About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Johannesburg Labour Court, Johannesburg
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Johannesburg Labour Court, Johannesburg
>>
2012
>>
[2012] ZALCJHB 13
|
|
NUMSA obo Members v Steinmuller Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others (JS758/10) [2012] ZALCJHB 13; [2012] 7 BLLR 733 (LC); (2012) 33 ILJ 1885 (LC) (16 February 2012)
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
Reportable
Of
interest to other judges
THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
JUDGMENT
case
no: JS 758/10
In the matter between:
NUMSA obo its members
Applicant
and
STEINMULLER AFRICA (PTY) LTD
First Respondent
INTERVALVE (PTY) LTD
Second Respondent
BHR PIPING SYSTEMS (PTY) LTD
Third Respondent
STRATEGIG HUMAN RESOURCES
Fourth Respondent
TQA TRADING ENTERPRISES (PTY) LTD
Fifth Respondent
Heard
:
3 February 2012
Delivered
:
16 February 2012
Summary:
Joinder – rule 22 – joinder of parties to
dispute where those parties were not part of conciliation.
JUDGMENT
STEENKAMP J
Introduction
The applicant employees are members of the National Union of
Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA). They were dismissed after
they
had taken part in strike action. They referred an unfair dismissal
claim against the first respondent, Steinmuller Africa
(Pty) Ltd
(“Steinmuller”). Subsequently, it became apparent that
some of the more than 200 former employees who had
been dismissed,
were in fact employed by other entities, albeit on the same
premises. Those entities did not participate –
at least not as
parties directly cited – in conciliation proceedings. Can they
be joined to the dispute before this court
in circumstances where
the dispute with Steinmuller had been conciliated, but the dispute
(arising from the same dismissal) in
respect of the other entities
sought to be joined had been referred late and the bargaining
council refused condonation?
The crisp question in this application is thus whether the following
entities should be joined to the pending unfair dismissal
proceedings against Steinmuller in this court:
Intervalve (Pty) Ltd (“Intervalve”) as the second
respondent;
BHR Piping Systems (Pty) Ltd (“BHR”) as the third
respondent;
Strategic Human Resources (“Strategic HR”) as the
fourth respondent; and
TQA Trading Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (“TQA”) as the fifth
respondent.
Intervalve and BHR, like Steinmuller, are engineering companies with
their premises at the same location in Pretoria West. Strategic
HR
and TQA are temporary employment services as defined in section 198
of the Labour Relations Act.
1
Intervalve and BHR oppose the joinder application. Although they are
represented by the same attorneys as Steinmuller, Mr
Fourie
made it clear from the bar that he is only instructed to represent
Intervalve and BHR in this joinder application. The application
is
not opposed by the other respondents.
Background facts
More than 200 employees were dismissed after strike action at the
shared premises of Steinmuller, Intervalve and BHR. The strike
was
handled, from the employer side, by the shared HR services of the
three companies.
NUMSA, on behalf of its dismissed members, referred an unfair
dismissal dispute to the Bargaining Council, citing Steinmuller
as
the employer party. Conciliation failed and the union referred the
matter to the Labour Court for adjudication.
At conciliation, Steinmuller - represented by the shared HR services
of Steinmuller, Intervalve and BHR – raised the point
that it
was not the employer of some of the dismissed employees.
Steinmuller's attorneys – who also represent Intervalve and
BHR in this application – furnished the union's attorneys
with
documentary records drawn from the shared HR services and with
lists, which they amended from time to time, identifying
the correct
employer of each of the individual applicants.
The union and its attorneys undertook the process of verification of
the records and lists provided by Steinmuller's attorneys.
This
process involved contacting each of the more than 200 dismissed
employees, many of whom returned to their home states in
rural areas
after their dismissal; and consultations with NUMSA officials in
attempts to verify the information regarding its
members’
employers.
At the end of the verification process, NUMSA and its attorneys
generated a new list of employees with their respective employers.
2
BHR and Intervalve deny that the list is correct in all respects.
NUMSA referred a fresh dispute to the Bargaining Council vis-à-vis
BHR and Intervalve as employers. The referral was late
and they
sought condonation, which was refused. NUMSA did not review that
ruling of the Bargaining Council.
Mr
Brickhill
, for the applicants, argues that the second
referral was not necessary as “the dispute” had already
been conciliated;
and the shared HR services of Steinmuller, BHR and
Intervalve were present at conciliation. That argument will be
considered
more extensively later on.
Nevertheless, having reached the end of that road, NUMSA then sought
to join BHR and Intervalve in these proceedings by way of
a joinder
application in terms of Rule 22 of the Labour Court rules (“the
rules”).
The basis for the application is that BHR and Intervalve have a
substantial interest in the dispute. In this regard, the following
facts are not in dispute:
BHR, Intervalve and Steinmuller form part of the same group of
companies and have certain directors and shareholders in common.
3
BHR and Intervalve employed some of the individual applicants at
the time of their dismissal.
BHR, Intervalve and Steinmuller are all concerned with the
manufacturing of different components later assembled to form a
power generating plant. They do so in terms of a contract (to which
they are apparently all parties). BHR, Intervalve and Steinmuller
therefore operate from the same premises.
BHR, Intervalve and Steinmuller have a number of “shared
services”, which include:
Payroll administration;
Purchasing of materials;
Quality control;
Heat treatment; and, significantly,
HR services.
The dismissal of the individual applicants was on the basis of a
strike action at the shared premises of Steinmuller, Intervalve
and
BHR. The strike was handled, from the employer side, by the shared
HR services of the three companies.
The shared HR Services of the three companies communicated with
employees using a document bearing a letterhead including the
names
of Steinmuller, BHR and Intervalve and signed by a single member of
management, Mr J Abert, under the designation “General
Manager”.
An addendum to the standard contract of employment reflects the
names of both Steinmuller and Intervalve. In that addendum,
the
employee accepts that “the Steinmuller group of companies”
bargains at national level at the Metal and Engineering
Industries
Bargaining Council.
BHR and Intervalve did not answer the following averments, which
accordingly stand to be accepted:
Certain employees among the individual applicants were
“transferred” from one of the three companies
(Steinmuller,
Intervalve or BHR) to another at different times.
These transfers did not involve the termination of one employment
contract
and the conclusion of a fresh contract, nor the cession
and assignment of contractual obligations.
4
NUMSA has provided several examples of individual applicants who
were subjected to such transfers, which have not been denied
or
answered by BHR and Intervalve.
The shared HR Services of Steinmuller, Intervalve and BHR maintain
a single system of records in respect of their employees
working at
their shared premises.
There are superintendents who perform management functions across
all the bays of the premises shared by Steinmuller, Intervalve
and
BHR, without distinction as to employees of the different entities.
Some employees of Steinmuller, Intervalve and BHR, including some
of the individual applicants, have been required to sign
an
addendum to their employment contracts reflecting the names of all
these entities, regardless of the identity of the employer.
Steinmuller, Intervalve and BHR acted with a single voice and face
throughout the events that culminated in the dismissal of
the
individual applications, in particular in effecting their
dismissals.
The shared HR Services prepared and issued identical letters of
dismissal to all employees, regardless of employer. The letter,
addressed to “all employees participating in the unprotected
strike action at the Pretoria workshop”, bears the
logos of
Steinmuller Africa and Intervalve and is signed by the “Managing
Director”, S von Neuberg.
5
Von Neuberg is the CEO of Bilfinger Berger Power Holdings (Pty)
Ltd. In a code of conduct applicable to the Steinmuller Group,
he
refers to the “Steinmuller Group of Companies (including
Bilfinger Berger Power Holdings, BHR Piping Systems, Intervalve
and
Kog)”.
No distinction was drawn between the three entities prior to the
referral to the dismissal claim. For example, a “management
brief” dated 11 March 2010 and addressed to “all
employees at the Pretoria workshop” regarding the planned
strike appears on the letterhead of Steinmuller, BHR and
Intervalve. It is signed by the “General Manager”, J
Abert.
Those employees who were re-employed were re-employed without
distinction as to their employer.
BHR and Intervalve have not denied the following averments
supporting the contention that they will suffer no prejudice if
joined:
Because they have shared HR Services, BHR and Intervalve in
reality already have full knowledge of the proceedings to date;
BHR and Intervalve have full and ready access to the shared
records in respect of the individual applicants as employees.
In light of their shared HR Services, Intervalve and BHR have
effectively been represented throughout the events leading to
the
dismissals.
The complaint that the individual applicants were not all employed
by Steinmuller was raised for the first time by the shared
HR
Services at conciliation.
The attorneys for Steinmuller (who also act for Intervalve and BHR)
furnished the applicant’s attorneys with documentary
records
drawn from the shared HR services and with lists, which they
amended on more than one occasion, purporting to identify
the
correct employer of each of the individual applicants.
Joinder: Rule 22 and the jurisprudence of this court
Rule 22 of the Labour Court Rules governs joinder.
6
In terms of Rule 22(2)(a), a party may apply on notice to every
other party for an order joining any person as a party in the
proceedings if the party to be joined has a
substantial interest
in the subject matter of the proceedings
.
BHR and Intervalve resist their joinder on three main grounds:
First, on the basis that they do not have a substantial interest in
the subject matter of the proceedings;
Secondly, on the procedural ground that it is not competent to join
them to the proceedings in the Labour Court at this stage,
after
conciliation and referral of the dispute; and
Thirdly, on the basis that a range of pending or completed
interlocutory, ancillary or otherwise related legal proceedings
constitute a barrier to the joinder of BHR an Intervalve.
In oral argument, Mr
Fourie
relied mainly on the second
ground. I will nevertheless deal with the first ground briefly. The
third one was not pressed in oral
argument.
The substantive requirement: a sufficient interest:
It is necessary for the applicant to demonstrate that each of the
entities sought to be joined has a substantial interest in
the
subject matter of the underlying proceedings.
The substantive requirements for joinder and the nature of the
interest required have been developed by the High Court:
The test for joinder requires a legal interest
in the proceedings, and not merely a financial interest.
7
A party has a right to ask that someone be
joined as a party “if such a person has a joined propriety
interest with one
or either of the existing parties to the
proceedings or has a direct and substantial interest in the Court’s
order.”
8
The court will exercise its discretion to order
joinder to ensure that all persons interested in the subject-matter
of the dispute
and whose rights may be affected by the judgment of
the Court are before it to avoid a multiplicity of actions and to
avoid
a waste of costs.
9
In the present matter, BHR and Intervalve contend – without
substantiation – that “the fact that a proposed
respondent was the employer of a dismissed employee is emphatically
not a basis justifying its joinder in these proceedings”.
I must agree with Mr
Brickhill
, though, that the fact that an
entity was the employer of a dismissed employee in proceedings in
which that dismissal is challenged
quite obviously constitutes a
sufficient legal interest in the proceedings.
The fact that BHR and Intervalve employed some of the dismissed
employees and that they had a hand – through the shared
HR
Services – in their dismissal must be a sufficient basis to
justify their joinder.
The union has gone further, however, to:
explain how it came to pass that BHR and Intervalve were not
initially joined, and in particular how the conduct of Steinmuller,
Intervalve and BHR contributed to the lack of clarity as to the
identity of each individual applicant’s true employer;
and to
demonstrate that the underlying unfair dismissal claim constitutes
a single dispute in which Steinmuller, Intervalve and BHR
acted
jointly, without distinction as to employee, to dismiss the
individual applicants by way of a single “process”
and
for the same reason.
The union, apparently on legal advice, did refer another dispute to
the bargaining council once it had been alerted to the fact
that
some of its members were in fact employees of BHR and Intervalve
rather than Steinmuller. Perhaps that was an unnecessary
step; to
proceed with separate actions arising from exactly the same
dismissal for the same reason would, it seems to me, lead
to
precisely the multiplicity of actions and waste of costs that
joinder is meant to prevent. It is clear that the dispute involves
Steinmuller, BHR and Intervalve as employers; and that BHR and
Intervalve have a substantial interest in the proceedings arising
from that dispute.
The procedural objection: joinder after conciliation and referral:
The main objection raised by Mr
Fourie
on behalf of BHR and
Intervalve is the procedural complaint that joinder is not
appropriate at this stage of the proceedings,
in particular because
conciliation has already taken place.
The argument has been considered and rejected by the Labour Court on
at least two occasions; although a subsequent judgment may
be read
to hold otherwise, albeit without reference to either of the two
earlier judgments. None of the trio has apparently been
decided on
appeal.
The High Court has confirmed the general principle that it has the
power to order the joinder of a further party to an action
that has
already begun.
10
That Court has said the following of this power:
“
The power of the Supreme Court to order
the joinder of further defendants in an action which has already
begun is undoubted and,
as I have said, it has been exercised in many
cases. The reason for the existence of such power is that the Court
is enabled to
ensure that persons interested in the subject-matter of
the dispute and whose rights may be affected by the judgment of the
Court
shall be before the Court, and it also enables the Court to
avoid multiplication of actions and to avoid waste of costs.”
11
The Labour Court has unequivocally held that it has the power to
join additional employer parties to an unfair dismissal claim
even
after conciliation has taken place.
In
Selala v Rand Water
, Pillay J held that the Labour Court
“has a discretion to join a person as a party to these
proceedings even if such person
was not joined at the time of
conciliation.”
12
The matter concerned the appointment of an employee to a position
within Rand Water. Ultimately, Pillay J held that SAMWU should
not
be joined as it did not have the necessary substantial interest, and
that the second applicant for joinder need not be joined
because he
had agreed to abide the outcome of the proceedings. However, Pillay
J held that joinder was procedurally competent
provided that the
requisite substantial interest was present.
The matter of
Mokoena v Motor Component Industry (Pty) Ltd
13
confirms this principle in the context of an unfair dismissal
dispute more closely analogous to the present matter.
In
Mokoena
, the applicants in an unfair dismissal claim
sought to join three respondents who were not cited in the dispute
referral and
did not participate in conciliation.
14
The respondents opposed their joinder on that basis. The court,
approving the dictum in
Selala
, emphatically rejected the
argument:
“
It is
immediately apparent that the court’s powers of joinder would,
in dismissal proceedings, only be exercised after the
conciliation
proceedings in terms of s 134 of the Act have been exhausted. Before
that occurs, the Labour Court is not seized with
the matter at all.
Rule 22 therefore clearly allows for applications for joinder after
conciliation proceedings, and it is significant
that rule 22 nowhere
specifies that a party may only be joined if that party was also a
participant in the conciliation proceedings.
In my view, this court has a
discretion to join parties to a matter, even if they did not
participate in the preceding conciliation
proceedings (Selala &
another v Rand Water (2000) 21 1LJ 2102 (LC) at 2104-5). While
statutory conciliation is one of the jurisdictional
facts that must
be present before an unfair dismissal dispute may be dealt with by
the Labour Court, or by arbitration, one must
not regard the dispute
and the parties to the dispute in synonymous terms. Situations may be
conceived where there is a dispute
between the immediate disputant
parties, in which other parties also have an interest. As long as the
dispute has been the subject
of proper conciliation, even if all the
parties thereto did not participate in such conciliation proceedings,
the aforesaid jurisdictional
requirement is satisfied.”
15
The court went on to note that the door to conciliation was not
necessarily closed to respondents joined at this stage, as
they may
employ the mechanism of a pre-trial conference to seek conciliation
or may ask the court not to deal with the merits
until there have
been further attempts at conciliation in terms of s 157(4)(a) of
the LRA.
16
The facts of the present matter – in respect of BHR and
Intervalve – are indeed more strongly in favour of joinder
than the facts of
Mokoena
, in that:
BHR and Intervalve participated in all the meetings and engagements
during the strike action and dismissal process;
BHR and Intervalve have the same knowledge of the proceedings as
Steinmuller;
BHR and Intervalve did, in effect, participate in conciliation
through the shared HR Services;
BHR and Intervalve are represented by the same attorneys as
Steinmuller, a further demonstration of their parity of interest
in
the underlying proceedings and of their readiness to participate in
them.
BHR and Intervalve have not expressed any interest in re-opening
conciliation. However, Mr
Brickhill
made it clear that the
applicant has no objection to doing so should they so request.
However, the stage which proceedings have
reached – well
before trial -- constitutes no obstacle to their joinder.
In
SACCAWU v Entertainment Logistics Service (a division of Gallo
Africa Ltd)
17
this court again discussed the principles relating to joinder in
terms of rule 22. In that case, neither party appears to have
referred the court to the earlier decisions in
Selala
or
Mokoena
; the court did not refer to them and expressed no
view that they had been wrongly decided.
18
In
Entertainment Logistics Service
, the applicant union
sought to join some 70 of its members to a referral made in respect
of the dismissal of a single employee.
In the course of his
judgment, Van Niekerk J held
19
:
“
[9]
The three acts of dismissal that gave rise to the three disputes
referred to the CCMA share a limited factual commonality. The
high
point for the applicant is that some of the individual employees were
dismissed for participation in same unprotected industrial
action for
which Mazibu was dismissed. Even then, Mazibu and the individual
employees dismissed for the same misconduct occupied
different
positions (Mazibu was a shop steward), and were dismissed after
differently constituted disciplinary enquiries (a separate
enquiry
was convened for Mazibu and other shop stewards). The remaining
individual employees, ie those not dismissed for participation
in the
same misconduct as Mazibu) were dismissed at a different time, for
participation in a different form of industrial action,
ie
participation in an overtime ban as opposed to a strike. The
applicant does not dispute that in these circumstances, the sanction
of dismissal imposed in each case may have been influenced by
different aspects in respect of each applicant. What is particularly
significant for present purposes is that the dismissals gave rise to
separate and independent disputes, each of which was processed
separately through the statutory dispute resolution mechanisms.
Separate conciliation meetings were held in respect of each, and
separate certificates of outcome were issued in respect of each
dispute.
[10] In my view, what the
structure and wording of section 191 demonstrates, consistent with
the manner in which the applicant had
processed them, is that in the
present instance, separate disputes had to be referred to this Court.
What the applicant might then
have sought after the referral is a
joinder or more correctly, a consolidation of the disputes in terms
of rule 23. It is not open
to the applicant to use the process of
joinder to circumvent the provisions of section 191(5) and (11) in
respect of each dispute.
These provisions require, in peremptory
terms, that each of the disputes had to be referred to this Court by
way of the filing
of a statement of case. Just as a plaintiff in a
civil claim in the high court cannot, through a belated process of
joinder, join
a defendant against whom a claim has prescribed (see
Waverley Blankets Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd & another
2002 (4) SA 166
(C) [also reported at
[2002] JOL 9331
(C) –
Ed]), an applicant in this Court cannot rely on a joinder in terms of
rule 22 to avoid its obligations to comply with
section 191 of the
LRA.
[11] Even if I am wrong in
coming to this conclusion, the application stands to fail on the
basis that in the present circumstances,
condonation is a
prerequisite for joinder. The granting of the application for joinder
would have the effect of the individual
employees coming party to
Mazibu’s statement of case with effect from the date of the
order, with the result that Mazibu’s
referral would serve as
their referral to this Court. Seen thus, the individual applicants
cannot escape their obligation to comply
with the 90-day time limit
in terms of section 191(11)(a), and their obligation to seek
condonation in terms of section 191(11)(b).”
It must be clear from the above extract that the facts in
Entertainment Logistics
are quite distinct from those in the
case before me. In that case, three acts of dismissal gave rise to
three disputes; the employees
occupied different positions; they
were dismissed after separately and differently constituted
disciplinary enquiries; and they
were dismissed for participation in
different types of industrial action. The dismissals, in the words
of Van Niekerk J, gave
rise to “separate and distinct
disputes.”
In the present case, all of the employees were dismissed for
participation in the same strike. Importantly, they were dismissed
pursuant to collective disciplinary procedures handled by the shared
HR services of Steinmuller, BHR and Intervalve. Identical
letters of
dismissal were prepared by the shared HR services. And those
employees who were re-employed, were re-employed without
distinction
as to their employer.
In short, unlike the scenario in
Entertainment Logistics
, the
NUMSA members in the case before me were all dismissed pursuant to
exactly the same set of facts. They referred an unfair
dismissal
dispute arising from that dismissal. That dispute has been
conciliated.
It is difficult to conceive of the purpose of rule 22 if it were not
to be applicable to the current set of circumstances. If
NUMSA had
to refer separate disputes to conciliation vis-à-vis each
employer, only to apply for consolidation of proceedings
afterwards,
it would obviate the need for joinder. It would also lead to costly
and unnecessary duplication of processes. It
would go against the
grain of the LRA’s stated aim of the effective resolution of
labour disputes.
20
Rule 22(6) clearly envisages that parties may be joined to
proceedings that are already in progress. It provides that:
“
An
application to join any person as a party to proceedings ... must be
accompanied by copies of all documents previously delivered,
unless
the person concerned or that person’s representative is already
in possession of those documents.”
In the present case, both the legal representatives of Steinmuller,
BHR and Intervalve, as well as their HR services, have been
in
possession of all pleadings and documents previously delivered; and
furthermore, they took part in the conciliation proceedings.
In these circumstances, it would, in my view, be overly formalistic
and against the spirit and stated purpose of the LRA to refuse
joinder on the basis that BHR and Intervalve were not parties to the
conciliation. The objection of those parties – represented
by
the same attorneys as Steinmuller – to the joinder smacks of a
cynically opportunistic approach in an attempt to avoid
dealing with
the merits of the dispute at trial.
Conclusion
I am satisfied that, on the facts of this case, the requirements for
joinder as set out in rule 22 have been met.
The application has been opposed only by BHR and Intervalve. The
other two entities that did not oppose the application, viz
Strategic HR and TQA, should similarly be joined.
This is not the end of the dispute. In these circumstances, neither
party should pay the other’s costs.
Order
Rule 22(2)(b) enjoins the court to “give such directions as to
the further procedure in the proceedings as it deems fit”.
I
will do so in terms of the following order:
The following parties are joined as respondents in these
proceedings:
Intervalve (Pty) Ltd as the second respondent;
BHR Piping Systems (Pty) Ltd as the third respondent;
Strategic Human Resources as the fourth respondent;
TQA Trading Enterprises (Pty) Ltd as the fifth respondent.
The applicant is granted leave to amend its statement of claim
insofar as may be necessary as a result of the joinder.
The first respondent, Steinmuller Africa (Pty) Ltd, is granted
leave to amend its statement of defence, and the second to fifth
respondents may file statements of defence, if any.
There is no order as to costs.
_______________________
Anton Steenkamp
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
APPEARANCES
APPLICANT:
Jason Brickhill
Instructed by Cheadle
Thompson & Haysom.
SECOND AND THIRD
RESPONDENTs:
Greg Fourie
Instructed by Anton
Bakker Inc.
1
Act
66 of 1995 (“the LRA”).
2
The
list was annexed as an annexure (“RD3”) to the founding
affidavit in this application.
3
All
three companies are subsidiaries of Bilfinger Berger Power Holdings
(Pty) Ltd. That entity has the majority shareholding in
each of the
three companies; in the case of Steinmuller and BHR, a shareholding
of 74.9%.
4
For
example, the payslips of a number of employees indicated that they
were paid by either Steinmuller or Intervalve within months
of each
payment.
5
A
somewhat ironic pay-off line appears at the bottom of the letter,
stating: “One Team – One Target”.
6
Rule
22 provides:
“
22 Joinder of parties, intervention as
applicant or respondent, amendment of citation and substitution of
parties
The court may join any number of persons, whether
jointly, jointly and severally, separately, or in the alternative,
as parties
in proceedings, if the right to relief depends on the
determination of substantially the same question of law of facts.
(a)The court may, of its own motion or on application
and on notice to every other party, make an order joining any
person as
a party in the proceedings if the party to be joined has
a substantial interest in the subject matter of proceedings.
(b)When making an order in terms of paragraph (a), the
court may give such directions as to the further procedure in the
proceedings
as it deems fit, and may make an order as to costs.
Any person entitled to join as a party in any
proceedings may, on notice to all parties, at any stage of the
proceedings, apply
for leave to intervene as a party and the court
may make an order, including any order as to costs, or give such
directions
as to the further procedure in the proceedings as it
deems fit.
If a party to any proceedings has been incorrectly or
defectively cited, the court may, on application and on notice to
the
party concerned, correct the error or defect and may make an
order as to costs.
If any proceedings it becomes necessary to substitute
a person for existing party, any party to such proceedings may, on
application
and on notice to every other party, apply to the court
for an order substituting that party for an existing party and the
court
may make such order, including an order as to costs, or give
such directions as to further procedure in the proceedings as it
deems fit.
An application to join any person as a party to the
proceedings or to be substituted for an existing party must be
accompanied
by copies of all documents previously delivered, unless
the person concerned or that person’s representative is
already
in possession of those documents.
No joinder of substitution in terms of this rule will
affect any prior steps taken in the proceedings.”
7
Hartland
Implemente (Edms) Bpk v Enal Eiendomme BK en andere
2002 (3) SA
653
(NC) 663E-H.
8
Harding
v Basson and Others
1995 (4) SA 499
(CPD) at 501C.
9
Harding
(supra)
at 501J.
10
Ploughman
NO v Pauw and Another
2006 (6) SA 334
(C) at 341E.
11
SA
Steel Equipment Co (Pty) Ltd v Lurelk (Pty) Ltd
1951 (4) SA 167
(T) 172H-173A.
12
Selala
& Another v Rand Water
(2000) 21
ILJ
2102 (LC) para
8.
13
Mokoena
& Others v Motor Component Industry (Pty) Ltd & Others
(2005) 26
ILJ
277 (LC).
14
Mokoena
(supra)
at 279A.
15
Mokoena
(supra)
at 279AC-G.
16
Mokoena
(supra)
at 279H-I.
17
(2011)
32
ILJ
410 (LC);
[2011] 2 BLLR 206
(LC).
18
Neither
Selala
nor
Mokoena
appears to have gone on appeal.
19
At
paragraphs [9] – [11].
20
LRA
s 1(d)(iv).