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[2008] ZALCJHB 42
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Mining Power Transfer t/a Driveline Technologies v Marcus NO and Others (JR732/2005) [2008] ZALCJHB 42 (5 March 2008)
IN THE LABOUR COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(HELD IN JOHANNESBURG)
CASE
NO.: JR732/2005
In
the case between:
MINING POWER TRANSFER
t/a
DRIVELINE
TECHNOLOGIES
Applicant
and
M
H MARCUS
N.O.
First
Respondent
MOTOR
INDUSTRIES BARGAINING
Second
Respondent
COUNCIL
HILTON
BERRY
Third
Respondent
JUDGMENT
RAMPAI, AJ
[1]
This proceedings are dual in nature. In the first place the
applicant applies
for the review of an arbitration award. In
the second place the applicant applies for the condonation of its
late filing
of the review application. The arbitration award
which precipitated these proceedings was issued by the first
respondent
in the performance of his duties as an arbitrator and as
senior commissioner under the auspices of the second respondent.
The award was in favour of the third respondent.
[2]
The review application was brought in terms of
section 145
of the
Labour Relations Act, No. 66 of 1995
. It was filed on the 31
March 2005. The arbitration award which precipitated these
proceedings was attached to the
founding affidavit as annexure A and
appears on page 14 – 22 of the record. The first and
second respondents are not
opposing this review application and will
abide by the decision of this court. Only the third respondent
opposes the application.
[3]
The relief sought by the applicant is an order whereby the matter is
remitted to the
second respondent for reconsideration on the basis
that the final written warning which stems from the first
disciplinary hearing
was perfectly valid at the time his second
disciplinary hearing was held.
[4]
The applicant also applies for the condonation of its late filing of
its review application.
The condonation application was filed
on the 25 July 2006. It became necessary for the applicant to
have its lateness pertaining
to the review application condoned
because the review application was served outside the prescribed six
week period. Again
the first and the second respondents abide.
Again only the third respondent opposes the condonation application.
[5]
The applicant conducts business in the motor industry. It
manufactures repairs
and distributes universal joints, prop shafts
and their components. Its industrial plant is situated at
Spartan.
[6]
The third respondent is an erstwhile employee of the applicant.
He was employed
in the position of stores controller since 1995 until
2004. His duties entailed various functions relating to the
stock management
and the warehouse of the applicant. He
reported directly to a director of the applicant, a certain Mr.
Richard Waite.
He was 59 years of age at the time the second
disciplinary hearing was held.
[7]
At all times material to these proceedings two disciplinary hearings
were held against
the third respondent. The first disciplinary
inquiry was held on the 1 September 2003. The charge against
him was “Not
following up on the transport to collect the
spares.” At the end of that inquiry the third respondent
was found guilty.
The chair of the first disciplinary inquiry
issued a final written warning against him.
[8]
The second disciplinary inquiry against the third respondent was held
on the 11 February
2004. He was charged with gross negligence.
It was alleged that he failed to secure goods that had been stolen
and
in that he failed to carry out the reasonable instruction to
prevent such stealing. Once again he was found guilty on this
charge. On 11 February 2004 he was dismissed from the employ of
the applicant.
[9]
The third respondent was aggrieved by his dismissal. On 10
March 2004 he referred
the case of unfair dismissal to the dispute
resolution centre of the Motor Industries Bargaining Council (MIBCO)
under case CA367/04C.
Attempts to reconcile the parties,
failed. On 28 April 2004 the conciliator issue the certificate
of outcome to that effect.
The parties then proceeded to have
the dispute arbitrated.
[10]
The arbitration proceedings were held on the 14 June 2004. The
first respondent chaired
the proceedings under the auspices of the
second respondent. The employer and the employee led evidence
before the arbitrator.
At the end of the inquiry the arbitrator
reserved his decision.
[11]
On the 12 July 2004 the arbitration proceedings were finalised.
The arbitrator issued the
following award in favour of the employee
against the employer:
“
1.
Applicant’s dismissal by respondent was substantively unfair.
2.
Applicant is awarded the sum of R80,076, equivalent to six months
remuneration,
as compensation for his unfair dismissal, which amount
respondent is ordered to pay to the applicant within 21 days of this
award
being issued to respondent.”
[12]
It is the aforesaid arbitration award which I am now called upon to
review and to set aside at
the instance of the applicant.
Obviously the applicant was aggrieved by the award. The dispute
resolution centre of
the aforesaid bargaining council duly served the
arbitration award on the parties. The applicant received the
arbitration
award on the 6 August 2004. From that date the
applicant had six weeks within which to bring its application for
review without
any need to have anything condoned. It was never
done. Therefore, the applicant has a hurdle to jump over.
The
merits of its review application can only be adjudicated provided
its lateness is condoned.
[13]
I deal with the condonation application first, since my decision in
respect of this condonation
application will decide whether or not
the review application should be entertained. It is common
cause between the parties
that the review application was brought
some seven months or so late. In order to succeed in
condonation proceedings the
applicant must persuade the court to
exercise its discretion in its favour taking into account the
following factors: The
degree of lateness, the explanation for
the delay, the prospects of success, the prejudice and the importance
of the case to the
applicant. It is trite that the court has a
discretion to condone non-compliance, but such discretion must be
exercise judicially
upon consideration of all the aforesaid factors,
MELANE v SANTAM INSURANCE CO LTD
1962 (4) SA 531
(AD),
A HARDRODT (SA)
(PTY) LTD v BEHARDIEN & OTHERS
(2002) 23 ILJ 1229 (LAC). I now proceed to examine the facts in
this case in order to ascertain whether or not exercise judicial
discretion in favour of the applicant.
[14]
In the first place I consider the degree of lateness. The
applicant received the arbitration
award on the 6 August 2004.
By law it had six weeks from that day within which to bring its
review application. That
period expired on the 17
September 2004. By then no
review application had been filed. From the 17 September 2004 a
further period of 27 weeks
lapsed. The review application was
only filed on the 31 March 2005. In other words it has taken
the application the
total of 33 weeks from 6 August 2004 to file the
review application. The applicant has effectively taken the
permissible
maximum period of six weeks times 5.5 to bring its
application. This is the equivalent of 231 days. Even if
I try to
be generous, the applicant’s degree of lateness from
the 17 September 2004, is still an inordinately long period of 27
weeks
which is the equivalent of the permissible maximum period of 6
weeks times 4.5. Either way the degree of lateness is
disturbingly
excessive in my view.
[15]
In the second place I deal with the explanation for the delay.
The applicant did not handle
the matter on its own. At all
times relevant to the arbitration award it was a member of Small
Enterprise Employers of South
Africa (SEESA). The organisation
acted on behalf of the applicant. It received the arbitration
award on the 6 August
2004 and timeously advised the applicant that
the arbitration award be taken on review. The applicant’s
deponent mandated
SEESA to do just that. On behalf of the
applicant SEESA briefed counsel who drew up the necessary
application.
[16]
On the 13 September 2004 Mr. W. A. Marais delivered the founding
affidavit to the applicant for
signing by its deponent. But Mr.
Waite was not satisfied with the founding affidavit. As a result of
his dissatisfaction
certain alterations had to be effected. The
amended copy was then delivered to the applicant on the 15 September
2005.
This was two days before the expiry of the six week
period. The applicant did not respond, the amended copy was not
immediately
signed and returned to the applicant’s labour
representative. Mr. Marais, who knew the urgency of the matter,
did not
follow the matter up. The review application was not
filed on 17 September 2005. At the end of September 2004 he was
promoted to the position of a legal advisor, Miss Ursula Botha, a
provincial manager of SEESA, took his duties over. The
integrated reading of the affidavits indicates that they did not sit
down together to identify urgent matters in order to ensure
smooth
transition.
[17]
The applicant’s operations director and its main deponent Mr.
Richard Waite says the following
about the founding affidavit which
was sent to him on the 15 September 2004:
“
4.5
However, it seems that the next draft had not been received and
attended to by the Applicant.
This was not due to any disregard
for the rules of the above Honourable Court, and was a mere
oversight. At all relevant
times, the Applicant fully intended
to pursue the review application. This remains the case.”
[18]
The aforegoing averment is not convincing. Both Miss Ursula
Botha and Mr W. A. Marais averred
that the founding affidavit was
sent to the applicant on the 15
September 2004. Now Mr. Richard
Waite, in a rather tame tone, suggested that the applicant did not
receive the founding affidavit.
The terse statement is rather
vague. He gives no further information as to why he thinks the
applicant did not receive the
draft founding affidavit. If
indeed the applicant did not receive the amended affidavit the
applicant’s failure to
file the review application before the
17
September
2004 cannot be regarded as a mere oversight. I do not think the
omission to file the review application in this
instance was an
oversight or an inadvertent mistake. In my view it appears to
have been negligent disregard of the rules
of this court.
[19]
The original draft was sent to the applicant on the 13 September
2004. The applicant received
it, attended to it, corrected it
and returned it to its labour representatives in less than two days.
This demonstrates that
the applicant was aware of the urgency of the
matter. The labour representative was aware of the urgency of
the matter which
was why he immediately effected the alterations the
applicant wanted and had it delivered to the applicant the very next
day on
the 15 September 2004. Although neither Miss Ursula
Botha nor Mr. W. A. Marais say how it was delivered, there is every
reason
to believe that it was delivered by hand, just as the original
was probably delivered. Mr. W. A. Marais did not immediately
leave the employ of SEESA, he was still there as a legal advisor on
the crucial date, 17 September 2005 and right up to the end
of the
year. The speed at which he effected the alterations and
sent the affidavit back to the applicant, strongly
suggested that he
was fully aware that time was of the essence and must have advised
his client about the urgency of filing the
review application.
[20]
In the circumstances I cannot believe that the applicant did not
receive the amended founding
affidavit in good time. I find,
therefore, that the non-compliance with the statutory provision was
not occasioned by any
miscommunication between the applicant’s
director concerned and the labour representative concerned. The
rule was broken
through carelessness on the part of the applicant.
The first excuse is not excusable.
[21]
The applicant’s deponent states as follows at paragraph 6 of
the founding affidavit:
“
6.1
In the meantime, different woes had befallen the Applicant which
affected its ability to deal with the
review application.
6.2
During the latter part of 2004, a dispute arose between the
shareholders of the Applicant.
One of the majority shareholders
of the Applicant, who was also the former Sale and Marketing director
of the Applicant, had abandoned
his dispute.”
[22]
The aforegoing averments are riddled with vagueness. The
deponent does not state exactly
when the shareholding dispute
commenced. All he says is that the shareholding dispute arose
during the latter part of 2004.
But we all know that the
earlier part of that year ended on the 30 June 2004. Did the
dispute arise on 1 July 2004 or 31
December 2004 or perhaps somewhere
in between? The deponent does not say. According to him
the shareholder dispute
exerted an enormous pressure on the time and
resources of the remaining two directors of the applicant.
[23]
Apart from attending to the day to day management of the applicant’s
operations its remaining
directors were required to attend numerous,
sometimes daily consultations with attorneys and advocates. Yet
the legal work
originally entrusted to the labour consultants or
labour representatives but handed over to the attorneys at the end of
2004 obviously
never featured in such countless consultations with
the lawyers, as one would have expected.
[24]
However, enormous the pressure might have been, I am not persuaded
that having to read and sign
a six page document would have made the
pressure any worse than it already was. The impression I get is
that according to
the applicant the review application was treated as
an insignificant matter. The applicant had more important and
pressing
matters to worry about. The review proceedings in the
labour court were certainly not seen as one of them.
[25]
By the 31 December 2004 the applicant’s file had already been
transferred from the labour
representative to the legal
practitioners. A candidate attorney in the law firm Edward
Hobbs Attorneys discovered the problem
early in February 2005.
The applicant was immediately made aware of the problem.
However, despite this advice, and
on that occasion by attorneys and
not labour representatives, the two remaining directors of the
applicant travelled to Germany
in order to negotiate and to secure a
crucial distribution agreement with a chief supplier of the
applicant. Again the applicant’s
deponent is vague.
No date for the German trip is specified. I find it hard to
accept that neither the labour representative
on 15 September 2004
nor the legal practitioners early before 15 February 2005 advised the
applicant about the urgency of the review
application. This two
incidents create a strong suspicion that the applicant itself was to
blame for the inordinate delay.
[26]
The applicant does not say when his directors came back from
Germany. But it must be borne
in mind that the error was
discovered early in February 2005. The attorneys discovered it
when they were doing a general
audit of the files they had inherited
from the labour representative, SEESA. The affidavits of Miss
Ursula Botha as well
as that of Mr. L. A. Smith are both vague as to
when it was discovered that the founding affidavit or the review
application had
not been signed. Equally vague is Miss Ursula
Botha’s allegation that when she took the file over from Mr. W.
A. Marais
she believed that the review application had been filed.
She makes no attempt to explain what it was that made her to come
to
that conclusion. Therefore I cannot accept that when she handed
over this file to the attorneys she was under the impression
that
everything necessary had been done. Her confirmatory affidavit
was obviously drafted in December 2005 about seven months
before the
founding affidavit. In the end the affidavits were signed on 24
July 2006 and 25 July 2006. There is no
explanation for this.
[27]
In support of Miss Ursula Botha’s impression, Mr. Richard Waite
puts it strongly as follows:
“
4.6
At the same time, Mr. Marais left the employ of SEESA and was
succeeded by Ms Botha.
Ms Botha
was under the firm impression,
upon
reviewing the Applicant’s file
and
seeing the unsigned application
, that
the review application had been lodged and that SEESA and the
Applicant were now only waiting for the Second Respondent to
file its
record of the proceedings before it.”
(my
own emphasis)
[28]
I cannot understand the aforegoing. Firstly, as I have already
pointed out, the applicant’s
deponent is incorrect. Mr.
Marais did not leave SEESA immediately. According to Miss Botha
whose affidavit is supported
by Mr. Marais himself, Mr Marais was
promoted but remained as a functionary of SEESA. To say that
Miss Botha reviewed the
applicant’s file, saw the unsigned
review application and formed a firm impression that the review
application had been lodged,
defies logic. The mere sight of an
unsigned founding affidavit or a notice of motion or both with no
official endorsement
by the Registrar of this court should
immediately have rang a warning bell to Miss Botha that there was
something wrong with the
review application.
[29]
I cannot accept the averment of the applicant’s deponent that
in the mist of the turmoil
occasioned by the shareholders dispute it
did not occur to him that condonation application was necessary.
The review application
was served and filed on the 31 March 2005
after an inordinate period of delay. This was done after
a long period of
6 more weeks after the attorneys had alerted the
applicant to the problem.
[30]
Simultaneously with a belated review application a condonation
application is usually filed.
In this case it was never done.
Instead the condonation application was filed as we have seen on the
25 July 2005, well over
some 16 more weeks later. And that
after the third respondent had objected to the hearing of the
extremely belated review
application. Only then was the
condonation application served and filed. Throughout the entire
episode the applicant
was represented, either by the labour
representatives or legal representatives. Even if it did not
occur to the applicant’s
deponent that it was necessary to seek
condonation for its lateness regarding the filing of the review
application, it is highly
improbable that the attorneys did not
advise him accordingly.
[31]
It seems to me that the applicant blames everyone, particularly his
labour law advisor, Mr. Marais
and his co-director and the majority
shareholder of the applicant who left the applicant in the lurch.
But I am not convinced
that they were the main culprits who led to
the sorry state of affairs. By the look of things the applicant
did not take
the advice given to it by its labour law advisors and
its legal representatives seriously. On all these counts I find
that
the applicant’s explanation lacks the necessary
particularity because it is riddled with vagueness and abortive
attempts
to shift the blame elsewhere. The applicant does not
give any specific adequately informative account of events and
interreactions
from the 31 September 2004 to the 31 December 2004 but
especially from 1 January 2005 to 24 July 2006. Whatever the
seriousness
of the shareholding dispute or the alleged departure of
Mr. W. A. Marais or both could not have retarded the simple signing
of
an affidavit for such a prolonged period of 33 weeks and further
for another prolonged period of approximately 70 weeks for a
consultation
to prepare, sign attest and file the affidavit in
support of the condonation application.
[32]
The second excuse that the applicant was paralysed by a lengthy and
complicated internal dispute
which adversely affected its operations
fails to impress me. In the circumstances I am of the
view that no adequate
satisfactory and reasonable explanation for the
delay has been given in this case. The condonation application
which became
absolutely necessary as on the 18 September 2004 was
only lodged on the 25 July 2005, over 50 weeks later. It is
significant
also to bear in mind that it was filed because the third
respondent objected to the hearing of the review application which
was
not accompanied by a formal application for condonation.
These are serious acts omissions.
[33]
In the third place I now turn to the prospects of success. The
grounds on which the applicant
relies to have the arbitration
reviewed and set aside are set out in paragraph 7.3 of the
condonation founding affidavit.
“
7.3
In short, the grounds of review are as follows:
7.3.1
in the course of his award, the First
Respondent entered upon an evaluation of the final written warning
given to the Third Respondent
on 1 September 2003. This warning
and its validity was not in issue before the First Respondent;
7.3.2
the First Respondent further incorrectly
did not take into account the damage the Applicant had suffered as a
result of the pilferage
of, inter alia, the Third Respondent;
7.3.3
the First Respondent also did not take into
account the patrimonial damages suffered by the Applicant as a result
of the Third Respondent
disobeying instructions.”
[34]
The grounds of review as set out in paragraphs 7.3.2 and 7.3.3. of
the condonation application
were not included in the review
application – vide paragraphs 8.2 and 8.3 on p. 12 of the
record. The only ground of
review common to both the founding
affidavit in support of the review application and the founding
affidavit in support of the
condonation application relates to the
final written warning given by the applicant to the third respondent
on the 1 September
2003 – vide paragraph 8.1, review affidavit
on p. 11 of the record and paragraph 7.1, condonation affidavit on p.
40 of the
record. In my view this is the main ground of the
review sought by the applicant. The only grounds of review I
will
take into consideration are those contained in the review
affidavit.
[35]
The thrust of the main ground of review is that the first respondent
committed misconduct in
the execution of his duties as an arbitrator
by reconsidering and evaluating the merits of final written warning
issued during
the first disciplinary inquiry on the 1 September
2003. On behalf of the applicant it was contended, before me,
that such
a warning was not before the arbitrator. Accordingly
it was submitted that the arbitrator was not entitled to evaluate the
pros and cons of such a warning. He was obliged to take it into
account as it was. So argued Mr. Joubert.
[36]
Having due regard to the facts of the matter and the two distinct
disciplinary hearings and the
fact that the applicant cannot deny
that the first hearing’s outcome was indeed used by the
applicant as a relevant aggravating
factor in the determination of a
proper sanctions to be imposed on the third respondent at the second
disciplinary inquiry whilst
it was undisputed evidence that the
charge at the first hearing did not form part of the third
respondent’s job description
or duties justified the first
respondent decision to enquire into the merits of the first
disciplinary hearing and therefore its
relevance and correctness to
the second disciplinary inquiry. The applicant itself elated to
make the facts of the first
disciplinary inquiry relevant to the
second disciplinary inquiry by asking the arbitrator to take those
facts into account.
This was Mr. Botha’s argument on
behalf of the third respondent.
[37]
In defence of himself the uncontested evidence of the third
respondent during the arbitration
proceedings was that he was not in
charge of transport or the collection of spares outside the plant.
The main issue raised
by the applicant related to the first
respondent’s decision to take into account what transpired
during the first disciplinary
inquiry. The gist of the
applicant’s contention was that after the final written warning
was issued on the 1 September
2003 the third respondent never
referred a separate dispute of unfair labour practice against the
applicant to the second respondent
(MIBCO). Counsel for the
third respondent submitted that seeing that the applicant itself
elected to use such warning as
an aggravating factor in order to
secure the third respondent’s dismissal, the third respondent
was entitled to attack the
merit of such a warning and that the first
respondent was entitled to assess the merits thereof afresh.
[38]
I am not persuaded by the submission of Mr. Botha. The issue
which fell to be determine
by the arbitrator was whether the
dismissal of the third respondent on 11 February 2005 was
procedurally and substantively fair
regard been had to the final
written warning given to the third respondent on 1 September 2003.
In
AGBRO PTY LTD v TEMPI
(1993) 2 LCD 24 (LAC) the court held that it was not entitled to
enquire into the question as to whether the final warning (which
had
never been challenged and reversed) had been justified as this would
qualify or derogate from the finality of the warning.
I am in
respectful agreement. See also
SUBROYEN
v TELKOM (SA) LTD
(2001) 22 ILJ
2509 (LC) at 2520 a – 2521d,
XABA
v EVERITE LTD
(1992) 1 LCD 265
(LC).
[39]
In
PAPER PRINTING WOOD & ALLIED WORKERS UNION & ANOTHER
v SAPPI FINE PAPERS (PTY) LTD
(1993) 2 LCD 318 (IC) the court
held:
“
The
law in respect of the right of an employee to challenge prior
warnings on the basis that these warnings are used in assessing
a
proper and fitting sanction is clear. An employee may raise the
question of the fairness of these previous warnings at
a subsequent
tribunal hearing only if he or she challenged the fairness of these
warnings at the time, assuming that he or she
knew of that right of
challenge or appeal.”
[40]
Therefore it seems to me that the applicant’s prospects of
successes on review are fairly
good. I am persuaded by Mr.
Joubert’s submission that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of
his functions and powers
in reconsidering the validity or otherwise
of the final warning that was never previously challenged.
Prima facie
it would appear that the first respondent has committed reviewable
irregularity. It is so that in the course of his decision
the
arbitrator ventured into an evaluation of the validity of the final
warning issued to the third respondent although this did
not form
part of the dispute referred to him. The contention of the
third respondent is one which, I cannot uphold.
Therefore the
applicant wins this round. The review application has some good
prospects of success.
[41]
In the fourth place I proceed to consider the prejudice to the
parties. It seems to me
that if condonation is granted in the
instant case the third respondent will suffer greater prejudice than
the applicant will if
condonation is not granted. The way in
which this entire case, and I mean the review application as well as
the condonation
application, has been handled demonstrates that the
applicant is really not concerned as to how long it takes to have the
dispute
finalised. The third respondent like any other serious
litigant is entitled to finality. The excessive delays both in
respect of the review application as well as the condonation
application suggest that this case is likely to be bedevilled by
further prolonged delays should condonation be granted. Timeous
finalisation of dispute is the hallmark of any efficient adjudication
process. In the instance case the applicant has seriously
undermined this principle.
[42]
The applicant avers that any prejudice the third respondent may
suffer as a result of the granting
of the condonation application
would be remedied by interest on the outstanding amount. This
is of little comfort to the
third respondent since the arbitration
award did not specifically direct the applicant to pay interest on
the capital award to
the third respondent. The third respondent
was awarded compensation on the 12 July 2004 but to date has not yet
received
it. Whatever prejudice the applicant may suffer the
applicant would have nobody but itself to blame. In my view the
factor o prejudice favours the third respondent.
[43]
As regards the importance of the case the vigour with which the third
respondent has pursued
the matter underscores the importance of the
case to him. The same cannot be said about the applicant.
Therefore,
I am of the view that, on the facts, the case is
more important to the employee than the employer.
[44]
The inordinate delays and the poor explanation, the importance of the
case as well as the prejudice
are all factors which count against the
applicant. These factors are interrelated and are not
individually decisive.
The strength of the one factor may in
certain circumstances redeem the weakness of another. In the
instant case, however,
the cumulative effect of the majority of the
factors has an adverse impact on the one and only factor favourable
to the applicant’s
case. The unfavourable aspects eclipse
the favourable aspect.
[45]
Although the review has good prospects of success, which is a very
important consideration, I
cannot find enough compelling substance in
this factor alone, to compensate for the extremely excessive degree
of lateness, and
the exceptionally poor explanation for the
inordinate delays. Add the factors of prejudice and importance,
then the situation
becomes even bleaker for the plight of the
applicant.
“
And
the respondent's interest in finality must not be overlooked.”
MELANIE
v SANTAM INSURANCE CO LTD
1962 (4)
SA 531
(AD) at 532E per Holmes JA. Therefore I would
decline to exercise my discretion in favour of the applicant. I
am not persuaded upon accumulative consideration of all the relevant
factors that this is a case where condonation can be granted.
It follows therefore that the review application falls by the way
side.
[46]
Accordingly I make the following order:
46.1 The
condonation application is refused with costs.
46.2 The review
application is dismissed with costs.
46.3
The arbitration award by the second respondent issued on the 12 July
2004 in favour of the third respondent by the first
respondent acting
under the auspices of the second respondent under case number 367/04C
stands.
________________
M.H.
RAMPAI, AJ
On
behalf of the applicant:
Adv. I. Joubert
Instructed
by:
Edward
Hobbs Attorneys
PRETORIA
On
behalf of the first and
second
respondents:
No appearance
On
behalf of the third respondent: Adv. J.H. DeV Botha
Instructed
by:
Assenmacher
Attorneys
JOHANNESBURG
Heard
on:
22 FEBRUARY 2007
Delivered
on:
5 MARCH
2008
/em