Air-O-Thene Products Pty) Ltd v Ford and Another (JR1414/07) [2010] ZALCJHB 8 (3 February 2010)

80 Reportability

Brief Summary

Labour Law — Review of arbitration award — Application for review of an arbitration award finding dismissal substantively and procedurally unfair — Applicant contending that the commissioner misdirected herself in her findings and calculations — Court finding that the dismissal was substantively unfair due to lack of training provided to the employee and procedurally unfair due to failure to provide necessary documents prior to the disciplinary hearing — However, error identified in calculation of compensation regarding commission — Application to review dismissed with modification of compensation order.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The matter concerned an application for review brought in the Labour Court in terms of section 145 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (the LRA). The applicant sought to review and set aside an arbitration award issued under the auspices of the Metal and Engineering Industries Bargaining Council (MEIBC) by the second respondent commissioner on 4 May 2007 (case number MEGA 7310). The applicant also sought a stay of enforcement of the award pending finalisation of the review, purportedly in terms of section 145(3) of the LRA.


The applicant was Air-O-Thene Products (Pty) Ltd, and the first respondent was Christine Ford, a former employee of the applicant. The second respondent was Zodwa Mdladla, the MEIBC commissioner who presided over the arbitration proceedings and issued the award under review.


The underlying dispute arose from the employee’s dismissal, which the commissioner classified as a dismissal for poor work performance. The commissioner found the dismissal to be both substantively and procedurally unfair and ordered reinstatement with back pay. The review proceedings thus concerned whether the commissioner’s findings on fairness and remedy were reviewable, and whether any aspects of the award required correction or substitution.


2. Material Facts


The first respondent was employed by the applicant on 4 December 2003 as a Sales Representative. On or about 15 December 2004, the applicant charged her with misconduct and poor work performance, she was found guilty, and she was dismissed.


After her dismissal, the first respondent referred a dispute to the Bargaining Council on 11 February 2005. The dispute was conciliated but remained unresolved. It proceeded to arbitration, which commenced on 23 March 2006 and concluded on 27 February 2007, with the award being issued on 4 May 2007.


On the substantive fairness aspect, it was not in dispute that the applicant’s complaint before dismissal related to alleged poor performance, and the commissioner accordingly treated it as such. It was also not in dispute that, at the time when a manager (Mr Lance Whitford) introduced the use of computers and required reporting by spreadsheet, the employee did not have computer skills, and the applicant knew she lacked those skills. The court further recorded that no evidence had been tendered at arbitration that the employee was trained in order to enable her to compile the required computer-generated reports.


On procedural fairness, it was common cause that the applicant did not provide the employee, prior to the disciplinary hearing, with a bundle of documents that it intended to use, despite the employee having requested the documents before the hearing. The applicant contended it could not provide documents because the essence of the charge was that the employee had not prepared the documents in question. The court, however, relied on the disciplinary hearing minutes (referenced as page 79 line 16 of “A2”) reflecting that Mr Whitford in fact produced a bundle of documents during the disciplinary hearing to support the allegations.


It was further accepted by the court that the employee was only given the documents during the disciplinary hearing and was required to proceed immediately, without being allowed an opportunity to peruse the documents and prepare her response. The chairperson’s refusal to grant a postponement in those circumstances was treated by the court as materially relevant to whether the procedure was fair.


Regarding remuneration and compensation, it was not in dispute that before the applicant took over a business referred to as Versapak, the employee’s remuneration included commission, and that the applicant later removed commission from the calculation of remuneration. The court treated the removal of commission as the principal change to the employee’s terms and conditions following the transfer.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were whether the arbitration award was reviewable under section 145 of the LRA on the grounds advanced, namely whether the commissioner failed to apply her mind, committed reviewable irregularities, or reached unreasonable conclusions on substantive fairness and procedural fairness, and whether the commissioner committed an error in the calculation of compensation.


The dispute required the court to consider a mixture of the application of legal standards to largely common-cause facts (for example, whether the employee was afforded a fair opportunity to meet performance standards, and whether the disciplinary procedure was fair given the timing of disclosure of documents), together with a review assessment of whether the commissioner’s conclusions were ones that could reasonably be reached on the material before her.


A further issue concerned the correct legal interpretation and application of section 197 of the LRA in relation to whether commission should have been included as part of the employee’s remuneration for purposes of calculating compensation.


4. Court’s Reasoning


On substantive fairness, the court accepted that the dispute was properly characterised as one of poor work performance. It referred to Schedule 8 item 9(b)(ii) of the LRA, which requires consideration of whether the employee was given a fair opportunity to meet the required performance standard. Applying this framework, the court emphasised that the employee lacked computer skills when computer-based reporting was introduced, that the employer knew this, and that there was no evidence the employer had provided training to enable compliance with the required standard.


Against that factual matrix, the court held that the commissioner’s conclusion that the dismissal was substantively unfair was not reviewable, stating in substance that it was not a conclusion that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach on the materials before the commissioner. The court therefore rejected the review attack directed at the substantive fairness finding.


On procedural fairness, the court considered the effect of the employer’s failure to provide the employee with the documents in advance of the disciplinary hearing, despite a prior request. It rejected the employer’s justification that it could not provide documents because the allegation was non-production by the employee, on the basis that the disciplinary hearing minutes reflected that the employer’s representative in fact produced and relied on a bundle of documents during the hearing.


The court reasoned that providing the documents only during the hearing and requiring the employee to proceed immediately, without an opportunity to study and prepare, undermined the employee’s ability to prepare for the hearing and to cross-examine effectively. The court treated the chairperson’s refusal of a postponement as unjustified in context, and as rendering the disciplinary proceedings unfair. On that basis, it rejected the contention that the commissioner failed to apply her mind or erred in concluding that the dismissal was procedurally unfair.


On compensation, the court accepted the applicant’s criticism that the commissioner had erred by including commission in calculating remuneration for purposes of compensation. The court analysed the commissioner’s reliance on section 197 of the LRA, holding that the commissioner’s view—namely that section 197 precludes an employer from unilaterally changing terms and conditions of employment at all—was not correct. The court interpreted section 197 as permitting unilateral changes provided they are not substantial, and it then assessed the particular change in issue.


Applying that approach, the court found that, although the employee retained salary and other conditions, the only relevant change was the removal of commission. On the court’s assessment, this change did not constitute a substantial change to terms and conditions “in the circumstances” of the case. Consequently, commission should not have been included in the remuneration figure used for compensation calculation. The court therefore corrected the award only to that limited extent by substituting the compensation paragraph with a recalculated amount.


5. Outcome and Relief


The Labour Court dismissed the application to review and set aside the arbitration award. However, it substituted paragraph 4.1.2 of the award, replacing it with an order that the applicant pay the first respondent compensation of R192 000.00, being the equivalent of 12 months’ remuneration calculated at the rate of R16 000.00 per month (the employee’s remuneration at the time of dismissal), with commission excluded.


The court made no order as to costs. The order did not separately address the requested stay of enforcement pending review in its final terms.


Cases Cited


No cases were cited in the judgment.


Legislation Cited


Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, section 145.


Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, section 145(3).


Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, Schedule 8 item 9(b)(ii).


Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, section 197.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The Labour Court held that the commissioner’s findings that the dismissal was substantively unfair and procedurally unfair were not reviewable on the grounds advanced. In particular, the court accepted that the employee was not shown to have been trained to meet newly imposed computer-based reporting requirements, and that she therefore had not been given a fair opportunity to meet the standard as contemplated in Schedule 8.


The court further held that the disciplinary process was procedurally unfair because the employer failed to provide the employee with relevant documents in advance despite request, provided a bundle only during the hearing, and required her to proceed immediately without time to prepare; the refusal of a postponement in that context rendered the proceedings unfair.


The court held, however, that the commissioner erred in including commission in the remuneration used to calculate compensation, and also erred in her articulation of section 197 insofar as she treated it as prohibiting any unilateral changes to terms and conditions. The court substituted the compensation order accordingly, while otherwise leaving the award intact and dismissing the review.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that, in cases of dismissal for poor work performance, fairness requires consideration of whether the employee was afforded a fair opportunity to meet the required standard, as reflected in Schedule 8 item 9(b)(ii) of the LRA. Where performance expectations change (such as through the introduction of computer-based reporting), the absence of evidence of enabling measures (such as training) may support a conclusion of substantive unfairness.


The judgment also applied the principle that procedural fairness in disciplinary proceedings is undermined where an employee is denied a reasonable opportunity to prepare. Where an employer intends to rely on documentary material to prove allegations, the employee’s receipt of those documents only during the hearing, coupled with a refusal of postponement, may render the process procedurally unfair.


In relation to section 197 of the LRA, the court applied the principle that a transferee employer may not make substantial unilateral changes to transferred employees’ terms and conditions, and that section 197 does not necessarily preclude any unilateral change whatsoever. Whether a particular change is substantial requires an evaluative assessment on the circumstances identified by the court.


Finally, the judgment illustrates that, even where a review application is dismissed in substance, the Labour Court may substitute part of an arbitration award where it finds a material error in a discrete aspect of the remedy, such as the calculation basis for compensation.

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[2010] ZALCJHB 8
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Air-O-Thene Products Pty) Ltd v Ford and Another (JR1414/07) [2010] ZALCJHB 8 (3 February 2010)

IN
THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
HELD
IN JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: JR 1414/07
In
the matter between:
AIR-O-THENE
PRODUCTS (PTY) LTD
APPLICANT
and
CHRISTINE
FORD

1
ST
RESPONDENT
ZODWA
MDLADLA

2
ND
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
NYATHELA
AJ
Introduction
[1]
This is an application for review in terms of section 145 of the
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (the LRA) of an award issued
by the
second respondent on 04 May 2007 under case number MEGA 7310.
[2]
In terms of the award, second respondent found that the dismissal of
the third respondent was both procedurally and substantively
unfair
and ordered the applicant to reinstate third respondent with back
pay.
[3]
Applicant also seeks to stay the enforcement of the award pending the
finalization of the review in terms of section 145(3)
of the LRA.
[4]
First respondent is opposing the review application.
The
parties
[5]
The applicant is Air-o-Thene Products (Pty) Ltd, a company duly
registered and incorporated in terms of the company laws of
the
Republic of South Africa.
[6]
The first respondent is the Christine Ford a former employee of the
applicant.
[7]
The second respondent is Zodwa Mdladla, a commissioner of the MEIBC.
The second respondent is cited herein in her capacity as
the
commissioner who presided at the arbitration proceedings under case
number MEGA 7310.
The
Facts
[8]
The first respondent was employed by the applicant on 04 December
2003 as a Sales Representative.
[9]
On or about 15 December 2004, first respondent was charged with
misconduct and poor work performance. She was found guilty and

dismissed.
[10]
On 11 February 2005, first respondent referred a dispute to the
Bargaining Council. The dispute was conciliated and remained

unresolved. The dispute was arbitrated on 23 March 2006 and concluded
on 27 February 2007. The award was issued on 04 May 2007.
Grounds
for review
[11]
In the founding affidavit the applicant contends amongst others that:
11.1 The second
respondent failed to apply her mind sufficiently to the evidence led
during the course of the arbitration proceedings
and failed to
rationally and correctly link the relevant facts which were given in
evidence to her findings and ultimately her
award.
11.2  The second
respondent misdirected herself and erred in finding that the
dismissal was procedurally unfair.
11.3  The second
respondent committed a gross irregularity in that her calculation of
the compensation payable was erroneous.
Analysis
Substantive
fairness
[12]
It is not in dispute that applicant complained about first
respondent’s alleged poor performance prior to her dismissal.

Second respondent therefore correctly classified this dispute as a
dismissal for poor performance.
[13]
Schedule 8 item 9 (b)(ii) of the LRA provides amongst others that in
determining whether a dismissal for poor work performance
is unfair,
one should consider whether or not the employee was given a fair
opportunity to meet the required standard.
[14]
In this matter, it is not in dispute that the second respondent did
not have computer skills at the time when Lance Whitford
introduced
the use of computers and required her to compile reports on
spreadsheet using a computer. Applicant never disputed having

knowledge that the first respondent had no computer skills to enable
her to prepare the reports required from her.
[15]
There was however no evidence tendered by the applicant during the
arbitration hearing that the first respondent was ever trained
on how
to use a computer to prepare the reports in question.
[16]
In view of the above information which was before second respondent,
I find that the conclusion reached by second respondent
that the
dismissal of the first respondent was substantively unfair is not a
decision which a reasonable decision maker, given
the materials
before her, could not have reached in the circumstances.
Procedural
fairness
[17]
It is common cause that applicant did not provide first respondent
with a bundle of documents which it intended to use in the

disciplinary hearing despite that first respondent had requested the
documents prior to the date of the hearing.
[18]
Applicant’s argument in this regard is that it could not have
produced the said documents since the thrust of the charges
is that
first respondent did not prepare the documents hence it did not have
any such documents requested.
[19]
However, page 79 line 16 of A2 which is the minutes of the
disciplinary hearing, Mr Lance Whitford who led applicant’s

case during the disciplinary hearing produced a bundle of documents
which he used to prove the allegations against first respondent

during the hearing.
[20]
First respondent was only given documents during the disciplinary
hearing and required to proceed with the hearing forthwith
without
first being allowed an opportunity to peruse the documents and
prepare her own bundle of documents to counter the documents

presented by the employer if need be. Clearly first respondent could
not have adequately prepared herself to cross-examine the
employer’s
witnesses when she received documents during the hearing.
[21]
The fact that applicant deemed it necessary that it has to use
documents to prove its case and actually used the said documents

implies that the applicant did in fact have the documents which were
relevant to the proceedings and should have been made available
to
first respondent prior to the hearing. It follows logically therefore
that first respondent was entitled to be given an opportunity
to
prepare herself for the hearing since she only received documents
during the hearing. The refusal by the chairperson of the
hearing to
grant postponement was unjustified in the circumstances and rendered
the proceedings unfair.
[22]
In view of the aforegoing, the argument by the applicant’s
legal representative that second respondent did not apply
her mind
properly to the facts before her in arriving at the decision that
first respondent’s dismissal is procedurally unfair
is
rejected.
Compensation
[23]
Applicant’s contention is that second respondent did not
apply her mind to the facts and erred in calculating the
amount of
compensation payable in that she included commission in calculating
the remuneration.
[24]
It is not in dispute that prior to applicant taking over Versapak
first respondent’s remuneration included commission.
Applicant
changed the remuneration and removed the commission in calculating
the first respondent’s remuneration. It is only
this aspect of
first respondent’s terms and conditions of employment which
appears to have changed after the transfer of
business to applicant.
[25]
As pointed out above, section 197 of the LRA provides that an
employer who takes over a business as a going concern may not
change
the terms and conditions of employment of employees from the old
business in a substantial way. What is implied in the section
is that
the employer may unilaterally change the terms and conditions of
employment as long as the changes are not substantial.
In the
circumstances, second respondent’s finding that section 197 of
the LRA precludes an employer from unilaterally changing
the terms
and conditions of employment at all is not a correct reflection of
the law.
[26]
In this matter, the employee retained her salary and other terms and
conditions of employment despite the transfer. The only
change is
with regard to the payment of commission. I do not find that the
change to the payment of commission can constitute a
substantial
change to terms and conditions of employment in the circumstances.
[27]
I therefore agree with applicant’s legal representative that
there was an error in the manner in which second respondent

calculated the remuneration as commission should have been excluded
from the calculation.
Order
[28]
In the premise I make the following order:
28.1   The
application to review and set aside the arbitration award issued by
the second respondent on 04 May 2007 under
case number MEGA 7310 is
dismissed.
28.2   I
substitute paragraph 4.1.2 of the award with the following order:
The applicant is ordered
to pay first respondent compensation in the sum of R192 000-00 which
is equivalent to first respondent’s
12 (twelve) months
remuneration calculated at her rate of remuneration at the time of
her dismissal which was R16 000-00 (sixteen
thousand rand) per month.
28.3 I make no order as
to costs.
_______________
Nyathela
AJ
Date
of Hearing   :
26 June 2009
Date
of Judgment         :
03 February 2010