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[1990] ZASCA 8
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S v Malaza (385/89) [1990] ZASCA 8 (8 March 1990)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(
APPELLATE DIVISION
)
CASE NUMBER 385/89 In the matter between:
JOSEPH MICHULU MALAZA
APPELLANT
and
THE STATE
RESPONDENT
Coram
: SMALBERGER, KUMLEBEN, JJA et GOLDSTONE AJA.
Date heard: 1 March 1990
Date delivered: 8 March 1990
2 JUDGMENT
GOLDSTONE AJA
:
The appellant stood trial in the Orange Free State Provincial Division on a
charge of murder. He was convicted and, no extenuating
circumstances having been
found, he was sentenced to death. His application for leave to appeal against
the imposition of the death
sentence was granted by the learned Judge
a
guo.
The appellant pleaded guilty to the charge of murder. Ccunsel who appeared
pro deo
for the appellant informed the trial Judge that the plea was not
in accordance with his instructions. He added that he had formed
the opinion
that the appellant was not of sound mind and unfit to stand trial. Thereupon
counsel for the State, who accepted the
onus of proving the fitness of the
appellant to stand trial, led evidence to that end. No evidence on
3 that
issue was led cn behalf of the appellant. After considering the State
evidence, the Court
a quo
held that the appellant was indeed fit to
stand
trial and able properly to defend himself. That decision is fully
justified
by the record and no attempt was made to challenge that
finding.
After the Court
a quo
found that the appellant was mentally fit to
stand trial, the appellant tendered a plea of guilty to the charge of murder.
The prosecutor
proceeded to lead evidenoe in order to establish, by evidence
aliunde, the ccmmission of the offence. The murder was a gruesome one.
In short,
on 29 July 1988, the appellant stabbed Thabo Davey Maniet (the deceased) twice
with an assegaai. He took the body of the
deceased to his room in the house of
his mother. He proceeded to mutilate the body. He buried parts of it and then
wrapped the remains
in a plastic sack and placed it under his bed. On the
following moming, the appellant's sister discovered the body. His mother
reported
the incídent to the headman and the police were called in.
The circumstances in which the murder was probably oommitted emerged
from
4 extra-curial statements made by the appellant to a magistrate and to
Professor
P. H. J. J. van Rensburg, a psychiatrist attached to the University of
the
Orange Free State. The appellant did not testify at the trial. It
appears
that the appellant, aged 26 years, suffered from what he regarded
as a
diminution of his vitality. More particularly he could find neither
a wife
nor permanent employment. The latter factor caused him anguish
as he was
unable to look after his widowed mother for whom he had a deep
respect.
According to Professor Nel, an ethnologist, who testified on
behalf of the
appellant, he found himself under psychological pressure
to gain "power". To
that end, one infers that the appellant consulted
a witchdoctor. The
appellant, so it would further appear to be probable,
was advised by the
witchdoctor to drink the blood of a strong and successful
person and to bury certain of his organs. For that reason the
appellant
killed the deceased.
In his judgment on extenuating circumstances, the learned trial Judge made
the following factual findings:
5 "Ons bevind dat die beskuldigde wel hcmself in hierdie psigologiese
drukgang bevind het. Ons bevind eweneens eenparig dat die beskuldigde
wei muti wou bekcm ten einde sy lewenskragte, in die sin deur prof.
Nel uiteengesit, aan te vul, en cns bevind eweneens dat die beskuldigde
in die omgewing en in die gemeenskap waarin hy beweeg het h diepe
gesetelde geloof in sodanige herstelkragte van die muti gehad het."
As the trial Court correctly directed itself, the issue was whether, having
regard bo that factual finding, there were extenuating
circumstances present in
respect of the murder. The trial Judge ooncluded his judgment as follows:
"Daar is voor ons geen getuienis hoegenaamd dat die beskuldigde enige vrees
gekoester het jeens die oorledene nie of dat die oorledene
hcm of sy familie of
sy gemeenskap met enige leed bedreig het nie. Daar is ock geen getuienis voor
ons dat die beskuldigde op aandrang
van h tjoordokter en uit vrees vir die
toordokter die oorledene gedood het nie.
6 Die waarskynlike afleiding wat gemaak word uit die getuienis van prof.
Nel en die beskuldigde se stilswye is dat hy die oórledene gedood
het ten einde muti te bekcm sodat hy lewenskrag kon herwin.
Ons bevind gevolglik eenparig dat op grond van die voorafgaande daar
geen versagtende cmstandighede aanwesig is nie."
In the judgment there is reference to the judgments of this Court in
R v
Myeni
1955 (4) SA 196
(A) and
S v Nxele
1973 (3) SA 753
(A) and to
the judgment of the Rhodesian Appellate Division in
S v Sibanda
1975 (1)
SA 966.
With reference thereto the learned Judge said the following:
"Die deurlopende gedagterigting in hierdie beslissings is deurgaans dat
alhoewel die geloof in magiese kragte kcn inwerk op die gedagtegang
van die
beskuidigde scdat hy die misdaad begaan, die effek daarvan nie is dat die hof
die doodslag van onskuldige persone, wat die
beskuldigde nie geglo het die
oorsaak van sy probleme was nie, as minder laakbaar beskou nie. Sover dit die
howe betref word in voornoemde
gevalle nie van die derde been van die drie
vereistes vir die bestaan
7 van versagtende omstandighede voldoen nie."
Counsel for the appellant submitted that this summary of the effect of the
aforesaid judgments was incorrect and constituted a misdirection.
It was
submitted to be incorrect in that it lays down as a general rule that the
killing of an innocent person does not admit of
a finding that there were
extenuating circumstances. I do not agree. The passage just cited, if read in
context, was clearly not
intended by the learned Judge to be a comprehensive
summary of what was laid down in the three judgments referred to by him. Indeed,
it is preceeded by a passage referring expressly to the judgment of Schreiner JA
in one of them, viz.
Myeni
's case,
supra
in the following
terms:
"In effek sê die geleerde Appèlregter dat die geloof in die
bonatuurlikke en die geloof in 'n magiese nie
per se
versagtende
omstandighede is nie, maar elke saak se feite self beoordeel moet word.
Dieselfde is ook die effek van die uitspraak in
S v Nxele
1973 (2)
8
SA 753 (A) op 757 en ook die uitspraak van die Rhodesiese Appelhof
in die beslissing van
S v Sibanda
1975 (1) SA 966."
In my opinion, the trial Judge oorrectly applied the approach of Rumpff CJ in
S v Modisadife
1980 (3) SA 860
(A) at 863C-E to the following effect:
"Dit is by herhaling gese dat h werklike geloof in toorkuns in oorweging
geneem kan word by die vasstelling of daar versagtende omstandighede
is.
Terselfdertyd is dit ock by herhaling beklemtoan dat toorkuns as versagtende
omstandigheid noodwendig moet afhang van die besondere
feite van elke saak. In
die tyd waarin ons lewe, kan, na my mening, die geloof in toorkuns wat appellant
waarskynlik gehad het, die
aard van die vrees van appellant,'n vrees wat o.a
niks met die oorledene te doen gehad het nie en ook nie onmiddellik was nie en
wat hy self kon afgewend het deur weg te trek uit die omgewing, nie sy daad
minder laakbaar of verwytbaar maak nie."
The deceased was in no way perceived by the appellant as having been a
9
threat to him or responsible for his misfortune. He was perchance a man
with a good job who was regarded by the appellant as a suitable
victim.
There was no question here of a threat of harm to either the
appellant
or to his family or tribe. Those were all circumstances properly
taken
into account by the trial Court in making its finding. The fact that
the
welfare of his mother was a factor which may have moved the appellant
to
have acted as he did, does not in my judgment, lessen the
moral
blameworthiness of his deed.
In my opinion, the Court
a quo
, in a carefully reasoned judgment,
correctly directed itself. I can find no reason to interfere with the discretion
exercised by
that Court. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
GOLDSTONE AJA
SMALBERGER J )
) CONCUR KUMLEBEN J )