention of the parties.
Moreover, as it was said in
Coopers,
one
also has to look at the context and purpose as well as the genesis of
the contract.
[24]
There is no doubt that the whole point of
concluding the 2010 agreement was to do away with the administrative
burden associated
with all three types of overtime contained in the
2007 agreement, especially where the recording, verification and
capturing of
the number of overtime hours worked at major events
became a nightmare and therefore almost impossible to administer.
[25]
If the purpose of concluding the 2010
agreement was precisely to do away with this kind of administrative
burden, how then could
it be possible that, when the parties
concluded the 2010 agreement, they would only make reference to
“
normal overtime”
and exclude the other types of overtime, i.e. overtime for duties
performed on a public holiday and overtime for duties performed
on a
Sunday when in fact all three types of overtime caused the same
administrative burden resulting in the conclusion of the 2010
agreement? That just doesn’t make sense.
[26]
It is clear from his award that the
commissioner never applied his mind to the purposive approach as a
canon of interpretation as
his conclusion is not supported by the
spirit and purport of the 2010 agreement. Had the commissioner
applied his mind to the purpose
and spirit of the 2010 agreement, he
no doubt would have found that, if the purpose of the 2010 agreement
was to do away with the
administrative burden associated with all
three types of overtime, it then could not be that, in concluding the
2010 agreement,
the parties would have made reference only to the
normal overtime and exclude the other two types of overtime as if it
was only
the normal overtime which caused administrative burden and
not the other two.
[27]
This is especially so because, I cannot,
for one moment, imagine a situation where, during major events,
classified as special events,
which fall on an ordinary day which is
neither a Sunday or public holiday, an employee is not required to
record the number of
overtime hours worked so as to avoid the
administrative burden but then strangely enough, at another special
event which happens
to fall on a Sunday or public holiday then the
same employee is now required to record the number of hours of
overtime worked in
order to be paid for overtime worked.
[28]
If this were to be the case, one would then
wonder as to what was the rationale behind the 2010 agreement if the
applicant would
still be burdened with having to capture the precise
number of hours worked during the performance of overtime duties. It
simply
does not make sense. Were this to have been the intention of
the parties, I have no doubt that they would have recorded such in
clearer terms than what clause 5 reveals. I am therefore of the view
that, over and above, the ordinary grammatical meaning of
clause 5
which clearly reveals the intention of the parties, i.e. to dispense
with all three types of overtime, when regard is
had to the context
and purpose of the 2010 agreement, clause 5 must be interpreted to
exclude all three types of overtime in instances
where the converted
non-pensionable special daily overtime allowance is payable.
[29]
There
is a further reason why in scrutinizing the award, especially clause
5 thereof, this Court should not lose sight of the contextual
and
purposive interpretation and that is, what the commissioner was
dealing with in essence was a collective agreement which, unlike
ordinary commercial contracts, ought to be interpreted with a view to
promote effective, fair and speedy resolution of labour disputes.
[10]
I therefore align myself to the view expressed by Froneman DJP (as he
then was) in
North
East Cape Forests
decision
and that is, the primary objects of the LRA are better served by a
practical approach to the interpretation and application
of the
collective agreement such as the 2010 agreement than by purely
commercial principles.
[30]
To
apply strict commercial principles when interpreting collective
agreements would simply frustrate collective bargaining and further
defeat the very purpose of the LRA. Having said so, I am however, not
ignorant of what was said by Zondo JP in the
Technikon
SA
decision, where the learned JP cautioned against the use of purposive
interpretation as a license to ignore the language used in
the
statute being the subject of interpretation.
[11]
I agree with the sentiments expressed by Zondo JP but only to the
extent that, where the language sought to be interpreted in a
contract or statute is clear and reveals the common intention of the
parties and does not lead to absurdity, there can be no justification
for invoking purposive interpretation for such would be subverting
the common intention of the parties by travelling outside the
instrument.
[31]
I have decided to mention the
Technikon
SA
decision because it seems to offer a
different perspective from the
North
East Cape Forests
decision which
preceded it but in my view the two decisions are not mutually
exclusive. I say this because, I doubt very much that
in the
North
East Cape Forest
decision, Froneman DJP
was advocating a disregard of ordinary and grammatical meaning in the
exercise of interpretation of collective
agreements. My understanding
of his words is that, not too much emphasis should be placed on the
literal meaning so as to frustrate
the object of the LRA and to the
complete disregard of purposive interpretation. There needs to be a
healthy balance between the
two approaches to interpretation.
[32]
Be that as it may, Zondo JP’s caution
against overreliance on purposive interpretation is of no consequence
in
casu
as
I have found that, quite apart from the context and purpose of the
2010 agreement, the ordinary and grammatical meaning of clause
5,
especially the phrase ‘
normal
overtime’
is such that the
intention of the parties when concluding the 2010 agreement was to
exclude all three types of overtime where the
converted
non-pensionable special daily overtime allowance is payable.
[33]
That, even if the phrase ‘
normal
overtime’
is somewhat nonsensical
in the context of the 2007 agreement, it could still have been
modified so as to accord with the common
intention of the parties.
For the sake of convenience and clarity, the crux of this decision is
that, both literal and purposive
interpretation of clause 5 reveal
the common intention of the parties to exclude all three types of
overtime where the converted
non-pensionable special daily overtime
allowance is payabale. For this reason, it is my well-considered view
that the award is
not a decision which a reasonable decision-maker
could have reached with the result that it must be reviewed and set
aside. I am
also mindful of the pressing need for clarity around the
proper interpretation of clause 5 and for that reason I do not intend
to make any order as to costs.
Order
[34]
In the premises, I make the following
order:
34.1
The award is reviewed and set aside;
34.2
Clause 5 of SSSBC Agreement 1 of 2010
excludes all three types of overtime as contemplated in the SSSBC
Agreement 4 of 2007 where
the converted non-pensionable special daily
overtime allowance is payable, regardless of whether the special
event falls on a public
holiday;
34.3
There is no order as to costs.
_____________________________
Zondo
AJ
Acting
Judge of the Labour Court
APPEARANCES:
FOR
THE APPLICANT:
Adv
M J Ramaepadi
Instructed
by State Attorney-Johannesburg
FOR
THE THIRD RESPONDENT: Adv
J L Basson
Instructed
by Grosskopf Attorneys
FOR
THE FOURTH RESPONDENT: Adv
P H Kirstein
Instructed
by Van der Merwe Du Toit Inc
[1]
See
Sidumo
and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and
Others
(2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC)
[2]
See
Herholdt
v Nedbank
Ltd (2013) 34 ILJ 2795 (SCA) where the court held: “A review
of a CCMA award is permissible if the defect in the proceedings
falls within one of the grounds in s 145 (2) (a) of the LRA. For a
defect in the conduct of the proceedings to amount to a gross
irregularity as contemplated by s 145 (2) (a) (ii), the arbitrator
must have misconceived the nature of the enquiry or arrived
at an
unreasonable result. A result will only be unreasonable if it is one
that a reasonable arbitrator could not reach on all
the material
that was before the arbitrator. Material errors of fact, as well as
the weight and relevance to be attached to particular
facts, are not
in and of themselves sufficient for an award to be set aside, but
are only of any consequence if their effect
is to render the outcome
unreasonable.”
[3]
Award: “As is the case in all exercises of interpretation, the
starting point is to try and determine the intentions of
the parties
from the words used. The words appearing in clause 5 of the SSSBC
Agreement 1 of 2010 must be attributed their ordinary,
literal and
grammatical meaning. It is only if there is an ambiguity in the
plain language that an additional approach to interpretation
becomes
necessary”.
[4]
See
Coopers
& Lybrand v Bryant
[1995] ZASCA 64
;
1995 (3) SA 761
(A) 767E-768E where Joubert JA said: “According
to the ‘golden rule’ of interpretation the language in
the
document is to be given its grammatical and ordinary meaning,
unless this would result in some absurdity or some repugnancy or
inconsistency with the rest of the instrument……the
mode of construction should never be to interpret the particular
word or phrase in isolation (
in
vacuo
)
by itself…..The correct approach to the application of the
golden rule of interpretation after having ascertained the
literal
meaning of the word or phrase in question is, broadly speaking, to
have regard:
(1)
to the context in which the word or phrase is used with its
interrelation to the contract as a whole, including
the nature and
purpose of the contract;
(2)
to the background circumstances which explain the genesis and
purpose of the contract, ie to matters probably
present to the minds
of the parties when they contracted….;
[5]
See R H Christie,
The
Law of
Contract
in
South Africa
6
th
ed (Lexis Nexis 2001) at 217
[6]
See
Engelbrecht
v Senwes Ltd
2007 (3) SA 29
(SCA) (7); See also
Hansen,
Schrader & Co v De Gasperi
1903 TH 100
at 103 where Solomon J observed: “Now it is not
for this court to speculate as to what the intentions of the parties
were
when they entered into the contract. That must be gathered from
their language, and it is the duty of the Court as far as possible
to give to the language used by the parties its ordinary grammatical
meaning.”
[7]
See
Sassoon
Confirming and Acceptance Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National
Bank Ltd
1974 (1) SA 641
(A) 646B where Jansen JA remarked: “The first
step in construing a contract is to determine the ordinary
grammatical
meaning of the words used by the parties (
Jonnes
v Anglo- African Shipping Co (1936) Ltd,
1971 (2) SA 827
(AD) at 834E. Very few words, however bear a single
meaning, and the ordinary meaning of words appearing in a contract
will necessarily
depend upon the context in which they are used,
their interrelation and the nature of the transaction as it appears
from the
entire contract………”
[8]
See R H Christie, 6
th
Edition at 218 and
Gravenor
v Dunswart Iron Works
1929 AD 299
& 303;
Boerne
v Harris
1949
(1) SA 793 (A) 804-805
[9]
See
Scottish
Union & National Insurance Co Ltd v Native Recruiting
Corporation Ltd
1934 AD 458
, 465-466 where Wessels CJ observed: “It has been
repeatedly decided in our Courts that in construing every kind of
written
contract the Court must give effect to the grammatical and
ordinary meaning of the words used therein. In ascertaining this
meaning,
we must give to the words their plain, ordinary and popular
meaning, unless it appears clearly from the context that both the
parties intended them to bear a different meaning. If, therefore,
there is no ambiguity in the words of the contract, there is
no room
for a more reasonable interpretation than the words themselves
convey. If however, the ordinary sense of the words necessarily
leads to some absurdity or to some repugnance or inconsistency with
the rest of the contract, then the Court may modify the words
just
so much as to avoid that absurdity or inconsistency but no more.”
[10]
See
North
East Cape Forests v SAAPAWU and Others
[1997] 6 BLLR 711
(LAC);
SA
Municipal Workers Union v SA Local Government and Others
(2012) 33 ILJ 353 (LAC).
[11]
Technikon
SA v National Union of Technikon Employees of SA
(2001) 22 ILJ 427 (LAC).