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[2009] ZALCJHB 32
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Pretoria Portland Cement Company Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (JR927/08) [2009] ZALCJHB 32 (24 April 2009)
IN
THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
HELD
AT JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: JR927/08
In
the matter between:
PRETORIA
PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY
LTD Applicant
and
THE
COMMISSION FOR
CONCILIATION First
Respondent
MEDIATION
AND ARBITRATION
COMMISSIONER
TIMOTHY BOYCE N.O.
Second
Respondent
GEORGE
MIYAMBO
Third
Respondent
JUDGMENT
JAMMY
AJ
1.
This is an opposed application in which the
Applicant seeks an order reviewing and/or setting aside the
Arbitration Award handed
down by the Second Respondent, the
Arbitrator appointed under the auspices of the First Respondent to
determine the dispute between
the Applicant and the Third Respondent
relating to the Third Respondent’s alleged unfair dismissal by
the Applicant.
The Second Respondent’s
determination in that regard in the Award in question dated 18 March
2008, was that that dismissal
was unfair in his perceived absence of
a fair reason for that sanction and his consequent order was that the
Third Respondent was
to be reinstated with retrospective effect to
the date of his dismissal, with certain ancillary relief.
2.
It is the Applicant’s contention that
that finding and its consequence constituted an unreasonable
conclusion, a gross irregularity
in the conduct of the proceedings,
the exceeding by the Second Respondent of his powers under the Labour
Relations Act and a misapplication
of the legal principles applicable
to the matter.
THE EVIDENCE
3.
On 12 October 2007, the Third Respondent,
who had been in the employ of the Applicant since 30 April 1982 as
what the Applicant
describes as an “Operator Support” but
what he himself terms as a “Bulk Loader”, was found, when
routinely
searched by a security guard at the pedestrian gate on the
Applicant’s premises, to be in possession of “a few
pieces
of scrap metal” in his bag.
4.
It is an established rule in the company
that pass-outs are required for the removal of any of the Applicant’s
property leaving
its premises. This is applicable to
scrap metal even if it is found, as the Third Respondent testified to
have been
the case, in what is known as the “waste bin”.
Evidence for the Applicant in that regard was that all scrap metal
is
placed in such a waste bin and is then collected by Rand Metals,
which pays for it.
5.
Testifying in that regard, the Applicant’s
Safety Officer quoted the relevant work instruction, the wording of
which is as
follows:
“
No
items/objects will be removed from these premises unless accompanied
by an approved gate clearance permit. Contravention
of the
abovementioned standard can lead to disciplinary action”.
Employees were routinely
issued, she said, with pass-outs to remove certain items such as
scrap planks, scrap iron, plastic chairs
and so forth. All
staff members, she said, know that pass-outs are required if any of
the employer’s property is to
be removed from its premises.
6.
The Third Respondent, in his testimony in
the Arbitration did not dispute that he had been found in possession
of the scrap metal
in question, which he had obtained from the waste
bin. The Second Respondent pertinently records his explanation
for that
fact as follows –
“
In
the present matter the employee gave 3 contradictory explanations
regarding his failure to obtain the pass-out for the scrap
metal in
question, viz:
1.
on the day of the incident (12 October 2007) he told the security
guard (Ngcobo) that he
had forgotten to get a pass-out;
2.
at his disciplinary hearing, the employee claimed that he did not get
a pass-out since his
supervisor was not present;
3.
During the Arbitration he argued that he never believed that he even
required the pass-out
for the scrap metal in question”.
7.
The Second Respondent then proceeds to make
the following factual findings –
“
The
employee, in my view, knew that he required a pass-out to remove the
scrap metal and that is precisely why he told Ngcobo that
he had
forgotten to get a pass-out. It stands to reason that the
employee would not have claimed that he had forgotten to
get a
pass-out if he genuinely believed (as he claimed during the
arbitration) that he did not need a pass-out.
Having regard to the
aforegoing, I am satisfied that the employer discharged the onus on
it to prove that the employee was guilty
of “theft of scrap
iron from the waste bin”.
THE LAW
8.
The unanimous decision of the
Constitutional Court of South Africa in what has become a leading
authority on the issue of the review
of Arbitration Awards, -
Sidumo
v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others (2007) 28ILJ 2405(CC)
was that, in deciding a
dismissal dispute, a Commissioner is not required to defer to
the decision of the employer.
The Commissioner is, however, not
given the power to consider afresh what he or she would do but to
decide whether what the employer
did was fair. The standard to
be applied when a decision by a Commissioner on a dismissal dispute
is sought to be reviewed
is the following: Is the decision reached by
the Commissioner one that a reasonable decision-maker could not
reach?
9.
The Third Respondent, referring to the Code
of Good Practice in Schedule 8 to the Labour Relations Act which
provides,
inter alia
,
that “generally it is not appropriate to dismiss an employee
for a first offence, except if the misconduct is serious and
of such
gravity that it makes a continued employment relationship
intolerable”, records that the second employee “had
a
clean disciplinary record and, in more than twenty five years of
employment, had not been found guilty of any misconduct whatsoever”.
This, he says, constitutes him as a first offender. Accepting
however “that the misconduct in question was undoubtedly
serious”, he then enquires “whether the employee’s
conduct was so grave that it can be said, after properly considering
all the relevant circumstances, that the sanction of dismissal was
fair.
10.
The Labour Appeal Court in –
Shoprite
Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and
Arbitration and Others (2008) 29ILJ 2581(LAC)
quoted
with approval the earlier dictum of the Labour Court in –
Standard Bank of SA Ltd v
CCMA and Others (1998) 19ILJ 903(LC)
to the
effect that –
“
It
is one of the fundamentals of the employment relationship that the
employer should be able to place trust in the employee…
a
breach of this trust in the form of conduct involving dishonesty is
one that goes to the heart of the employment relationship
and is
destructive of it”
A
further reference in the judgment, and one frequently quoted in this
Court and the Labour Appeal Court is the dictum in –
De
Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA and Others (2000) 21ILJ 1051(LAC)
namely
–
“
A
dismissal is not an expression of moral outrage; much less is it an
act of vengeance. It is, or should be a sensible operational
response to risk management in the particular enterprise. That
is why supermarket shelf packers who steal small items are
routinely
dismissed. Their dismissal has little to do with society’s
moral opprobrium of a minor theft; it has everything
to do with the
operational requirements of the employer’s enterprise”.
11.
In reaching his finding, the Second
Respondent, referring to the Applicant’s Disciplinary Code
which, with reference to a
schedule of offences which includes theft,
provides for a range of sanctions from a minimum of a final warning
to a maximum of
a summary dismissal, and to the further factor of
“the employee’s length of service (more than twenty five
years) and
his clean disciplinary record, … cannot see how
dismissal could have been a fair sanction and I am impelled to
conclude
that the employer did not exercise its discretion reasonably
when it decided to dismiss the employee”. Those factors
have however been critically discounted in a number of decisions of
the Labour Courts. In –
“
Hulett
Aluminium (Pty) Ltd v Bargaining Council for the Metal Industry and
Others (2008) 29ILJ 1180(LC)
the
Court comments that –
“
Turning
to the issue of the seriousness of the offence, the presence of
dishonesty tilts the scales to an extent that even the strongest
mitigating factors, like long service and a clean record of
discipline are likely to have minimal impact on the sanction to be
imposed. In other words, whatever the amount of mitigation, the
relationship is unlikely to be restored once dishonesty has
been
established in particular in a case where the employee shows no
remorse. The reason for this is that there is a high
premium
placed on honesty because conduct that involves corruption by the
employees damages the trust relationship which underpins
the essence
of the employment relationship”.
With regard to one aspect
of those comments, it is contended by the Applicant in this matter
that in the course of the arbitration,
the Third Respondent showed no
remorse for his alleged conduct, but that submission, in my view, is
one of little probative value
in the face of the Third Respondent’s
ostensible denial of the allegations against him.
12.
The respected writer and commentator on
Labour Law, Dr John Grogan in the December 2008 issue of his
publication Employment Law,
dealing with “
Sidumo
”
and the “Reasonable Commissioner Test”, comments, with
reference to,
inter alia
,
Hulett supra that –
“…
the
Labour Court found that the ‘
Sidumo
test’ did not preclude a reviewing Court from setting aside
awards in which employees dismissed for dishonesty were reinstated.
Before setting aside the award in
Hulett
Aluminium
, the Court cited a string of
pre-
Sidumo
judgments which support the proposition that ‘conduct that
involves corruption by the employees damages the trust relationship
which underpins the essence of the employment relationship”.
13.
Following a further review of decided
authorities, including
Shoprite Checkers
and
De Beers Consolidated Mines
(supra)
,
the following further comments are made:
“
The
common characteristic of all these judgments was that the Courts set
aside Commissioners’ decisions to reinstate employees
with long
service and clean disciplinary records for defrauding their employers
out of relatively insignificant amounts of money
or stealing property
of relatively insignificant value”.
14.
The Second Respondent, as I have indicated,
makes factual findings which, on any rational analysis, are difficult
to reconcile with
the conclusions and final determination reached by
him. He records three “contradictory explanations”
offered
by the Third Respondent for his unauthorised possession of
the scrap metal in question. He records the Third Respondent’s
knowledge of the rule requiring a pass-out for the removal of the
Applicant’s property and disbelieves the explanation of
his
having “forgotten” to obtain that authorisation. In
the result he is “satisfied” that the employee
“was
guilty of theft of scrap iron from the waste bin”.
15.
This notwithstanding, he finds the sanction
of dismissal to have been “excessive and strikingly
inappropriate”, that
it was unfair and unreasonable and that
notwithstanding evidence to the contrary, a continued employment
relationship would not
be intolerable. In the result, he
concludes, a fair reason for the third employee’s dismissal had
not been proved.
16.
In the face of the authorities to which I
have referred, the evidence adduced in the arbitration and the Second
Respondent’s
factual conclusions based thereon, I have little
hesitation in concluding that his final decision of the dispute was
not one that
a reasonable decision-maker could have reached and that
his reinstatement of the Third Respondent, in all the surrounding
circumstances
of the matter, cannot be sustained. I accordingly
make the following order.
16.1
The Arbitration Award handed down by the Second Respondent on 18
March 2008 under the auspices of the First Respondent in its
Case No.
GAJB37633/07, is reviewed and set aside and is replaced with the
following –
“
The
dismissal of the employee by the employer on 24 October 2007 was
procedurally and substantively justified and fair”.
16.2
The Third Respondent is to pay the Applicant’s costs.
_______________________________________
B
M JAMMY
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE LABOUR COURT
24
April 2009