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[2010] ZALCJHB 330
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Makume v Hakinen Transport CC; In Re: Moyi v Imkhunzi Contractors (Pty); In Re: Ltd v Shashape v Tswaing Local Municipality (J33/10, J732/10, J427/10) [2010] ZALCJHB 330 (12 November 2010)
IN
THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
HELD
AT JOHANNESBURG
Reportable
In
the matters between:
CASE
NO J33/10
MAKUME,
SIMON MOSIUWA
Applicant
and
HAKINEN
TRANSPORT CC
Respondent
CASE
NO J732/10
MOYI,
RAOUI BAYAMBA MUKOLE
Applicant
and
INKHUNZI
CONTRACTORS (PTY) LTD
Respondent
CASE
NO J427/10
SHASHAPE,
ELIZABETH KOLOJANE
Applicant
and
TSWAING
LOCAL MUNICIPALITY
Respondent
JUDGMENT
TIP
AJ:
1.
This judgment concerns three applications
which came before me on the same day. There is a common central
question which involves
the jurisdiction of this Court in respect of
demands that have been made of employers in terms of the Basic
Conditions of Employment
Act 75 of 1997 (“BCEA”). I
will briefly outline the circumstances of each of the applications
and then proceed
to a consideration of the legal issues that arise.
2.
J33/10
: Mr
Makume was employed by Hakinen Transport CC as a driver on 20
September 2005. He resigned on 27 October 2006. In
his
application he seeks an order directing the respondent to furnish a
certificate of service in terms of section 42 of the BCEA
as well as
certain forms relating to a retirement claim which he wishes to lodge
with the Motor Industry Autoworkers Pension –
Provident Fund
(as he described it). The application was launched on 29
January 2010.
3.
J732/10
:
Mr Moyi was employed by Inkhunzi Contractors (Pty) Ltd on 1 March
2008 as a site residential engineer and was dismissed on 12
November
2008. On 15 July 2010 he served an application in which he
seeks one month’s notice pay in terms of section
38 of the
BCEA, pay for accrued leave in terms of sections 40 and 20 of the
BCEA, outstanding pay for the period from 1 October
to 12 November
2008, remuneration information in terms of section 33 of the BCEA and
a certificate of service in terms of section
42 thereof.
4.
J427/10
:
Ms Shashape was employed by the Tswaing Local Municipality as a
traffic officer from 17 September 2007 to 30 May 2009. On
20
March 2010 she commenced application proceedings for four weeks’
notice pay in terms of section 38 of the BCEA, outstanding
pay for
the month of May 2009 and a certificate of service in terms of
section 42.
5.
All three of these applications were
instituted in the wake of the decision of Van Niekerk J reported as
Ephraim v Bull Brand Foods (Pty) Ltd
(2010) 31 ILJ 951 (LC) which was
delivered on 27 November 2009. It was there held that the
jurisdiction of this Court is of
a residual nature in respect of the
operation of section 77(1) of the BCEA and that an employee with a
non-compliance complaint
should seek relief through the enforcement
provisions of Chapter Ten of the Act rather than to approach the
Labour Court.
The learned Judge’s reasoning is captured
in paragraphs [4], [5] and [6] of the judgment:
“
Section
77(1) of the BCEA reads as follows:
'Subject
to the Constitution and the jurisdiction of the Labour Appeal Court
and except where this Act provides otherwise, the Labour
Court has
exclusive jurisdiction in respect of all matters in terms of this
Act, except in respect of an offence specified in sections
43, 44,
46, 48, 90 and 92.'
In my view, the
provisions of this section do no more than confer a residual
exclusive jurisdiction on this court to deal with those
matters that
the Act requires to be dealt with by the court. The wording of the
section does not confer jurisdiction on the court
to deal with
matters that must be dealt with, in the first instance, by duly
appointed functionaries. ....
In
the absence of any provision in the BCEA that confers jurisdiction on
this court to enforce the provisions of the Act directly
and as an
agent of first instance, the applicant's claim is misconceived. To
hold otherwise would entirely undermine the system
of enforcement
established by chapter 10 of the Act. Chapter 10 establishes the
mechanisms to monitor and enforce the protections
guaranteed by the
Act. In summary, the entry point into the system is the office of the
labour inspector, to whom complaints may
be made. ... What relevance
and purpose would this carefully crafted system continue to have if
an employee were entitled to bypass
it and approach this court for
orders directly enforcing the provisions of the Act?
The
BCEA clearly contemplates that this court has a general supervisory
function in the statutory scheme of enforcement (given its
appellate
functions in terms of s 72), that it should facilitate the
enforcement of orders made by the appropriate functionaries
(given
its powers to make compliance orders of court) and that it should
ultimately act to impose punishment for continued breaches
of the Act
(given the court's powers to impose fines in terms of schedule 2 to
the Act), [but] the Act does not extend to this
court those functions
that are reserved for the labour inspectorate, and in particular, it
does not contemplate that this court
may grant orders that would
effectively amount to the compliance orders contemplated by s 69.
”
6.
Basson J has expressed her full agreement
with this approach, in
Indwe Risk
Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Zyl; In re Van Zyl v Indwe Risk Services
(Pty) Ltd
(2010) 31 ILJ 956 (LC)
(delivered on 18 February 2010) at paragraphs [32] to [34]. I
respectfully add my concurrence.
7.
In both those matters the issues were
framed in terms of section 77(1) of the BCEA as involving the
enforcement of statutory obligations,
as distinct from those invoking
contractual provisions. Mr Schöltz represented the
applicant in those cases, as does
he the applicants in the three
applications before me. Notwithstanding the essential
congruence of the nature of the relief
sought in all these matters,
the present applications have been couched primarily in terms of
prayers based on section 77(3) of
the BCEA and, in that way, they
have been repositioned as contractual rather than statutory claims.
8.
A similar recasting of the relief had been
done by Mr Schöltz in a total of 48 matters which were enrolled
for hearing in a
specially convened motion court before Van Niekerk J
on 25 March 2010. Each of those matters had initially relied on
section
77(1) of the Act but, evidently in consequence of the
Bull
Brand
judgment, substantially identical
supplementary affidavits were filed in each case, comprising two
elements. Firstly, the
relief was alleged to be based on the
contract of employment, pursuant to section 4 read with section 77(3)
of the BCEA.
Secondly, each applicant contended that he or she
was exercising a right to elect to proceed with an application in the
Labour
Court instead of recourse to the Department of Labour, which
was described as operating with a number of resource and other
limitations,
to the extent that complainants were said to be unable
to obtain effective assistance from it.
9.
Judgment in respect of this gathering of
matters was delivered on 23 September 2010:
Fourie
v Stanford Driving School and 34 related cases
under
case number J2218/08, as yet unreported. After observing that
the allegations concerning the Department of Labour were
patently not
within the knowledge of the individual applicants, Van Niekerk J went
on as follows, in paragraph [7]:
“
That
issue aside for the moment, the question that arises in each of the
applications before me is whether the BCEA entitles an
aggrieved
party to enforce the provisions of the Act as contractual terms, and
to rely on the concurrent jurisdiction that this
court enjoys under s
77 of the BCEA to enforce them. The starting point is s 4 of
the Act which provides, with some exceptions,
that a basic condition
of employment constitutes a term of any contract of employment.
A ‘basic condition of employment’
is defined in s 1 to
mean "a provision of this Act or sectoral determination that
stipulates a minimum term or condition of
employment”. In
Bartmann & another t/a Khaya
Ibhubesi v De Lange & another
(2009)
30 ILJ 2701 (LC) Todd AJ expressed his reservations about whether it
could be said that an obligation under the BCEA to furnish
certificates, information regarding remuneration and the like could
be said to constitute basic conditions of employment (at paragraph
[38] of the judgment). For the purposes of these proceedings, I
am prepared to accept that they are, and that they may be
enforced as
contractual terms. I deal with this issue below in the context
of the prayers for costs on a punitive scale that
accompanies
virtually every application before me.
”
10.
On this basis the learned Judge concluded
in paragraph [10] that the BCEA established dual enforcement
mechanisms and that an employee
could choose to refer a complaint to
the labour inspectorate or seek to enforce a basic condition of
employment in a civil court
or the Labour Court as a term of the
employment contract. The matters before him were accordingly
disposed of by granting
the relief but applying a suitable formula as
to costs: (i) no costs were awarded where documents were sought; (ii)
no costs were
awarded where a payment was sought that fell within the
jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court; and (iii) costs were denied
or
ordered on the Magistrates Court scale where a payment was sought
that fell between the limits of the Small Claims Court and the
Magistrates Court.
11.
As is apparent from the above, Van Niekerk
J refrained from deciding the reservation which had been articulated
by Todd AJ concerning
the ambit of ‘a basic condition of
employment’. In my view, it is appropriate for me to
undertake that enquiry
in the context of the manner in which the
applications before me have been formulated. The legal
foundation for them rests
in essence upon section 4 read with section
77(3) of the Act. Section 4 reads:
“
A
basic condition of employment constitutes a term of any contract of
employment except to the extent that-
(a)
any other law provides a term that is more favourable to the
employee;
(b)
the basic condition of employment has been replaced, varied, or
excluded in accordance with
the provisions of this Act; or
(c)
a term of the contract of employment is more favourable to the
employee than the basic
condition of employment.
”
Section 77(3) reads:
“
The
Labour Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the civil courts to
hear and determine any matter concerning a contract of employment,
irrespective of whether any basic condition of employment constitutes
a term of that contract.
”
12.
These sections were relied on by Mr Schöltz
to support an argument that the effect of section 4 is that all basic
conditions
of employment are imported into an employee’s
contract of employment and that section 77(3) therefore vests this
Court with
the jurisdiction to deal with ‘any matter’
relating to such contract. Hence, runs the argument, it is
permissible
for an aggrieved employee to approach this Court directly
with
any
compliance issue without first having to seek the assistance of the
labour inspectorate.
13.
These propositions may
prima
facie
appear to be sound, but that is
so only if the two provisions relied upon are abstracted from their
context within the framework
of the BCEA as a whole. As already
indicated, Van Niekerk J has concluded that the point of entry for an
employee with a
BCEA compliance complaint is the Department of Labour
inspectorate and not this Court. I would respectfully
underscore that
conclusion with some supplementary considerations
arising from the Act. A useful springboard for that is section
2:
“
The
purpose of this Act is to advance economic development and social
justice by fulfilling the primary objects of this Act which
are-
(a)
to give effect to and regulate the right to fair labour practices
conferred by section 23
(1) of the Constitution-
(i)
by establishing and enforcing basic conditions of employment; and
(ii)
by regulating the variation of basic conditions of employment;
(b)
to give effect to obligations incurred by the Republic as a member
state of the International
Labour Organisation.
”
It is immediately
apparent from this that the BCEA gives expression to a constitutional
right and that one element thereof is the
detailed enforcement
structure contained in Chapter Ten. The role assigned to the
labour inspectorate must be interpreted
and applied in that context.
14.
Patently, not every provision of the Act
amounts to a basic condition of employment, which is defined as
meaning: “
a provision of this Act
or sectoral determination that stipulates a minimum term or condition
of employment
”. The scope
of this may be illustrated through a few examples. Thus, the
requirement in section 14(1) that a
meal interval must be at least
one continuous hour is plainly a minimum condition. An employer
may give more, but it cannot
give less. By contrast, the
stipulation in section 43(1) that no person may employ a child who is
less than 15 years of age
is not a minimum condition. It is
simply a prohibition which could not on any sensible basis find its
way into a contract
of employment. Likewise, the obligation on
an employer set out in section 29(1) to supply a new employee with
written particulars
of employment cannot meaningfully be described as
a minimum condition. It is there to ensure that there is
certainty, that
the employee understands the terms of his employment
and that there is a record thereof which must be retained for three
years
after termination of the employment. It must be complied
with but can barely be viewed as a minimum condition which an
employer
might improve upon. Accordingly, I would endorse the
view of Todd AJ in
Bartmann
at
paragraph [38]:
“
....
While this is not something that it is necessary for me to decide for
the purpose of the present application, it seems appropriate
... for
me to express my view that an employer's obligation under s 29 of the
BCEA is not a 'basic condition of employment' as
defined in that Act.
It may well follow from that, it seems to me, that the subject-matter
of that application falls outside the
jurisdiction conferred on this
court by the provisions of s 77(3) of the BCEA, and that those
obligations may be enforced only
by means of the enforcement
provisions set out in chapter 10 of the BCEA ...
”
15.
Aside from the question of what is or is
not part of the employment contract, there is a further set of
considerations which define
the jurisdiction of this Court.
These concern the role of the enforcement provisions in the BCEA as
well as the distinction
drawn in the Act between, on the one hand, a
range of non-compliance complaints and, on the other hand, claims for
money and other
contractual disputes.
16.
Complaints of the first sort are ordinarily
to be dealt with through the detailed enforcement mechanisms of, in
particular, Part
A of Chapter Ten. Various provisions point to
this. A departure point is to be found in section 64(1)(d)
which describes
the functions of labour inspectors:
“
A
labour inspector appointed under section 63 (1) may promote, monitor
and enforce compliance with an employment law by- ...
(d)
endeavouring to secure compliance with an employment law by securing
undertakings or issuing
compliance orders ...
”
17.
Significantly, securing an undertaking must
be an inspector’s first endeavour. Section 68(1) requires
this:
“
A
labour inspector who has reasonable grounds to believe that an
employer has not complied with any provision of this Act must
endeavour to secure a written undertaking by the employer to comply
with the provision.
”
The approach underlying
this is consonant with the premium that our system of employment law
places on the resolution of disputes
through consensus rather than
compulsion. See, comparatively, section 157(4)(a) of the Labour
Relations Act 66 of 1995 (“LRA”):
“
The
Labour Court may refuse to determine any dispute, other than an
appeal or review before the Court, if the Court is not satisfied
that
an attempt has been made to resolve the dispute through
conciliation.
”
18.
If no undertaking is secured or having been
given is not implemented, then a labour inspector would move to the
next step, being
to issue a compliance order. Section 69(2) of
the BCEA details the required content of such an order, which must
include
inter alia
particulars
of the employer’s conduct constituting the non-compliance and
the steps that it must take to correct the position.
Subsections 3(a) and (4) stipulate that the order must be served on
all affected employees if practicable and that it must be displayed
prominently at a place accessible to the employees. Evidently,
these publication requirements are calculated to inform and
thus
enhance employees’ understanding of their rights and the
consequences for the employer of a contravention. The
publication is not confined to a particular complainant but must
reach all affected employees.
19.
Measures of this sort reflect the careful
composition of these enforcement provisions. At a practical
level, they may be distinguished
from the role of the Labour Court
which generally deals only with the applicant or applicants before it
and involves no attempt
to secure an undertaking or to publish the
equivalent of a compliance order. This plainly forms part of
the legislative intention,
for Chapter Ten goes on to delineate
precisely when recourse may be had to the Labour Court. Section
72(1) allows an employer
to appeal to the Court against an order made
by the Director-General in respect of that employer’s objection
to a compliance
order issued by an inspector. Section 73
permits the Director-General to apply to the Court to have a
compliance order made
an order of the Court. In the face of
that definition of the Court’s part in the compliance process,
it is not open
to an employee with a complaint of that sort to simply
bypass the inspectorate altogether and to come to this Court directly
for
an order that an employer must provide, say, a certificate of
service in terms of section 42 or must bring the employee’s
leave entitlement into line with the minimum requirements of the
BCEA. Such complaints are not matters for this Court but
for
enforcement in terms of Chapter Ten. There is nothing novel
about a conclusion that detailed monitoring and enforcement
provisions of this kind implicitly operate to exclude the
jurisdiction of the Labour Court, at least temporarily. A
comparable
result has been reached in the context of the
Employment
Equity Act 55 of 1998
:
Dudley v City of
Cape Town and another
(2008) 29 ILJ
2685 (LAC) at paragraphs [43], [48] and [49].
20.
I likewise hold in the matters before me
that this Court has no jurisdiction as a forum of first instance to
entertain compliance
issues other than, as set out below, when there
is a claim for money.
21.
I may add that the terms of
section 77(3)
(cited above) do not alter this conclusion. Bearing in mind
that the Labour Court has no inherent jurisdiction, this section
does
not confer any capacity on the civil courts. Rather, the
jurisdiction of the civil courts is extended to the Labour
Court
within the parameters of the section. See in relation to the
construction of
section 157(2)
of the LRA, which has similar wording:
Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security
and others
(2010) 31 ILJ 296 (CC) at
paragraphs [71] and [72]. An examination of the Small Claims
Court Act 61 of 1984 shows that it
has no jurisdiction to order
compliance with the provisions of the BCEA: sections 15 and 16.
The same emerges from the
Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944
:
section 29(1)
read with
section 46(2)(c).
I have no doubt that
the legislature did not intend that compliance orders of that sort
should be sought in the High Court.
22.
In instances where an employee’s
claim is for money which is due to him in terms of the BCEA but which
the employer refuses
to pay, a different picture is to be seen. The
Act puts in place an election, either to secure payment through a
complaint
to a labour inspector or through proceedings instituted in
a competent court. That an inspector has the power to enforce
payment which is owed in terms of the Act is clear from
inter
alia
section 68(2)(a):
“
In
endeavouring to secure the undertaking, the labour inspector may seek
to obtain agreement between the employer and employee as
to any
amount owed to the employee in terms of this Act;
”
There is a similar
provision in respect of a compliance order: section 69(2)(c).
23.
It is likewise clear that the BCEA
contemplates civil proceedings for the recovery of money due to an
employee, without the necessity
of a preceding referral to a labour
inspector. This follows from section 70(c):
A
labour inspector may not issue a compliance order in respect of any
amount payable to an employee as a result of a failure to
comply with
a provision of this Act if - ... any proceedings have been instituted
for the recovery of that amount or, if proceedings
have been
instituted, those proceedings have been withdrawn ...
”
.
The effect of this is
that an employee may choose to institute civil proceedings for a
money claim and if he has done so, even if
he should later withdraw
those proceedings, an inspector would no longer have the capacity to
require compliance through payment
by the defaulting employer.
Put differently, once an employee makes the election to proceed
through civil action he cannot
thereafter revert to the inspectorate
in order to secure payment. An inspector is similarly barred
from enforcing compliance
if the employee is governed by a collective
agreement which provides for an amount owing in terms of the Act to
be dealt with through
arbitration: section 70(a). These
provisions may be read with the dual stream of enforcement
possibilities which are accorded
an employee in section 78(1):
“
Every
employee has the right to-
(a)
make a complaint to a trade union representative, a trade union
official or a labour inspector
concerning any alleged failure or
refusal by an employer to comply with this Act; ...
(f)
participate in proceedings in terms of this Act
;
...
”.
Once it is so that resort
by an employee to civil proceedings for a monetary claim excludes the
making of a statutory compliance
order, it would be artificial to
nonetheless require such employee first to report the claim to an
inspector for an attempt to
be made to secure an undertaking. I
do not consider that the BCEA lends itself to a fragmentation of that
sort in respect
of the enforcement mechanisms detailed in Chapter
Ten.
24.
In sum, it is my conclusion that this Court
ordinarily has no jurisdiction concerning the enforcement of employee
rights as contained
in the BCEA, other than those which consist of
monetary claims. In the latter class of cases there is
concurrent jurisdiction
with the civil courts, with the proviso that
any orders as to costs should be reflective of the quantum of the
claim, in accordance
with the approach of Van Niekerk J in the
Stanford Driving School
case
referred to above.
25.
A corollary of the conclusion that the
Labour Court ‘ordinarily’ has no jurisdiction regarding
non-monetary compliance
complaints is that it may in certain
extraordinary circumstances assert jurisdiction over them. Two
such instances are as
follows:
25.1.
As is the position in case number 732/10,
monetary claims may be accompanied by demands such as those seeking
compliance with the
obligation to furnish remuneration particulars
and a certificate of service in terms of sections 33 and 42 of the
BCEA. On
their own, for the reasons set out above, claims of
that kind would not be entertained. However, where they
accompany monetary
claims which
do
fall within the Court’s jurisdiction the question arises
whether they should not be disposed of by that Court at the same
time. Plainly, there are considerations of convenience that
they should be and it would in my view be competent to do so
on the
basis of the
causae continentia
rule. In this context it is pertinent that the Act does not
impose an absolute jurisdictional prohibition concerning compliance
orders of that kind, for they could potentially and unexceptionably
present themselves in terms of
inter
alia
sections 72(1) and 73(1) of the
Act.
25.2.
The requirement of jurisdiction could be
satisfied also in those cases where a proper case is made out for the
intervention of this
Court despite there having been no prior
referral to a labour inspector. A clarifying example may be
outlined in relation
to four aspects of the right to annual leave:
(i) If a new employee is given a contract of employment which
provides for less leave
than the minimum set out in the BCEA, that
should be referred to a labour inspector. (ii) If an employee
is informed by his
employer some months before his annual leave falls
due that it has been cancelled (without good cause), that should be
referred
to a labour inspector. (iii) If an employee is
similarly informed, but so soon before the leave is due that it is
not feasible
for a timely resolution of the issue to be achieved
through the inspectorate (bearing in mind that Chapter Ten involves a
number
of steps that may potentially have to be taken before a
complaint is finalised), then the issue of the withholding of leave
could
be placed before this Court on an appropriately urgent basis
for an order of specific performance. To use the language of
the
Bull Brand
decision,
this would be an instance of the exercise of the Court’s
residual jurisdiction. (iv) If an employee
is told
that he may take leave but that he will not be paid for it, that
could be referred to an inspector or found a monetary
claim pursuant
to section 77(3).
26.
I turn now to the application of these
conclusions to the three matters before me.
J33/2010
27.
The first claim in this matter is for a
certificate of service in terms of section 42 of the BCEA. It
does not fall within
this Court’s jurisdiction. The
second claim is for documents in respect of a retirement benefit
claim. That claim
is to be directed to the Motor Industry
Autoworkers Pension – Provident Fund which plainly has its own
rules. No case
has been made out on the papers that those rules
contemplate the intervention of this Court in order to secure an
employer’s
observance of the relevant certificates. To
the contrary, illustratively, the
Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956
prescribes the manner of dealing with a ‘complaint’,
which is defined in broad terms as meaning: “
a
complaint of a complainant relating to the administration of a fund,
the investment of its funds or the interpretation and application
of
its rules, and alleging - ... (d) that
an employer who participates in a fund has not fulfilled
its duties
in terms of the rules of the fund
;”.
In terms of
section 30A
of that Act a complainant may place his
complaint before the board of the fund and, if not satisfied with the
outcome, may refer
the issue to the Pension Funds Adjudicator.
I may add that it would surprise me if even simpler measures are not
available
through the Motor Industry Bargaining Council.
J732/10
28.
Mr Moji has three claims for payment.
The first is for notice pay which, in terms of clause 17.1 of his
employment contract,
amounts to one month’s pay. In this
regard, it is relevant that a CCMA arbitrator has held that his
dismissal was unfair
both substantively and procedurally.
Although he was awarded compensation in an amount of R30,000 he
remains entitled also
to this notice pay:
Evans
v Japanese School of Johannesburg
[2006]
12 BLLR 1146
(LC);
SABC v CCMA and
others
[2002] 8 BLLR 693
(LAC) at para
[20]. His second claim is for
pro
rata
leave pay in the sum of R4,924.95
and the third for unpaid salary in the amount of R15,000. Those
claims are properly before
this Court, save only that the costs are
to be limited to the Magistrates’ Court scale.
29.
There are also claims for remuneration
particulars and a certificate of service in terms of sections 33 and
42 of the BCEA.
For the reasons set out above, those claims can
be disposed of as falling within the scope of the convenience rule.
J427/10
30.
This application is similar. There is
a notice pay claim for R5,607.20 and a claim for unpaid wages
amounting to R6,074 together
with a demand for a certificate of
service in terms of section 42. An order should be made in
respect of all three of these
claims but, since the amounts fall
within the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court, no order as to
costs will follow.
Order
31.
Accordingly, the following orders are made:
1.
In respect of case number J33/2010:
1.1.
The application is dismissed.
1.2.
There is no order as to costs.
2.
In respect of case number J732/10:
2.1.
The respondent is directed to pay the
applicant the amount of R29,924.95.
2.2.
The respondent is directed to pay the
applicant interest on the said sum at the rate of 15,5% per annum
a
tempore morae
until date of payment.
2.3.
The respondent is directed to provide the
applicant with a certificate of service in terms of
section 42
of the
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997
.
2.4.
The respondent is directed to provide the
applicant with particulars of remuneration in terms of
section 33
of
the
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997
.
2.5.
The respondent is directed to pay the
applicant’s costs of this application in respect of the
monetary claims on the Magistrates’
Court scale.
3.
In respect of case number J427/10:
3.1.
The respondent is directed to pay the
applicant the amount of R11,681.20.
3.2.
The respondent is directed to pay the
applicant interest on the said sum at the rate of 15,5% per annum
a
tempore morae
until date of payment.
3.3.
The respondent is directed to provide the
applicant with a certificate of service in terms of
section 42
of the
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997
.
3.4.
There is no order as to costs.
____________________________
K
S TIP
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE LABOUR COURT
DATE
OF HEARING:
23 September 2010
DATE
OF JUDGMENT:
12
November 2010
FOR
APPLICANTS:
Mr W P Schöltz
of
Jansens Incorporated