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[2011] ZALCJHB 35
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Seatlolo and Others v Entertainment Logistics Service (A division of Gallo Africa Ltd (JS 1971/10) [2011] ZALCJHB 35; (2011) 32 ILJ 2206 (LC) (5 May 2011)
IN THE LABOUR COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
HELD AT JOHANNESBURG
Case no: JS 1971/10
Reportable
In the matter between:
HORATIOUS SEATLOLO
…......................................................................
First
Applicant
INDIVIDUAL APPLICANTS
LISTED IN SCHEDULE ‘A’
….............................................
Second
to Further Applicants
And
ENTERTAINMENT
LOGISTICS SERVICE
(A DIVISION OF GALLO
AFRICA
LTD)
…....................................................
Respondent
JUDGMENT
BHOOLA J:
Introduction
[1]
This
is an opposed application for condonation of the late referral of two
disputes involving the dismissal of the applicants to
this court.
Background
[2]
The applicants are and have at all material times been members of the
South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers’
Union
(SACCAWU), which represented them in three disputes with the
respondent as described below.
(a)
The first dispute: on 5 March 2008 the respondent dismissed 28 of the
applicants for participation in an overtime ban on 23
and 24 February
2008 whilst they were on final written warnings. SACCAWU referred the
dispute to the CCMA on 31 March 2008 and
a certificate of outcome was
issued on 21 April 2008. The 90-day period for referral of this
dispute in terms of section 191 (11)
(a) of the Labour Relations Act
66 of 1995 (the Act) expired on 21 July 2008.
(b)
The second dispute: during the period 5 to 27 March 2008, the
respondent dismissed 53 of the applicants for having participated
in
an unprotected strike on 26 February 2008. SACCAWU referred this
dispute to the CCMA on 28 April 2008 and a certificate of outcome
was
issued on 1 July 2008. The 90-day period for referral of this dispute
in terms of the Act expired on 1 October 2008.
(c)
The third dispute: on 18 April 2008 the respondent dismissed Mazibu,
a SACCAWU shop-steward for participation in the unprotected
strike of
26 February. SACCAWU referred a dispute arising from her dismissal to
the CCMA on 8 May 2008 and on 2 June 2008 the CCMA
issued a
certificate of outcome. This dispute was referred to this court in
terms of the Act on 2 September 2008.
[3]
On 14 October 2008 SACCAWU brought an application for joinder of the
applicants in this matter (who are the applicants in the
first and
second disputes referred to above) with the matter involving Mazibu
(the third dispute). At this stage, the referrals
to this court of
the first and second disputes were three months and two weeks out of
time respectively. In its answering affidavit
in the joinder
application the respondent alleged that the joinder procedure was
incorrect and that SACCAWU should have referred
the first and second
disputes together with applications for condonation, and then
thereafter sought to consolidate all three disputes.
This warning was
not heeded and SACCAWU persisted with the joinder application. The
joinder application was dismissed with costs
by Van Niekerk J on 31
August 2010 on the grounds
inter alia
that the joinder
application was misconceived. The learned judge held further that
condonation was a pre-requisite for joinder:
[12]
To the extent that the applicant contends that an application for
condonation is not required at this stage and that it ought
appropriately to be dealt with after a ruling in this application,
this contention overlooks the structure of the dispute resolution
process. In effect, the applicant seeks to refer a dispute on behalf
of the individual employees [i.e. the applicant’s herein
–
court’s note] outside of the prescribed time limit, and thus
requires condonation. It is not sufficient, as the applicants
submit
that the individual employees have never denied any necessity for an
application for condonation or that such an application
will not be
forthcoming. It is incumbent on a party to apply for condonation as
soon as possible after becoming aware of the default.
[4]
On 19 October 2010, some six weeks after the dismissal of the joinder
application, Vuza Biyana & Associates delivered this
application
together with a referral of the first and second disputes (“the
statement of claim”). It is common cause
that the statement of
claim is two years and three months late in respect of the first
dispute and two years and three weeks late
in respect of the second
dispute.
[5]
On 9 November 2010, E S Makinta attorneys, the current attorneys of
record for the applicants delivered a “supplementary
and
replying affidavit” in the condonation application.
The
legal test
[6]
The onus is on the applicants to satisfy the court that condonation
should be granted:
Meintjies v H D Combrinck (Edms) Bpk
1961
(1) SA 262
(A) at 263H-264A;
Saloojee & another N.N.O v
Minister of Community Development
1965 (2) SA 135
(A) at 138E-F;
and
Glazer v Glazer NO
1963 (4) SA 694
(A) at 702H.
[7]
The test for determining whether good cause exists for the delay in
filing a statement of claim in terms of section 191(11)
(b) is now
well established. In
Melane v Santam
Insurance Co Ltd
1962 (4) SA 531
(A)
Holmes
J.A at C-E set out the applicable principles as
follows:
...the
basic principle is that the court has a discretion, to be exercised
judicially upon a consideration of all the facts, in
essence it is a
matter of fairness to both sides. Among the facts usually relevant
are the degree of lateness, the explanation
thereof, the prospects of
success and the importance of the case. Ordinarily these facts are
interrelated: they are not individually
decisive, for that would be a
piecemeal approach, incompatible with a true discretion, save of
course that if there are no prospects
of success there will be no
point in granting condonation. What is needed is an objective
conspectus of all the facts. Thus, a
slight delay and a good
explanation may help to compensate for the prospects of success which
are not strong. On the importance
of the issue and strong prospects
of success may tend to compensate for a long delay. The Respondents
interest in finality must
not be overlooked...
[8] However it has been
held that a
bona fide defence
and good prospects of success
are not sufficient in the absence of a reasonable explanation for the
default:
Chetty v Law Society Transvaal
1985 (2) SA 756
(A) at
765. This principle has been interpreted as follows by the Labour
Appeal Court in
NUM v Council for Mineral Technology
(1999) 3
BLLR 209
(LAC) at 211 G-H:
There is a further
principle which is applied and that is that without a reasonable and
acceptable explanation for the delay, the
prospects of success are
immaterial, and without prospects of success, no matter how good the
explanation for the delay, an application
for condonation should be
refused.
[9]
This approach has been endorsed in a long line of LAC judgments. See
in this regard
NUM v Western Holdings Gold Mine
(1994) 15 ILJ
610 (LAC at 613 E;
Zondi & Others v President of Industrial
Court & Another
[1997] 8 BLLR 984
(LAC) at 989 E-F;
Mziya
v Putco Ltd
]1999]
[2002] ZACC 30
;
2 BLLR 103
(LAC) at 107 A-C;
NEHAWU v
Nyembezi
[1999] 5 BLLR 463
(LAC) at 456 J-466 A;
Waverely
Blankets Ltd v Ndima & Others, Waverely Blankets v Sithukura &
Others
(1999) 20 ILJ 2564 (LAC) at para 11;
Mgobhozi v Naidoo
NO & Others
[2006] 3 BLLR 242
(LAC) at para 34 and
Moila v
Shai NO & Others
[2007] 5 BLLR 432
(LAC) at para 34-36.
However in
NEHAWU obo Mofokeng & Others v Charlotte Theron
Children’s Home
[2004] 10 BLLR 979
(LAC), the Labour Appeal
Court noted that “a more flexible approach” had been
adopted in two other judgments (
PPWAWU & others v AF Dreyer &
Co (Pty) Ltd
[1997] 9 BLLR 1141
(LAC) at 1145 E and
Toyota
Marketing v Schmeizer
[2002] 12 BLLR 1164
(LAC) at para 18).
[10]
It is trite that an application for condonation must be brought as
soon as the party becomes aware of the default. This principle
has
been emphasized by the Supreme Court of Appeal on numerous occasions
(see
Saloojee
supra at 138H;
Rennie v Kamby Farms (Pty) Ltd
1989 (2) SA 124
(A) at 129G; and
Napier v Tsaperas
1995 (2) SA
665
(A) at 671 B-D). This approach has been endorsed by the Labour
Appeal Court which in fact advocates bringing the application for
condonation on the same day it is discovered to be necessary. See in
this regard
inter alia
Allround Tooling (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA
and others
[1998] 8 BLLR 847
(LAC) at 849 para 8;
NEHAWU v
Nyembezi
[1999] 5 BLLR 463
(LAC) at 464 D-F; and
Librapac CC v
Fedcraw and Others
[1999] 6 BLLR 540
(LAC) at 543.
[11] In order to exercise
its discretion whether or not to grant condonation, this court must
be appraised of all the facts and
circumstances relating to the
delay. The applicant for condonation must therefore provide a
satisfactory explanation for each period
of delay. See
NUMSA
and another v Hillside Aluminium
[2005] ZALC 25
;
[2005]
6 BLLR 601
(LC) where Murphy AJ held that an unsatisfactory
explanation for any period of delay will normally be fatal to an
application,
irrespective of the applicant’s prospects of
success.
Evaluation
of pleadings and submissions
[12]
The respondent submits that it is noteworthy that SACCAWU is not a
party to this application notwithstanding having represented
the
applicants up to this point, including having prepared this
application. I agree with the respondent that this appears to be
an
expedient strategy to avoid liability and to enable the applicants to
rely on the delays to establish good cause without it
having to
provide any explanation. The essential submission by the applicants
is that their union is to be blamed for the delays
and that they
should not be visited with punishment for its incorrect legal advice.
The respondent submits that in circumstances
where there is a
manifest failure to provide a reasonable and acceptable explanation
for the delay, the applicants cannot escape
the consequences by
simply blaming their union. In my view it is simply unacceptable that
SACCAWU has elected not to be a party
to these proceedings and has
not even endeavoured to take this Court into its confidence to
explain its conduct. Had it done so
the outcome of this application
might well have been different. Obviously these applicants have civil
remedies at their disposal
in respect of the manifest and negligent
disregard of the union’s duty towards them. Nonetheless, it is
the merits of the
application which must be considered and it is to
this that I now turn.
[13]
The applicants submit that although the delay in referring the first
and second disputes is lengthy, it is redeemed by the
reasonable and
satisfactory explanation provided. The explanation in essence is that
their union representative labored under the
wrong impression that
since one of the three disputes which related to the events that led
to their dismissals (i.e. the dismissal
of Mazibu) had been timeously
referred to the Labour Court, the other disputes could simply be
consolidated with it and need not
be separately referred. Their
counsel did not concede that this was a mistaken view of the law.
Instead, Mr Boda asserted that
it was “probably” mistaken
but that the
bona fides
of the union officials were
demonstrated by the fact that the joinder application was actually
brought. After the joinder judgment,
the attorneys representing the
applicants at that point arranged an urgent consultation with them in
order to refer the disputes
to this court and apply for condonation.
However, given the large number of applicants and their location all
over the country,
the earliest that a meeting could be secured with
them was 16 October 2010. The applicants submit that this is an
acceptable explanation
for the delay, and that the disputes were
referred and the condonation application made a month and a half
after the joinder judgment,
and which is not an unreasonable delay.
[14]
The applicants submit further that the balance of convenience favours
the granting of condonation. They at all times demonstrated
an
intention to challenge their dismissals, which the respondent was
well aware of, and the respondent will not be prejudiced by
consolidation of the claims as it will have an opportunity to defend
all three disputes on the merits.
[15]
In regard to the prospects of success, the applicants submit that it
is common cause that there are
prima facie
prospects of
success on the merits. They deny participation in any overtime ban
and allege that certain of the applicants were
not requested to work
overtime and others advanced personal reasons for their inability to
work overtime. Moreover, the alleged
overtime ban lasted only about
two hours, and they immediately complied with the ultimatum issued by
the respondent to return to
work. They deny that they embarked on an
unprotected strike and submit that their dismissals were in the
circumstances unfair.
[16]
Mr Boda submitted on behalf of the applicants that they seek to
vindicate a constitutional right and relied on
Brummer
v Gorfil Brother Investments (Pty) Ltd & others
[2000] ZACC 3
;
2000
(5) BCLR 465
(CC) as authority for the proposition that the prospects
of success are not decisive but are simply one factor to be taken
into
account. This is the approach adopted by the Labour Appeal Court
in
NEHAWU obo Mofokeng & others v
Charlotte Theron Children’s Home
[2004]
10 BLLR 979
(LAC).
The question, he submitted,
was whether the long delay tips the scales of justice so much that
they should not be permitted to proceed.
In this regard two
considerations are relevant. The first being the oversight on the
part of the union – there is no definitive
authority for the
argument that the union’s failure to refer the first and second
disputes was an error, although it is conceded
that it was probably
an error. The facts are similar to
Motloi v SA
Local Government Association
[2006] 3 BLLR
264
(LAC) in that the employees erroneously referred a dispute to
arbitration instead of to the Labour Court. The Labour Appeal Court,
in condoning a delay of four years, had regard to whether the route
they adopted was unreasonable. In the present instance although
the
union was advised by the respondent that it had adopted the incorrect
process and it remained adamant, there is no clear authority
to
support the proposition that its conduct was negligent or reckless.
It is therefore in the interests of justice that condonation
should
be granted. The second consideration is the prejudice caused to the
employer by having the merits aired after such a lengthy
delay. In
this regard Mr Boda submitted, relying on
Republican
Press and CEPPAWU
2007 11 BLLR 1001
(SCA),
that the delay is only relevant to relief and can be
taken into account by way of an appropriate order (for instance, not
ordering
back pay should the applicants succeed in obtaining
reinstatement). The difficulty with this approach, as submitted by Mr
Dodson,
is that this submission is not accompanied by any formal
waiver.
[17] It is clear from the
authorities cited above that an application for condonation must be
brought as soon as a party becomes
aware of the need for it. In the
present matter, the applicants chose to ignore the advice of the
respondent that they were obliged
to refer the disputes and apply for
condonation. In this regard I agree with Mr Dodson that they did so
at their own peril and
must face the consequences. Mr Dodson cited as
authority in this regard
NUMSA & others v Duro Pressing (Pty)
Ltd
[2002] 11 BLLR 1087
(LC) where Ntsebeza AJ refused
condonation in circumstances where the claim was 107 days late and
the application for condonation
was brought seven and a half months
after the respondent had raised the delay and failure to apply for
condonation as a point
in limine.
He further referred to the
Labour Appeal Court decision in
SABC Ltd v CCMA & others
[2010] 3 BLLR 251
(LAC) where Waglay ADJP (as he then was) held that
a delay of two and a half or three and a half months was substantial
(in the
context of the prescribed six weeks for instituting a
review), and the explanation for the delay was vague and
unsatisfactory where
the appellant failed to explain its inactivity
during the entire period. Moreover the appellant failed to seek
condonation at the
earliest opportunity, and took 39 days to apply
for condonation.
[18] Mr Dodson submitted
that in circumstances where the applicants were at the material times
represented by an experienced trade
union which had access to
attorneys and counsel, as well as shop-stewards who are required by
section 14(4) of the Act to have
knowledge of labour law, the
considerations applicable to unsophisticated litigants are not
relevant. It is also inexplicable that
a group such as the applicants
who have shown themselves to be quick to defend their interests
suddenly become passive victims
when they engage with their union
about progress in their matters. They advance no explanation why,
after being told by their union
that as soon as the second dispute
had been conciliated it would refer all three disputes to the Labour
Court, they continue to
wait even after the certificate of outcome in
respect of the second dispute was issued. This is inexplicable in the
context where
there must have been considerable anticipation that
their dispute would be referred to the Labour Court. In any event the
facts
were entirely different – involving an overtime ban on
the one hand and an unprotected strike on the other – and they
were aware of this. There is a complete lack of explanation as to why
the applicants did nothing to pursue the matter and similarly
why the
union failed to provide any explanation why they did not honour the
promise to refer the second dispute by 1 July 2008.
Thereafter on 2
September 2008, some six or seven months after their dismissals, the
applicants come to learn that SACCAWU had
only referred Mazibu’s
case to this Court, for reasons the deponent to the founding
affidavit says are unknown to the applicants.
There is no explanation
why the previous commitment to refer the second dispute was not
honoured and indeed why this was not questioned
by the applicants.
SACCAWU assisted the applicants in drafting the application for
condonation and was a party to the joinder application
and it would
appear to be disingenuous for them to deny any knowledge of why only
Mazibu’s dispute was referred. In any event
Mazibu’s
referral was also late (albeit by one day, being filed on 2 September
2008) and reflects a pattern of disregard
of the Rules of this court.
[19] Thereafter, between
2 September and about 13 October 2008, a period of about one and a
half months, things lay dormant. The
deponent to the founding
affidavit did not question the lack of progress; the affidavits in
the joinder application were signed
on or before 30 September but the
application was only brought on 14 October, two weeks after being
signed. There is no explanation
for this delay nor is there any
explanation why the 90-day period in respect of the second dispute
(which expired on 30 September)
was not complied with.
[20] The delay of five
months from 14 October 2008 to March 2009 is not explained. The
applicants allege that they approached SACCAWU
to enquire about
progress and Motane (a para-legal) advised them that SACCAWU was
waiting for the set-down of the joinder application
and would revert
to them after three months. They provide no explanation why they
waited for about six months before approaching
SACCAWU and why they
then stopped making enquiries. Moreover, no reason is advanced reason
why SACCAWU could not have sought to
set down the joinder application
in this period.
[21] In September 2009,
some six months later, the applicants learned that Motane has
resigned and another official, Boboyi, is
assigned to their matter.
There is no explanation provided for why they did not endeavour to
ascertain progress earlier, or why
when they did not hear from Motane
after the promised three months they failed to take steps to
ascertain the status of their matters.
SACCAWU furthermore elects not
to explain why it persisted with the joinder application, waiting two
years till the matter is set
down and then dismissed, despite the
clear warning in the answering affidavit that they were pursuing the
wrong cause of action.
SACCAWU simply does not reply to the
allegation that they were advised in about three places in the
answering affidavit in the
joinder application that the correct
procedure was to refer the disputes and apply for condonation for the
late referrals.
[22] In September 2009,
Boboyi advised that SACCAWU has instructed Vuza Biyana and associates
as their attorneys in the matter.
There then follows a period of
continued and unexplained delays from about 30 September 2009 until
mid-February 2010 during which
the applicants are advised by the
attorneys that the joinder application is still pending (which advice
they accept even though
it had been pending for a year already); and
when advice from Counsel is sought (and this take about four months);
and heads are
drafted in the obviously misconceived joinder
application. SACCAWU is party to these delays but by virtue of its
absence in the
condonation application does not provide any, let
alone a satisfactory explanation. Despite a Directive issued by the
Judge President
of this Court on 12 February 2010, heads of argument
are only filed by SACCAWU on 12 May 2010 after a second Directive
placing
them on terms is issued on 4 May 2010. Again no explanation
is forthcoming for this conduct, which by this stage borders on
contempt
for the Rules of this Court.
[23] After the joinder
judgment on 31 August 2010 the applicants held a meeting at the
SACCAWU offices a month and a half later
(on 16 October 2010) at
which they were addressed by Boboyi. The explanation provided for the
delay in convening this urgent meeting
is that there were
difficulties in contacting all the applicants dispersed throughout
the country. The respondent submits that
this is in any event a
nonsensical explanation in that a mass meeting is not required for
SACCAWU (which at that stage was still
the applicants’
representative) to decide how to proceed given that it had a mandate
to deal with the dispute and the deponent
was available; and
moreover, it was strange that the applicants had no means of
communicating among themselves. Boboyi advised
that an application
for condonation had to be drafted immediately and he proceeded to
draft the founding affidavit in this application
on the understanding
that it would be settled by the attorney, Vuza Biyana. The
application was brought six weeks later, which
is in itself
inexplicable given that it was already two years since they had been
advised that a condonation application was necessary.
In explaining
this delay, the applicants rely on their lack of knowledge of the law
and procedures of this Court, which is in itself
disingenuous given
that they were at all times represented by SACCAWU in brining the
condonation application, and that SACCAWU
had instructed attorneys
and counsel. They cannot therefore rely on their ignorance of the
law. The persistence with the joinder
application is in the end
explained as Motane’s fault but no attempt is made to explain
why SACCAWU persisted with this after
Motane’s departure in
April 2009.
[24] In the
circumstances, the delay is egregious and the explanation for it
would have to be compelling. Whether the prospects
of success are
considered to be irrelevant in the absence of a reasonable or
acceptable explanation for the delay, or whether the
prospects are
relevant but are outweighed by the lack of a satisfactory explanation
and the egregious delays, the consequences
remain the same. If the
prospects are taken into account, the correct enquiry is, as advanced
by the respondent in its written
heads, whether the applicants would
succeed in the main action if the facts pleaded by them in their
condonation application were
established at trial (see
Mould v
Roopa NO & Others
[2003] 1 BLLR 38
(LC) at para 34). On this
approach, the applicants may have
prima facie
prospects of
success. However, they fall well short of demonstrating that their
prospects of success are so good as to compensate
for such egregious
and unexplained delays. On the respondent’s version the first
dispute relates to 28 applicants engaging
in an unprotected overtime
ban while on a final written warning while the 53 applicants
dismissed in the second dispute engaged
in an unprotected strike
whilst on a final written warning, and dismissal was warranted in
both instances.
[25] I am cognisant of Mr
Boda’s plea that the doors of justice should remain open to
litigants who are laypersons and reliant
solely on their union and
who genuinely believed they were in safe hands. However, there are at
the same time limits beyond which
the doors of justice cannot but be
closed – in these circumstances where they themselves are to
blame for not holding their
union accountable and where the Act is
premised on expedition and the employer is likely to be prejudiced by
permitting the matter
to proceed on the merits. The applicants are in
any event not entirely bereft of a remedy in that civil proceedings
in delict may
still be available to them. I disagree with Mr Boda
that it is not clear that the joinder application was obviously
misconceived
– in my view it is manifestly clear and must have
been so to the union or at least its legal representatives. In any
event
even if it were not, they sought to pursue the remedy despite
due warning which in my view is nothing short of reckless. In any
event as Mr Dodson submitted,
Motloi
(supra) is not in point –
the respondent had contributed to the delay and the applicant had
clean hands. Here, on the contrary,
all the applicants are equally
blameworthy. Likewise
Gorvil
(supra) lastly is not a Labour
Court matter and is impervious to the interests of expediency which
is a core objective of the Act.
[26] The applicants have
failed to advance a compelling explanation for the egregious delays
of more than two years. There are lengthy
periods of delay and sheer
inactivity that are unexplained involving the applicants themselves;
there is no explanation from SACCAWU
of the persistence with the
flawed joinder application and consequent delay of two years; there
is no explanation for the delays
in bringing the condonation
application. If SACCAWU was a party its failure to explain the second
and third aspects would result
in the application being dismissed.
However it is not a party to this application. The respondent submits
that the result should
be no different in that the applicants have in
all probability feigned a breakdown in the relationship with SACCAWU
by ensuring
that it is not a party. However they have not terminated
their mandate to SACCAWU and are not in a situation where they cannot
expect co-operation or where they are not privy to the facts and
circumstances that gave rise to the application. Instead, SACCAWU
in
the form of its national legal unit co-ordinator Boboyi drafted the
founding affidavit in this application; instructed attorneys
to
settle and file it and is still advising the applicants. In these
circumstances, the respondent submits, the applicants cannot
benefit
from the absence of a satisfactory explanation on the main issues and
the application therefore stands to be dismissed.
This is a prime
example of where they cannot escape the negligence of their
representatives. The respondent submits that the applicants
are in an
even more dire situation than that of a party who is relying on the
negligence of his attorneys and where it was made
to bear the
consequences of his attorney’s negligence (as in
Colyn v
Tiger Food Industries Ltd t/a Meadow Feed Mills (Cape
)
2003 (6)
SA 1
(SCA)). Indeed a trade union is not an independent legal
representative acting as an agent to the detriment of a client. It is
a collective embodiment of its members and is akin to a
curator at
litem
in civil proceedings – in other words, it is “the
institutional embodiment of the several members involved in the
dispute”:
Manyale & Others v Maizecor (Pty) Ltd &
another
[2002] 10 BLLR 972
(LC) at para 13. The trade union is
its members and thus the applicants cannot escape the consequences of
their decision to be
members of SACCAWU and act collectively under
its auspices: See
inter alia Mhlongo & Others v FAWU &
Another
[2007] 2 BLLR 141
(LC) at paras 21-22 .
[27]
It is trite that c
ondonation
should only be granted where the legal requirements have been met and
is not a default option. It remains an indulgence
granted by a court
exercising its discretion whilst being
cognisant
of the criticism
emanating from the Constitutional Court and the SCA and bearing in
mind the primary objective of the expeditious
resolution of disputes
articulated in the Act. On the facts and law as set out above this is
not an instance where condonation
can be granted.
Order
[28]
In the premises, I make the following order:
The
application for condonation is dismissed.
In
the interests of law and fairness there is no order as to costs.
_____________
Bhoola J
Judge of the Labour Court
of South Africa
Date of hearing: 19 April
2011
Date of judgment: 5 May
2011
Appearance:
For the Applicants: Adv F
A Boda instructed by E S Makinta Attorneys
For the Third Respondent:
Adv A Dodson instructed by Bowman Gilfillan
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