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[2013] ZALCJHB 86
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Chiseno and Others v Norkim Raiseboring CC t/a North-West Mining CC and North-West Mining Services (Pty) Ltd and Another (JR2515/11) [2013] ZALCJHB 86 (9 May 2013)
1
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
THE LABOUR COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG)
JUDGMENT
Not Reportable
Case no: JR2515/11
In the matter between
T.
CHISENO AND
190 OTHERS
......................................
First
and Further Applicants
NATIONAL UNION OF
MINEWORKERS
..........................................
Second
Applicant
and
NORKIM RAISEBORING CC
t/a NORTH WEST
MINING CC AND NORTH
WEST MINING
SERVICES (PTY) LTD
........................................................................
First
Respondent
COMMISSION FOR
CONCILIATION MEDIATION
AND ARBITRATION
......................................................................
Second
Respondent
SIMON MALAZA N.O.
.......................................................................
Third
Respondent
Heard: 20 December
2012
Delivered: 09 May 2013
JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________
NTSABA-LETELE AJ
I
ntroduction
[1] This is an opposed
application to review and set aside the arbitration award made by the
third respondent (“the Commissioner”)
under case number
MP1866/2011 dated 25 July 2011 and issued under the auspices of the
second respondent, the Commission for Conciliation
Mediation and
Arbitration (“CCMA”).
[2] In terms of the
arbitration award, the Commissioner made a determination that the
CCMA has no jurisdiction over the dispute
referred as the dispute
related to contracts of employment. The Commissioner further ruled
that the dispute be referred to the
Labour Court or Civil Court in
terms of section 77(3) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act
(“BCEA”) 1997.
[3] The applicants have
also applied for condonation for late filing of the review
application. In the circumstances of this case,
taking into account
the short period of two (2) weeks and four (4) days delay, I find no
reason why condonation should not be granted.
Background facts
[4] The applicants
referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the CCMA which was set down
for hearing on 29 June 2011. The first respondent
raised four (4)
points
in limine
before the CCMA but the main contention by
the first respondent was that there was no unfair dismissal of the
applicants as the
contracts of employment of the applicants were
fixed term contracts and they expired.
[5] The applicants
contended that they were dismissed by the first respondent and that
the dismissals were both procedurally and
substantively unfair. The
applicants were therefore seeking compensation of five months wages
for each applicant; that each applicant
be paid their 50% outstanding
wages of January 2011; and that each applicant be paid UIF benefits
and annual bonuses and outstanding
leave as relief for the alleged
unfair dismissals by the first respondent.
[6] During the
arbitration proceedings whilst the applicants and the first
respondent were making oral submissions with regard to
the points
in
limine
, the first respondent suggested to the Commissioner that
perhaps the applicants and the first respondent, (hereinafter also
referred
to as “the parties”) should make written
submissions to the Commissioner concerning the points
in limine
.
The Commissioner would, thereafter, make a determination on the
points
in limine
and a determination on whether or not there
was a basis for the first respondent to dispute the alleged unfair
dismissals of the
applicants based solely on the written submissions
by the parties.
[7] After some
deliberation before the Commissioner, the applicants agreed to the
proposal made by the first respondent for the
parties to make written
submissions to the Commissioner regarding the points
in limine
raised by the first respondent, but most importantly to make
submissions on the issue of the alleged unfair dismissal of the
applicants
that was being disputed by the first respondent. The
parties further agreed on the timeframe for the submissions to the
Commissioner
and that the Commissioner should make the determination
based on the written submissions. The submissions were made to the
Commissioner
as agreed and the Commissioner made a determination
based on the written submissions as per the agreement of the parties.
[8] However, the
applicants in their written submissions to the Commissioner raised a
concern that it was unusual for the Commissioner
to agree that
parties should present only written submissions without giving oral
evidence and allowing cross examination of the
evidence presented
given that the issue of unfair dismissal was being contested by the
first respondent. Regardless of this issue
being raised by the
applicants in their closing arguments and submissions to the
Commissioner, the Commissioner did not afford
the parties an
opportunity to present oral evidence and to cross-examine witnesses
but made his determination based on the written
submissions only as
per the agreement of the parties.
[9] In their submissions
before the court, the applicants allege that they were dismissed on
the basis of ill-discipline and not
because their contracts of
employment came to an end. This submission was also made before the
CCMA. The first respondent in its
submissions before the CCMA alleged
that the applicants embarked on an illegal strike on 31 January 2011
despite having been requested
by management to refrain from any
illegal action and being advised that all grievances would be
resolved. As a result of this illegal
action by the applicants, on 01
February 2011 Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited informed the first
respondent that the contract
at Evander 8 shaft would be terminated.
The contract at Evander 8 shaft appears to have been directly linked
with the applicants’
contracts of employment with the first
respondent.
[10] According to the
first respondent, all the applicants were then informed of the
termination of the contract between Harmony
Gold Mining Company
Limited and the first respondent which led to the termination of the
applicants’ fixed term contracts
with the first respondent. In
my view, it is clear from these submissions that the termination of
the contracts of the applicants
by the first respondent were
triggered by the applicants so called ill-discipline because the
decision to terminate came after
the ill-discipline occurred despite
the applicants having been warned not to engage in such
ill-discipline. What is not clear is
whether the contracts of
employment were for a fixed term as alleged by the first respondent
or whether they were for an indefinite
period as alleged by the
applicants. Disputes of fact surrounding the issue of fixed term
contracts vis-a vis contracts for indefinite
period were not
canvassed and argued adequately before the CCMA nor before this court
to determine whether or not the applicants
were employed on fixed
term contracts or on indefinite contracts of employment.
[11] It is obvious that
the Commissioner would not have been in a position to make a
determination of whether or not the contracts
of employment between
the parties were fixed term contracts or whether the contracts were
for indefinite periods because of the
manner he approached the
process of arbitration before him. By not allowing oral evidence and
cross examination to interrogate
the issues in dispute before him,
the arbitrator found himself in a position where the only way out was
to refer the matter for
determination to the Labour Court or the
Civil Court as it was not possible to come to any conclusion with so
many issues in dispute
by making a determination based on written
submissions only.
Grounds for review
[12] The applicants in
their review application before the court are challenging the award
on the basis that the Commissioner made
the determination based
solely on written submissions and argue that they wanted to lead
evidence, but that the Commissioner acceded
to the first respondent’s
request and disregarded oral evidence and that this therefore,
constituted misconduct on the part
of the Commissioner.
[13] The applicants
further are requesting the court for an order setting aside the award
and an order that the second respondent
has jurisdiction to arbitrate
this dispute. Furthermore, the applicants are requesting the court to
order the dispute to be referred
back to the second respondent for
arbitration by a Commissioner other than the third respondent.
The arbitration award
[14] The Commissioner in
his award relied on the agreement made between the parties that
points
in limine
be decided on the basis of written
submissions. The Commissioner ignored the fact that the applicants
raised the issue of not presenting
oral evidence and affording cross
examination of witnesses as a critical point in their submissions as
they felt that this denied
them the opportunity to be heard. In my
view, this aspect was very pertinent to the determination to be made
by the Commissioner
as the main bone of contention was whether the
applicants were dismissed or whether their fixed term contracts came
to an end as
alleged by the first respondent.
[15] The record of the
proceedings before the CCMA clearly reveal that the applicants agreed
with the first respondent to make written
submissions and that the
Commissioner should make determination based on the written
submissions by the parties. However, in their
closing argument the
applicants realised their mistake and raised this issue as a concern
that on a dispute of this nature, it
was unusual for the Commissioner
to make a determination solely on written submissions without hearing
oral evidence.
[16]
I
find that the said agreement was binding on both parties and that it
cannot be raised as a basis on which the award should be
set aside as
in abiding by the agreement between the parties, the Commissioner did
not commit any misconduct. However, in failing
to advice the parties
that fully blown arbitration would assist in making a determination
before him, the Commissioner short-chained
himself in reaching a
conclusion on the issues in dispute placed before him.
[17] As a result of this
approach, the Commissioner in his determination did not answer the
question that he set out to determine
which was mainly whether the
applicants were dismissed or whether their fixed contracts came to an
end. In my view, it was not
possible for the Commissioner to answer
the question he set out to determine and answer because no oral
evidence and cross examination
was presented before him. The
Commissioner found that there were a lot of issues being raised in
the written submissions which
were in dispute involving the said
contracts of employment and the only fair and justiciable way to deal
with the matter having
come thus far, and having decided to determine
the matter only on written submissions, would be for the referral to
the Labour
Court or Civil Court under section 77 of the BCEA for
determination hence he decided that the CCMA had no jurisdiction on
the matter.
[18] The Commissioner in
his analysis of evidence and argument which was based on the written
submissions, made an observation from
the submissions by the first
respondent that the services of the applicants were terminated by the
first respondent as a result
of the expiry of the contract of service
between the first respondent with their client, Harmony Gold Mine.
Furthermore, the Commissioner
made an observation that the alleged
unprotected strike as the reason for termination of contracts of
employment with the applicants
was raised as an alternative argument
by the first respondent.
[19] The Commissioner
went on to say, that there could be no unprotected strike when
employees collectively withdraw labour in demand
of mandatory
compensation they have worked for in line with the common law
principle that puts in place a reciprocal relationship
to perform
employment and be remunerated in return, and that failure by one
party to honour the contract would amount to revocation
of the
contract. After this analysis, the Commissioner concluded that the
dispute related to contracts of employment and that the
issue fell
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court or Civil Court
in terms of section 77 of the Basic Conditions
of Employment Act.
Consequentially, the Commissioner made a finding that the CCMA lacks
jurisdiction over the matter and ordered
that the matter be referred
to Labour Court or to the Civil Court.
Evaluation
[20] The essence of the
applicants challenge to the arbitration award is that the
Commissioner made the determination based solely
on written
submissions and disregarded oral evidence and cross-examination of
witnesses by the parties and that this therefore,
constituted
misconduct on the part of the Commissioner. The applicants further
are requesting the court for an order setting aside
the award and an
order that the second respondent has jurisdiction to arbitrate this
dispute as the dispute relates to unfair dismissal
of the applicants.
The applicants are further requesting the court to order the dispute
to be referred back to the second respondent
for arbitration by a
Commissioner other than the third respondent.
[21] The question to ask
is whether or not the Commissioner misconducted himself and
therefore, reached an unreasonable conclusion
in finding that the
CCMA has no jurisdiction over the dispute referred as according to
the Commissioner the dispute relates to
contracts of employments over
which the Labour Court or Civil Courts have exclusive jurisdiction.
The applicants’ argument
is based on the premise that the
dispute referred to the CCMA was that of unfair dismissal which was
being contested by the first
respondent on the basis that the
applicants were not dismissed but that their contracts were fixed
term contracts and they simply
came to an end.
[22] The second question
to ask is whether the Commissioner would have reached a different
conclusion had he given the parties an
opportunity to present oral
evidence and to cross-examine witnesses. I am inclined to believe
that the Commissioner would have
reached a different conclusion had
he ventured to make a determination on whether or not there was
unfair dismissal of the applicants
or whether the applicants fixed
term contracts came to an end and afforded the parties an opportunity
to present oral evidence
and the cross-examination of witnesses. The
Commissioner failed to answer the question he set out to answer when
he decided on
the basis of the agreement between the parties to
determine the dispute solely on written submissions. It is trite law
that any
arbitration conducted under the auspices of the CCMA is a
hearing
de novo
and that being the case, one would expect the
evidence to be more extensive and more deeply probed more so where
the alleged unfair
dismissal is in dispute and the onus is on the
applicants to prove that there was dismissal as opposed to fixed term
contracts
coming to an end.
[23] In my view an
arbitration hearing is much like a court hearing, except that it is
less formal. Subject to the discretion of
the arbitrator, a party to
a dispute may present evidence, call witnesses, question the
witnesses or any other party and parties
can address concluding
arguments to the arbitrator. Where there are serious disputes of
fact,
the
arbitrator as in a court of law should also exercise discretion to
allow oral evidence and cross examination as it may not be
adequate
to make a determination based on the written submissions only despite
the agreement of the parties. The same principles
as enunciated in
the matter of
Room
Hire Co (Pty) Ltd v Jeppe Street Mansions (Pty) Ltd
1
should apply where Murray
AJP said that if a dispute cannot properly be determined it may
either be referred to evidence or to trial.
[24] The Commissioner
should have foreseen that there would be serious dispute of facts in
this matter given that the first respondent
was at the commencement
of the arbitration denying that the applicants were dismissed but was
alleging that fixed term contracts
of the applicants came to an end.
The onus to proof that dismissal occurred therefore shifted to the
applicants and the applicants
should have had an opportunity to lead
oral evidence and to cross examine witnesses in order to assist the
Commissioner to reach
an informed decision in making a determination.
[25] The test to apply in
this case to determine whether or not the Commissioner acted contrary
to section 145 of the Labour Relations
Act (“LRA”) should
be the dialectical or process-related test of unreasonableness which
focuses on the logical path
by which the decision maker arrived at
his or her decision and which since
Sidumo
and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others
2
became accepted in
contrast to the substantive or results-based reasonableness test
which considers whether the outcome reached
by the arbitrator is one
which a reasonable decision-maker could reach.
[26]
By disallowing oral evidence and cross-examination, the Commissioner
failed to apply his mind properly to the issues before
him and in
consequence arrived at a conclusion that no reasonable decision maker
could reach. It is obvious from his process of
reasoning in the award
that the Commissioner missed the point. In
Southern
Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others
3
van
Niekerk J held that a CCMA award is reviewable where it is shown that
the commissioner’s process related conduct is found
wanting.
The line of reasoning in that decision elaborates upon the standard
of review enunciated by the Constitutional Court in
Sidumo
and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others (supra),
which
stated the test to be whether the decision reached by the
Commissioner is one that a reasonable decision maker could not reach.
[27]
In
Southern
Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others
4
van
Niekerk J expressed the opinion that the reasonableness requirement
is relevant to both process and outcome. In other words
an award will
be reviewable if it suffers either from dialectical unreasonableness
or is substantively unreasonable in its outcome.
Where a Commissioner
fails to have regard to material facts, this will constitute a gross
irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration
proceedings because
the Commissioner would have unreasonably failed to perform his or her
mandate and thereby have prevented the
aggrieved party from having
its case fully and fairly determined. Proper consideration of all the
relevant and material facts and
issues is indispensable to a
reasonable decision and if a decision-maker fails to take account of
a relevant factor which he or
she is bound to consider, the resulting
decision will not be reasonable in a dialectical sense.
[28] The CCMA has
jurisdiction to hear and determine matters of unfair dismissal
arising out of contracts of employment and this
cannot be the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court and Civil Courts. The
dispute referred to the CCMA before the Commissioner
was that of
unfair dismissal and not of breach of contract. The Commissioner’s
decision is therefore reviewable as it suffers
from dialectical
unreasonableness. The Commissioner’s process albeit being
agreed to by the parties led the Commissioner
to make a determination
on what he did not set out to determine whilst he failed to make a
determination on whether or not there
was unfair dismissal of the
applicants or that the fixed term contracts came to an end. The
Commissioner simply missed the point
and erred in making a
determination on the breach of contracts and deciding that the CCMA
lacks jurisdiction on the matter. Had
the Commissioner followed the
process that would allow him to weigh all the issues before him and
had given the applicants an opportunity
to present their case as to
the alleged unfair dismissal and not relied only on written
submissions, he would have been able to
determine whether or not
fixed term contracts came to an end or whether the applicants were
unfairly dismissed. In light of this
the Commissioner’s award
stands to be reviewed and set aside.
Order
[29] I accordingly order
as follows:
29.1. The arbitration
award issued by the second respondent under case Number MP 1866/2011
dated 25 July 2011is reviewed and set
aside.
29.2. The matter is
remitted back to the second respondent for consideration by a
Commissioner other than the third respondent.
29.3 There is no order as
to costs.
________________________
Ntsaba-Letele, AJ
Acting Judge of the
Labour Court
Appearances
For the applicant: E.S.
Makinta Attorneys
For the respondent:
Advocate C Goosen
Instructed by: Parsons
Attorneys
1
1949
(3) SA 1155
(T) at 1162
2
(
2007)
28 ILJ 2405 (CC).
3
(2009)
11 BLLR (LC).
4
Id
at para 14.