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[2011] ZALCJHB 59
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Plastics Convertors Association of South Africa v Association of Electric Cable Manufacturers of South Africa and Others (J1212/11) [2011] ZALCJHB 59; [2011] 11 BLLR 1095 (LC); (2011) 32 ILJ 3007 (LC) (18 July 2011)
AC BASSON J
IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
HELD AT BRAAMFONTEIN
CASE NO: J1212/11
In the matter between:
PLASTICS CONVERTORS ASSOCIATION
OF SOUTH AFRICA
…...............................................................................
First
Applicant
and
ASSOCIATION OF ELECTRIC CABLE
MANUFACTURERS OF SOUTH AFRICA
(AECMSA)
….............................................................................................
1
st
Respondent
ASSOCIATION OF METAL SERVICE
CENTRES OF SOUTH AFRICA
…..........................................................
2
nd
Respondent
BRIGHT BAR ASSOCIATION
…..............................................................
3
rd
Respondent
CAPE ENGINEER’S AND FOUNDERS’
ASSOCIATION (SOUTH AFRICA)
….......................................................
4
th
Respondent
CONSTRUCTIONAL ENGINEERING
ASSOCIATION (SOUTH AFRICA)
….......................................................
5
th
Respondent
COVERED CONDUCTOR MANUFACTURER’S
ASSOCIATION
….....................................................................................
6
th
Respondent
ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING AND ALLIED
INDUSTRIES’ ASSOCIATION
…..............................................................
7
th
Respondent
ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURER’S
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH AFRICA
…....................................................
8
th
Respondent
ELECTRONICS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INDUSTRIES’ ASSOCIATION
…..............................................................
9
th
Respondent
FERRO ALLOY PRODUCERS’
ASSOCIATION
…...................................................................................
10
Th
Respondent
GATE AND FENCE ASSOCIATION
…...................................................
11
th
Respondent
HAND TOOL MANUFACTURERS’
ASSOCIATION(HATNA)
….....................................................................
12
th
Respondent
IRON AND STEEL PRODUCERS’
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH AFRICA
…..................................................
13
th
Respondent
KWAZULU NATAL ENGINEERING
INDUSTRIES’ ASSOCIATION
…............................................................
14
th
Respondent
LIFT ENGINEERING ASSOCIATION OF
SOUTH AFRICA
….................................................................................
15
th
Respondent
LIFT ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES’
ASSOICATION OF SOUTH AFRICA
…..................................................
16
th
Respondent
NON-FERROUS METAL INDUSTRIES
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH AFRICA
…..................................................
17
th
Respondent
PLUMBERS AND ENGINEERS BRASSWARE
MANUFACTURES’ ASSOCIATION
…....................................................
18
th
Respondent
PORT ELIZABETH ENGINEERS’
ASSOCIATION
…...................................................................................
19
th
Respondent
PRESSURE VESSEL MANUFACTURER’S
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH AFRICA
…..................................................
20
th
Respondent
RADIO, APPLIANCE AND TELEVISION
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH AFRICA
(RATA)
…................................................................................................
21
st
Respondent
REGRIGIRATION AND AIRCONDITIONING
MANUFACTURERS’ AND SUPPLIERS’
ASSOCIATION
…...................................................................................
22
nd
Respondent
SHEETMETAL INDUSTRIES’ ASSOCIATION
OF SOUTH AFRICA
…...........................................................................
23
rd
Respondent
SA ELECTRO-PLATIN INDUSTRIES’
ASSOCIATION
…...................................................................................
24
th
Respondent
SA ENGINEERING AND FOUNDERS’
ASSOCIATION
…...................................................................................
25
th
Respondent
SA FASTERNERS MANUFACTURERS’
ASSOCIATION
(SAFMA)
….............................................................................................
26
th
Respondent
SA REGRIGIRATION AND AIRCONDITIONING
CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION (SARACCA)
…..................................
27
th
Respondent
SA POST TENSIONING ASSOCIATION
(SAPTA)
…..............................................................................................
28
th
Respondent
SA RUMP MANUFACTURERS’ ASSOCIATION
…................................
29
th
Respondent
SA REINFORCED CONCRETE ENGINEERS’
ASSOCIATION (SARCEA)
….................................................................
30
th
Respondent
SA VALVE & ACTUATOR MANUFACTURERS’
ASSOCIATION (SAVAMA)
….................................................................
31
st
Respondent
FEDERATED EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATION
OF SA (FEOSA)
….................................................................................
32
nd
Respondent
NATIONAL EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATION OF
SA (NEASA)
…........................................................................................
33
rd
Respondent
CHEMICAL, ENERGY, PAPER, PRINTING
WOOD AND ALLIED WORKERS
ASSOCIATION (CEPPAWU)
…..............................................................
34
th
Respondent
METAL AND ELECTRICAL WORKERS’
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH AFRICA
…..................................................
35
th
Respondent
SOLIDARITY MWU 36
th
Respondent
UNITED ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH AFRICA
…...................................
37
th
Respondent
NATIONAL UNIION OF METAL WORKERS’
OF SOUTH AFRICA (NUMSA)
…...........................................................
38
th
Respondent
S.A. EQUITY WORKERS’ ASSOCIATION
(SAEWA)
….............................................................................................
39
th
Respondent
METAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES
BARGAINING COUNCIL
…....................................................................
40
th
Respondent
STEEL ENGINEERING FEDERATION OF
SOUTH AFRICA (SEIFSA)
….................................................................
41
st
Respondent
Date of Order : 3 July 2011
Date of Reasons : 18 July 2011
________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
________________________________________________________
A.C BASSON J:
This application was brought in terms of section
68(1)(a)(i) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (“the LRA”)
for
an order declaring that the strike by the employees of the
applicant’s members constitutes an unprotected strike. The
matter
was argued in Court on Sunday 3 July 2011. The Court
dismissed the application for an interim interdict with costs.
Argument
was presented to the Court on behalf of the 34
th
respondent (the
Chemical, Energy, Paper,
Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Association (CEPPAWU); the
38
th
respondent (National Union of Metal Workers
of South Africa – NUMSA); the 40
th
respondent (the Metal Engineering Industries
Bargaining Council - MEIBC) and the 41
st
respondent (the Steel Engineering Federation of
South Africa (SEIFSA)). No order was sought against the 41
st
respondent and it was merely cited as an
interested party.
The crux of the dispute is the applicant’s
complaint that the Metal Engineering Industrial Bargaining Council
(“the
MEIBC”) had failed to comply with the peremptory
provisions of its Constitution and had failed to involve the
applicant
in a process of conciliation in respect of the industry
dispute before it (the MEIBC) and in respect of which the MEIBC had
issued
a certificate of non-resolution. It was submitted that the
failure of the MEIBC to comply with the compulsory provisions of
clause
3(b)(ii) of the Constitution rendered the process “unlawful,
unconstitutional and unfair resulting in the strikes in the
plastic
industry to be unprotected”. It was therefore submitted that
because of the non-compliance with section 64(3) of
the LRA (which
stipulates that employees need not comply with the provisions of
section 64 (1) in order to strike if the parties
to the disputes are
members of a council and the dispute has been dealt with by that
council in accordance with its constitution)
the strike is
unprotected insofar as the applicant’s members are concerned.
The relevant provisions of the LRA provides
as follows:
“
64. Right to strike and recourse to
lock out
Every employee has the right to strike and every employer has
recourse to lock out if-
the issue in dispute has been referred to a council or to the
Commission as required by this Act, and-
a certificate stating that the dispute remains unresolved has
been issued; or
…
.
in the case of a proposed strike, at least 48 hours' notice of the
commencement of the strike, in writing, has been given
to the
employer, unless-
the issue in dispute relates to a collective agreement to be
concluded in a council, in which case, notice must have been
given to that council; or
the employer is a member of an employers' organisation that is a
party to the dispute, in which case, notice must have
been given
to that employers' organisation; or
…
.
The requirements of subsection (1) do not apply to a strike or a
lock-out if-
the parties to the dispute are members of a council, and the
dispute has been dealt with by that council in accordance with
its
constitution; ….”
The applicant’s complaint is therefore limited to
the non-compliance with section 64(3) of the LRA in that the
procedures
contained in the Bargaining Council’s constitution
were not followed. I will deal with this aspect in more detail
herein
below.
It is important to point out that the applicant does
not seek to have the certificate of non-resolution of the dispute
issued
by the MEIBC on 30 June 2011 set aside. The Court therefore
understood the argument not to be that the various union parties who
are respondents to this application and who were part of the
conciliation process which resulted in the issuing of the
certificate
of non-resolution, are not entitled to embark on
(protected) strike action. What the applicant is arguing is that any
strike
in respect of
its
members
will be unprotected
as a result of the MEIBC’s non-compliance with clause 3
(b)(ii) of the Constitution. I will return
to this argument herein
below.
Brief background to the relevant facts
1
The applicant was previously a member of the MEIBC but
resigned in February 2011. However despite the applicant’s
resignation,
its members’ activities remain within the
jurisdiction of the MEIBC. The applicant represents 320 members and
the applicant’s
members employ approximately 21,185 (twenty
one thousand one hundred and eighty five) employees.
The 38
th
Respondent (NUMSA) and the other
unions who are parties to the MEIBC submitted their demands on 8
April 2011 for the conclusion
of a collective agreement at the
MEIBC. The demands included a wage increase of 13%, an extension of
family responsibility leave
and a total ban on labour brokers.
Wage negotiations for 2011 commenced on 4 May 2011
under the auspices of the Management Committee (MANCO) of the
council. Numerous
meetings were held until eventually deadlock was
declared on 7 June 2011. On 13 June 2011 the MEIBC’s MANCO met
to decide
on the process to be followed in light of the deadlock. It
was agreed that this was an industry dispute and MANCO decided to
establish a sub-committee to resolve the dispute. The sub-committee
made up of representatives of the parties to the council (and
to the
dispute) met on 14, 21, 25 and 26 June 2011. The parties were unable
to resolve the dispute. On 30 June 2011 a certificate
was issued
declaring that the dispute was unresolved. Only one union, namely
NUMSA, has issued 48 hours’ notice of the
strike.
On 14 April 2011, at a MANCO meeting, NEASA attempted
to table proposals on behalf of the applicant. MANCO confirmed that
the
applicant was no longer a party to the MEIBC and therefore NEASA
could not table proposals on behalf of the applicant. The applicant
was therefore aware on 14 April 2011 that it would not be allowed to
participate in the negotiations. NEASA withdrew the proposals
tabled
on behalf of the applicant as the applicant had resigned and
therefore no longer a party to the negotiation process which
involved only the parties to the MEIBC. However, despite the fact
that the applicant had resigned, it is common cause that the
applicant and its members remain within the registered scope of the
Council albeit as a non-party to the MEIBC .
On 27 June 2011 the applicant forwarded a letter to the
CEO of the MEIBC in which reference is made to the provisions of
clause
3(b)(ii) of the Constitution. In this letter the applicant
pointed out that the failure to conduct a conciliation meeting with
the applicant as required by the Constitution will result in the
strike being unprotected. The applicant further stated that
the
deliberations that have taken place under the auspices of the MEIBC
will have no effect on non-parties. The MEIBC was requested
by the
applicant to follow the correct procedures in respect of the dispute
as required by the relevant provisions of the Constitution.
NUMSA responded to the aforementioned letter and
pointed out to the applicant that it was of the view that employees
within the
sector, including employees employed by the applicant’s
members, are entitled to embark upon strike action in support of
the
union’s demands. NUMSA further pointed out that it will oppose
any attempt to discipline employees for engaging in
any intended
strike action.
As already pointed out, the applicant is not seeking to
have the certificate of non-resolution issued by the MEIBC set
aside.
What it is challenging is the dispute resolution procedures
(contained in the Constitution of the MEIBC and in a Dispute
Resolution
Agreement) that the Council has pursued in attempting to
resolve the dispute that was referred to the MEIBC which culminated
in a certificate of outcome which , according to the applicant, does
not bind the applicant (and its members).
Clause 3 (b)(ii) of the (MEIBC) Constitution
As already pointed out, the applicant submitted that
the negotiation and dispute procedures contained in Annexure “E”
to the MEIBC Constitution provides that, in the case of a dispute
involving a non-party to the Council, it is compulsory for
the
Management Committee of the MEIBC to refer the dispute to
conciliation in terms of clause 7 of the Constitution. Because
of
the non-compliance with the provisions of clause 3(b)(ii) of the
Constitution and in light of the fact that the industry dispute
between the applicant (as a non-party) had not been referred to
conciliation as required by said the provisions of the Constitution,
the strike in respect of the applicant’s members will be
unprotected in that it falls outside of the ambit of the certificate
issued by the MEIBC on 1 June 2011. Clause 3(b)(ii) of Annexure “E”
to the Constitution states as follows:
“
The Management Committee shall use its best
endeavours to settle the [industry] dispute and shall meet as often
as it deems necessary
for this purpose. In the course of its
deliberations the Committee may give consideration to the following:
-
…
.
(ii) Referring the dispute to conciliation in terms of sub-section 7
below,
provided that this shall be compulsory, in the case of a
dispute involving a non-party to the Council.’”
2
The respondents
3
argued that the application has no merits and that it
should be dismissed with costs. I will return to the respondents’
arguments in more detail hereinbelow
Legal framework
Collective bargaining can take place at various levels
or forums. In this particular instance bargaining in respect of
wages and
other conditions of employment take place at industry
level between unions on the one side and employer organisations on
the
other side. Collective bargaining further takes place under the
auspices of the Bargaining Council (the MEIBC).
Bargaining Councils are established in terms of section
27 of the LRA. One of the functions of a Bargaining Council is to
conclude
collective agreements which will bind the
parties
to the collective agreement and those contemplated in section 23 of
the LRA. A collective agreement may be extended by the Minister
to
any non-parties to the collective agreement that fall within its
registered scope (section 32 of the LRA). Should the parties
to the
Bargaining Council in casu conclude an agreement, the agreement may
therefore be extended to the applicant in the circumstances
as
contemplated in section 32 of the LRA as the applicant, although it
had resigned its membership from the Council (and therefore
a
non-party to the Council), still falls within the registered scope
of the Council. In the present case there are approximately
5000
employers that are non-parties to the MEIBC but who may be affected
by any extension of a collective agreement by the Minister
in terms
of section 32 of the LRA. Nothing, however, prevents an employer who
falls within the registered scope of the MEIBC
and who wishes to be
involved in the process leading up the conclusion of the main
agreement to be a member of an employers association
which is party
to the MEIBC.
Was there compliance with section 64(3)(a) of the
LRA?
I have already pointed out that it was principally the
argument on behalf of the applicant that, because the Council had
not complied
with section 64(3) of the LRA in that it did not refer
the dispute in terms of its Constitution to conciliation, the strike
involving
the applicant’s members will be unprotected.
I am not persuaded by this argument simply because the
applicant was and is not a party to the dispute. The dispute is
between
the
parties
to the Council who are locked into
negotiations in respect of the conclusion of the Main Agreement. It
is furthermore, the parties
to the negotiations who have deadlocked
and in respect of which a certificate of non-resolution was issued
by the MEIBC. Moreover,
should the parties to the Council (and the
dispute) resolve the dispute by signing the Main Agreement the said
agreement will
not even be applicable to the applicant’s
members simply because they are
non-parties
to the
agreement
. As already pointed out, the agreement may
be extended to non-parties by the Minister of Labour.
I am in agreement with the respondent’s
submission that it makes no sense to involve a non-party in the
negotiations leading
up to the conclusion of the new Main Agreement
simply because non-parties by choice do not have any bargaining
rights in this
regard. The agreement is negotiated and concluded
between the (negotiating) parties to the Council. Having said this
it must
be made clear that this does not mean that employees of
non-members may not as a result embark on strike action in support
of
the dispute which could not be resolved during the negotiations
under the auspices of the Bargaining Council. These employees fall
within the scope of the Bargaining Council and as a result have an
interest in the
outcome
of the negotiations. I will
return to this issue herein below.
In deciding whether or not the MEIBC has not complied
with the provisions of section 64(3)(a) of the LRA, it must first be
considered
whether clause 3(b)(ii) of the Constitution of the
Bargaining Council compels the Management Committee to refer the
dispute to
conciliation and involve a non-party to the Council as
argued on behalf of the applicant. I am not persuaded that this
clause
compels the Management Committee to do so. In the present
circumstances no one has referred a dispute formally against the
applicant.
In other words, the applicant is not party to a dispute
before the MEIBC. The disputes that have been declared are between
the
disputed parties referred to in the declaration of the disputes.
Consequently I am in agreement with the submission that this clause
is not applicable in the present circumstances and that the
Management Committee was therefore not compelled in terms of the
Constitution to involve a non-party to the Council in conciliation.
I am therefore not persuaded that the Council had not complied
with
section 64(3) of the LRA.
There is, in my view, an even more compelling reason
why it is not necessary to involve a non-party in the negotiations
about
the Main Agreement and that is the fact that the applicant,
even if it and its members were invited to participate in the
conciliation
proceeding, would not have been able to settle the
dispute which is the subject matter of the strike simply because
settling
the dispute between the applicant and the relevant unions
will not settle the dispute between the bargaining or negotiating
parties
to the Council. The applicant would be but one of the
parties to the agreement.
I am further in agreement with the respondents’
submission that it is simply inconceivable that the MEIBC would be
required
to conciliate disputes with approximately 5000 non-party
employers before management and/or the unions may resort to power
play
4
.
I am further in agreement that such an interpretation would
undermine the principles and purpose of sectoral bargaining as well
as the Constitutional right of unions to strike. Such an
interpretation would further be administratively and logistically
impossible to carry out. A similar approach was followed by the
Labour Court in
Tiger Wheels Babelegi (Pty)
Ltd t/a TSW International v NUMSA and Others
5
where
the Court held as follows in the context of the notice that has to
be given to embark on a strike in terms of section 64
(1)(b)(i) of
the LRA:
“…
if the issue in dispute which is
the subject matter of the strike is a matter which relates to a
collective agreement to be concluded
in a council, the notice is not
required to be given to the employer but the council.
There must be a reason why the legislature decided to provide for
exceptions to the general rule that the strike notice must be
given
to the employer. Insofar as exception is concerned, it must be
because the bargaining Council must be taken to be a forum
which is
representative of the industry over which it has jurisdiction and if
notice is given to the Council, it must be deemed
to have been given
to all employer within the Council. The other reason may well be that
in the absence of the exception, notice
would have had to be given,
in a case such as this one, to thousands of employers individually.
In that event, administratively
and logistically not only would an
industry-wide strike be a nightmare but also it would almost be
impossible to embark upon.”
6
Section 63(1) of the LRA
Even if I am wrong in finding that the Bargaining
Council did not have to comply with its Constitution for the reasons
given and
even if it is found that the MEIBC had not complied with
section 64(3)(a) of the LRA, it would in my view, in any event not
follow
that intended the strike by the employees employed by the
applicant will be unprotected. In both
County
Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v Food and Allied Workers Union and Others,
7
and
SA Clothing and Textile
Workers Union v Free State and Northern Cape Clothing Manufactures’
Association,
8
the Labour Appeal Court was of the view that employees
have an election either to comply with the statutory requirements or
to
comply with pre-strike procedures contained in a collective
agreement. In
County Fair,
the
Court held that the LRA contemplates situations where a party is
exempted from complying with the procedures set out in section
64(1)
of the LRA before striking or locking-out. Those situations are
provided for in section 64(3) of the LRA. In such a case
it is
therefore not necessary for a disputing party to follow section
64(1) of the LRA. However, the Court made it clear that
section
64(3) of the LRA does not preclude striking employees from following
64(1) of the LRA. According to the Court, it is
clear that the LRA
gives a party an election of either following a pre-strike procedure
agreed to in a collective agreement or
following the statutory
procedure as laid down in section 64(1) of the LRA. Compliance with
either procedure suffices to confer
on employees the right to strike
with the result that the strike will be protected.
9
Can the employees of non-parties embark on strike
action?
Employees who are employed by non-parties are entitled
to go out on strike in order to promote sectoral collective
bargaining
and need therefore not refer individual disputes against
employers who are non-parties to the Council in circumstances where
these employers nevertheless fall under the Council’s
jurisdiction. This approach gives effect to the majoritarian
principal
by recognising that a Bargaining Council exists because it
has been established by a majority of employers and employees in the
industry. A Bargaining Council is the representative of the industry
over which it has jurisdiction
10
.
It is therefore unnecessary and too cumbersome for every non-party
to be joined to a referral before an industry-wide strike
takes
place. Equally, as long as the dispute has been dealt with by the
Bargaining Council, all employees that have a material
interest in
the demands over which deadlock has been reached may strike. It
further follows, in my view, that once the issue
in dispute has been
referred to a Council for conciliation (as was done in this case)
every employee employed in the sector and
who has a material
interest in the outcome of the demands made by the union party to
the Council may embark on a protected strike
action. This approach,
in my view, gives effect to the right to strike afforded to every
employee in terms of section 64(1) of
the LRA. See in this regard
Metal Box of SA Ltd t/a Molders v NUMSA and
Others,
11
where the Industrial Court held that all employees in
the industry were entitled to strike including those employed by
employers
of non-parties to the Council because the Council had
industry-wide jurisdiction. The Court rejected the submission that a
non-party
employer could rely upon the fact that no dispute had been
referred against it specifically as a basis for it to interdict the
strike. See also
Afrox Ltd v SACWU and
Others
12
where the Court also concluded that employees have the
right to strike even thought the employees were not part of the
referral
of the dispute for conciliation in light of the fact that
the
issue in dispute
had
been referred to conciliation.
In conclusion, it was not disputed that the unions have
complied with section 64(1) of the LRA. Consequently the strike will
in
my view be legal.
13
The required strike notice
[25] In so far as it was submitted that the failure to
give notice of the intended strike to the applicant, it is clear from
section
64(1)(b)(i) of the LRA and the case law that it is sufficient
to give notice to the Bargaining Council if the issue in dispute
relates to a collective agreement to be concluded in a Council. In
respect of non-parties it is likewise sufficient to merely give
notice to the Bargaining Council. See the
Tiger
Wheels
-case (supra). In that matter the
employer was not a member of the Motor Industry Bargaining Council
and had not been party to wage
negotiations at the Council although
the employer fell within the jurisdiction of the Council. It was
contended by the employer
that it was entitled to receive 48
hours’notice of the strike before its employees were entitled
to embark on a protected
strike. In that matter the strike was
likewise in support of collective bargaining at sectoral level. The
Court held that it would
create administrative and logistic chaos if
the unions were required to give every employer non-party notice of
the strike. The
Court found that once notice was given to the Council
it must be deemed to be given to all employers who fall within the
scope
of the Council. The Court accepted that a Bargaining Council is
the representative of the industry over which it had jurisdiction
over and consequently if notice is given to the Council it must be
deemed to be given to all employers who fall within the scope
of the
Council.
14
[26] In conclusion, the application is dismissed for the
following reasons:
The MEIBC did not contravene the provisions of section
64(3)(a) of the LRA because the applicant and its members are not
involved
in the dispute. Consequently it was not necessary for the
MEIBC to have convened a conciliation meeting with the applicant in
terms of the Constitution of the Bargaining Council.
Alternatively, even if this Court ought to have found
that the MEIBC did not comply with section 64(3)(a) of the LRA, the
union
parties to the dispute have nonetheless complied with section
64(1) of the LRA. The issue in dispute had been referred to the
MEIBC as is required by the LRA and a certificate of non-resolution
had been issued. Consequently, once the unions have complied
with
this requirement, all employees falling within the jurisdiction of
the Bargaining Council and who have an interests in the
outcome of
the deliberations on the bargaining council, are entitled to
participate in the contemplated (protected) strike.
Notice has been served on the Bargaining Council in
respect of the intended strike. The fact that non-parties have not
been served
with a notice to strike does not render the strike
unprotected. As already pointed out it will result in an
administrative and
logistical nightmare to insist that all
non-parties to the Council must be invited to the concliation
process and to receive
notice of the intended strike in
circumstances where the Bargaining Council as the representative of
the industry over which
it had jurisdiction has received notice of
the strike.
[27] In respect of costs, I am satisfied that costs
should follow the result. Costs are therefore awarded in favour of
the 34
th
, 38
th
and 40
th
respondents.
As no order as to costs were sought in the Notice of Motion against
the 41
st
respondent, I make no order as to costs in
respect of this respondent.
______________________
AC BASSON J
Appearances:
For the Applicant : E Van Graan, SC. Adv A van der Walt
Instructed by : Geldenhuys Botha Attorneys
For the 40
th
Respondent : Adv. FA Boda
Adv. A Mosam
Instructed by : Gatoo Attorneys
For the 38
th
Respondent : Mr. Anton Roskam of
Haffegee Roskam
Savage Attorneys
1
In
light of the fact that the facts were largely common cause, I have
liberally relied on the heads of argument submitted on behalf
of the
40
th
and 38
th
respondents in summarizing the
relevant facts.
2
Court’s
emphasis.
3
As
presented on behalf of the 38
th
and 40
th
respondents.
4
There
are approximately 9000 employers falling within the scope of the
MEIBC. There are about 330000 employees in the industry.
59% of the
employees are parties to the Council in that they are members of
employer organisations that are party to the Council.
5
(1999)
20
ILJ
677 (LC).
6
Id
at para [18] and [19].
7
(2001)
22 ILJ 1103 (LAC).
8
(2001)
22 ILJ 2636 (LAC).
9
See
the summary as contained in the headnote.
10
See
Tiger Wheels supra
11
(1993)
14
ILJ
152(IC)
12
(1997)
4 BLLR 375
(LC),
13
See
in this regard
Columbus Joint Venture t/a Columbus Steel v NUMSA
[1997] 4 BLLR 375
(LC);
County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v FAWU and
Others
[2001] 5 BLLR 494
(LAC)
14
Above
n 3 at para [19].
19