About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Cape Town Labour Court, Cape Town
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Cape Town Labour Court, Cape Town
>>
2012
>>
[2012] ZALCCT 22
|
|
De Klerk v Cape Union Mart International (Pty) Ltd (C 620/2011) [2012] ZALCCT 22; (2012) 33 ILJ 2887 (LC) (12 June 2012)
Reportable
Of
interest to other judges
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, CAPE TOWN
JUDGMENT
Case
no: C 620/2011
In the matter between:
BARBARA DE KLERK
Applicant
and
CAPE UNION MART INTERNATIONAL (PTY) LTD
Respondent
Heard
:
30 May 2012
Delivered
:
12 June 2012
Summary:
Dismissal after lodging grievance. Applicant alleges
automatically unfair dismissal in terms of LRA s 187(1)(d).
Respondent raises
exception.
Mackay v ABSA
followed.
JUDGMENT
STEENKAMP J
Introduction
The applicant alleges that her dismissal was automatically unfair.
She was dismissed after having lodged a grievance concerning
the
respondent’s management. The respondent has raised an
exception that this is not a reason for dismissal contemplated
by s
187(1)(d) of the Labour Relations Act.
1
The matter raises the question whether the reasoning of Mlambo J
2
in
Mackay v ABSA Group & another
3
is a correct interpretation of the Act and whether it should be
followed.
Background facts
The applicant was employed by the respondent from 2 May 2009 until
her dismissal on 6 July 2011. At the time of her dismissal
she was
employed as the group procurement manager.
During May and June 2011, the applicant submitted various grievances
in terms of the company’s grievance procedure. The
procedure
states in terms that:
“
Employees
may lodge grievances without prejudice to their employment”.
On 8 June 2011 the respondent notified the applicant to attend a
disciplinary hearing. The misconduct complained of was phrased
in
these terms:
“
1. You
repeatedly refused, for no good reason, to accept the finding to your
grievance that the company is unable to identify the
person/s
responsible for distributing untrue information regarding your ill
health absence, and instead consistently demanding
[
sic?
]
that the matter be re-opened and heard again in the full knowledge
that nothing further can be done by the company.
2. Escalating your original
grievance which has been dealt with by now raising numerous
additional complaints against senior members
of management, including
inter alia, alleged unilateral changes to your employment.
3. Demanding and attempting to
dictate, for no good reason, that various members of senior
management, including the company’s
chief executive officer
attend a meeting to discuss and resolve various spurious and
unfounded allegations including (i) their
alleged attempts to
victimise you, (ii) their failure to correctly implement company
policy and (iii) their failure to protect
your reputation.”
It appears that management was frustrated; what is less than clear,
is why the raising of the grievances complained of should
constitute
misconduct. Even more surprisingly, the employee was dismissed on 6
July 2009. But it is not for this court to determine
at this stage
whether a fair reason for dismissal existed; without having heard
any oral evidence, the court is only called upon
to consider an
exception to the applicant’s subsequent referral of an
automatically unfair dismissal dispute to this court.
Conciliation having failed, the applicant referred a dispute to this
court on 1 September 2011. She set out a wide-ranging basis
for her
complaint, including the following:
“
The
applicant avers that the respondent dismissed her unlawfully [
sic
]
in contravention with [
sic
]
section 187(1)(c) and (d) of the [LRA] in that said dismissal amounts
to an automatically unfair dismissal because she initiated
grievances
against the respondent’s directors and senior management.
The applicant further avers that
the reasons proffered by the respondent for her dismissal infringed
her Constitutional and statutory
rights for the following reasons:
Section
23 of the Constitution ... provides that everyone has a right to
fair labour practices.
Section
5(1) of the [LRA] precludes any discrimination against an employee
for exercising any right conferred by the Act.
Section
187(1) of the Act provides that a dismissal is automatically unfair
if the employer, in dismissing the employee, acts
contrary to
section 5 or if the reason for dismissal is in contravention of s
187(1) of the Act.
Section
6
of the
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998
provides that no person
may unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly, against an
employee in any employment policy or practice.”
The respondent filed a notice of intention to except on a number of
grounds.
Firstly, it pointed out that
s 187(1)(c)
of the LRA deals with
dismissals that are automatically unfair if the reason for dismissal
is to compel the employee to accept
a demand in respect of a matter
of mutual interest. The applicant made no such allegation in her
statement of claim.
Secondly, the applicant purported to rely directly on the
Constitutional right provided for in s 23 of the Constitution. The
respondent, relying on legal advice from its attorneys of record,
quite properly and correctly pointed out that national legislation
–
specifically the LRA – has been effected to give effect to
those rights. The applicant could not, therefore, rely
directly on
the Constitution without challenging the legislation.
Thirdly, the applicant did not set out any grounds for her purported
reliance on unfair discrimination in terms of the
Employment Equity
Act. And
in any event, such a claim would have had to have been
dealt with in terms of the dispute resolution processes provided for
in
that Act.
Fourthly, the respondent excepted on the basis that the applicant
could not found a claim on
s 187(1)(d)
of the LRA because she did
not have a
statutory
right to initiate a grievance against
her employer.
Fifthly, the applicant did not allege in her statement of claim on
what she based her claim, ie what right conferred by the LRA
she
exercised, to found a claim in
s 5
of the LRA.
For all these reasons, the respondent averred that the statement of
claim did not sustain a cause of action; and in any event,
was vague
and embarrassing.
The applicant then filed a “notice of intention to remove the
exceptions to statement of claim”, purportedly in terms
of
rule 11.
On 20 October 2011, the respondent’s attorney, Mr
Harrison
, wrote to the applicant’s attorney, Mr
De
Villiers-Mohr
, seeking clarity in this regard and setting out
his understanding that the “notice” was intended to be
in the nature
of a notice by the applicant to amend her statement of
claim in an effort to cure the grounds of intended exception.
De Villiers-Mohr confirmed that and filed an amended statement of
claim, but the applicant persisted with the following averments:
“
The
applicant avers that the respondent dismissed her unlawfully [
sic
]
in contravention with [
sic
]
section 187(1)(d)
of the [LRA] and that said [
sic
]
dismissal amounts to an automatically unfair dismissal, as she was
victimized because she initiated grievances against the respondent’s
directors and senior management...
The applicant further avers that
her dismissal was not in accordance with her Constitutional and
statutory rights for the following
reasons:
One
of the main objects of the [LRA] is to give effect to and regulate
the fundamental rights conferred by section 23 of the Constitution
... as well as to promote the effective resolution of disputes...
The Constitution entrenches the following right:
‘
Every
person shall have the right to fair labour practices (section
23(1)).’
Section
5(1) of the [LRA] precludes any discrimination against an employee
for exercising any right conferred by the Act.
Section
187(1) of the Act provides that a dismissal is automatically unfair
if the employer, in dismissing the employee, acts
contrary to
section 5 or if the reason for dismissal is in contravention of s
187(1) of the Act.”
The applicant therefore no longer relied on s 187(1)(c) of the LRA
or on the
Employment Equity Act for
her cause of action, but
persisted in the other claims.
The respondent accordingly persisted with the remaining grounds of
exception.
General principles that apply to exceptions
The rules of the Labour Court do not specifically provide for
exceptions. However, it is now trite that exceptions may be raised
under
rule 11
of this Court read with rule 23 of the Uniform Rules
of the High Court.
4
In dealing with exceptions to a statement of claim, the Court will
have regard to the principles developed in the High Court.
5
An exception is a legal objection intended to address a defect
inherent in the other party’s pleadings. Two categories
of
exceptions are generally recognised in this regard, namely:
Where the pleading is vague and embarrassing; and
Where the pleading lacks averments which are necessary to sustain
an action or defence.
Thus, where a litigant is faced with a pleading that is vague and
embarrassing or that lacks averments to sustain an action or
defence, the litigant is entitled to take an exception to have the
action or defence dismissed even before the merits of the
matter are
considered in evidence.
6
Waglay J
7
set out the following principles in
Harmse v City of Cape Town:
8
“
[6]
The statement of claim serves a dual purpose. The one purpose is to
bring a respondent before the court to respond to the claims
made of
and against it and the second purpose of a statement of claim is to
inform the respondent of the material facts and the
legal issues
arising from those facts upon which applicant will rely to succeed in
its claims.
[7] The material facts and the
legal issues must be sufficiently detailed to enable the respondent
to respond, that is, that the
respondent must be informed of the
nature or essence of the dispute with sufficient factual and legal
particularity so that it
knows what it is that the applicant is
relying upon to succeed in its claim.
[8] The Rules of this Court do
not require an elaborate exposition of all facts in their full and
complex detail – that ordinarily
is the role of evidence,
whether oral or documentary. There is a clear distinction between the
role played by evidence and that
played by pleadings – the
pleadings simply give the architecture, the detail and the texture of
the factual dispute are provided
at the trial. The pre-trial
conference provides an occasion for the detail or texture of the
factual dispute to begin to take shape.
In terms of rule 6(4)(b) the
parties in the pre-trail conference must attempt to reach consensus
on facts that are common cause,
facts that are in dispute, the issues
that the court is required to decide and the precise relief claimed.
[9] Accordingly the rules of
this Court anticipate that the relief claimed might not have been
precisely pleaded in the statement
of claim filed. The Rules of this
Court further anticipate that the factual matters at issue will be
dealt with more fully and
precisely in the pre-trail conference. The
rules therefore anticipate that the parties at the pre-trial
conference will have dealt
in much more detail not only with the
factual matters but also the legal issues. The statement of claim and
response thereto foreshadows
this activity but is not a substitute
for it. It is for this reason that the rule on pre-trial conferences
provides for reaching
consensus on the issues that the court is
required to decide.
[10] When an exception is raised
against a statement of claim, this Court must consider, having regard
to what I have said above,
whether the matter presents a question to
be decided which, at this stage, will dispose of the case in whole or
in part. If not,
then this Court must consider whether there is any
embarrassment that is real and that cannot be met by making
amendments or providing
of particulars at the pre-trial conference
stage.”
In the current case, the respondent’s attorneys provided the
applicant with the opportunity to cure the defects raised
in the
intended exceptions. Although the applicant addressed some of those,
others remain. It would serve little purpose to try
and address
those exceptions, which are legal and not factual in nature, at a
pre-trial conference before they are dealt with
in these
proceedings.
The first exception: direct reliance on the Constitution
As set out above, the applicant relies directly on the right to fair
labour practices enshrined in s 23 of the Constitution.
As the applicant herself acknowledges, national legislation –
specifically the LRA – has been enacted to regulate
and to
give effect to the right to fair labour practices. Where legislation
has been enacted to give effect to a constitutional
right, a
litigant may not bypass that legislation and rely directly on the
Constitution without challenging the legislation in
question.
In
Mazibuko & another v City of Johannesburg and others
9
the Constitutional Court discussed the principle of constitutional
subsidiarity and reiterated that:
“
This
Court has repeatedly held that where legislation has been enacted to
give effect to a right, a litigant should rely on that
legislation in
order to give effect to the right or alternatively challenge the
legislation as being inconsistent with the Constitution.”
This
dictum
is consistent with, inter alia, the earlier
statement by Ngcobo J in
Minister of Health & ano v New
Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd & others
10
:
“
[434]
In
NAPTOSA
,
the Cape of Good Hope High Court had occasion to consider whether in
the context of the Labour Relations Act (LRA) it is appropriate
to
grant relief directly under section 23(1) of the Constitution without
a complaint that the LRA was constitutionally deficient
in the
remedies that it provides. The Court held that it could not conceive
that it is permissible for an applicant, save by attacking
the
constitutionality of the LRA, to go beyond the regulatory framework
which it establishes. In reaching this conclusion, the
High Court was
concerned that were the practice to be permitted, it would encourage
the development of two parallel streams of
labour law jurisprudence,
one under the LRA and the other under section 23(1). It considered
this to “be singularly inappropriate”.
[435] In
NEHAWU
, this
Court considered
NAPTOSA
but refrained from expressing any
opinion on it as it found that it had no application in that case. In
Ingledew
, again this Court referred to
NAPTOSA
and
observed, that together with other cases referred to in
Ingledew
,
it “cast doubt on the correctness of the proposition that a
litigant can rely upon the Constitution, where there is a statutory
provision dealing with the matter without challenging the
constitutionality of the provision concerned.
[436] In my view, there is
considerable force in the view expressed in
NAPTOSA
. Our
Constitution contemplates a single system of law which is shaped by
the Constitution. To rely directly on section 33(1) of
the
Constitution and on common law when PAJA, which was enacted to give
effect to section 33 is applicable, is in my view inappropriate.
It
will encourage the development of two parallel systems of law, one
under PAJA and another under section 33 and the common law.
Yet this
Court has held that there are not two systems of law regulating
administrative action – the common law and the Constitution
–
“but only one system of law grounded in the Constitution.”
And in
Bato Star (supra)
we underscored this, holding that
“[t]he Courts’ power to review administrative action no
longer flows directly from
the common law but from PAJA and the
Constitution itself.”
[437] Where, as here, the
Constitution requires Parliament to enact legislation to give effect
to the constitutional rights guaranteed
in the Constitution, and
Parliament enacts such legislation, it will ordinarily be
impermissible for a litigant to found a cause
of action directly on
the Constitution without alleging that the statute in question is
deficient in the remedies that it provides.
Legislation enacted by
Parliament to give effect to a constitutional right ought not to be
ignored. And where a litigant founds
a cause of action on such
legislation, it is equally impermissible for a court to bypass the
legislation and to decide the matter
on the basis of the
constitutional provision that is being given effect to by the
legislation in question.”
And specifically in the context of the LRA, O’Regan J stated
in
SANDU v Minister of Defence & ors:
11
“
Accordingly,
a litigant who seeks to assert his or her right to engage in
collective bargaining under section 23(5) should in the
first place
base his or her case on any legislation enacted to regulate the
right, not on section 23(5). If the legislation is
wanting in its
protection of the section 23(5) right in the litigant’s view,
then that legislation should be challenged constitutionally.
To
permit the litigant to ignore the legislation and rely directly on
the constitutional provision would be to fail to recognise
the
important task conferred upon the Legislature by the Constitution to
respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the
Bill of
Rights.”
The applicant has not challenged the constitutionality of the LRA in
her statement of claim. It lacks the particularity it needs
to
sustain a cause of action as pleaded. The first exception is upheld.
The second exception: s 187(1)(d) of the LRA principles and
Mackay
v ABSA
The second exception is more contentious. It relies on the language
of s 187(1)(d):
“
187. Automatically
unfair dismissals.—(1) A dismissal is automatically
unfair if the employer,
in dismissing the employee, acts contrary to
section 5 or, if the reason for the dismissal is—
(a) ...
(b) ...
(c) ...
(d) that the employee took
action, or indicated an intention to take action, against the
employer by—
(i) exercising any right
conferred by this Act; or
(ii) participating in any
proceedings in terms of this Act.”
The applicant’s reliance on s 187(1)(d) is phrased thus in her
statement of claim:
“
The
applicant avers that the respondent dismissed her unlawfully [
sic
]
in contravention with [
sic
]
section 187(1)(d) of the [LRA] and that said [
sic
]
dismissal amounts to an automatically unfair dismissal, as she was
victimized because she initiated grievances against the respondent’s
directors and senior management...”
It appears from the statement of claim that the applicant’s
claim of automatically unfair dismissal is premised on the
reason
for dismissal being that she lodged a grievance in accordance with
the company’s internal policy. On the face of
it, as Mr
Harrison
argued, this is not because she took action by
exercising a right “conferred by” the LRA or because she
participated
in proceedings “in terms of” the LRA; at
best, she exercised a right conferred by the company’s
internal procedures
and policies or initiated grievance proceedings
in terms of that internal policy. And surprisingly, the applicant
did not plead
in the alternative that she was simply unfairly
dismissed
12
– ie in the alternative to it being an automatically unfair
dismissal in terms of s 187(1)(d).
The excipient’s difficulty is that Mlambo J dealt with exactly
such a scenario in
Mackay v ABSA
13
.
As that judgment is directly in point, I shall quote extensively
from it. Taking a purposive approach to the interpretation of
s
187(1)(d), Mlambo J held:
14
“
[11]
[C]an one find that the lodging of a grievance by Mackay amounted to
taking action against the respondents by participating
in proceedings
in terms of the Act[?]. Nowhere does the Act make explicit provision
protecting an employee who lodges a grievance
against his employer in
terms of an internally agreed document such as a grievance procedure
or code. A provision of the Act that
mentions grievances specifically
is section 115(3)(d) which provides:
‘
(3) If
asked, the Commission may provide employees, employers, registered
trade unions, registered employers’ organisations,
federation
of trade unions, federations of employers’ organisations or
councils with advice or training relating to the primary
objects of
this Act, including but not limited to –
. . .
(d) preventing and resolving
disputes and employees’ grievances.”
On this basis therefore it
appears that, on the face of it, there is no explicit provision
regarding the lodging of a grievance
being regarded as a proceeding
in terms of the Act.
[12] Does it mean therefore that
the absence of specific provisions regarding the lodging of a
grievance by an employee cannot be
regarded as a right conferred by
the Act or being regarded as a proceeding in terms of the Act? Was
this specific conduct intended
to be excluded from the ambit of the
Act? If this was the intention how are claims based on this situation
to be dealt with? A
quick glance at section 191 of the Act reveals
that the scenario
in casu
is not contemplated. This scenario
is also not contemplated in item 2 of Schedule 7
15
of the Act. Could this mean that the Commission and this Court cannot
arbitrate or adjudicate a dispute of this nature because
the Act does
not refer to it in specific terms?
[13] Section 3 enjoins any
person applying the Act to interpret its provisions:
1. to give effect to its primary
objects;
2. in compliance with the
Constitution; and
3. in compliance with the public
international law and obligations of the Republic.
This means in short, that one
should interpret the Act in a manner that does not lead to absurd
consequences.
[14] One of the main objects of
the Act is to give effect to and regulate the fundamental rights
conferred by section 27 of the
interim Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa which is now section 23 of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa
108 of 1996, as well as to promote the
effective resolution of disputes (section 1(a) and (d) of the Act).
The Constitution is
the supreme law of the land and it entrenches the
following right: “Every person shall have the right to fair
labour practices”
(section 23(1)).
[15] The Act is intended to
regulate and govern the relationship between employee and employer...
In keeping with the Act’s
main objects all disputes arising
from the employer-employee relationship must be effectively resolved.
Such disputes are resolved
through conciliation, arbitration and
adjudication, and those of a collective nature through collective
bargaining. In the light
of the aforegoing it is clear that it could
never have been intended that some disputes arising out of the
employer-employee relationship
are incapable of resolution in terms
of the Act. One of such disputes is Mackay’s claim which he has
chosen to base on section
187(1)(d) of the Act.
[16] This Court is the chief
custodian of the responsibilities of resolving labour disputes. It
must comply with the Constitution
in its quest to guarantee the right
to fair labour practices. Section 39 of the Constitution enjoins any
court, forum or tribunal
when interpreting the Bill of Rights, to
promote the values that underline an open and democratic society
based on human dignity,
equality and freedom, and to consider
international and foreign law. In the same section the Constitution
enjoins courts, when
interpreting any legislation, to promote the
spirit, and objects of the Bill of Rights.
[17] This Court must further
comply with the public international law obligations of the Republic.
The Republic is a signatory to
the International Labour Organisation
and must therefore comply with its conventions. Convention 158
article 5 provides:
“
The
following inter alia, shall not constitute valid reasons for
termination:
(a) union membership or
participation in union activities outside working hours or, with the
consent of the employer, within working
hours;
(b) seeking office as, or acting
or having acted in the capacity of, a worker’s representative;
(c) the filing of a complaint of
participation in proceedings against an employer involving alleged
violation of laws or regulations
or recourse to competent
administrative authorities;
(d) race, colour, sex, marital
status, family responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, political
opinion, national extraction or social
origin;
(e) absence from work during
maternity leave.”
The filing of a complaint
against an employer is specifically mentioned. It is also noteworthy
that the provisions of article 5
are mirrored in section 187(1).
[18] Therefore in keeping with
the main object of the Act, ie of resolving all labour disputes
effectively, and with the constitutional
guaranteed right to fair
labour practices it must follow that a purposive interpretation of
section 187(1) would mean that the
exercise of a right conferred by a
private agreement binding on the employer and employee as well as
participation in any proceeding
provided for by such agreement was
also contemplated in that section. As
in casu
, the
participation by an employee in a privately agreed grievance
procedure, must have been contemplated as a proceeding in terms
of
this Act, ie when section 187(1)(d) was enacted. This is on the basis
that the disputes specifically mentioned in section 187(1)
are of the
same kind as the dispute
in casu
.”
It is so, as Mr
Harrison
persuasively argued, that the
absence of a remedy in terms of s 187(1)(d) does not leave an
employee in the position of Mr Mackay
or Ms de Klerk (the applicant)
without any remedy. She can still claim unfair dismissal in terms of
s 186; of course, that would
cap her compensation at 12 months
instead of 24 months.
However, I am not persuaded that the purposive interpretation
adopted by Mlambo J is clearly wrong. It does seem anomalous that
an
employee in the position of Ms de Klerk or Mr Mackay should not
enjoy special protection. Why would a whistleblower enjoy
special
protection in terms of s 187(1)(h), but not an employee who lodges a
grievance in terms of her own employer’s procedures?
I should add that
Mackay
was overturned on appeal.
16
But
it was overturned on the facts, the LAC finding that, in fact, the
lodging of a grievance was not the reason for Mackay’s
dismissal. The LAC therefore found it unnecessary to rule on the
legal question of interpretation discussed above.
In the absence of any finding to the contrary by the LAC, I consider
the interpretation adopted by Mlambo J to be sufficiently
persuasive
not to prevent the applicant from pursuing her claim in those terms.
The interpretation in
Mackay
appears to me to give effect to
the Constitutional values discussed in the quoted passage. I am not
in a position to disagree
with the learned judge’s finding on
the legal position.
The second exception is therefore dismissed.
The third exception: LRA section 5(1)
The applicant also relies on s 5(1) of the LRA as it “precludes
any discrimination against an employee for exercising any
rights
conferred by the Act”.
The subsection reads, quite simply:
“
No
person may discriminate against an employee for exercising any right
conferred by this Act.”
The applicant has not set out any grounds for her claim of alleged
discrimination by reference to the specific employer actions
outlined in s 5(2), neither has she claimed any ground of
discrimination.
Regardless of whether the employee exercised any right “conferred
by the Act”, she has simply not set out any cause
of action
relating to discrimination. The claim under this heading is vague
and embarrassing by virtue of failing to make out
a cause of action
with the requisite clarity.
Conclusion
The first and third exceptions are upheld. The second exception is
dismissed.
Both parties have been partly successful. I do not deem it prudent
in law or fairness to make a costs order at this preliminary
stage
of the proceedings.
Order
The first and third exceptions are upheld. There is no order as to
costs.
_______________________
AJ Steenkamp
Judge of the Labour Court
APPEARANCES
APPLICANT:
Attorney GJ de Villiers
-Möhr, Somerset West.
RESPONDENT:
Attorney SW Harrison
of Edward Nathan
Sonnenbergs, Cape Town.
1
Act
66 of 1995 (“the LRA”).
2
As
he then was.
3
[1999]
12 BLLR 1317
(LC).
4
Charlton
v Parliament of the RSA
[2007] 10 BLLR 943
(LC). (This principle
was not overturned on appeal by the subsequent judgments of the LAC
and the SCA).
5
Eagleton
& ors v You Asked Services (Pty) Ltd
[2008] 11 BLLR 1040
(LC) para [15].
6
Davidson
& ors v Wingprop (Pty) Ltd
[2010] 4 BLLR 396
(LC) para [25].
7
As
he then was
8
(2003)
24
ILJ
1130 (LC);
[2003] 6 BLLR 557
(LC) paras [6] –
[10].
9
2010
(4) SA 1
(CC);
[2010] 3 BCLR 239
(CC) at para [73]; and see also the
Constitutional Court decisions cited at footnote 54 of that
judgment.
10
2006
(2) SA 311
(CC);
[2006] 1 BCLR 1
(CC) paras [434] - [437] (footnotes
omitted).
11
[2007]
8 BCLR 863
(CC) para [52].
12
As
contemplated in ss 186(1)(a) read with s 191 of the LRA.
13
Supra.
14
Ibid.
paras [11] – [18].
15
(now
repealed).
16
ABSA
Bank Ltd & another v Mackay
[2000] ZALAC 18
(CA 89/1999, 22
August 2000).