De Beers Consolidated Mines (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others (JR1583/09) [2010] ZALCJHB 6 (22 January 2010)

80 Reportability

Brief Summary

Labour Law — Jurisdiction — CCMA's jurisdiction to arbitrate disputes — Applicant sought to review ruling of CCMA regarding its jurisdiction over a dispute concerning non-payment of a benefits parity allowance to employees — Employees alleged breach of contract by the applicant for not providing the allowance as stipulated in their contracts — CCMA ruled it had jurisdiction to arbitrate the matter, rejecting the applicant's argument that the Labour Court had exclusive jurisdiction — Holding that the CCMA has jurisdiction to arbitrate disputes related to unfair labour practices concerning benefits, as per the Labour Relations Act, despite the applicant's claims regarding the exclusivity of the Labour Court's jurisdiction.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


This was an application in the Labour Court to review and set aside a jurisdictional ruling made by a commissioner of the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA). The applicant was De Beers Consolidated Mines (Pty) Ltd (the employer). The first respondent was the CCMA, the second respondent was the commissioner who issued the impugned ruling, and further respondents included the affected employees (the fourth to eleventh respondents) as well as their trade union (the third respondent).


The matter arose after the employees referred a dispute to the CCMA. Although the employer requested a jurisdictional ruling at conciliation stage, the dispute was nonetheless conciliated without such a ruling being made. The dispute was then set down for arbitration, where the employer raised jurisdiction as a point in limine and filed a notice and supporting affidavit seeking a ruling that the CCMA lacked jurisdiction to conciliate or arbitrate the dispute. The employees and the union filed no answering affidavit. On 24 April 2009, the commissioner dismissed the employer’s jurisdictional challenge and ruled that the CCMA had jurisdiction.


The review application was unopposed in the Labour Court. The court nonetheless approached the matter on the basis that it was still required to assess whether the commissioner’s jurisdictional ruling was reviewable and should be set aside. The general subject-matter of the dispute concerned whether employees were entitled (under their contracts) to receive a contractual allowance described as a benefits parity allowance, and whether a dispute about non-payment of that allowance could be determined by the CCMA as an unfair labour practice relating to benefits, or whether it fell exclusively within the Labour Court’s contractual jurisdiction under the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997.


Material Facts


The employees were employed on the basis of written contracts of employment titled “Offer of employment”, addressed individually to each employee. The contract provided for remuneration in the form of a total remuneration package (TRP) and incorporated an attached schedule of conditions of employment.


A particular contractual provision became central to the dispute, namely clause 9 of the annexure, headed “Benefits parity allowance”. Clause 9 recorded that a non-pensionable benefits parity allowance would be paid monthly in addition to the TRP, that it would only be payable to employees employed at specified operations (which included the relevant mine), that it would not be included for certain calculation purposes (such as performance bonuses and leave encashment), and that it was designed to compensate for additional living costs associated with city centres compared to operations.


The employees’ referral to the CCMA stated, in substance, that the employer had failed to pay the allowance as “documented and specified” in the contract and that the outcome sought was retrospective payment of the allowance as stated in the contract and conditions of employment.


The employer’s jurisdictional challenge before the CCMA was advanced on the basis that the employees’ claim was essentially one of breach of contract, contending that such disputes fell within the Labour Court’s jurisdiction and that the CCMA’s unfair labour practice jurisdiction did not extend to creating entitlement to remuneration or benefits not due under the contract. The employer further characterised the employees’ claim as a demand for a new term and condition of employment (a dispute of interest rather than a dispute of right).


The commissioner approached the matter on the basis that the dispute related to a benefit, that the employer’s challenge was concerned with the correct forum rather than the benefit itself, and that the CCMA had jurisdiction under the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 to arbitrate an unfair labour practice dispute concerning benefits. The commissioner also took the view that the Basic Conditions of Employment Act provisions relied upon by the employer did not establish exclusive Labour Court jurisdiction for all contractual disputes to the exclusion of other statutory fora, and concluded that both the Labour Court and the CCMA could have jurisdiction depending on how the matter was pursued.


In the review proceedings, the employer disputed that it was common cause the matter concerned a “benefit”, and maintained that the true nature of the dispute was contractual enforcement which, in the employer’s submission, the CCMA lacked power to adjudicate.


Legal Issues


The central legal question was whether the CCMA had jurisdiction to conciliate and arbitrate the employees’ dispute, framed as an unfair labour practice dispute concerning the provision of benefits, where the employees alleged entitlement to payment under their written employment contracts.


This was primarily a dispute about the proper characterisation of the claim for jurisdictional purposes and the allocation of jurisdiction between statutory fora. It concerned the application of legal principles to largely common-cause features of the referral (the contractual provision relied upon and the remedy sought), rather than a factual dispute about what occurred. The question was not whether the employees were ultimately entitled to the allowance on a correct interpretation of the contract, but whether the CCMA could lawfully arbitrate a dispute of that kind.


Court’s Reasoning


The Labour Court emphasised that a commissioner must determine the real dispute between the parties by considering the available material, including the dispute description and the outcome sought, and not merely the labels used by the parties. In this respect, the court relied on the approach set out by the Constitutional Court, namely that the arbitration system does not involve pleadings in the civil-litigation sense and that a commissioner must ascertain the substantive dispute from the referral documentation and the issues presented.


Applying that approach, the court considered what the employees had actually referred: a complaint that the employer had failed to pay an allowance “documented and specified” in the employment contract, and a request for retrospective payment. The court accepted that the commissioner had undertaken the correct inquiry into the nature of the dispute for jurisdictional purposes and had treated it as a dispute about a benefit contemplated by the unfair labour practice provisions of the Labour Relations Act.


The court then addressed the proper approach to jurisdiction, drawing on authority that jurisdiction does not depend on whether the claim will succeed on the merits. The court treated it as axiomatic that the substantive strength or weakness of the claim does not determine jurisdiction, and that a claim that may ultimately fail does not, for that reason alone, deprive a forum of jurisdiction. On this footing, the court regarded the employer’s contention—namely that the contract did not in fact entitle these employees to the allowance—as irrelevant to the jurisdictional inquiry at this stage.


Turning to the statutory framework, the court considered the Labour Relations Act provisions defining an unfair labour practice as including unfair conduct relating to the provision of benefits, and empowering arbitrators to determine unfair labour practice disputes on reasonable terms. It also considered the Basic Conditions of Employment Act provisions conferring on the Labour Court exclusive jurisdiction in respect of matters “in terms of” that Act, and concurrent jurisdiction with civil courts in respect of matters concerning a contract of employment, as well as the Labour Court’s remedial power to make determinations on contractual matters including orders for specific performance, damages, or compensation.


The court held that the employer had misconceived the nature of the jurisdictional enquiry by treating the dispute as necessarily excluded from CCMA arbitration because it related to contractual entitlement. The court reasoned that a dispute about non-payment of a benefit that an employee alleges is contractually due is capable of constituting an unfair labour practice dispute about benefits, and can be determined through arbitration. The court drew support from Labour Appeal Court authority indicating that the unfair labour practice jurisdiction regarding benefits is directed at disputes concerning benefits to which an employee is already entitled (whether by contract, collective agreement, or law), and is not intended to create new entitlements through arbitration (i.e., it does not convert a dispute of interest into a dispute of right). On the facts as presented in the referral, the employees were asserting an entitlement grounded in the written contract, which placed the dispute in the category of an arguable dispute of right capable of arbitration.


The court accepted that the Labour Court could also have jurisdiction if the dispute were pursued as a contractual claim under the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. However, it held that this did not exclude CCMA jurisdiction in relation to an unfair labour practice benefits dispute. On the court’s reasoning, the matter was one in which two fora could have jurisdiction, and the referring party was entitled to select the forum, provided that the selected forum had jurisdiction.


Finally, the court underscored that, because the employees were the parties who referred the dispute, they were in a position to choose among available fora. The court also noted that the employer could have referred a contractual dispute to the Labour Court if it wished, but that did not mean the CCMA lacked jurisdiction over the employees’ referral. On this basis, the court found no reviewable irregularity in the commissioner’s ruling and concluded that the review application was not made out.


Outcome and Relief


The Labour Court dismissed the review application and allowed the commissioner’s ruling (that the CCMA had jurisdiction) to stand.


Because the review was unopposed, the court made no order as to costs.


Cases Cited


Kusa v Tayo Young Metal Industries and Others 2009 (1) BLLR 1 (CC).


Chirwa v Transnet Limited and Others [2007] ZACC 23; 2008 (4) SA 367 (CC).


Makambi v MEC for Education Eastern Cape [2008] ZASCA 61; 2008 (5) SA 449 (SCA).


Hospisa and Another v Northern Cape Provincial Administration 2000 (21) ILJ 1066 (LAC).


Protocon (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others 2005 (26) ILJ 1105 (LC).


Legislation Cited


Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, section 186(2)(a); section 191(5)(a) (as referred to in the commissioner’s ruling); section 193(4).


Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997, section 74 (as referred to in the commissioner’s ruling); section 77(1); section 77(3); section 77A(e).


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 34.


Rules of Court Cited


No specific rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that the commissioner adopted the correct approach by determining the true nature of the dispute from the employees’ referral and the remedy sought, and by treating it as a dispute concerning the provision of benefits for purposes of the unfair labour practice jurisdiction.


The court held further that the employer’s contention that the employees were not contractually entitled to the allowance was a merits issue and did not determine jurisdiction. The CCMA could arbitrate an unfair labour practice dispute about benefits where employees allege a contractual entitlement to the benefit, even though the Labour Court could also have jurisdiction over a contractual claim under the Basic Conditions of Employment Act.


The review application was dismissed, and no costs order was made.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A commissioner determining jurisdiction in CCMA proceedings must ascertain the real dispute between the parties by considering the referral documentation, the relief sought, and the factual matrix, and is not bound by the parties’ characterisation or labels.


The existence of jurisdiction is determined by the nature of the right asserted and the claim pursued, not by whether the claim will ultimately succeed on the merits. A claim’s potential failure does not, by itself, deprive a forum of jurisdiction.


The unfair labour practice jurisdiction concerning the provision of benefits is directed at disputes where an employee asserts an entitlement to a benefit arising ex contractu (from contract), from a collective agreement, or ex lege (from legislation), and is not intended to create new benefits through arbitration in circumstances amounting to a dispute of interest.


Where statutory schemes permit more than one competent forum to determine a dispute (for example, contractual adjudication in the Labour Court and unfair labour practice arbitration in the CCMA on the pleaded basis), the referring party may select the forum, provided the selected forum has jurisdiction on the nature of the dispute as referred.

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[2010] ZALCJHB 6
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De Beers Consolidated Mines (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others (JR1583/09) [2010] ZALCJHB 6 (22 January 2010)

IN
THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
HELD
AT BRAAMFONTEIN
CASE
NO:  JR1583/09
DATE
:
22/01/2010
In
the matter between
DE
BEERS CONSOLIDATED MINES (PTY)
Ltd                                                   APPLICANT
and
CCMA
AND
OTHERS                                                                                        RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
SONI
J
:
The applicant in this matter seeks to have reviewed and set
aside a ruling made by the second respondent in respect of the

jurisdiction of the CCMA to arbitrate a dispute that had been
referred to it.
The
dispute had been referred to the CCMA which is cited as the second
respondent in these proceedings by the thought to 11 respondents
who
are employees of the applicant.  The third respondent is the
union of the employees.
The
review application is not opposed.  Nevertheless, I am required
to properly consider whether the ruling made by the second
respondent
falls to be reviewed and set aside.  Clearly, if on a proper
consideration of the matter I find that the CCMA does
not have
jurisdiction I am required to set aside the ruling.
The
matter had been conciliated, despite the fact that the applicant had
requested that a ruling on the jurisdiction question be
made.
No such ruling was given.
The
dispute was then set down for arbitration where the question of
jurisdiction was re-argued, this time as a point
in
limine
.
The
applicant had filed a notice in which it indicated that it sought a
ruling that the CCMA did not have jurisdiction to arbitrate
or even
conciliate the dispute that the 4
th
to 11
th
respondents had referred to it.  In support of that application
for the ruling the applicant filed an affidavit.  There
was no
answering affidavit from the employees or the union.
On
24 April 2009 the second respondent made his ruling.  In his
ruling he dismissed the application in which the applicant
had sought
a ruling that the CCMA did not have jurisdiction in the matter.
It
is necessary now what the issue was that had been said by the
applicant in support of the application for the ruling.
However, before doing so it is necessary to point out that the
employees who had referred the dispute where employed in terms of
a
written contract of employment.  A copy of the contract is
included in the court papers.  It is not necessary to refer
in
detail to the contract.  It will suffice to refer in particular
to three aspects of the contract.
First,
the contract is addressed to each of the employees who had brought
the application.  The document is headed “Offer
of
employment [at the mine in question]” and it goes on to say:

We
have pleasure in offering you a position as security officer manage
self-specialist at De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd, Voorspoed
Mine
with effect from 1 June 2008.”
I
point out in parenthesis that the starting dates for the employees
was not necessarily the same.
Clause
1 deals with the question of remuneration.  It points out that
the employee would enjoy a total remuneration package
TRP and the
rate of that is set out.
Clause
2 states:

This
offer of employment is subject to your agreeing to the attached
schedule COE annexure of conditions of employment as applicable
to
you.”
Clause
3 says:

Please
signify your acceptance of this offer of employment by signing in the
space provided and returning a copy of this letter
to an address
indicated on the contract.”
The
provision of the contract that is in dispute constitutes clause 9 of
the annexure to the contract.  In view of the importance
it
takes in this matter I will read it out in full.  It is referred
to, or the heading of clause 9 is “Benefits parity
allowance.”
It reads as follows:

A
non-pensionable benefits parity allowance is payable on a monthly
basis in addition to the TRP.  The allowance will only
be
payable to employees employed by Johannesburg Campus,
Cullinan
Diamond Mine, Kimberley Mines, Kimberley Head Office, Voorspoed Mine
or
De Beers Marine Cape Town.  This allowance will not be
included for the purposes of calculating your annual performance
bonus,
leave encashment and other salary based allowances, payments
and bonuses.  It has been designed as compensation towards the

additional costs associated with living in city centres as compared
with the operations.”
I
turn now to a consideration of what the applicant said in support of
its application for the ruling.  As I have indicated,
it filed
an affidavit.  In the relevant part of the affidavit the
applicant makes the following submissions.
It was clear from what
the employees themselves had said that they alleged that the essence
of their claim was that the applicant
had breached their contracts
of employment by not providing them with the allowance in question.
The
Labour Court has jurisdiction to deal with breaches of contracts of
employment.
The allowance is not
something which the applicants are entitled to in terms of their
contracts of employment.  t is trite
that he unfair labour
practice jurisdiction does not extend to a certain rights to
benefits or remuneration which an employee
is not entitled to in
terms of their contracts of employment.
The
applicants are in essence making a demand to a new term and
conditions of employment.
It
would be helpful to consider however what the applicants, or the
dispute which the applicants had referred to the CCMA.
They say
failed, I take it they mean the employer, failed to benefit.
What they say in effect is that the employer failed
to pay the
allowance as documented and specified in the contract of employment.
They then go on to say that the outcome that
they require is that the
allowance be paid retrospective as stated in the contract of
employment and conditions of employment.
Having
heard argument apparently from both sides the second respondent then
made his ruling.  He records in the ruling that
the issue to be
decided was whether the CCMA had jurisdiction to arbitrate the matter
at hand.  Having pointed out what had
been said by the applicant
in its supporting affidavit and pointing out further that the
employees had not opposed the application,
but had left the decision
in the hands of the CCMA, they had however stated that the CCMA does
have jurisdiction.
In
his analysis of the evidence and argument the arbitrator says the
following:

It
was common cause between the parties that the issues relate to a
benefit.”
He then goes on to state:

I
must be very clear that the challenge of the respondent was never
related to the benefit itself, but to the correct forum to deal
with
the dispute.”
In
his view Section 191 (5) (A) (4) of the Labour Relations Act makes it
clear that the CCMA has jurisdiction.
He
points out that the applicant had contended that Section 77 (3) and
77 (A) (E) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act indicated
that
the Labour Court was the competent forum to adjudicate the matter. He
goes on to state that the applicant’s argument
was that where
the matter relates to non-performance by a party to a contract of
employment, it is the Labour Court that must adjudicate
it.
Considering
these contentions, the second respondent says the applicant had
misinterpreted the wording, presumably of Section 77
so as to limit
all disputes related to contracts of employment to adjudication by
the Labour Court.  The second respondent
rejects that
contention. He says that Section 77 and Section 77 (A) does not
provide that the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction
to solely
determine all and every dispute related to contacts of employment.
He
goes on to point out that the Basic Conditions of Employment Act give
wide ranging powers to officials of the Department of Labour
to
determine disputes and even issue compliance orders in terms of the
Act.  He also points out that in terms of Section 74
of the Act
the CCMA is entitled to arbitrate certain disputes.
The
second respondent then pointed out that where a condition of
employment is not described in legislation it is based in a contract

of employment whether oral or written, in the case at hand it was
contained in a written contract.
He
then goes on to say, the dispute is that some employees receive the
benefit, but others did not.  This is the basis for
most, if not
all disputes of this nature before the CCMA.  He points out that
it is difficult to imagine what else could be
seen as an unfair
labour practice relating to the provision of benefits.  If one
accepted the argument of the applicant, then
the provisions of unfair
labour practices relating to benefits would be superfluous.
However, in terms of the Labour Relations
Act the CCMA may arbitrate
those disputes.
In
the light of the foregoing the second respondent concluded that the
Labour Court would have jurisdiction to deal with the matter,
had the
dispute been referred to it, but the CCMA would also have
jurisdiction because of the provisions of the Labour Relations
Act
allowing it to arbitrate matters concerning unfair labour practice
related to benefits.
It
is for those reasons that the second respondent dismissed the
application and ruled that the CCMA had jurisdiction to deal with
the
matter.
The
affidavit in support of the review application sets out the reasons
why the ruling falls to be reviewed and set aside.
Very briefly
the following reasons were submitted:
The
second respondent unreasonably found or committed a gross
irregularity in finding, or misconducted himself in finding that
it
was common cause between the parties that the issue related to a
benefit.
That was not the issue.
The issue was whether the CCMA had jurisdiction in terms of the Act
and the provisions relating to
unfair labour practices to decide
whether the respondents were contractually entitled to the allowance
in question.
The commissioner
unreasonably found that despite the provisions of Section 77 of the
Basic Conditions of Employment Act, the CCMA
had jurisdiction to
decide the dispute before it.
The
commissioner unreasonably failed to take into account the nature of
the dispute that had been referred to the CCMA.
Because
the employees had complained that the applicant had breached their
contracts of employment by failing to comply with a term
thereof, the
CCMA did not have jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the contract,
such jurisdiction fell within the exclusive domain
of the
Labour
Court.  Much the same attack was made on the ruling in the heads
of argument submitted by the applicant.
It
is necessary now to consider very briefly the relevant provisions
that occupied the attention of the arbitrator and formed the
basis of
the challenge to his ruling.
First,
Section 186 (2) (A) says that

An
unfair labour practice means among other things an unfair act or
omission that arises between an employer and an employee involving

the unfair conduct by the employer relating to among other things the
provision of benefits to an employee.”
Section
193 (4) of the Labour Relations Act says:

An
arbitrator appointed in terms of this Act may determine any unfair
labour practice dispute referred to the arbitrator on terms
that the
arbitrator deems reasonable which may include ordering reinstatement,
reemployment or compensation.”
It
is necessary now to consider Section 77 of the Basic Conditions of
Employment Act.  The provisions are as follows:
1.

Subject to the constitution and the
jurisdiction of the Labour Appeal Court and except where this Act
provides otherwise, the Labour
Court has exclusive jurisdiction in
respect of all matters in terms of this Act except in respect of an
offence specified in sections
43, 44, 46, 46, 48, 90 and 92.”
The provisions of
subsection (2) are not relevant and will not be dealt with.
The
provisions of subsection (3) read as follows:
3.

The Labour Court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the civil courts to hear and determine any matter
concerning a contract of employment
irrespective of whether any basic
condition of employment constitutes a term of that contract.”
The provisions of
subsections (4) and (5) are also not relevant and will not be
considered.
I
deal now with the relevant provisions of Section 77 (A).  This
provides,

Subject
to the provisions of this Act the Labour Court may make any
appropriate order, including an order
(E)
Making a determination that it
considers reasonable on any matter concerning a contract of
employment in terms of Section 77 (3)
which determination may include
an order for specific performance, an award of damages or an award of
compensation.”
It is against the factual
and statutory matrix summarised above that I deal now with the
question of whether the ruling of the second
respondent is
reviewable. I should begin by pointing out that the applicant is
quite correct when he says that the arbitrator is
required to
determine the nature of the dispute before him.  That point was
stressed by the Constitutional Court in
Kusa v Tayo Young Metal
Industries and others
2009 (1) BLLR 1
(CC).  There at
paragraph 66 the Constitutional Court pointed out that

A
commissioner must as the Labour Relations Act requires, deal with the
substantial merits of the dispute.  This can only be
done by
ascertaining the real dispute between the parties.  In deciding
what the real dispute between the parties is, a commissioner
is not
necessarily bound by what the legal representative say the dispute
is.  The labels that parties attach to a dispute
cannot change
its underlying nature.  A commissioner is required to take all
the facts into consideration, including a description
of the nature
of the dispute, the outcome requested by the union and the evidence
presented during the arbitration.  What
must be borne in mind is
that there is no provision for pleadings in the arbitration process
which helps to define disputes in
civil litigation.  Indeed the
material that a commissioner will have prior to a hearing will
consist of standard forms which
record the nature of the dispute and
the desired outcome.”
With
respect, that is precisely what the second respondent did.  He
pointed out that the issue to be decided is whether the
CCMA has
jurisdiction.  However, in determining whether or not it did, he
looked at the complaint made by the employees and
the basis of the
complaint, he concluded that the complaint related to whether or not
in terms of their contracts of employment
they were entitled to the
allowance which he was of the view constituted a benefit as
contemplated in Section 186  (2) (A)
of the Labour Relations
Act.
When
determining matters relating to jurisdiction it is important to bear
in mind what has recently been said on this issue.
I refer only
to two recent cases where the courts have pointed out what is meant
by the notion of jurisdiction. In
Chirwa
v Transnet Limited and others
[2007] ZACC 23
;
2008 (4)
SA 367
at paragraph 155 under the heading “The correct approach
to determining jurisdiction” the following was said:

It
seems to me axiomatic that the substantive merits of a claim cannot
determine whether a court has jurisdiction to hear it.”
Thereafter the following
was said:

The
mere fact that an argument must eventually fail cannot deprive a
court of jurisdiction.”
The
same point was made by Nugent JA in
Makambi
v MEC for Education Eastern Cape
[2008] ZASCA 61
;
2008
(5) SA 449
(SCA) at paragraph 30 of the judgment the learned judge of
appeal said the following:

Whether
a court has jurisdiction to consider a particular claim depends on
the nature of the rights that the claimant seeks to enforce.

Whether a claim is good or bad in law is immaterial to the
jurisdictional inquiry.”
The
question then is, when regard is had to those principles, does the
CCMA have jurisdiction to arbitrate the dispute that had
been
referred to it.  The Labour Appeal Court in the case of
Hospisa
and another v Northern Cape Provincial Administration
2000 (21) ILJ 1066 (LAC) made the following point about the unfair
labour practice provision that is in issue in this case.

I must point out however that at that stage it appeared in a
different section of the Act.  For present purposes it is
irrelevant
at paragraph 9 of the judgment of the LAC the following
was said:

it
appears to me that the Legislator did not seek to facilitate through
the provision in question the creation of an entitlement
to a benefit
which an employee otherwise does not have.  I do not think that
the provision was ever intended to be used by
an employee who
believes that he or she ought to enjoy certain benefits which the
employer is not willing to give him or her to
create an entitlement
to such benefits through arbitration in terms of the provision.
It simply sought to bring under the
unfair labour practice
jurisdiction disputes about benefits to which an employee is entitled
ex contracto
by virtue of the contract of employment or collective agreement or
ex
lege
the Public Service Act or any
other applicable act.  Such disputes must be distinguished from
disputes of interest.
The former are arbiterable, the latter
are not.  They must be determined through other mechanisms.”
In
the case of
Protocon (PTY) Ltd v CCMA
and others
2005 (26) ILJ 1105 (LC), the
question of whether or not a benefit such as the allowance in issue
in this case can be the subject
of an arbitration was determined.
There the same point was being made that the employee in question did
not have a contractual
right to the benefit.  The Court rejected
the argument.
In
my view the applicant has throughout these proceedings both before
the arbitrator and in this Court misconceived what the real
issue
is.
The
employees in question, it would appear to be clear from the referral
that they had made, stated that they wished to be paid
the allowance
which was documented and specified in the contract of employment.
That is a proper understanding of their complaint.
Whether or
not on a proper reading of the contract together with clause 9 of the
annexure, the employees are entitled to the allowance
is at this
stage of the inquiry totally irrelevant.  That much is clear
from the
Chirwa
and
Makimba
cases to which I have already referred.
If
on a proper reading of the contract, when the dispute is arbitrated,
an arbitrator find that the employees are in fact entitled
to the
allowance, that decision can be taken on review if there is no such
entitlement in terms of the contract it is unlikely
that the award
would be upheld.  On the other hand, it cannot be said simply
because on the understanding of the applicant
the contracts in
question do not provide for, or do not allow the employees in
question the allowance, does not mean that they
are not entitled to
have that dispute properly arbitrated.
It
is of course a dispute that can be determined by the application of
law.  Consequently it must be borne in mind that the
4
th
to 11
th
respondents have the right in terms of Section 34 of the Constitution
to refer the dispute to any court or tribunal.  Of course
that
tribunal must have jurisdiction before it can determine the dispute,
but nevertheless, the applicants have a right to have
the dispute
determined.  Their dispute is that in terms of their contracts
of employment as they understand those contracts,
they are entitled
to the allowance.  That dispute can be determined by an
arbitrator.
After
all if an employee is in terms of his contract of employment entitled
to a car allowance and the employer refuses to pay it,
the employee
is entitled to approach the CCMA and complain that a benefit to which
he is entitled is not being paid, as a result
the conduct of the
employer constitutes an unfair labour practice.  He could of
course approach the Labour Court in terms
of the Basic Conditions of
Employment Act, but the fact that he can approach the Labour Court
does not mean that he is not entitled
to approach the CCMA.
I
may point out that the employees in question where
domini
litis
, they were the persons who could
choose the forum if the forum has jurisdiction, they were entitled to
choose that particular forum,
in this case the CCMA.
The
employer on the other hand, if he had wished to refer the dispute to
the Labour Court would have been entitled to do so.
It could
not then be said that the matter had to be determined by the CCMA.
This is one of those cases where two forums referred
to in the Labour
Relations Act have jurisdiction and the person who makes the referral
is entitled to choose the forum.
In
all the circumstances I find that no case for review has been made
out.  Consequently the order I make is as follows:
The
application for review is dismissed in view of the fact that there
has been no opposition.
There
is no order as to costs.
-,
they were the persons who could choose the forum if the forum has
jurisdiction, they were entitled to choose that particular
forum, in
this case the CCMA.
The
employer on the other hand, if he had wished to refer the dispute to
the Labour Court would have been entitled to do so.
It could
not then be said that the matter had to be determined by the CCMA.
This is one of those cases where two forums referred
to in the Labour
Relations Act have jurisdiction and the person who makes the referral
is entitled to choose the forum.
In
all the circumstances I find that no case for review has been made
out.  Consequently the order I make is as follows:
The
application for review is dismissed in view of the fact that there
has been no opposition.
There
is no order as to costs.
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