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[2018] ZALAC 48
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University of KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay and Others (DA09/2015) [2018] ZALAC 48; [2019] 2 BLLR 149 (LAC); (2019) 40 ILJ 158 (LAC) (25 September 2018)
IN
THE LABOUR APPEAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, DURBAN
Reportable
Case no. DA09/2015
In the matter between:
UNIVERSITY
OF KWAZULU-NATAL
Appellant
and
PRUSHOTHMAN SUBRAMONEY
PILLAY
First Respondent
HILDA GROBLER
N.O.
Second Respondent
COMMISSION FOR
CONCILIATION, MEDIATION
AND
ARBITRATION
Third Respondent
Heard:
28 August 2018
Delivered:
25 September 2018
Summary:
Review of arbitration award – procedural fairness - Employee
dismissed for misconduct by lying under oath –
Employer setting
a tribunal to investigate the employee’s improprieties –
the tribunal recommended that the employee
be dismissed for lying
under oath – subsequent to the recommendation of the tribunal,
the employer instituted a disciplinary
hearing to deal with the
appropriate sanction which tribunal found that the trust relationship
had broken down and also recommended
dismissal – Labour Court
found that dismissal substantively fair but remitted the matter for
the determination on the procedural
fairness of the dismissal –
commissioner finding that dismissal procedurally fair – Labour
Court setting aside award
on review – held that
Commissioner’s
finding is correct and certainly one that a reasonable commissioner
could arrive at on the material before
her. The lies Pillay told at
the Magid Tribunal quite evidently destroyed trust and once the lie
was admitted Pillay’s defence
was primarily aimed at mitigation
of sanction to show that notwithstanding his admitted dishonesty he
had a good track record,
long service and should be forgiven. That
was the tenor of the case Pillay presented to Pretorius SC. In the
premises, no purpose
would have been served by having two separate
hearings, one on guilt and the other on mitigation of sanction
Further
that The Labour Court made no finding whether the commissioner’s
finding was unreasonable. The learned judge did not
provide reasons
for why she considered the award so flawed that the decision of the
commissioner was one to which no reasonable
commissioner could have
come on the material before her. In fact, she did not deal with the
finding by the commissioner that a
separate hearing on mitigation was
unnecessary having regard to the nature of the proceedings and the
manner in which the defence
was presented. She accordingly erred by
failing to address the primary issue on review. The central question
of the reasonableness
of the award was not asked or answered in her
judgment. Labour Court’s Judgment set aside and Appeal upheld
with costs.
Coram: Davis JA,
Hlophe and Murphy AJJA
JUDGMENT
MURPHY
AJA
[1]
The appellant, the University of Kwa-Zulu Natal (“UKZN”),
appeals with
the leave of this Court against the judgment of the
Labour Court (Fourie AJ) setting aside the award of the second
respondent (“the
commissioner”) and directing payment to
the first respondent (“Pillay”) of 10 times his monthly
salary as compensation
for his alleged procedurally unfair dismissal.
[2]
Prior to his dismissal, Pillay was employed as Chief Financial
Officer at UKZN. On
31 August 2007, the Chair of the Council of the
university informed Pillay that he had been dismissed pursuant to a
council resolution
approving and accepting a report into his conduct
by a disciplinary enquiry chaired by Advocate Paul Pretorius SC
(“Pretorius
SC”) which recommended his dismissal. Pillay
was legally represented (first by senior counsel and later by an
attorney) during
the proceedings of the disciplinary enquiry.
Pretorius SC found that Pillay had lied under oath to a university
tribunal chaired
by retired Judge Magid and that the dishonesty in
question (discussed more fully below) justified dismissal as it had
caused an
irretrievable breakdown of the employment relationship.
[3]
Pillay challenged the fairness of his dismissal in a referral to the
Commission for
Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA),
essentially alleging that dismissal was too harsh and thus an
inappropriate sanction.
The commissioner found that the dismissal was
fair. Pillay then took the award on review. The Labour Court (per Van
Niekerk J)
held that the dismissal was substantively fair. The
learned judge, however, was not satisfied that the commissioner had
dealt properly
with the question of procedural fairness. He
accordingly remitted the matter back to the commissioner to determine
whether the
dismissal was procedurally fair. In a second amplified
award, the commissioner found that the dismissal was indeed
procedurally
fair. This second award was set aside on review in the
Labour Court by Fouche AJ and is the subject of the present appeal.
Background
[4]
The background facts are for the most part common cause. The dispute
involving Pillay
has its provenance in the award to him of the degree
of Master of Commerce by UKZN in 2006. Shortly after the degree was
conferred,
the university vice-chancellor received anonymous
information alleging serious irregularity in relation to the awarding
of the
degree to Pillay.
[5]
A committee (“the Bawa committee”) under the chairmanship
of Professor
Bawa was then established and tasked with investigating
the allegations. The Bawa committee was concerned with the manner in
which
Pillay’s dissertation was marked and passed and the way
in which he came to be registered for the degree in 2006
retrospectively
to 2005 to enable him graduate in 2006.
[6]
The report of the Bawa Committee, among other things, found that the
degree was initially
failed by the external examiners charged with
marking it, but was then passed by a majority vote of three internal
examiners of
which two were the co-supervisors of the dissertation
and the third had never read it.
[7]
One of the co-supervisors was Professor Msweli-Mbanga (“Mbanga”).
The
Bawa committee in its report referred to a suggestion made to it
that, during the time the dissertation was being developed and
co-supervised by Mbanga, she and Pillay were in an intimate romantic
relationship. The committee accordingly recommended that a
letter be
written to Pillay asking whether there was an intimate relationship
while Mbanga acted as a co-supervisor. The committee
stressed that a
failure to answer the question or any conclusion that there was
nepotism in the award of the degree could lead
to disciplinary
action. Furthermore, UKZN had been provided with information that
Pillay had paid Mbanga an amount of R80 000.
UKZN felt that an
unusual payment by a student to his supervisor required explanation.
Accordingly, after receiving the report
of the Bawa committee, a
sub-committee convened by the Council to deal with the report,
addressed a letter seeking answers to the
two questions of possible
impropriety. Pillay declined to furnish a direct response to the
questions.
[8]
On 27 November 2006, the sub-committee decided that steps should be
taken to withdraw
Pillay’s degree. Later that same day an
emergency meeting of the Council was called. The reason for the
emergency meeting
of Council was that Mbanga had lodged a complaint
of sexual harassment against the chairman of Council and the
vice-chancellor
of the UKZN. The Council resolved at that meeting to
establish what became known as the Magid Tribunal and
inter alia
took the decision that the report of the Bawa Committee be
temporarily put on hold.
[9]
The main issue referred to the Magid Tribunal was the allegation of
sexual harassment,
but the terms of reference in the Council’s
resolution also required investigation of whether there were any
irregularities
in the awarding of the MComm degree to Pillay.
[10]
The Magid Tribunal commenced in December 2006. Evidence was taken
under oath. Pillay was called
on three separate occasions. The
Tribunal made key credibility findings against Mbanga and Pillay,
disbelieving their denials that
there had been an intimate
relationship and that Pillay had paid R80 000 to Mbanga. In
particular, it rejected Pillay’s denials
that he had in the
past mentioned the affair and the payment to the vice-chancellor
(Professor Makgoba), a member of the executive
(Professor Mazibuko),
Mr. Brian Leslie (an internal legal adviser) and Mr. Richard
Pemberton, an attorney.
[11]
After considering the report of the Magid Tribunal, the Council
adopted a resolution on 16 January
2007 that Pillay should be
dismissed for lying to the Tribunal. Notwithstanding the resolution,
the Deputy Director Human Resources
was instructed to take the
necessary steps to set up a disciplinary enquiry to afford Pillay an
opportunity to deal with the Council’s
wish to terminate his
employment on the ground that it had lost trust in him by reason of
his untruthful testimony to the Tribunal
which, given his senior
position, had destroyed the employment relationship.
[1]
The
disciplinary enquiry before Pretorius SC
[12]
In a letter dated 1 February 2007, the Deputy Director: Human
Resources informed Pillay that
when he testified before the Magid
Tribunal he falsely alleged that the vice-chancellor, the chairperson
of Council, Professor
Mazibuko and the university’s legal
representatives had lied in order to implicate him as part of a
greater conspiracy against
him. This evidence was not believed by the
Tribunal and destroyed the relationship of trust. Accordingly, a
disciplinary enquiry
chaired by Pretorius SC had been mandated to
hear evidence and submissions and asked on the strength thereof to
make factual findings
as to whether the employment relationship has
been destroyed as a result of the loss of trust and to provide a
recommendation with
regard to the appropriate sanction.
[13]
The disciplinary hearing before Pretorius SC endured over many days
in the period between March
and July 2007. Pretorius SC handed down
his findings and recommendation of dismissal on 15 August 2007. In
view of the limited
nature of the issues before us, it is not
necessary to traverse the evidence before the disciplinary hearing.
Suffice it to say
that Pillay’s legal representatives never put
it to any witness who testified that either of the two alleged lies
was not
a lie.
[14]
Three senior UKZN witnesses (the vice-chair of Council, Mr Mia; the
vice-chancellor, Professor
Makgoba; and a member of Council and chair
of the Audit and Risk Committee, Mr Luthuli), testified before the
disciplinary enquiry
that they no longer trusted Pillay and could not
continue to work with him. Pillay’s position as Chief Finance
Officer involved
him in matters requiring complete faith and trust
and that the employment relationship had in those circumstances
completely broken
down. Professor Makgoba explained that it was
impossible for Pillay to return to his post because of the way in
which matters had
developed, and this had destroyed their working
relationship completely.
[15]
During his testimony before the disciplinary enquiry on 14 and 15
July 2007, Pillay admitted
the R80 000 payment to Mbanga. He had
denied the payment before the Magid Tribunal and had alleged that
those he told about the
payment had not been truthful in their
evidence to the Tribunal. He conceded he misled the Tribunal and thus
had damaged trust
but said that he felt the relationship could be
repaired. He justified his dishonesty as a split second decision at a
moment when
the question was posed. He then persisted in that lie
elaborating upon it on the subsequent occasions he testified. He
conceded
that he ought not to have done so and that he exacerbated
the position by contending that the others who were in fact telling
the
truth on the topic were lying and falsely said that they were
doing so as part of a conspiracy instigated against him by the
vice-chancellor.
[16]
The witnesses called by Pillay at the enquiry added nothing to the
relevant facts regarding Pillay’s
dishonest misconduct. They
essentially testified about the backdating of his registration and
gave evidence in mitigation related
to his character, teaching
competence and personal circumstances.
[17]
The ultimate finding of Pretorius SC reads as follows:
‘
I
find that there is, as a matter of fact, an irretrievable breakdown
in the trust relationship between Professor Pillay and his
employer
the UKZN. Clear evidence of this was given in the disciplinary
hearing by Professor Makgoba and others. This evidence
was backed by
objective factual circumstances warranting that conclusion.
It
is common cause that Professor Pillay advanced an amount of R80 000
to Professor Msweli-Mbanga. I find that he told as much
to Professor
Makgoba on 26 June 2006. I accept Professor Makgoba’s evidence
in this regard. It was clear and consistent.
It also accords with all
the probabilities. Two findings flow from this. First, that Professor
Pillay lied under oath to the Magid
Tribunal. It was an elaborate and
calculated lie. This against the background of his duty to deal fully
and honestly with the subject
matter of the enquiry. The inevitable
consequence of his lies in this regard is the direct allegation that
Professor Makgoba, the
Vice-Chancellor of the University, was himself
deliberately dishonest when he testified before the Magid Tribunal.
On this basis
I am satisfied that Professor Pillay made himself
guilty of conduct which contributed directly to an irretrievable
breakdown in
the relationship of trust between himself and the
University.
In
the light of all the evidence, I conclude as a matter of probability
that Professor Pillay did indeed have a romantic and sexual
affair
with Professor Msweli-Mbanga. Further I find, as a matter of fact,
that Professor Pillay related as much to Professor Makgoba
on 26 June
2006. That such an affair took place is consistent with other
evidence, including, importantly, Professor Msweli-Mbanga’s
admitted subsequent aggressive conduct towards Professor Pillay.
Further, if Professor Pillay indeed told Professor Makgoba on
26 June
2006 that he had been involved in an intimate sexual relationship
with Professor Msweli-Mbanga one is driven to the conclusion
that
that was indeed the case. There is no feasible reason for Professor
Pillay to have distorted the truth on this occasion.
There
are ultimately two findings that I make in this regard. The first is
that Professor Pillay lied to the Magid Tribunal when
he asserted
that he had not conducted an intimate sexual relationship with
Professor Msweli-Mbanga. It follows that he also lied
to the
disciplinary enquiry in this regard. The second finding is that
Professor Pillay lied to the Magid Tribunal when he denied
that he
had told Professor Makgoba that he had conducted an intimate sexual
relationship with Professor Msweli-Mbanga. In doing
so, Professor
inevitably accused Professor Makgoba of serious dishonesty. On the
basis of either finding (or on both) the conclusion
that Professor
Makgoba and others correctly and justifiably asserted that the
relationship of trust had broken down irretrievably
follows.
Accordingly,
I find that the relationship of trust between Professor Pillay and
the UKZN has broken down irretrievably.’
[18]
The letter of UKZN to Pillay dated 1 February 2007, setting out the
charges and the details of
the intended disciplinary process, made it
plain that Pretorius SC was mandated “to provide a
recommendation with regard
to the appropriate sanction” and
that the UKZN intended to ask Pretorius SC to make a recommendation
to the Council “that
the appropriate sanction is summary
dismissal”. His finding on sanction reads as follows:
‘
I
have taken into account evidence relating to Professor Pillay’s
record of performance at the UKZN. However, I find that
the conduct
of Professor Pillay that led to the breakdown of the relationship of
trust between himself and his employer is of the
most serious nature.
The latter outweighs the former
In
relation to the contention that my findings notwithstanding,
Professor Pillay should continue to be employed in the capacity
as an
Associate Professor or lecturer, I am not persuaded that this should
be the outcome. Firstly, one is here dealing with the
relationship of
employment between an employer and employee and not particular
contracts which make up that relationship. But more
importantly, I
accept the evidence of Professor Makgoba that the breakdown of trust
goes to the root of the relationship between
employer and employee
and my findings must apply in whatever capacity the employment
relationship might find its expression.
Accordingly,
I recommend that Professor Pillay be dismissed with effect from the
date upon which my recommendation might be accepted
by Council.’
The
Council Resolution
[19]
The minutes of the Council Meeting of 31 August 2007 record the
following resolution:
‘
Recommendation
on the Pillay Enquiry
It
was NOTED that the report form the disciplinary committee had been
sent to all members under separate cover…….
Dr
Maphai referred to the recommendation in the report which recommended
that Prof PS Pillay be dismissed with immediate effect.
He enquired
from Council whether any member believed that the findings of
Advocate Paul J Pretorius SC were in conflict with the
decisions of
Council, or whether there were any material factors that would have
affected the Council decisions taken had these
factors been known at
the time that the decisions were taken. In the absence of any
objections by Council members, the Chair called
for a proposal.
It
was proposed that the report be accepted.
Council
UNANIMOUSLY APPROVED that the report by Advocate Paul Pretorius be
accepted.’
The
first arbitration award and Labour Court review
[20]
The resolution was implemented, Pillay was dismissed and he then
referred a case of unfair dismissal
to the CCMA. At the CCMA
arbitration, the bundle of documents and the transcript of the
hearings before Judge Magid and Pretorius
SC were agreed to be
accurate reflections of the evidence and true copies of the documents
and were handed in on that basis by
consent. Mr Mia gave evidence on
behalf of UKZN. He testified to the reason why trust had broken down
and the unanimous resolution
which was passed by Council. Pillay
testified that even though the relationship had broken down because
of his dishonesty, the
decision to dismiss was unfair, because there
was a prospect the relationship could be restored through mediation.
The commissioner
found that dismissal was an appropriate sanction for
the dishonest misconduct.
[21]
In the review proceedings before Van Niekerk J, Pillay contended that
the commissioner committed
a gross irregularity in that she had
failed to determine the issue of procedural fairness and
alternatively that the dismissal
was procedurally unfair in that the
Council had taken a decision to dismiss Pillay in January 2007,
before the appointment of the
disciplinary enquiry, and was thus
pre-disposed to dismissing him. It was contended further that certain
members of the Council
who participated in the vote on the Pretorius
report on 31 August 2007 ought to have recused themselves on account
of a conflict
of interest and that Pillay ought to have been given an
opportunity before a vote was taken to make submissions on the
recommendation
that he be dismissed.
[22]
In relation to the issue of substantive fairness, Van Niekerk J held
that the commissioner’s
conclusion that the trust relationship
had been irretrievably damaged and thus that dismissal was an
appropriate sanction was “not
one that can be said to fall
outside of the band of decisions to which reasonable people could
come”. On the question of
procedural fairness, the learned
judge however stated:
‘
In
the present matter, as I have noted, it is common cause that the
commissioner does not deal expressly with the attack on procedural
fairness, despite the fact that the applicant raised the issue both
in the referral of his dispute and in the heads of argument
filed
after the arbitration proceedings. I am not able to imply from the
terms of the award any decision on the fairness of the
procedure
adopted by the university in relation to the applicant’s
dismissal, especially those submissions that concern the
‘post-Pretorius’ phase of the disciplinary process, i.e.
the averments of bias in regard to the university council’s
decision to accept Pretorius’s recommendation, and the failure
by the council to afford the applicant an opportunity to make
submissions on whether Pretorius’s recommendation should be
accepted. The award does not lend itself to a rejection of the
applicant’s contentions regarding procedural unfairness: they
simply appear to have been left in limbo. In these circumstances,
I
am driven to conclude that the commissioner failed to determine a
material element of the dispute between the parties and that
her
failure to do so constitutes a reviewable irregularity.’
On
that basis, the Labour Court remitted the matter to the commissioner
and directed her “to determine whether the applicant’s
dismissal was procedurally fair”.
The
second arbitration award
[23]
In her second amplified award, dated 1 October 2011, the commissioner
held that the issue of
procedural fairness basically turned on two
key questions: firstly, whether Pillay had been given a proper
opportunity to be heard
on the question of sanction; and secondly
whether the process followed by the Council after receiving the Magid
Tribunal report
was in accordance with the requirements of fairness.
[24]
Unfortunately, the arbitration award does not deal with the issues
coherently, but a reading
of it as a whole reveals that the
commissioner was persuaded that Pillay had had ample opportunity in
the disciplinary enquiry
to deal with the question of sanction and in
fact had done so, as was evident from the nature of the testimony of
the witnesses
who testified on his behalf, and upon which Pretorius
SC explicitly relied when making his finding regarding sanction.
[25]
As regards the Council’s resolutions, the commissioner found
that, although the terms of
the Council resolution in January 2007
had indicated its preference for dismissal, subsequent events had
ensured a fair process
at the instance of Pretorius SC, a highly
experienced and respected counsel. While it might have been
preferable for those Council
members who testified at the
disciplinary hearing to have recused themselves from the proceedings
of the Council on 31 August 2007,
the vote to accept the
recommendation of Pretorius SC was unanimous, meaning that the
participation of those persons at the Council
meeting did not
materially or adversely affect the outcome. Moreover, in terms of the
governing statute, it is the Council that
has authority to dismiss a
senior staff member like Pillay. It had taken that decision by a
proper vote on an informed basis, relying
on the comprehensive report
of Pretorius SC.
[26]
The commissioner also dealt with the matter of Pillay’s right
to an internal appeal. It
was common cause that the applicant filed
his appeal out of time and that the UKZN refused to grant condonation
for the late filing.
No further evidence was led in this regard
before the commissioner and thus she was not able to conclude that
the UKZN’s
decision not to receive the appeal was procedurally
unfair.
[27]
Lastly, Pillay also submitted that it was procedurally unfair of UKZN
to have refused to pay
his legal costs at the disciplinary hearing as
this had meant the process was not “evenly balanced”. The
commissioner
held that there was no evidence of any UKZN policy in
terms of which the legal fees of employees who face disciplinary
hearings
were paid by the university.
[28]
The commissioner accordingly ruled that the dismissal of Pillay was
not procedurally unfair.
The
merits of the review of the second arbitration award
[29]
Pillay filed an application to review the second arbitration award on
6 December 2011, seeking
the setting aside of the award and an order
directing UKZN to pay him compensation of six months remuneration.
The matter was heard
on 16 July 2014 and Fouche AJ delivered her
judgment 30 October 2014. The judge upheld the review (without
setting aside the award)
and, for reasons not explained, awarded
compensation of 10 months remuneration, being an amount in excess of
that requested by
Pillay in his application.
[30]
In truth, the judgment of Fouche AJ is difficult to follow. There is
no clear delineation between
submissions of the parties that the
judge merely repeated and findings made in the judgment. However, she
found that the disciplinary
enquiry before Pretorius SC suffered
various procedural flaws. Most significantly, she held that it was
procedurally unfair not
to have afforded Pillay a second opportunity
to deal with mitigation of sanction.
[31]
The commissioner in her amplified award provided clear reasons for
finding that a second hearing
was not necessary in the circumstances
since the issue before the disciplinary enquiry was whether the trust
relationship had broken
down and that this was understood by Pillay
who led evidence on that issue specifically. In the commissioner’s
opinion, it
was appropriate and procedurally fair for the question of
sanction to have been dealt with as part and parcel of the hearing.
[32]
In our view, the commissioner’s finding is correct and
certainly one that a reasonable
commissioner could arrive at on the
material before her. The lies Pillay told at the Magid Tribunal quite
evidently destroyed trust
and once the lie was admitted Pillay’s
defence was primarily aimed at mitigation of sanction to show that
notwithstanding
his admitted dishonesty he had a good track record,
long service and should be forgiven. That was the tenor of the case
Pillay
presented to Pretorius SC. In the premises, no purpose would
have been served by having two separate hearings, one on guilt and
the other on mitigation of sanction. In any event, as a general rule,
there is nothing unfair about both aspects being decided
in one
hearing. The case was whether, having regard to the proven
dishonesty, continued employment was possible. In his finding
on
sanction, Pretorius SC explicitly indicated that he had relied on the
evidence led by Pillay about his qualities and personal
circumstances. He had more than sufficient information at his
disposal to make that determination, including evidence concerning
Pillay’s teaching skills and character. Most importantly, he
concluded, correctly in our view, that the gravity of Pillay’s
wrongdoing far outweighed any mitigating personal factors. A second
discrete hearing was not required and there was certainly no
procedural unfairness in not having held one.
[33]
Fouche AJ made no finding whether the commissioner’s finding
was unreasonable. The learned
judge did not provide reasons for why
she considered the award so flawed that the decision of the
commissioner was one to which
no reasonable commissioner could have
come on the material before her. In fact, she did not deal with the
finding by the commissioner
that a separate hearing on mitigation was
unnecessary having regard to the nature of the proceedings and the
manner in which the
defence was presented. She accordingly erred by
failing to address the primary issue on review. The central question
of the reasonableness
of the award was not asked or answered in her
judgment.
[34]
Likewise, Fouche AJ did not evaluate the reasonableness of the
commissioner’s finding that
the participation in the unanimous
vote of the Council by the three members of Council called as
witnesses in the disciplinary
enquiry was not procedurally unfair.
The Council unanimously approved the recommendation of Pretorius SC,
who was appointed specifically
to make the relevant factual findings
after a full hearing. That some of its members testified at the
disciplinary hearing and
did not recuse themselves from the Council
meeting had no material impact on the Council’s decision to
dismiss Pillay. The
commissioner’s finding on this question is
likewise a finding that a reasonable commissioner could have made.
[35]
The commissioner’s findings on Pillay’s right to appeal
and the issue of paying for
his legal representation are equally
correct and reasonable. A senior employee who is legally represented
by an experienced attorney
and senior counsel can reasonably be
assumed to know of his right of appeal and the requirements of
exercising it. Pillay appealed
out of time and made out no clear case
for why his non-compliance ought to have been condoned. Similarly,
Pillay’s claim
that he was entitled to have the UKZN pay his
costs for legal representation at the disciplinary has no legal
basis.
[36]
In the premises, the Labour Court erred in concluding that Pillay’s
dismissal was procedurally
unfair and (by implication) that the award
of the commissioner was unreasonable. The appeal must accordingly
succeed.
[37]
The following orders are made:
37.1
The appeal is upheld and the order of the Labour Court of 30 October
2014 is set aside and substituted with
the following order:
“
The
application to review the award of the Second Respondent is dismissed
with costs”.
37.2
The First Respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the appeal.
___________________
JR Murphy
Acting Judge of Appeal
I agree
_________________
D Davis
Judge of Appeal
I agree
________________
J Hlophe
Acting Judge of Appeal
APPEARANCES:
FOR THE APPELLANT:
Mr IA Cox
Instructed by: Cox
Attorneys
FOR THE FIRST RESPONDENT:
In
person
[1]
The wording of the initial resolution caused some controversy about
the manner in which the matter had been handled. This was
resolved
on 16 February 2007 when the Council ratified all decisions taken
with regard to Pillay after the Council meeting of
16 January 2007.