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[2016] ZALAC 107
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Potgietersrus Platinum Mine v Kobe and Others (JA127/14) [2016] ZALAC 107 (8 March 2016)
IN
THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Case no:
JA127/14
In the
matter between:
POTGIETERSRUS
PLATINUM MINE
Appellant
and
J
KOBE AND THREE OTHERS
Respondent
Held: 8 march 2016
EX TEMPORE
JUDGMENT
DAVIS JA
[1]
This is an appeal against the judgment of
the court
a quo
which was delivered on the 10
th
of March 2014. In terms of this judgment, the application for review
was upheld and the dispute was remitted to the Commission
for
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) for a hearing
de
novo
. The court
a
quo
raised a host of separate
justifications for why it came to the conclusion it reached; much of
which I do not propose to traverse
as an extensive analysis is not
necessary for the resolution of this appeal.
[2]
The first and second respondents were
charged by their employer, the appellant, with the following:
1. Insubordination.
2. Insolence; and
3. Refusal to obey lawful instructions.
[3] A disciplinary hearing against them was held, in their absence
and, on their version, without them being notified of the date
of the
hearing. They were found guilty and dismissed. The version of the
respondents was that they had lodged internal grievances
against
their supervisor, Mr D Maade. They escalated this grievance to the
CCMA. Thereafter the appellant, in retaliation for this
action and,
in essence, laid a charge on the same facts as the grievance which
they had raised. Again a process of disciplinary
action against
respondents took place culminating in a hearing on the 25
th
of August 2010. This disciplinary hearing was postponed
sine die
.
[4] Thereafter the first and second respondent received notification
of a disciplinary hearing set down for 31
st
of August
2010. They attended the disciplinary hearing with a union
representative from FEDCRAW. They were informed by the presiding
officer at the disciplinary hearing that FEDCRAW was not recognised
by the appellant and that accordingly the representative could
not
reappear on thei behalf at the disciplinary hearing.
[5] The first and second respondent contend that the disciplinary
hearing was then postponed
sine die
. The appellant submits
that notification was given to first and second respondent for a
disciplinary hearing to be held on the
3
rd
of September
2010. The fact that the respondents did not appear, according to the
appellant, was due to their fault. The appellant
could not be found
to be at fault for the fact that, as a disciplinary hearing to which
the first and second respondents did not
attend, dismissal was the
sanction imposed.
[6] Of particular relevance to this dispute is that when this action
by the appellant was referred to the CCMA, the LRA Form 7.1.1,
that
is the referral of a dispute to the CCMA for conciliation (including
con-arb), contained the following: The nature of the
dispute was
described as an unfair dismissal. The outcome which the first and
second respondent sought was described as follows:
“
Reinstatement
on both the applicants without a loss of benefits or income and/or
alternative compensation.”
[7] When the matter proceeded before the first respondent, the
following passage appears in the record:
“
Commissioner
:
Any opening statements to be made?
Ms
Ramafalo
:
On our side we can just quickly mention that we are dealing here with
misconduct which is running from three charges: failure
to obey
lawful instructions, insubordination and insolence of both
applicants. We will call four witnesses to come and show that
the
dismissal was substantively fair; and then I think two of them would
speak to the procedure and two of them will be talking
to the
substantive fairness.
Commissioner
:
Is that all? The opening statement, Mr Ngobeni?
Mr
Ngobeni
:
Thank you, Mr Commissioner. As far as we know in this matter, the
applicant is going to contest procedure. Substance will not
be in
dispute.
Ms
Ramafalo
:
Yes.
Commissioner
:
Substance will not be an issue, which means you will curtail your
proceedings.
Ms
Ramafalo
:
Yes.
Commissioner
:
Proceed. Is that all?
Mr
Ngobeni
:
Whereby the matter was postponed on the 31
st
.
The last day was postponed on the 31
st
of October 2010. Thereafter there will… no date of schedule to
give the applicant the opportunity of the applicant to defend
the
allegations. And they only received the notice of termination on the
29
th
of 10 2010 last year.” (sic)
[8] The thrust of the argument before the court
a quo
in
so far as this issue is concerned was that, notwithstanding the
description of the relief sought by the first and second respondents,
first respondent had asked of a union representative representing the
two respondents as to what components of the appellant’s
case
have been placed in dispute. When he received the answer that it was
only about procedure; in particular, whether the first
and second
respondent had been properly notified of the disciplinary hearing at
which the decision to dismiss them have been taken,
the
representative suggested this was the sole basis of the dispute.
Substantive unfairness was not to be placed in dispute,
notwithstanding
that the appellant had come prepared to deal with
this question.
[9] I should add it is not surprising that the respondents were
prepared to deal with those issues, because no doubt, having read
the
referral, they knew full well that, if reinstatement was the relief
sought, it could only be predicated on a finding of substantive
unfairness. Later in the record it is clear that the third respondent
had raised questions of substantive unfairness. The following
passage
is instructive.
‘
Commissioner
:
What about the reading? What will they be seeking? What will you
people… you will be seeking?
Mr
Kobe
:
I want to be… I am saying for reinstatement that I would
losing any of my monthly income…”
A litter later in the record the following occurs:
“
Mr
Kobe
:
I was prepared to change the susceptiv (sic) fairness, but I was
never given a chance to that effect.
Ms
Ramafalo
:
What do you mean by that?
Mr
Kobe
:
Just because I was not called to the hearing and given a chance to
state my case to defend myself.
Ms
Ramafalo
:
But you had an opportunity here at the CCMA to do exactly that.
Mr
Kobe
:
Yes, at the CCMA I was given a chance to at the CCMA how to dispute,
because I was alleging that I was never given a fair chance
that the
company will state my case.’
[10] It is clear that Mr Kobe, notwithstanding submissions to the
contrary by Mr Malan, understood that what he was seeking was
to be
put back in his job. This is a clear implication from the passage to
which I have made reference. This issue has to be resolved
by posing
the question: what is the duty of an arbitrator, such as the first
respondent, in the present case? It appears to me
that the dispute
between the parties turns on the weight of the burden imposed upon an
arbitrator in these circumstances to ensure
that the hearing is
conducted in a fair manner and which is fair to both parties.
[11] In my view, account must be taken the fact that in South Africa
many labour disputes are conducted either by an unrepresented
employee or by a union representative, who with great respect to the
unions, may not always be versed in the law and procedure
as the
employer might expect. For this reason, in
Consolidated Wire
Industries (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others
(1999) 20 ILJ 2602 (LC) it
was held:
“
The
parties were laymen unrepresented by legal practitioners and without
the benefit of pleadings to tie the parties with a version.
When a
version is changed or a new version is suddenly presented, the
arbitrator must take charge of proceedings. He cannot rely
on the
parties to realise what it expected of them unaided.”
[12] This observation is pertinent to the general conditions which
face labour relations in South Africa. I accept readily that
arbitrators from the CCMA are confronted with a considerable burden
and on onerous workload. But their task is to ensure that hearings
are conducted in a fair manner. This means that when there is a
manifest discrepancy between the referral and any concession made
by
a union representative, there is a duty upon the arbitrator to
enquire thoroughly into the discrepancy.
[13] Take the present case: The concession is made, notwithstanding
that the respondents had come prepared to deal with substantive
questions, that on the side of the respondents the issue of
substantive fairness will not be placed in issue. A cursory
examination
of the referral, to which I have made reference, would
have triggered a concern, which would then have necessitated a
question
along the following lines: ‘I do not understand your
concession. It appears to be at war with the referral. Your client
cannot
get reinstatement if the only issue which is placed in dispute
is that of procedural fairness. Can you please clarify the position
to me and if you are not certain, perhaps you wish to consult with
your client.’ This would have been the proper course of
action.
[14] Other than a perfunctory set of questions, which really did not
take the matter further, nothing was done by the first respondent
pursuant to the obligations imposed upon him to which I have already
made reference. It is for this reason that, when the record
is read
at a later stage in terms of the evidence given by Mr Kobe, it is
discovered that Kobe expected that, at some point, his
plea for
reinstatement would be considered. By then, however, the concession
had been made.
[15] But if he had raised these questions before the first
respondents , a warning light should have come on and the first
respondent
should have asked yet again: “well, I do not
understand this. I got a concession at the beginning. Now it appears,
pursuant
to the referral, your client is asking for reinstatement”.
[16] Mr Malan correctly conceded that there was no such interrogation
by the first respondent in this case. It appears there was
a
significant breach of procedural fairness in the conducting of the
hearing for first respondent to justify the order which was
made by
the court
a quo
.
[17] I have not dealt with the question of whether the individual
respondents were informed properly of the date which the hearing
would trigger their dismissal was to be heard. It is not necessary to
deal with those matters, although it is fair to say the following:
there is considerable uncertainty and ambiguity in the record as to
precisely what happened, particularly certain contradictions
between
two of the appellant’s witnesses.
[17] For all of these reasons, therefore, it appears that this appeal
should be dismissed with costs; and accordingly the matter,
pursuant
to the order of the court
a quo
, should be referred back for a
proper hearing before the CCMA. This is the least that justice
demands in these circumstances. For
this reason, the order I propose
is one which confirms the order of the court
a quo
:
Order
1. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
2. The matter is referred back to the CCMA for a hearing
de novo
.
3. The CCMA is directed to send the matter to a senior commissioner
for a hearing with instructions to:
a) Warn the parties of their fundamental rights.
b) To alert the parties of a witness to put a new version before the
hearing.
c) To instruct the parties to put a version under oath of which he or
she is aware.
d) To warn the parties an adverse inference can be drawn from the
parties’ acceptance of uncontested testimony placed before
the
commissioner.
e) To record the above warnings in the record.
4. A commissioner is directed to hear the applicant’s version
on both the substantive fairness and the procedure which applied
during the dismissal.
5.
In so far as the court
a quo
is concerned, there was no order as to costs. I do not propose to
make such an order on this part; safe to say the appeal is dismissed
with costs.
Davis
JA
Tlaletsi
DJP et Musi JA concur in the judgment of Davis JA
APPEARANCES:
FOR THE
APPELLANT: Mr Fritz Malan
Instructed by ENS Africa
FOR THE
FIRST AND SECOND RESPONDENTS: Mr TP Phahla
Instructed by TP Phahla Attorneys