Pikitup Johannesburg (SOC) Ltd v South African Municipal Workers Union and Others (J920/2013) [2013] ZALCJHB 75; (2014) 35 ILJ 188 (LC) (15 May 2013)

80 Reportability

Brief Summary

Strike — Unprotected strike action — Unilateral change in terms and conditions of employment — Applicant sought an interim interdict against the Respondent union and its members from participating in unprotected strike action regarding the withdrawal of transport and half-day leave on payday — Court found that the issues in dispute had not been conciliated and no certificate of non-resolution had been issued, thus rendering the strike unprotected — Interim interdict granted prohibiting the strike action.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The matter was an urgent application in the Labour Court for interim relief, in the form of an interdict restraining intended strike action on the basis that it would be unprotected under the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA). The applicant was Pikitup Johannesburg (SOC) Ltd (the municipal waste management entity), and the respondents were the South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) and employees of Pikitup who were SAMWU members.


On 5 May 2013 the Labour Court granted a rule nisi and an interim interdict prohibiting the respondents from embarking on the strike that was to commence on 6 May 2013, as well as from interfering with and disrupting the applicant’s business. At that stage the matter was unopposed. The matter then returned on 10 May 2013 as the return day, when it was opposed and argued.


The underlying dispute concerned whether the applicant’s decision to discontinue free transport to employees and the longstanding practice of allowing employees to leave early (a half-day off on the last Friday of the month) constituted a unilateral change to terms and conditions of employment, thereby entitling employees to invoke the special mechanisms in section 64(4) and 64(5) of the LRA and to strike without following the ordinary procedural requirements.


2. Material Facts


Historically, before the applicant’s establishment, certain employees worked in municipal waste management structures and were later transferred to Pikitup when it was established in 2001. It was common cause that, both prior to 2001 and thereafter, employees were allowed to leave earlier on payday to cash cheques, and employees were provided with free transport. These arrangements persisted for many years.


On 26 April 2013, management informed SAMWU that it would no longer provide transport and would no longer allow employees to leave at 12h00 on the last Friday of the month. The applicant’s explanation was that employees were now paid by EFT, making early departure to cash cheques unnecessary, and that the applicant did not have a lawful passenger-transport fleet (it had waste collection vehicles not designed for passenger conveyance, with potential safety and legal implications). The applicant also alleged that it had sought to engage SAMWU about withdrawing these arrangements at the Local Labour Forum, including a meeting scheduled for 28 March 2013 that SAMWU allegedly did not attend.


On 30 April 2013, the respondents referred a dispute to the CCMA described as a “unilateral change to terms and conditions”, identifying the issues as transport and the half-day practice. In the referral, the respondents required the applicant not to implement the changes for 30 days, alternatively to restore the prior position. It was common cause that the dispute was referred, that it had not yet been conciliated, and that no certificate of outcome had been issued.


On 3 May 2013, the applicant wrote to SAMWU noting the referral and seeking confirmation of “rumoured” industrial action. Later that day, at 16h43, the applicant received a strike notice stating that strike action would commence on 6 May 2013 at 06h00, based on the two issues (transport and half-day off).


In opposing the application, the respondents contended that the free transport and early-departure arrangement were terms and conditions of employment due to longstanding practice and the circumstances of transfer in 2001, and that the applicant’s discontinuation was a unilateral change entitling the respondents to invoke section 64(4) and 64(5) without the ordinary notice and conciliation preconditions.


The court identified a central disputed factual characterisation: although the practices were longstanding (which was common cause), it was seriously disputed whether they had become contractual or collectively agreed terms and conditions of employment as opposed to mere practices. The applicant relied on the existence of a collective agreement regulating conditions of service, including 40 hours per week, and pointed out that the collective agreement made no mention of free transport or a half-day off. The court also noted there was no evidence that stopping the half-day practice would result in employees working more than 40 hours per week, and the respondents’ assertion that remuneration would be negatively affected was not explained with supporting detail.


3. Legal Issues


The court framed three interrelated issues for determination.


The first issue was whether the strike notice issued on 3 May 2013 was valid, particularly in light of the procedural requirements ordinarily applicable to protected strikes under the LRA, and the respondents’ reliance on the special dispensation created by section 64(4) and 64(5) for unilateral changes to terms and conditions of employment.


The second issue was whether the matters in dispute—withdrawal of free transport and the payday half-day practice—were terms and conditions of employment (as alleged by the respondents) or merely historical practices (as alleged by the applicant). This issue required the court to characterise the true nature of the dispute, which is a question involving the application of legal principles to established or undisputed features of the employment relationship and the evaluation of whether contractual or collective rights were shown.


The third issue was whether, given that characterisation, the proposed strike would be protected or unprotected, including whether the substantive and procedural limitations on the right to strike in the LRA applied (in particular, whether the respondents could rely on section 64(4) and 64(5), or whether the ordinary procedural requirements and/or statutory limitations applied).


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter by emphasising that it is required to determine the real issue in dispute, having regard to substance rather than the parties’ labels. In this respect, the court referred to authority emphasising that parties cannot convert a dispute that is properly resolved through statutory adjudication or arbitration into a strikeable dispute by the way they frame the issue, and that a court must determine the genuine dispute for strike purposes.


On the question of strike notice validity, the court considered the operation of section 64(4) and 64(5), which provides a short-term remedy where an employer unilaterally changes terms and conditions of employment. The court accepted, with reference to Swissport (SA) (Pty) Ltd v SA Transport and Allied Workers Union and Others (2011) 32 ILJ 1256 (LC), that where a union refers a unilateral-change dispute and, in that referral, requires the employer not to implement the change (or to restore the pre-existing terms if already implemented), and the employer fails to comply within 48 hours, a protected strike may commence without adherence to further statutory procedures. Applying this to the referral documents, the court found that the respondents did include the statutory requirement in their referral (a demand not to implement for 30 days, alternatively to restore). On that basis, the court was not persuaded that the strike notice was invalid merely because it did not afford 48 hours’ notice; the court considered that if section 64(4) and 64(5) were applicable, the respondents would not be obliged to give 48 hours’ notice.


However, the court held that the central enquiry was not purely the formal validity of the notice, but whether section 64(4) was engaged at all. That depended on whether there was, in truth, a unilateral change to terms and conditions of employment. The court therefore turned to the characterisation of the issues (transport and half-day off) as terms and conditions versus practices.


In determining whether an aspect of the employment relationship constitutes a term and condition of employment (as distinct from a working practice), the court considered that the enquiry required an examination of the employees’ contracts of employment, relevant collective agreements, and whether any additional terms could be implied from conduct, custom, or practice in the workplace. The court placed weight on the documentary framework that governed conditions of service: the letters of appointment did not mention either free transport or a half-day off, and there was no allegation supported by evidence that individual employment contracts contained such entitlements. Most importantly, the court noted that a collective agreement existed between the applicant and the representative unions (including SAMWU), and that it expressly regulated conditions of service, including working hours (40 hours per week), yet made no provision for free transport or a half-day off on the last Friday of the month.


Although the court accepted the practices were longstanding and pre-dated 2001, it was not persuaded that longevity alone established a contractual or collectively agreed right. The court further noted that there was no evidence that discontinuing the half-day practice would increase working time beyond the collectively agreed 40-hour week, and the respondents’ claim that remuneration would be negatively affected was unsupported by detail. The court also accepted the applicant’s evidence that the discontinuation did not alter the essential terms and functions of employees, and that the collectively agreed terms and conditions remained unchanged.


The court distinguished authorities relied upon by the respondents on the basis that those cases involved either a clear policy forming part of an employment benefit scheme or a formal agreement creating a contractual entitlement. By contrast, the court found no comparable evidence of a policy or agreement in this matter that elevated the practices to enforceable terms. The court consequently concluded that it was not convinced the half-day off and free transport practices had become terms and conditions of employment, and found they remained longstanding practices only.


Having reached that conclusion, the court held that the discontinuation did not amount to a unilateral change to terms and conditions of employment, and therefore section 64(4) did not apply. As a result, the court reasoned that the respondents could not rely on the section 64(4) and 64(5) dispensation to bypass the ordinary procedural requirements. The court considered that the procedural limitations applicable to any right to strike that might otherwise arise from the referral to conciliation therefore continued to apply, consistent with the approach in South African Airways (Pty) Ltd v South African Transport and Allied Workers Union (2010) 31 ILJ 1219 (LC).


Finally, on costs, the court exercised a discretionary value judgment informed by labour-relations considerations, holding that no costs order was appropriate in light of the ongoing collective bargaining relationship and the risk that a costs order might prejudice the relationship and the resolution of outstanding issues.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court confirmed the rule nisi issued on 5 May 2013, with the effect that the interdict restraining the respondents from participating in the intended unprotected strike action (and from interfering with and disrupting the applicant’s business) remained in force.


The court made no order as to costs.


Cases Cited


Swissport (SA) (Pty) Ltd v South African Transport and Allied Workers Union and Others (2011) 32 ILJ 1256 (LC).


Cape Clothing Association v South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union and Another (2012) 33 ILJ 1643 (LC).


Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Betta Sanitary Ware v National Construction Building and Allied Workers Union (2) (1997) 18 ILJ 671 (LAC).


Coin Security Group (Pty) Ltd v Adams and Others (2000) 21 ILJ 924 (LAC).


Staff Association for the Motor and Related Industries v Toyota of South Africa Motors (Pty) Ltd (1997) 18 ILJ 374 (LC).


South African Municipal Workers Union v Matjibeng Local Municipality (2011) 3 BLLR 299 (LC).


Maritime Industries Trade Union of South Africa and Others v Transnet Ltd and Others (2002) 23 ILJ 2213 (LAC).


South African Airways (Pty) Ltd v South African Transport and Allied Workers Union (2010) 31 ILJ 1219 (LC).


Legislation Cited


Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, including section 64(1)(a), section 64(3)(e), section 64(4), section 64(5), section 65(1)(c), and section 186(2)(a).


Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The Labour Court held that the longstanding practices of providing free transport and allowing employees a half-day off on the last Friday of the month were not established on the papers as terms and conditions of employment contained in contracts of employment or in the operative collective agreement. The court therefore found that discontinuing those practices did not constitute a unilateral change to terms and conditions of employment.


Because there was no unilateral change to terms and conditions, the special remedial regime in section 64(4) and section 64(5) of the LRA was held to be inapplicable, with the result that the ordinary procedural limitations for protected strike action continued to apply. The strike action threatened for 6 May 2013 was accordingly treated as unprotected, and the interim interdict was confirmed. The court made no costs order.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A court determining whether strike action is protected must ascertain the true or real issue in dispute, looking to the substance rather than the parties’ characterisation of the dispute. A dispute that is fundamentally a rights dispute cannot be converted into a strikeable issue merely by adding a demand framed to suggest a different remedy.


The special mechanism in section 64(4) and section 64(5) of the LRA operates only where there is a dispute about a unilateral change to terms and conditions of employment, and where the referring party has, in the referral, required the employer not to implement the change (or to restore prior terms if already implemented). If the employer fails to comply within 48 hours, a strike may commence without further procedural steps. However, this dispensation depends on proof that an existing term and condition of employment has been varied unilaterally.


Whether a workplace arrangement constitutes a term and condition of employment rather than a mere practice requires consideration of the contractual and collective regulatory instruments governing the relationship (including individual contracts and collective agreements), as well as whether any term can be implied from conduct, custom, or practice. Longstanding practice, without more, is not necessarily sufficient to establish an enforceable term where the operative collective agreement comprehensively regulates conditions and does not include the alleged entitlement.


Where section 64(4) does not apply because no unilateral change to terms and conditions is established, the ordinary procedural limitations for protected strike action—including conciliation-related requirements and statutory notice requirements—remain applicable, and non-compliance may render strike action unprotected.


In determining costs in labour disputes, the Labour Court may decline to award costs where ongoing collective bargaining relationships may be adversely affected, and where broader labour-relations considerations justify the absence of a costs order.

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[2013] ZALCJHB 75
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Pikitup Johannesburg (SOC) Ltd v South African Municipal Workers Union and Others (J920/2013) [2013] ZALCJHB 75; (2014) 35 ILJ 188 (LC) (15 May 2013)

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
,JOHANNESBURG
JUDGMENT
Reportable
Case number: J 920/2013
In the matter between:
PIKITUP JOHANNESBURG (SOC) LTD
.........................................................
Applicant
and
THE SOUTH AFRICAN MUNICIPAL WORKERS UNION
.................
First Respondent
EMPLOYEES WHO ARE MEMBERS OF SAMWU
......................
Second
Respondent
Heard: 5 and 10 May 2013
Delivered: 15 May 2013
Summary: Strike—Unilateral change in terms and conditions of
employment- Section 64(3)(e), 64(4) and 64(5) of the Labour
Relations
Act
JUDGMENT
PRINSLOO AJ
Introduction:
On 5 May 2013, this Court granted the
Applicant an interim interdict prohibiting the Respondent union and
its members employed
by the Applicant from participating in
unprotected strike action, which was to commence on 6 May 2013 and
from interfering with
and disrupting the business of the Applicant.
At that stage the matter was unopposed. The return day was 10 May
2013 when the
matter came again before this Court. The matter is now
opposed.
Brief history:
Prior to the establishment of the
Applicant, a number of employees were employed by the Greater
Johannesburg Metropolitan (or
other municipal entities) in the waste
management department.
In 2001, the City of Johannesburg
established the Applicant to provide refuse related services to its
ratepayers and the employees
who were working in the refuse
collection section were transferred to the Applicant. Employees so
transferred were assured that
their conditions of employment would
not be altered in any way.
It is not in dispute that employees
were historically allowed to leave earlier on payday in order to
allow them to cash their
cheques. This was prior the establishment
of the Applicant. The employees were also provided with free
transport.
On 26 April 2013, the Applicant’s
management informed the Respondent union that it would no longer
provide transport to
employees and that it would no longer allow
employees to leave at 12h00 on the last Friday of the month.
According to the Applicant,
it has been engaged over time in
discussions with the Respondent at the Local Labour Forum to discuss
the withdrawal of the transport
and half day off. A meeting to
discuss the withdrawal of the transport and half day off was set for
28 March 2013 but the Respondent
failed to attend. The Applicant
consequently took a decision to withdraw the half day off as it
became irrelevant because employees
are now paid by way of EFT and
no longer need to cash their salary cheques at a bank. The provision
of transport had been withdrawn
as the Applicant does not have a
transport fleet that could provide transport to employees, but owns
a fleet of waste collection
vehicles not designed to convey persons.
Transportation of employees on the waste collection vehicles may
have safety and legal
consequences.
On 30 April 2013, the Respondents
referred a dispute in respect of ‘unilateral change to terms
and conditions’ to
the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation
and Arbitration (‘CCMA’). It is evident from the
referral document that
it was faxed to the Applicant only at 20h03
on 30 April 2013. The issues in dispute were defined as ‘unilateral
change
of employment conditions concerning transport to and from
work and half day on pay day’. In the referral form, the
Respondents
required the Applicant not to implement the proposed
changes for a period of 30 days, alternatively to restore the terms
and
conditions of employment that applied before the change.
On 3 May 2013, the Applicant wrote a
letter to SAMWU confirming that two separate disputes had been
referred to the CCMA, including
the dispute about transport and half
day work after pay day. The Applicant confirmed its commitment to
engage and co-operate
with SAMWU on all matters and requested that
SAMWU confirm the ‘rumoured illegal industrial action slated
for Monday 6
May 2013’. It was specifically recorded that
confirmation of ‘rumoured’ industrial action was sought
from the
SAMWU representative, who was unable and or unwilling to
confirm the rumour. It was specifically recorded that the rumoured
industrial
action would be unlawful.
Subsequent to the correspondence and
at 16h43 on 3 May 2013, the Applicant received a strike notice,
indicating that the strike
action would embark on 6 May 2013 at
06h00. The strike would be based on two specified issues to wit
transport and half day off
on pay day.
On 4 May 2013, the Applicant’s
attorney of record addressed a letter to SAMWU indicating
inter
alia
that the strike notice was received at 16h43 and that the
notice did not afford the Applicant 48 hours notice as required by
section
64(5) of the Act. It was further stated that the issues in
dispute related to transport and half days off are disputes relating

to benefits and should be adjudicated in terms of section 186(2)(a)
of the Act. The Applicant sought an undertaking from SAMWU
that
strike action would not commence on 6 May 2013, but in the absence
of such an undertaking this Court was approached on an
urgent basis
on 5 May 2013.
The urgent application
The Applicant approached the Court on
an urgent basis and averred that the intended strike action, which
was to commence on 6
May 2013, would be unprotected for a number of
reasons. Firstly, the dispute had not been set down for conciliation
and no certificate
of non-resolution had been issued. Secondly, the
issues in dispute relating to transport to and from home and half
day work on
pay day are unfair labour practice disputes relating to
benefits and should be referred for conciliation and arbitration.
Those
are not disputes the Respondents could strike about. Thirdly,
the notice was given in terms of section 64(5) of the Act and
therefore
the Respondents were obliged to give the Applicant 48
hours notice. The notice was only received at 16h43 on Friday 3 May
2013,
Saturday 4 May and Sunday 5 May 2013 are weekend days and the
notice does not afford the Applicant with the requisite 48 hours

notice to prepare itself and to consider its position.
The Respondents are opposing the
application and stated that free transport to and from work along
specified routes and at specified
pick up points is a term and
condition of employment. Another term and condition of employment is
that employees are permitted
to leave at 12h00 on the last Friday of
the week in which the workers were paid. These terms were not
re-negotiated in 2001 when
the Applicant was established and the
employees transferred from the previous municipal entities and since
2001 the Applicant
provided free transport and permitted them to
leave at 12h00 on the last Friday of a month.
The Respondents’ case is that
these longstanding practices of providing free transport and
permitting employees to take
a half day off on the last Friday
constitute terms and conditions of employment and the Applicant is
seeking to unilaterally
change those terms and conditions of
employment.
Common cause and disputed facts
It is common cause that the half day
off on the last Friday after payday and provision of transport were
long standing practices.
Whether those practices became and
constitute terms and conditions of employment is seriously disputed.
The Respondents’ case is that
those were part of terms and conditions that existed prior to the
creation of the Applicant
and when they were transferred, they were
transferred to the Applicant on the same terms and conditions and it
was never re-negotiated
until April 2013 when the Applicant
unilaterally stopped the existing practices.
The Applicant on the other hand
disputed that those are terms and conditions of employment vested by
law or by policy and stated
that those were no more than practices
and never became terms and conditions of employment.
The Applicant submitted that it does
not own a transport fleet for the legal transportation of
passengers, but owns a fleet of
waste collection vehicles, designed
for waste collection and not for the conveyance of employees.
The applicable terms and conditions
are set out in a collective agreement and no mention is made of the
provision of transport
as a term and condition of employment. It
provides further for a 40 hour work week and no mention is made of
half day off on
the last Friday of a month. There was no evidence
before this Court to show that the cancellation of half day off on
the last
Friday of the month would result in the employees working
more than the 40 hours work week as per the collective agreement.
The Applicant submitted that the
issues in disputes are unfair labour practice disputes relating to
an unfair labour practice
in respect of benefits and it should be
conciliated and arbitrated. The Respondents deny that there is a
dispute about an unfair
labour practice relating to benefits and
stated that the changes will negatively affect their remuneration.
In the opposing papers
the Respondents did not explain how the fact
that a half day off has been stopped will negatively affect their
remuneration.
The Applicant argued that the employees’
remuneration would remain as it is and will therefore not be
negatively affected.
It is common cause that a dispute
related to unilateral change in terms and conditions had been
referred to the CCMA, that the
dispute has not been conciliated and
that no certificate of outcome was issued. It is disputed whether
those are requirements
for a protected strike. The Applicant’s
view is that the dispute had to be conciliated and a certificate of
non-resolution
had to be issued before the strike action could
commence. The Respondents’ view is that those are not
requirements for
a protected strike in relation to a unilateral
change to terms and conditions of employment, the Respondents
required the Applicant
not to implement the changes and the strike
is thus protected.
It is not disputed that the strike
notice was issued to the Applicant at 16h43 on Friday 3 May 2013.
The Respondents’ case
is that no strike notice was required as
the dispute relates to unilateral change in terms and conditions of
employment and the
Applicant has failed to comply with the
Respondents’ requirement not to implement the changes for a
period of 30 days,
alternatively to restore the terms and conditions
of employment that applied before the change.
The arguments
The Applicant argued that the issue
in dispute pertains to transport and half day off and submitted that
those are not terms and
conditions of employment. The Applicant does
not have a fleet of vehicles to provide free transport to employees
and transporting
employees on the waste management vehicles, not
only has a cost implication but also poses a safety risk and
potential legal
consequences. The parties, in a collective
agreement, agreed to terms and conditions of employment and no
reference is made to
free transport and half day off in the
agreement. The hours of work are specified in the collective
agreement and it is agreed
that employees would work 40 hours a
week.
The half day off has a historic
background and is nothing more than a practice, so is the provision
of free transport. The Applicant
has not changed any existing terms
and conditions of employment, it merely changed a past practice.
Nothing has changed in the
way the employees are expected to do
their work and nothing changed in respect of the terms and
conditions of employment. The
dispute is not a one that entitles the
Respondents to embark on industrial action.
Mr Nalane, for the Applicant,
submitted that the Respondents have not made a demand requiring the
Applicant not to implement the
changes or if it has already done so,
to restore pre-existing conditions for the duration of the
conciliation period. As no such
demand was made, the Respondents do
not fall within the ambit of section 64(3)(e) of the Act. He further
submitted that the provisions
of section 64(3),(4) and (5) of the
Act do not apply.
The Respondents are opposing the
application is because the dispute revolves around terms and
conditions of employment and there
is no need to issue a strike
notice. Section 64(5) allows the Respondents to strike even if the
matter was not referred for conciliation
and no certificate had been
issued. Mr Brickhill for the Respondents submitted that the issues
relating to free transport and
half day off are terms and conditions
of employment. The question is whether these issues are terms and
conditions of employment
or merely practices and this is a factual
question. It is common cause that the practices had been in place
for many years and
the only relief the Respondents seek, is to
restore those terms and conditions of employment.
Section 64(4) of the Act creates a
special short term remedy and is triggered only when an employer
makes a unilateral change
to terms and conditions of employment.
Section 64(4) provides a limited purpose remedy for a limited period
to allow employees
to embark on immediate strike action.
The issue
There are three issues to be decided
in this application. The first is whether the strike notice issued
on 3 May 2013 by the Respondent
was valid and the second is whether,
assuming the notice to be valid, whether the issues in dispute are
terms and conditions
of employment. Thirdly, whether the proposed
strike is protected or unprotected.
Was the strike notice issued on 3
May 2013 valid
The Applicant’s case is that
the strike notice was not valid for two main reasons. Firstly, the
dispute had not been set
down for conciliation and no certificate of
non-resolution had been issued. Secondly, the notice was given in
terms of section
64(5) of the Act and therefore the Respondents were
obliged to give the Applicant 48 hours notice, which was not done.
The Respondents’ case is that
no strike notice was required as the dispute relates to unilateral
change in terms and conditions
of employment and the Applicant has
failed to comply with the Respondents’ requirement not to
implement the changes for
a period of 30 days, alternatively to
restore the terms and conditions of employment that applied before
the change. The Respondents
are entitled to embark on immediate
strike action and they did so in terms of the provisions of section
64(5) of the Act.
In
Swissport
(SA) (Pty) Ltd v SA Transport and Allied Workers Union and Others
1
this issue was
considered and the Court held that:

The
requirements for protected strike action under the Labour Relations
Act are well-known. Compared to the regime under the old
Labour
Relations
Act
28 of 1956
, the requirements are relatively simple. The trade
union must refer the issue in dispute to the CCMA or relevant
bargaining council;
the CCMA must issue a
certificate
that the matter could not be resolved at conciliation, or a period of
30 days (or a longer period agreed between the
parties) must elapse;
and the trade union must then give the employer 48 hours' notice of
the commencement of the strike, in writing.
But
even these requirements do not apply to a strike if the employer
has
failed to comply with subsections (4) and (5) of s 64. These
subsections provide as follows:

(4)
Any employee who or any trade union that referred the dispute about a
unilateral change to terms and conditions of employment
to a council
or the
Commission
in terms of subsection (1)(a)
may,
in the referral, and for the period referred to in subsection (1)(a)
-
(a)
require
the employer not to implement unilaterally the change to terms and
conditions of employment; or
(b)
if the employer has already implemented the change unilaterally,
require the employer to restore the terms and conditions of

employment D that applied before the change.
(5)
The employer must comply with a requirement in terms of subsection
(4) with in 48 hours of service of the referral on the employer.”
As
Clive Thompson points out:

In
order to qualify for this release from the statutory requirements,
the would-be strikers or their union, at the time of referring
the
dispute about the unilateral alteration to the council or CCMA, must
require the employer not to implement the change (or if
it has
already done so, to restore the pre-existing conditions) for the
duration of the conciliation period. If the
employer
fails to comply with this requirement within 48 hours, a protected
strike can commence without adherence to any further
statutory
procedures.”
There
was no need for SATAWU to give 48 hours' notice of the intended
strike action - even though it did do so, ex abundante
cautela
- and, contrary to the averments of the applicant's Mr Moodley in his
founding affidavit, the proposed strike action was
neither 'illegal'
(as he termed it) or unprotected.”
It is evident from the referral form
that the Respondents indeed made a demand requiring the Applicant
not to implement the proposed
changes for 30 days or if it has
already done so, to restore pre-existing conditions. I am of the
view that the Respondent did
not have to give 48 hours’ notice
of the intended strike action and for this reason the strike notice
is not invalid.
The issue therefore is not the
validity of the strike notice, but whether the nature of the dispute
is such that section 64 applies.
Are the issues in dispute terms and
conditions of employment
In
Cape Clothing Association v
SA Clothing and Textile Workers Union and Another,
2
the Court held that:

In
Ceramic
Industries Ltd t/a Betta Sanitary Ware v National Construction
Building and Allied Workers Union
(2)
(1997)
18 ILJ 671 (LAC)
, Froneman JA dealt with the characterization of
a dispute for the purposes of strike action. In that case, a union
had referred
a dispute to
the
CCMA concerning the harassment of its officials and members by
certain members of management. Rejecting a characterization by
this
court that the subject-matter of the dispute included a demand for
the dismissal of the latter, Froneman JA said at 677J-678A:

Even
it was open to approach the matter on the basis of a characterization
of the issue as one involving a specific demand, there
are compelling
reasons why it would not in any event not affect the eventual outcome
of the present case. The union's initial complaint
was the alleged
harassment of union officials and employees. For the reasons already
stated that was a justiciable rights dispute
with a specific remedy
to be pursued at the Labour Court. The
union
could not convert the nature of that underlying dispute into a
non-justiciable one simply by adding a demand for a remedy
falling
outside those provided by the Act. The tail cannot wag the dog. If
such an approach is allowed, an underlying rights dispute
normally
justiciable or arbitrable in terms of the Act could be transformed
into a strikeable issue simply by adding a demand for
a remedy not
provided for in the Act. That would not be acceptable.”
This
has been interpreted by the Labour Appeal Court to mean that it is
this court's duty to ascertain the true or real issue in
dispute (see
Coin
Security Group (Pty) Ltd v Adams and Others
(2000)
21 ILJ 924 (LAC) at 930B). In doing so, the court is obliged to
look at the substance of a dispute, and not the form in which
it is
presented. Nor is the characterization of a dispute by any of the
parties decisive.’
It is this Court’s duty to
ascertain the real issue in dispute, irrespective of how it was
characterised by the Respondents.
The Applicant’s case is that
the issues in dispute are unfair labour practice disputes relating
to an unfair labour practice
in respect of benefits and it should be
conciliated and arbitrated. It is denied that that half day off and
free transport are
terms and conditions of employment. The
Applicant’s case is that those are merely practices and the
practices had been
stopped and there was no change to terms and
conditions of employment.
The Respondents on the other hand
submitted that the practices were longstanding and constitute terms
and conditions of employment.
There was a unilateral change and
hence the Respondents are entitled to strike when the Applicant
failed to comply with their
demand not to implement the changes for
a period of 30 days, alternatively to restore the terms and
conditions of employment
that applied before the change.
Is this a unilateral change to terms
and conditions of service? If so, SAMWU is entitled to call its
members out on a protected
strike. If not, their intended strike is
unprotected and stands to be interdicted, as the limitation
provisions of section 65(1)
(c) will apply.
The Applicant disputes that the
issues relating to transport and half day off are terms and
conditions of employment and submitted
that those are merely
practices. In its founding affidavit, the Applicant averred that a
half day off on the last Friday of the
month and the provision of
free transport were issues related to benefits and therefore an
unfair labour practice route has to
be followed as contemplated in
section 186(2)(a) of the Act. In its replying affidavit, the
Applicant contended that it was in
fact not even a benefit, but
merely a gesture or practice that had been observed over time. It is
accepted by the Respondents
that those are indeed long standing
practices, but that is why it became part of terms and conditions of
employment, so goes
the Respondents’ case.
John Grogan,
writing in
Collective Labour Law
(Juta 2007) notes that the precise limits of s
64(1)
(a)
have
not yet been determined, but expresses the view that it must concern
the terms under which employees work, or their benefits,
rather than
a mere 'working practice' (at 145). He continues:

The
difference between ''terms and conditions of employment' and working
practices is generally determined by whether the employees
are able
to demonstrate that the changes affect their contractual rights,
whether emanating from their individual contracts of
employment or
from a collective agreement.’
Determining whether a particular
aspect of an employment relationship constitutes a condition of
service or a work practice requires
an examination of:
39.1 the employees' contracts of
employment;
39.2 any other document regulating the
relationship such as collective agreements;
39.3 any additional terms that can be
implied from the parties' conduct or from custom and practice in the
workplace.
In summary before this Court are the
following undisputed facts:
There are long standing practices
permitting workers to take a half day off on the last Friday of the
month and the provision
of free transport;
These practices are in place before
the establishment of the Applicant in 2001 and persisted until
April 2013, when the Applicant
decided to stop the half day off and
the provision of free transport;
The employees’ letters of
appointment made no mention of a half day off on the last Friday of
the month and the provision
of free transport;
There is no allegation that the
employees’ contracts of employment provided for a half day
off on the last Friday of the
month and free transport, nor is such
a contract appended to the papers before Court;
There is a collective agreement in
place between the Applicant and the two representative unions,
SAMWU and IMATU, and the agreement
specifically sets out the
conditions of service;
The collective agreement stipulates
hours of work (40 hours per week) and makes no provision for free
transport to be provided
by the Applicant;
There was no evidence before this
Court to show that the cancellation of half day off on the last
Friday of the month would
result in the employees working more than
the 40 hours work week as per the collective agreement;
The Applicant averred that the
essential terms and conditions and functions of the employees are
not affected by the discontinuation
of the practice as they are
still required to fulfil the same functions as before and the terms
and conditions of employment
as set out in the collective
agreement, remained unchanged. Apart from stating that their half
day off on the last Friday of
the month and free transport had been
stopped, the Respondents did not refer to specific terms and
conditions as provided for
in a contract of employment or
collective agreement or applicable legislation that had been
changed;
The Respondents averred that the
changes to half day off on the last Friday of the month and free
transport will negatively
affect their remuneration and
remuneration always forms part of terms and conditions of
employment. The Respondents provided
no detail of how their
remuneration will be negatively affected.
There is no evidence to show that the
Respondent employees would be paid less or that the essential terms
and conditions and functions
of the employees will be affected by
the discontinuation of half day off on the last Friday of the month
and free transport,
as they are still required to fulfil the same
functions as before and the terms and conditions of employment as
set out in the
collective agreement, remained unchanged.
I am not convinced that the
longstanding practice of half day off on the last Friday of the
month and free transport became a
term and condition of employment.
It is not provided for in a contract of employment or in the
collective agreement regulating
terms and conditions of employment
between the Applicant and its employees. Although the half day off
on the last Friday of the
month and free transport had been
longstanding practices, I am not convinced that it is anything more
than a longstanding practice.
Counsel
for both parties referred the Court to authorities they were of the
view would support their respective arguments. I have
considered the
authorities I was referred to and it is not necessary to deal in
much detail with the authorities. The following
remarks, however,
are to be made. In
Staff
Association for the Motor and Related Industries (SAMRI) v Toyota of
SA Motors (Pty) Ltd,
3
the Court dealt with a matter where
there was a motor vehicle benefit policy in existence and the
employer sought to unilaterally
amend the terms of the policy. The
employees who benefited from the terms of the motor vehicle benefit
policy, would have been
prejudiced in that they would have to
downgrade the models they were able to use under the previous
scheme. The employer was
ordered to not to implement the proposed
changes as the matter was referred to the CCMA for conciliation and
as provided for
in section 64(4) of the Act. This case is to be
distinguished from the matter
in
casu

there is no
policy on the provision of transport and from the papers before
Court it appears that transport was provided along
specified roads
and pick up points with vehicles designed for municipal waste
collection and there was not a fleet for transportation
of employees
ever made available.
In
SAMWU v Matjibeng Local
Municipality,
4
the Court dealt with a matter where
the employer and trade union agreed upon an expansion of routes and
the introduction of new
pick up points after the union requested an
improvement of the existing transport arrangements. There was a
joint exercise between
the union and employer in which agreement was
reached on the extended routes and new pick up points were
introduced. An agreement
was subsequently signed, setting out the
transport arrangements. The employer subsequently withdrew the
transport benefit. The
Court held that when the parties entered into
an agreement setting out the transport arrangements, it brought a
contractual term
into existence and the employer was ordered to
resume providing transport for employees. This case is also to be
distinguished
from the current application. There is no evidence
that the Applicant and Respondent entered into any formal agreement,
setting
out transport arrangements, and that a contractual
entitlement to free transport came into existence.
Is the proposed strike unprotected
because the substantive limitations on the right to strike
established by section 65 of the Act
apply
In
Cape Clothing Association v
SA Clothing and Textile Workers Union and Another,
5
the Court held that:

To
invoke the remedy established by s 64, it is necessary to establish
both an existing term and condition of employment and the
fact of a
variation of that term and condition by the employer, in
circumstances where the employee has not consented to the variation.’
I already found that half day off on
the last Friday of the month and free transport, do not constitute
terms and conditions of
employment. It follows that the
discontinuation thereof does not amount to a unilateral change to
terms and conditions of employment.
In
Maritime Industries Trade
Union of SA and Others v Transnet Ltd and Others,
6
the Labour Appeal Court held that:

It
is clear that s 64(4) relates to a dispute about a unilateral change
to terms and conditions of employment. It is also clear
that it
affirms that such a dispute can be the subject of a referral in terms
of s 64(1) which is a referral of a dispute that
can be the subject
of a strike. Accordingly, it can be accepted that a strike is
competent in respect of a dispute about a unilateral
change to terms
and conditions of employment. However, if a dispute about a
unilateral change of conditions of employment can properly
fall
within the provisions of item 2(1)(b) of schedule 7, it will
nevertheless be arbitrable. 'Strikeable' and arbitrable disputes
do
not necessarily divide into watertight compartments. Although in
relation to dispute resolution the Act contemplates the separation
of
disputes into those that are resolved through arbitration, those that
are resolved through adjudication and those that are resolved
through
power-play, there are disputes in respect of which the Act provides a
choice between power-play, on the one hand, and,
arbitration, on the
other, as a means for their resolution. This is the case, for
example, with disputes about organizational rights…
A
dispute about a unilateral change to terms and conditions of
employment, which, as already stated above, is a dispute in respect

of which a strike is competent, may, arguably also be said to fall
within the ambit of an unfair labour practice as defined in
item
2(1)(b), especially in relation to training, demotion and the
provision of benefits to an employee. A dispute falling under
item
2(1)(b) is, of course, subject to arbitration in terms of item
3(4)(b).
It
is therefore clear from the above that the fact that a strike is
competent in respect of a dispute does not mean necessarily
that it
is not arbitrable in terms of the Act. What needs to be done in each
case is to examine the provisions of the Act to determine
whether
such a dispute is, indeed, not arbitrable. Where the court a quo
seems to have gone wrong, in my view, is that it adopted
the attitude
that, because the Act has provisions which made a strike competent in
respect of a dispute about a unilateral change
of conditions of
employment, such a dispute could not be arbitrable. That, as I have
shown above, does not follow under the Act.’
In
SA Airways (Pty) Ltd v SA
Transport and Allied Workers Union,
7
it was found that:

In
the absence of any evidence of any change that affects any of the
union's members' terms and conditions of employment, s 64(4)
has no
application in the present instance. It follows that the procedural
limitations of any right to strike that may be acquired
consequent on
the referral of this matter to conciliation on 5 October 2009 (and I
make no finding as to whether such a right does
accrue) continue to
apply.’
I am of the view that the same
applies in this matter and that
section 64(4) has
no application in the present instance. It follows that the
procedural limitations of any right to strike that
may be acquired
consequent on the referral of this matter to conciliation on 30
April 2013 continue to apply.
I am also inclined to the view that
there should be no order as to costs, having regard to the on-going
collective bargaining
relationship between the parties, and the
prospect of prejudice to that relationship and the successful
resolution of outstanding
issues should an order for costs be made.
Order
In the premises, I make the following
order:
1.
The rule
nisi issued on 5 May 2013 is confirmed;
2. No order as to costs.
______________
Prinsloo, AJ
Acting Judge of the Labour Court
APPEARANCES:
For the Applicant: Advocate Nalane
Instructed by: Tshiqi Zebediela
Attorneys
For the Respondents: Advocate
Brickhill
Instructed by:
Cheadle Thomson and Haysom Attorneys
1
(2011)
32 ILJ 1256 (LC) at paras 13-16.
2
(2012)
33 ILJ 1643 (LC) at paras 9-10.
3
(1997)
18 ILJ 374 (LC).
4
(2011)
3 BLLR 299
(LC).
5
Above
n 2 at para 12.
6
(2002)
23 ILJ 2213 (LAC) at paras 106-108.
7
(
2010)
31 ILJ 1219 at para 32
.