About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Johannesburg Labour Court, Johannesburg
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Johannesburg Labour Court, Johannesburg
>>
2010
>>
[2010] ZALCJHB 339
|
|
Lowveld Allied And General Employers Organization (LAGEO) v Minister of Labour and Others (J2431/09) [2010] ZALCJHB 339 (22 October 2010)
IN
THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(HELD
AT JOHANNESBURG)
Case number:
J 2431 / 09
In
the matter between:
LOWVELD
ALLIED AND GENERAL EMPLOYERS’
ORGANIZATION
(“LAGEO”)
Applicant
and
THE
MINISTER OF LABOUR
1
st
Respondent
THE
DEPARTMENT OF
LABOUR
2
nd
Respondent
REGISTRAR
OF LABOUR
RELATIONS
3
rd
Respondent
JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This was an urgent application in terms of which the applicant
(Lowveld Allied and General Employers’ Organization) sought
the
following urgent relief:
1.
That, pending the final determination of this application
and/or the appeal in terms of section 111 of the Labour Relations Act
66 of 1995 (“the LRA”):
1.1 The
applicant be permitted to enjoy the full benefit of rights and
privileges enjoyed by a registered employers’
organization in
terms of the LRA;
1.2 That the
cancellation of the registration of the applicant be suspended with
effect from 28 October 2009 (the date
of the decision taken by the
3
rd
respondent);
2.
That the respondents be interdicted from:
2.1
Publishing on the website operated by the 2
nd
& 3
rd
respondents the fact that the applicant had been deregistered; and
2.2
Preventing the applicant from enjoying the full benefits of a
registered employers’ organization
in terms of the LRA.
3.
Costs of suit in the event of opposition only.
[2]
On 22 September 2010 this Court dismissed the application with costs.
Here are the full reasons for my order.
[3]
The application was opposed by the 1
st
respondent (the
Minister of Labour); the 2
nd
respondent (the Department of
Labour) and the 3
rd
respondent (the Registrar of Labour
Relations). I will refer to the three respondents collectively as
“the respondents”.
The opposing affidavit was deposed to
by Mr. Crouse who is the Registrar of Labour Relations employed by
the 2
nd
Respondent. I will refer to Mr. Crouse as “the
Registrar” where applicable.
[4]
The respondents raised three issues: Firstly, the matter is not
urgent; secondly the relief sought by the applicant is not competent
and appropriate and thirdly the applicant has not made out a case for
the relief it seeks.
The
relevant facts
[1]
[5]
The applicant was a registered employers’ organization in terms
of the LRA since 1 February 1999 and has currently 165
registered
members. On or about 24 December 2008 a manager in the office of the
Registrar made a submission (hereinafter referred
to as “the
first submission”) to the Registrar in terms whereof it was
recommended that the Registrar publish an intention
to cancel the
applicant’s registration in the
Government Gazette
in
terms of section 106(2B) of the LRA. In this first submission (dated
24 December 2008) the author (Mr Blom) sets out in some
detail why he
is of the view that the registration of the applicant should be
cancelled. In brief it is submitted that the applicant
has ceased to
operate as a genuine employers’ organization. Blom then
proceeds to set out in a ten page document the facts
upon which he
relies in support of this contention. In brief it is stated that the
applicant is in reality practicing a labour
consultancy and that the
labour consultancy camouflages itself as an employers’
organization merely in order to continue
with their businesses. On 24
April 2009 the Registrar approved the recommendation that the
applicant be deregistered.
[6]
On 4 May 2009 the applicant wrote a letter to the Registrar
requesting copies of the documents which have been collected by
the
Registrar’s office during the latter’s investigation and
which related to the intended cancellation of the applicant.
[7]
On 8 May 2009 the Registrar published a notice of his intention to
cancel the applicant’s registration in the Government
Gazette.
In this Gazette the applicant is notified of the intention of the
Registrar to cancel the registration of the applicant.
On 9 June 2009
the Registrar sent a response to the applicant.
[8]
On 6 August 2009 the applicant presented submissions to the Registrar
as to why the registration of the applicant should not
be cancelled.
On 9 October 2009 the Registrar sent a letter to the applicant
advising it that he was still of the opinion that
the employers
organization is not a genuine employers’ organization and that
its registration will be cancelled with effect
from 28 October 2009.
[9]
On 10 November 2009 the applicant was advised that the cancellation
of its registration was published on 28 October 2009. The
applicant
dispatched a letter to the Registrar requesting him to furnish in
terms of section 111(1) of the LRA his reasons for
the decision to
cancel the registration of the applicant. On 11 November 2009 the
applicant lodged an appeal against the cancellation
of its
registration in terms of section 111(3) of the LRA.
[10]
On 14 December 2009, the Registrar sent a letter to the applicant
furnishing his reasons for the decision to cancel the applicant’s
registration.
[11]
On 13 November 2009 pursuant to the publication of the cancellation
of its registration and the lodging of an appeal against
the
cancellation of the registration, a certain Mr. Raymond Dibden (a
Senior Commissioner of the CCMA (“Dibden”)) sent
an
e-mail to Ms. Bone (the applicant’s legal officer - “Bone”)
confirming to her that the appeal “
suspends the
administrative action of deregistration”
and that “
this
should be sufficient to allow the representation to continue until
such time as the matter has been adjudicated by the labour
court”.
[12]
On 1 December 2009 Dibden confirmed by e-mail to Bone that the
applicant’s rights to represent its members at the CCMA
had
been restored.
[13]
On 28 July
2010 Ms. Eleanor Hambidge (“Hambidge”) of the CCMA
advised Bone by e-mail of the decision by Molahlehi, J
in
CCMA
v Registrar of Labour Relations & Others
(
J984/10:
27
July 2010 referred to hereinafter as “UPUSA”). In that
decision Molahlehi, j held that the decision of the Registrar
to
deregister is
not
suspended pending the outcome of the appeal in terms of section
111(3) of the LRA.
[2]
A few days
later the Court in
UNICA
Plastic Moulders CC v National Union of South African Workers
(J1072/2010: 3 August 2010 – hereinafter referred to as
“
UNICA”
)
handed down a decision in which it agreed with the decision of
Molahlehi, J.
[14]
On 30 July 2010 Dibden, in light of these recent decisions, advised
Bone that the applicant will have to apply to the Labour
Court for an
order suspending the cancellation of the registration. A resolution
was passed on 2 August 2010 that the Applicant
associate with CTL
Management Forum (“CTL”) and that all paid-up members of
the applicant became paid-up members of
CTL. CTL is an employers’
organization whose registration had also been cancelled, but who had
obtained an order from the
Labour Court on 30 October 2007 suspending
such cancellation pending an appeal against such cancellation.
According to the Registrar
although CTL has been de-registered in
2006 it has done nothing to pursue or finalise its appeal.
[15]
On 2 August 2010 UPUSA lodged an appeal against the UPUSA judgment.
On 3 August 2010 the applicant received a letter
from Bowman
Gilfillan, acting on behalf of the CCMA (in the UPUSA – matter
(
supra
), confirming that the CCMA accepted the legal position
as set out in the UPUSA judgment and does not agree that the
application
for leave to appeal has the effect of suspending the
judgment appealed against. On the same day, the applicant sent a
further letter
to Bowman Gilfillan in an attempt to persuade the CCMA
that at common law, the noting of an appeal suspends the operation of
the
order in question. No reply was received to this letter.
[16]
The applicant was allowed to operate in terms of the association with
CTL until 17 August 2010 when Bone was told to leave
a process before
the CCMA in Sabie. On 20 August 2010 Bone sent a letter to the CCMA,
confirming the association with CTL. On 23
August 2010 Mr. Van Zuydam
of the CCMA (“Van Zuydam”) stated in an e-mail that “
the
CCMA records show that LAGEO was deregistered on 28 October 2009
which prohibits that employers’ organizations from representing
its members at the CCMA…”.
[17]
Van Zuydam also stated in a further e-mail that in the light of the
recent judgments of the Labour Court “…
an official
practice note will be issued that no representation will be allowed
in the CCMA by deregistered unions or employers
organizations
notwithstanding an appeal having been lodged”
.
[18]
Upon receipt of the e-mails from Van Zuydam, Bone contacted the State
Attorney on 25 August 2010 and requested whether an agreement
could
be reached that the implementation of the deregistration of the
applicant could be stayed, pending the outcome of the appeal.
On 1 September the State Attorney advised Bone that such agreement
could not be reached. The urgent application was filed on 2
September
2010 to be heard on 16 September 2010.
Urgency
[19]
The respondent disputed the urgency of the application and argued
that the applicant had been aware of the deregistration since
10
November 2009. The applicant submitted that, after it had lodged an
appeal against the cancellation of its registration, it
continued to
represent its members before the CCMA and was allowed to do so. There
was, therefore no need to launch this application.
It was only on 28
July 2010 that it was made aware of the fact that Molahlehi, J handed
down the UPUSA judgment in terms of which
it was held “…
that the general common law rule practice that an appeal stays the
enforcement [of] a judgment pending the outcome of an appeal does
not
apply to decisions made by the Registrar in terms of s 106 of the
LRA
”. As already indicated, the applicant then formed an
association with CTL in terms whereof the applicant’s paid-up
members became paid-up members of CTL and continued with this
arrangement until 23 August 2010 when Van Zuydam of the CCMA informed
the applicant that in light of the recent judgments of the Labour
Court, deregistered organizations would not be allowed to represent
their members notwithstanding an appeal having been lodged. When the
applicant was unable to reach an agreement with the State
Attorney
the applicant filed the urgent application.
[20]
I am in agreement with the submission on behalf of the applicant that
the matter is urgent in light of the fact that the need
for the
urgent relief only arose after the UPUSA judgment was handed down on
27 July 2020 and more specifically on 17 August 2010
when the
applicant was not allowed to represent one of its members at the
CCMA. I am also satisfied that the applicant took reasonable
steps
and acted with appropriate urgency to bring this matter before the
Court. In light of these facts I am persuaded that the
matter is
urgent.
The
relief sought
[21]
The respondent argued that the relief sought by the applicant is not
competent and that, although the applicant seeks an interim
interdict
pending the finalization of the appeal lodged in terms of section
111(3) of the LRA, the interdict will have final relief.
It was
further submitted on behalf of the respondent that the effect of an
order suspending the operation of the deregistration
of the applicant
will have final effect in that the applicant will be able to proceed
with all its operations as if it is a properly
registered
organisation despite the fact that it has been deregistered in terms
of the provisions of section 106 of the LRA. It
was further argued
that should the deregistration be suspended pending the appeal, there
would be no incentive for the applicant
to pursue and finalise the
appeal. Lastly it was argued that it is clear from the wording of
section 106(3) of the LRA that it
was the intention of the
legislature to bring an end to the rights and privileges enjoyed by
an employers’ organisation pending
the outcome of the appeal.
[22]
I am not persuaded by this argument. The relief sought in the Notice
of Motion is both competent and appropriate. See in this
regard the
UPUSA
-judgment where the Court held as follows:
“
[37] If
assuming that the decision of the Registrar is patently wrong and is
based on incorrect facts, then the union is not without
a remedy. The
remedy available to the union is to approach the court for an order
suspending the decision pending appeal. Of course
one of the things
that the union would have to show in approaching the court on this
basis would be to show that it will suffer
prejudice if the decision
is not suspended pending the appeal and that it has prospects of
success on appeal. “
[23]
It also appears from the papers that the applicant is intending to
pursue the appeal and that it has in fact lodged an appeal.
Lastly, I
am also not in agreement with the argument that the relief sought
will have the effect of a final order. The interim
relief will always
be limited by the outcome of the appeal. If the appeal is withdrawn
or lapses for whatever reason, the cancellation
of the registration
will become final. In the event I am of the view that the relief is
competent. Whether or not the applicant
is entitled to the relief
depends, however, on other considerations.
The
requirements for interim relief
[24]
A party
seeking an interim interdict must establish the following:
[3]
(i)
it has a
prima facie
right;
(ii)
that the balance of convenience favours the applicant;
(iii)
that it has a well grounded apprehension that it will suffer
irreparable harm
if the
interim
relief is not granted;
(iv)
that it has no alternative remedy that will afford adequate
protection.
These requirements should
not be considered separately or in isolation but in conjunction with
one another in order to determine
whether or not this Court should
exercise its discretion in favour of the applicant.
[4]
[25]
An
organisation whose registration has been cancelled by the Registrar,
has a right in terms of section 111(3) of the LRA to lodge
an appeal
against the Registrar’s decision to the Labour Court. The
lodging of the appeal does not, however, suspend the
decision of the
Registrar to de-register. Both the decisions in
UPUSA
and
UNICA
altered
the common law position by holding that the common law position does
not apply to appeals in terms of section 111(3) of
the LRA against
the cancellation of the registration of an organisation in
terms of section 106(2A) of the LRA. The
result of these
decisions is that an appeal does not automatically suspend the
operation of the decision to deregister. The aforementioned
courts
came to this conclusion in light of the fact that it is clear from
the wording of section 106(3) that it was the intention
of the
legislature to bring to an end the rights and privileges enjoyed by
an employers’ organisation that has been de-registered
even
pending the outcome of the appeal.
[5]
[26]
Nothing however, prevents an employers’ organisation (and a
trade union) from approaching the Court for an order suspending
the
decision of the Registrar (to de-register) pending the outcome of an
appeal against the decision to de-register. The Court
pertinently
pointed out that the remedy available to an organization which
believes that the Registrar’s decision is patently
wrong, is to
approach the court for an order suspending the decision pending
appeal. The applicant needs to show that The Court
stated that such
an applicant needs to show:
(i)
That it will suffer prejudice if the decision is not suspended
pending the appeal, and
(ii)
That it has prospects of success on appeal.
[27]
A de-registered employers’ organisation or trade union
therefore has the right to approach the Labour Court for an order
suspending the decision to appeal. Whether or not the Court will
grant the interim order depends on the facts and on whether or
not
the applicant has satisfied the requisites for an interim interdict.
I will return to the facts which gave rise to the de-registration
hereinbelow . See also the discussion in paragrapf [35]
et seq
.
[28]
The applicant also argued that it will suffer prejudice as its
members will be left without guidance and assistance in various
matters such as matters at the CCMA or at the Labour Court. Only a
registered employers’ organisation or trade union may
represent
(through its officials) its members in proceedings at the CCMA (see
Rule 25(1)(b)(3) of the Rules of the CCMA), bargaining
councils and
the Labour and Labour Appeal Court (see section 161 of the LRA).
[29]
It is so that the applicant’s members may be without
representation by the applicant at the CCMA and bargaining councils.
However, as was pointed out by the Court in
UPUSA,
this is an
unfortunate consequence of having been deregistered. This is,
however, a consequence that the legislature has foreseen
when it
formulated the consequences of deregistration as follows. Section
106(3) of the LRA reads as follows:
”
When a trade
union’s or employers’ organisation’s registration
is cancelled, all the rights it enjoyed as a result
of being
registered
will
end
.”
[6]
[30]
Moreover, the members of the applicant are not left without recourse
and they are free to approach another employers’
organisation
or even a legal representative for assistance. As already pointed
out, the fact that the applicant will no longer
be able to exercise
its rights in terms of the LRA is the very consequence of being
de-registered and does not, in my view, constitute
irreparable harm
(see also the next paragraph).
[31]
The applicant also submitted that the balance of convenience favours
the applicant. In this regard it was argued that the applicant
has
demonstrated strong prospects of success on appeal, which have been
left unchallenged by the respondents. It was further argued
that the
prejudice that the applicant will suffer if the
interim
relief
is not granted by far outweighs the prejudice that the respondents
will suffer if the
interim
relief is granted. It was
specifically argued that the protection of the public interest is
almost of no significance whatsoever
where the Registrar’s
decision to cancel the applicant’s registration is based on the
fact that the Registrar is of
the view that the applicant was not
operating as a genuine employers’ organization. This is not a
case where the applicant
is suspected of financial impropriety. In
this regard it was argued that the present matter is to be
distinguished from the facts
in the
UPUSA
-judgment and
UNICA-
judgment where the Court stressed the need to protect
the union’s members against financial impropriety. In light of
the fact
that no such a need exist in respect of the applicant, it
was argued that the Court should find that the balance of convenience
favours the applicant.
[32]
The respondent, however, argued that the Registrar has the
responsibility to protect the general interest of the members of
a
trade union or employers’ organisation and argued that the mere
fact that this particular employers’ organisation
is not
accused of financial impropriety does not diminish the public
interest nor the duty of the Registrar to protect the general
interest of the public and the members of the employers’
organisation.
[33]
I am in agreement with the submissions advanced by the respondent.
Firstly, the Registrar must ensure that an employers’
organisation do not abuse the rights and privileges afforded to it in
terms of the LRA. Secondly, an employers’ organisation
occupies
a position of trust and it is the responsibility of the Registrar to
ensure that there is compliance with this position
in light of the
requirements set out in the LRA. In this regard the Court in
UNICA
held as follows:
“
[21] ……
As already indicated, I am of the view that the statute is clear that
the intention of the legislature was
to bring to an end the rights
and privileges enjoyed by a trade union in terms of certain
provisions of the LRA pending the outcome
of the appeal. There is
also a further and important public policy consideration as to why
the rights of a trade union should come
to an end when it is
de-registered by the Registrar (pending the appeal). A trade union is
in a position of trust vis à
vis its members and as such is
entrusted with ensuring that the employee is treated fairly by his or
her employer in the workplace.
A registered trade union is further
allowed to represent its member at the CCMA, the Bargaining Council
and the Labour Court and
is as such in a similar position as an
attorney or counsel. From a public policy point of view a trade union
should not be able
to enjoy the rights afforded to a registered trade
union if it has flaunted the very act from which these rights are
being derived.
“
[34]
In the present case the applicant was deregistered because the
Registrar was of the view that it was not operating as a genuine
employers’ organization. This in my view, if this is indeed the
case, is serious as this defies the whole purpose of an employers’
organisation namely to protect and advance the interests of their
members. Section 106 of the LRA has been enacted to protect members
from an abuse of their trust. An employers’ organisation who
has, according to the Registrar, ceased to operate as a genuine
employers’ organisation, is abusing the trust of its members
and should not be allowed to operate.
[35]
According to the applicant it has good prospects of success in the
appeal particularly in light of the fact that the decision
to
deregister was taken after a very limited opportunity was provided to
the applicant to state its case. Put differently, the
applicant
argued that it was denied the necessary
audi alternam
partem
before a decision was taken.
[36]
Crouse (the Registrar) denies that there was no adherence to the
audi
alteram partem
rule. He also denies that he was biased when
taking his decision. Crouse points out that he had raised concerns
with the applicant
in respect of its (the applicant’s)
compliance with several legal requirements as far back as 23 July
2007. In this letter
Crouse raised various concerns about membership
fees; minutes of annual general meetings, the list of office bearers
and officials
and the family involvement of certain individuals. On
24 April 2009 it was decided to give the applicant notice of the
intention
to deregister. This was done after the first submission
dated 24 December 2008 was received. In terms of this submission the
applicant
has ceased to function in terms of its constitution; the
applicant is functioning for the personal gain of individuals; the
applicant
has ceased to function as a genuine organisation as
envisaged by section 106(2A)(a) of the LRA and labour consultants are
involved
in the running of the applicant.
[37]
A notice of intention to cancel was published in the Government
Gazette of 8 May 2009 (Notice 420 of 2009). In terms
of this
Notice the applicant was afforded an opportunity to make written
representations as to why the registration should not
be cancelled.
The applicant submitted detailed written representations dealing with
each and every point raised by the Registrar
in the Notice. This
document is dated 6 August 2009 and was received by Crouse on 12
August 2009. According to Crouse he duly considered
the
representations made by the applicant and remained of the opinion
that the applicant was not a genuine employers’ organisation.
The applicant was then informed that it would be deregistered as from
28 October 2009. According to Crouse the applicant had a
sufficient
opportunity to respond to the Notice of Intention to deregister and
accordingly submitted that the
audi alteram partem
rule was
adhered to.
[38]
I have perused the documents (including the submission that was filed
with the Registrar and the response received from the
applicant
pursuant to the Notice of the intention to de-register) and am of the
view that the applicant has not established that
it has a
prima
facie
right to the relief sought in its Notice of Motion. As
pointed out by the Court in
Gool v Minister of Justice
1955
(2) SA 682
(C) at 688, the question is not whether or not the
applicant, on the facts set out by it together with any facts set out
by the
respondent which the applicant cannot dispute and having
regard to the inherent probabilities, “
could on those facts
obtain final relief at the trial
”. The question is whether
or not the applicant “
should
” obtain final relief
at the trial. Although the applicant disputes that the
audit
alteram partem
has been denied, it appears from its own
submissions to the Registrar in response to the Notice that the
audit
alteram partem
rule was in fact adhered to. In order to succeed
the applicant must show that it has a
prima facie
right which
may only be open to “
some doubt
”. In the present
case serious doubt is cast upon the averment of the applicant that it
was not granted the
audi alteram partem
. I am therefore of the
view that, in light of the aforegoing, it cannot be concluded that
the applicant should obtain final relief
when the appeal is heard.
[39]
The applicant lastly submitted that it has no alternative remedy
other than to approach this court for the relief it seeks.
This is
disputed by the respondent who argued that the applicant has an
alternative remedy and that is to pursue the appeal.
[40]
The requirement of no other satisfactory remedy is normally in the
context of an application for interim relief considered
together with
the requirement of “irreparable harm”: If the applicant
will suffer irreparable harm the requirement
of no alternative remedy
will be satisfied. I have already indicated that I am not persuaded
that the applicant (and more particularly
its members) will suffer
irreparable harm if the relief is not granted.
Conclusion
[41]
On the facts of this particular case and having considered the
requisites for an interim interdict, I am not persuaded that
the
applicant is entitled to the relief sought. It is, in my view, not in
the public’s interest to allow the present applicant
to operate
in circumstances where the Registrar is of the view that the
applicant was not operating as a genuine employers’
organization and in circumstances where it appears that the Registrar
has arrived at this conclusion after having afforded the
applicant
the
audi alteram partem
. In the event the application is
dismissed. I can find no reason why costs should not follow the
result.
AC
BASSON, J
Date
of application
: 16 September 2010.
Date
of order
: 22 September 2010
Date
of judgment
: 22 October 2010
For
the applicant:
Adv Riaan Venter.
For
the respondents:
Adv C Prinsloo. Instructed by the State
Attorney, Pretoria.
[1]
As far as the chronology of material facts is concerned I have
quoted liberally from the applicant’s heads of argument
in
light of the fact that most of the facts were not in dispute. Where
necessary, I will point out where the parties differ on
the facts.
[2]
“
[35]
The objects of s106 read with s111 (3) of the LRA must also be
understood in the context that the legislature having created
an
environment and a frame work for the guaranteed and enjoyment of the
Freedom of Association in form of trade unions, also
sought to
ensure that certain minimum duties of transparency and
accountability are imposed on the trade unions. The need for
accountability arises from the fact that trade unions, as public
entities, depends largely on financial contributions from the
workers who are members of the public. It cannot be denied that the
decision of the Registrar to de-register a trade union has
serious
consequence on that union as an entity and its members. As an entity
the decision of the Registrar, is likely to have
a profound impact
on its structures and its operations including the right to
represent its members in various dispute resolution
processes. It
further cannot be denied that there exists a possibility that the
Registrar in arriving at the decision to de-register
a trade union
may be based on an incorrect interpretation of facts before him or
her or other invalid reasons which may ultimately
result in the
decision being overturned on appeal.
[36]
The prejudice that a union may suffer as a result of de-registration
and enforcing such, even pending appeal, should be weighed
against
the public interest of protecting the interest of union members in
particular that of ensuring that funds contributed
are utilized for
the purpose of benefiting union members. This simple accountability
principle is founded on the notion that
a union occupies a position
of trust as concerning the management of the funds contributed by
members. In short the provisions
of s 106 of the LRA are protective
in nature, intended to protect the vulnerable workers from abuse of
their trust by unscrupulous
union officials whose involvement in a
union may be for no other reason but to advance their selfish
business interest. “
[3]
Setlogelo
v Setlogelo
1914
AD 221
at 227 and
Eriksen
Motors (Welkom) Ltd v Protea Motors, Warrenton and Another
1973
(3) SA 685
(A) at 691 B – E.
[4]
Olympic
Passenger Service (Pty) Ltd v Ramlagan
1957 (2) SA 382
(D) at 383D – F.
[5]
See in this regard the UNICA judgment where the Court held as
follows: “
It
would therefore appears from the aforegoing that the principle is
that, unless the relevant statute provides otherwise, the
lodging of
an appeal suspends the effect of the (administrative) decision
pending the outcome of the appeal..”
[6]
My emphasis.