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[2007] ZALCJHB 25
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Solidarity obo Kern v Mudau and Others (JR987/05) [2007] ZALCJHB 25 (19 January 2007)
IN
THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(HELD
AT JOHANNESBURG)
CASE
NO. : JR 987/05
REPORTABLE
In
the matter between:
SOLIDARITY
obo J F KERN
Applicant
And
R
MUDAU
First
Respondent
COMMISSION
FOR CONCILIATION,
MEDIATION
AND ARBITRATION
Second
Respondent
LOCAL
MUNICIPALITY OF LEKWA
Third
Respondent
JUDGMENT
MOKGOATLHENG A.J.
Introduction
[1]
This is an application in terms of section 145 of the Labour
Relations Act No 66 of 1995 (“the Act”) to review,
correct or set aside the award made by the First Respondent
(“arbitrator”) on the 16
th
March 2005, when he determined that JF Kern was not demoted or
subjected to an unfair labour practice as contemplated within the
meaning of section 186(2) (a) of “the Act”. The
application is opposed.
[2]
The review application was preceded by an application for condonation
of the late filing of the Applicant’s replying affidavit.
The
replying affidavit was filed approximately 3 weeks out of time. The
application was opposed by the Third Respondent. The third
Respondent
did not proffer any substantive reasons for such opposition.
[3]
The Applicant alleges that reason for the late filing of its replying
affidavit is that after the receipt of the Third Respondent’s
answering affidavit in December 2005, it handed same to its legal
advisor for settlement and reply.
[4]
The Applicant alleges that his replying affidavit was not settled
timeously by its legal advisors due to the fact that the latter’s
offices were closed on the 14
th
December 2005 for the Christmas and New Holiday Festive season.
[5]
The Applicant alleges that the law offices were re-opened on the 9
th
January 2006. Subsequent thereto the replying affidavit was settled
and was served on the Third Respondent on the 13
th
January 2006.
[6]
The Applicant states that the dispute between itself and the Third
Respondent essentially concerns the interpretation and application
of
a Collective Agreement regulating the placement of employees’
in posts. The Applicant’s submission is that the placement
of
JF Kern as a Committee Officer was a demotion. The Applicant
contends that it has good prospects of success
[7]
The Applicant states that the Third Respondent has not suffered any
prejudice as a result of the late service of its replying
affidavit
and argues that if the application for condonation is not granted its
member JF Kern will suffer irreparable harm and
prejudice in that he
would be permanently denied the opportunity to have his case
ventilated. The Applicant submits that it has
shown good cause.
[8]
After considering the extent of the delay, the explanation proffered
and the prospects of success, I am of the view that the
Applicant has
shown good cause. The application for condonation is granted.
Factual
Background
[9]
JF Kern was employed by Standerton Municipality as a Senior Personnel
Officer from 1
st
September 1992 until the 5
th
December 2000, when the Standerton and Morgenzon Municipalities were
disestablished and merged to establish the Local Municipality
of
Lekwa (“the Third Respondent”) in terms of the provisions
of;
(a)
the Organised Local Government Act 1997,
(b) the
Local
Government Municipal Demarcation Act 1998
,
(c)
the
Local Government Municipal Systems Act 2000
, and
(d)
the Local Government Municipal Structures Act 2000.
[10]
The disestablishment of the Standerton and Morgenzon Municipalities
resulted in JF Kern’s employment being transferred
to the Third
Respondent in terms of section 197 of “the Act”.
[11]
The Third Respondent passed a resolution on the 2
nd
December 2002 adopting a document, “
the
Policy Guidelines on the Placement of Staff”
(“PGPS”) regulating the transfer and placement of
employees into its employ.
[12]
The Third Respondent concluded a Collective Agreement incorporating
the “
PGPS”
with
the South African Municipal Worker’s Union (“SAMWU”)
on the 24
th
January 2003. The latter represented the majority of the former’s
employees.
[13]
The “PGPS” made provision for establishment of;
(a)
a Placement Committee, seized with the classification of posts and
the placement of employees, and
(b)
an Objection Committee seized with the resolution of objections
arising from the placement of
employees.
[14]
The Placement Committee, on the 10
th
March 2003 placed JF Kern in the post Committee Officer on the same
terms, conditions and remuneration applicable to his former
post as
Senior Personnel Officer. JF Kern objected to his placement
contending that it was a breach of the “PGPS” and
a
demotion.
[15]
Pursuant to its establishment the Third Respondent created an
organogram of its employment and management structure reflecting,
new
posts, unchanged posts, minor changed posts and major changed posts.
[16]
The “PGPS” stipulates that;
(a)
the placement of staff must not be used to promote or demote
employees.
(b)
the intention is to firstly place existing employees from
disestablished municipalities transferred
in terms of section 197 of
“the Act” into existing or newly created posts before
external applicants are considered
for posts,
(c)
in placing employees in the new structure, employees shall be placed
on close - match basis. In close
– matching a post, the job
content of the new post must be compared with the existing job
content of the employees.
(d)
The focus should be on the crux of the job. The close match is done
on the job content and not on designation,
(e)
The salary of an employee shall play no role in the placement, only
qualifications and minimum requirements,
(f)
Where more than one employee can be close matched to a post and there
are more employees than
there are posts, affirmative action and
employment equity shall have preference over length of service,
(g)
the placement committee is obliged to classify posts in the new
structure into four categories, namely;
(i)
unchanged posts, which are posts that have no change in their
schedule of duties, that is their
job content,
(ii)
major changed posts, which have undergone a major change in duties
and responsibilities, and
(iii)
new posts, which carry duties and responsibilities that do not exist
in any form in the present structure,
these posts had to be submitted
for evaluation before appointment,
JF
Kern’s Objection
[17]
The Objection Committee is enjoined that, it shall consider any
objection and shall within 5 working days from receipt of the
objection in considering same apply the same criteria, processes and
procedures as the Placement Committee.
[18]
JF Kern contends that the designation of his post as Senior Personnel
Officer by the disestablished Standerton Municipality
and the Third
Respondent was a misnomer in nomenclature in that the duties and
responsibilities the post encompassed were in essence
Human Resources
related functions.
[19]
JF Kern states that since the 1
st
September 1992, he has been a Senior Personnel Officer with
Standerton Municipality and the Third Respondent executing Human
Resources
related functions, and says that he was the Third
Respondent’s most senior Human Resources employee and its
de
facto
Manager Human Resources.
[20]
JF Kern contends that the post Senior Personnel Officer is a level
four senior post with managerial responsibilities, that
in contrast
the post Committee Officer is a junior level grade post, with less
status, functions and responsibilities.
[21]
The Third Respondent, on the 4
th
February 2003, decided to advertise the post Manager Human Resources.
The post was advertised internally and externally. JF Kern
applied
for the post, was short listed, but not interviewed.
[22]
JF Kern declared a dispute with the Third Respondent on the 2
nd
December 2003; the dispute was referred to the Commission for
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (“CCMA”). The
matter remained unresolved, and was referred to arbitration.
[23]
The arbitrator determined on the 16
th
March 2004, that the Third Respondent did not subject JF Kern to an
unfair labour practice, that he was not demoted when it appointed
him
to the post Committee Officer. JF Kern took early retirement on the
31
st
March 2004.
The
Applicant’s Grounds of Review
[24]
The Applicant assails the arbitrator‘s award on the basis that;
(a)
The arbitrator misdirected himself in finding that the JF Kern was
not demoted because in his view he
did not suffer any financial loss
or benefits.
[25]
The Applicant submits that the arbitrator did not properly apply his
mind to the facts, that he has failed to appreciate that
the
juridical concept demotion does not necessarily require that one
should suffer financial loss or benefits for a demotion to
eventuate,
that demotion may also occur where status, job content,
responsibility and promotion prospects are prejudiced.
The
Applicant’s Submissions
[26]
The Applicant argues that there was a very real possibility that when
the post Committee Officer was evaluated at an uncertain
future time,
it would in all probability have been degraded to a lower level with
less remuneration than the post Senior Personnel
Officer.
[27]
The Applicant contends that it was patent that the Third Respondent
had no intention of placing JF Kern in accordance with
the behest of
the “PGPS” to the post Manager Human Resources, and
states that his placement as Committee Officer was
final.
[28]
The Applicant argues that the arbitrator misdirected himself because
he found that JF kern’s placement as Committee Officer
was a
breach of the Collective Agreement, yet concluded that no unfair
labour practice had been perpetrated against him.
The
Third Respondent’s Submissions
[29]
The Third Respondent contends that there is no basis for JF Kern’s
contention that his placement as Committee Officer
was a demotion,
and argues that JF Kern did not suffer any loss in remuneration or
benefits, that in any event at the time when
took early retirement
the post Committee Officer had not yet been evaluated or graded.
[30]
The Third Respondent contends that JF Kern could not be placed in the
post Manager Human Resources because this was a newly
created, that
the appointment criteria had to be made in terms of the provisions of
the
Employment Equity Act, The Skill
Development Act and Affirmative Action Policy,
and submits that these were the overriding factors in determining his
placement, that the preference was to appoint a designated
person.
The
Award
[31]
The arbitrator made the following findings;
(a)
“
taking into account the number of years
the Applicant spent dealing with human resources issues, his
educational qualifications
and the position he occupied before the
municipalities amalgamated, one can safely conclude that he was
suitable for the position
of human resources management”.
(b)
“the Applicant was sidelined on the basis of unfair
discrimination; that the labour court was
the forum to deal with the
matter on that basis”
.
(c)
“It is correct to conclude that the Third Respondent did not
deal with the Applicant’ case
in accordance with the placement
policy or collective agreement”
.
[32]
From these findings, it is apparent that the arbitrator accepts that
JF Kern;
(a)
had the proper qualifications and the experience suitable for the
post Manager Human Resources;
(b)
was a victim of unfair labour practice - which the arbitrator
erroneously categorises as unfair discrimination,
and
(c)
his placement was not in accordance with the “PGPS” or
the Collective Agreement.
[33]
The arbitrator’s finding that, “
it
is not correct to conclude that because JF Kern was placed as
Committee Officer instead of in a position in the Human Resources
then he was demoted. The position committee officer was not evaluated
and graded in terms of salary and benefits at the time of
JF Kern’s
departure that he would have had a legitimate claim of demotion at
the time of the reduction of salary and when
other conditions
occurred”
.
[34]
In my view, the arbitrator misconstrued the juridical concept of
demotion. JF Kern’s undisputed evidence is that;
(a)
since the 1
st
September 1992 he was a Senior Personnel
Officer executing Human Resources related functions until his early
retirement on the
31
st
March 2004,
(b)
he was the Third Respondent’s
de facto
Manager Human
Resources as from the 6
th
December 2000, and
(c)
the job content of the post Committee Officer was purely a clerical
post different from the job content
of the post Senior Personnel
Officer.
[35]
JF Kern’s undisputed evidence is that the job content of the
post Senior Personnel Officer encompassed Human Resources
functions.
[36]
It is apparent that had the arbitrator properly applied his mind to
JF Kern’s evidence he would not have come to the
conclusion
that JF Kern was not demoted when he was placed in the post of
Committee Officer.
[37]
In my view, the arbitrator, had he properly applied his mind to the
evidential material before him, should have found that
the status of
the post Senior Personnel Officer was higher than that of the post
Committee Officer.
[38]
It logically follows that at least in status JF Kern was demoted and
consequently was subjected to an unfair labour practice
within the
meaning of section 186(2)(a) of “the Act”.
[39]
In
Van Der Riet v Leisure Net t/a
Health and Racquet Clubs [1997] 6 BLLR at 721 (LAC),
it
was held that, “
failure to consult
with an employee in a non – disciplinary demotion is an unfair
labour practice”
. In
Du
Toit and Others Labour Relations Law (4
th
Edition at 465)
the
learned authors state that
, “In
law demotion could also mean a reduction or diminution of dignity,
importance, responsibility, power or status even
if salary attendant
benefits and rank are retained”.
[40]
The arbitrator found that, “
Much
as I see the unfairness in terms of the handling of his case, I do
not find the element of demotion and therefore do not find
the
existence of an unfair labour practice”. Not all unfair acts of
an employer may be regarded as one of unfair labour practices.
Had
the Applicant waited for the evaluation of his position, the grade
would definitely be lower. The salary would also be lower,
and then
there would have been a good case”
.
[41]
Section 186(2) provides that;
(i)
“unfair labour practice” means an unfair act or omission
that arises between an employer
and employee involving –
(ii)
unfair conduct by the employer relating to the promotion, demotion,
probation (excluding disputes about
dismissals for a reason relating
to probation) or training of an employee or relating to the provision
of benefits to an employee.
[42]
The arbitrator misdirected himself because having found that when the
post Committee Officer was to be evaluated it would have
resulted in
the post being degraded in level and salary. It follows that the only
reasonable conclusion is that JF Kern was demoted.
[43]
The evidence shows that JF Kern was demoted. In my view, the time
when the grading or evaluation of the post eventuates is
not decisive
regarding the determination of demotion; in fact such consideration
is irrelevant.
[44]
In my view, the arbitrator misdirected himself in finding that JF
Kern should have waited for the certainty of the evaluation
grading
of the post Committee Officer, that if he had done so he would have
had a good case based on unfair discrimination.
[45]
JF Kern’s case is that he was subjected to unfair labour
practice by being placed in the position Committee Officer in
contravention of the “PGPS”, that he was demoted within
the meaning of section 186(2)(a) of “the Act”.
JF
Kern’s case is not based on unfair discrimination as postulated
in
section 6
of the
Employment Equity
Act 55 of 1998
.
[46]
In the premises, the arbitrator’s findings are not rationally
connected to the evidence before him, this renders his
award
reviewable. The award is set aside.
The
Analysis of Evidence and Argument Whether JF Kern is entitled to
Compensation in terms of Section 194(4) of “the Act”
[47]
In
SA Fibre Yarn Rugs Ltd v
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & Others
(2005) 26 ILJ 921 (LC),
Murphy AJ
held that, “
Section 145 of “the
Act” obliges the court to scrutinize the legality and
regularity of the CCMA arbitration awards
on review and not to
substitute a decision by the Labour Court in place of the CCMA
commissioner. The section grants a power of
review not appeal. As a
general principle, therefore, this court should be reluctant to
substitute its own decision for that of
the CCMA. However, in
exceptional circumstances and in the interests of speedy resolution
of disputes, this principle may be departed
from. The court has
discretion, to be exercised judicially upon the consideration of the
facts of each case. Although the matter
will normally be sent back if
there is no reason for not doing so, it is in essence a question of
fairness to both sides –
Livestock
& Meat Industries Control Board v Garda
1961 (1) SA 342
(A) at
349.
In this regard the court
will have regard to whether: a fresh consideration would lead to a
result which is a foregone conclusion;
the importance of time
considerations; the willingness and likelihood of the body being able
to re-apply its mind to the issues
at stake; any indications of bias
or incompetence that cannot be remedied; and whether the court is in
as good a position as the
functionary under review to make the
decision itself. In the present case it is this latter consideration
which to my mind is the
most important”.
[48]
I fully associate myself with the remarks of the learned Judge. In
applying the above
dictum
;
I am of the view that this is a case which this Court can exercise
its discretion and make a decision regarding the question whether
JF
Kern is entitled to compensation in terms of section 194(4) of “the
Act”, and if so, the amount of the compensation.
[49]
In considering an appropriate relief where an employee alleges that
he has been subjected to unfair labour practice section
194(4) of
“the Act” provides that, “
the
compensation awarded to an employee in respect of an unfair labour
practice must be just and equitable in all the circumstances,
but not
more than the equivalent of 12 months remuneration”
.
[50]
In
Ferodo (Pty) Ltd v De Ruiter [1993] 14 ILJ 1974 (LAC)
the Labour Appeal Courts formulated the following guidelines in
establishing the loss and determining the compensation to be awarded:
(a)
“There must be evidence of actual financial loss suffered by
the person claiming compensation,
(b)
there must be proof that the loss was caused by the unfair
labour
practice
,
(c)
The loss must be foreseeable, i.e. not too remote or speculative,
(d)
The award must endeavour to place the Applicant in monetary terms in
that position which he would have
been had the unfair labour practice
not been committed,
(e)
In making the award the Court must be guided by what is reasonable
and fair in the circumstances,
(f)
There is duty on the employee (if he is seeking compensation to
mitigate his damages by taking
all reasonable steps to acquire
alternative employment)”,
[51]
The Applicant’s case is predicated on the following basis;
(i)
the Placement Committee and Third Respondent acted in breach of the
Collective Agreement by placing
JF Kern in the post Committee
Officer, and not as Manager Human Resources,
(ii)
the Placement Committee and Third Respondent committed an unfair
labour practice against JF Kern
regarding his placement as Committee
Officer because he was effectively demotion in fact and in law, and
(iii)
the Objection Committee and the Third Respondent failed to address JF
Kern’s objections and
grievances as obliged in terms of the
Collective Agreement.
The
Third Respondent’s Human Resources
Function
Instructions to JF Kern
[52]
The 18
th
February 2004;
(a)
The Third Respondent instructed JF Kern to furnish the Acting Manager
Human Resources with its
employees’ job descriptions which were
requested by the South African Local Government Bargaining Council to
facilitate the
implementation of the process of job evaluation and
job description writing and evaluation,
[53] The 19
th
February 2004,
(a)
the Acting Executive Manager Corporate Affairs addressed a memorandum
to JF Kern headed:
RE: TASK ALLOCATION – JOB DESCRIPTION
stating that;
(i)
JF Kern was allocated the task of attending to the whole process of
job description writing, that
he was informed in writing that he was
expected to fulfil this task, as a matter of extreme urgency; failing
which he would be
guilty of extreme gross insubordination
.
[54] The 1
st
December 2003,
(i)
The Third Respondents Acting Executive
Manager Corporate Services addressed a memorandum to JF Kern headed
RE: “ALLOCATION OF HUMAN RESOURCES
TASKS”.
The memorandum allocated
JF Kern the following Human Resources tasks;
(ii)
Selection and Placement Policy,
(ii)
Disciplinary Code and Grievance Procedure, and
(iv)
Job Description Writing,
[55]
The 23
rd
December 2003;
(a)
The Third Respondent’s Corporate Services Manager addressed a
memorandum to JF Kern headed
“
RE
ALLOCATION OF HUMAN RESOURCES – RELATED TASKS”
.
In the memorandum JF kern is advised
that when he was placed as the Committee Officer, it was stated that
he would still be required
to perform his old duties that he is
expected to carry out the tasks that were allocated to him.
[56]
The uncontroverted evidence shows that whenever there were Human
Resources functions to be performed, the Third Respondent
instructed
JF Kern to execute same.
JF
Kern’s Objection to his Placement as Committee Officer
[57]
In terms of the Collective Agreement the Placement Committee was
obliged to place JF Kern in a post that totally or close matched
his
qualifications and experience.
[58]
The Third Respondent’s contention that the prescriptions of the
Employment Equity Act, the
Skills
Development Act or Affirmative Action Policy
were the overriding factors which influenced the Placement
Committee’s decision not to place JF Kern as Manager Human
Resources
is disingenuous and not borne out by the proven objective
facts.
[59]
JF Kern was the only employee in the Third Respondent’s employ
whose qualifications and experience close-matched the
post Manager
Human Resources. This evidence is not disputed. It therefore follows
that the
Employment Equity Act, Skills
Development Act or Affirmative Action Policy
did not apply.
[60]
The post Manager Human Resources was not a new post carrying duties,
functions and responsibilities which did not exist in
any form in the
newly established Third Respondent’s employ.
[61]
In my view, when the Third Respondent purported to create a new post
referred to as Manager Human Resources, in effect it only
changed the
designation of the post Senior Personnel Officer to Manager Human
Resources.
[62]
JF Kern was in effect occupying two posts namely: Senior Personnel
Manager (
de facto
Manager Human Resources
)
and Committee Officer. The reality of the aforementioned assertion is
confirmed by the fact that the Third Respondent subsequently
appointed ZJ Mtsweni as its Manager Human Resources and Holmner as
its Committee Officer.
[63]
It is common cause that the Third Respondent instructed JF Kern to
define the job content of the post Manager Human Resources,
that JF
Kern based the job description of the post on the daily functions,
duties and responsibilities he executed.
[64]
The facts show that the post Committee Officer is inferior in status
and entails less functions and responsibilities than the
post Senior
Personnel Manager. In any event JF Kern’s assertion that
the post Committee Officer was a purely clerical
post was not
assailed.
[65]
JF Kern executed Human Resources functions on behalf of the Third
Respondent and also performed the duties and functions of
a Committee
Officer. JF Kern was in effect executing the functions of two posts
in breach of the Collective Agreement.
[66]
The Third Respondent has misconceived the legal status of the “
the
Policy Guidelines on the Placement of Staff”.
This document is not a guideline, it is a Collective Agreement
arising out of a bargaining process, it forms part of JF Kern’s
terms and conditions of employment.
[67]
A Collective Agreement is defined in section 213 of “the Act”
as a
written agreement concerning terms and conditions of
employment or any other matter of mutual interest concluded by one or
more
registered trade unions, on the one hand and, on the other
hand-
(a)
one or more employers;
(b)
one or more registered employers’ organisations; or
(c)
one or more employers and one or more registered employers’
organisations.
[68]
The Third Respondent and the Objection Committee despite requests by
JF Kern to address the objection of his placement failed
to do so.
The failure by the Objection Committee and the Third Respondent
constitutes a breach of the Collective Agreement and
is an unfair
labour practice.
The
Relief
[69]
The postulation of an unfair labour practice within the contemplation
of section 186(2)(a) of “the Act”, “
makes
it quite clear that it is the conduct of the employer that gives rise
to the consequences of a demotion and not the demotion
itself, that
is capable of being impugned in terms of that section covered by “the
Act”
. See
Hlophe
and Others v Minister of Safety and Security and Others
[2006] 3 BLLR
297
(LC)
at para 17.
[70]
The Third Respondent argues that JF Kern did not suffer any
patrimonial loss as a consequence of his alleged demotion, because
he
took early retirement and is no longer in the Third Respondent’s
employment that the matter would be academic and even
if it was to be
found that JF Kern was demoted when he was placed as Committee
Officer.
[71]
The evidence shows that JF Kern was subjected to continuous unfair
labour practices, that by not being placed in the post Manager
Human
Resources he has suffered actual financial loss.
[72]
It is undisputed that JF Kern had possessed outstanding academic and
practical experience qualifications for the post Manager
Human
Resources, that for the past 20 years he occupied Senior Managerial
Human Resources posts in various private and public companies,
that
he had 10 years experience in local government services as a Senior
Personnel Officer, that he had previously being employed
as a Senior
Human Resources Manager in the chemicals industry. It is not disputed
that he was the Third Respondent’s most
senior Human Resources
employee.
[73]
In my view, having regard to the Third Respondent’s its
obstinate obduracy in refusing to address JF Kern’s placement
objections over the period March 2003 to March 2004, its dictatorial,
parlous and reprehensible conduct in ordering JF kern to
execute
Human Resources functions without remuneration, it is just and
equitable under all the circumstances to award the maximum
compensatory relief in terms of section 194 (4) of “the Act”.
[74]
Had the Placement Committee and the Third Respondent complied with
the prescriptions of the Collective Agreement, JF Kern would
have
been placed in the post Manager Human Resources on the 10
th
March 2003 earning a salary in the amount of R337 000 00 per annum.
[75]
The Third Respondent on the 22
nd
April 2003 adopted a resolution in terms whereof the post Manager
Human Resources was changed from being a permanent post into
a three
year fixed term contract post. This resolution also reduced the
remuneration of the post from the amount of R337 000 00
per annum to
R250 000 00 per annum.
[76]
In my view, this resolution would not have been applicable to JF Kern
because had he been placed in the post Manager Human
Resources on the
10
th
March 2003 as prescribed by the provisions of the “PGPS”
his placement would have pre-dated the adoption of the resolution
this renders its applicability to JF Kern
ultra
vires
.
[77]
On the 31
st
March 2004, JF Kern’s remuneration as
Committee Officer was R144 285 36 per annum. It follows that JF Kern
has sustained
actual financial loss in the amount of R 192 714 64
calculated as follows;
R337
000 00
-
R144 285 36
_________________
=
R192 714 64
_________________
The
Order
[1]
The Third Respondent is ordered to pay compensation to JF Kern in the
amount of R192 714 64 this being
the equivalent of 12 months
remuneration being the difference between the post
Manager Human Resources and the post
Committee Officer.
[2]
The Third Respondent is entitled to deduct any applicable income tax
in terms of the Income Tax Act
No 58 of 1962 from the amount of R192
714 64.
[3]
The Third Respondent is ordered to pay the costs of this application.
_______________________________________________________
MOKGOATLHENG
A.J.
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
Date
of Hearing
:
22
nd
September 2006
Date
of Judgment
:
19
th
January 2007
Appearances
For
the Applicant
:
F J Van Der
Merwe
Instructed
by
:
Solidarity Union
Kumba
Resource Building
Cnr DF
Malan & Eendracht Streets
Kloofsig
PO Box
11760
0046
Centurion
Tel:
(012) 643 8500
Fax:
(012) 663 6366
For
the Respondent
:
Attorney J Kaapu
Instructed
by
:
Bowman Gilfillan
Inc
165
West Street, Sandton, 2146
PO Box
785812, Sandton, 2146
Tel:
(011) 669 9000
Fax:
(011) 669 9001
Ref:
Mr J Kaapu/1102877