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[2015] ZALAC 33
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National Health Laboratory Service v Yona and Others (PA 12/13) [2015] ZALAC 33; [2015] 10 BLLR 1002 (LAC); (2015) 36 ILJ 2259 (LAC) (12 May 2015)
IN
THE LABOUR APPEAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
PORT
ELIZABETH
Case no: PA 12/13
DATE: 12 MAY 2015
Reportable
In the matter
between:
NATIONAL HEALTH
LABORATORY
SERVICE
..............................................................
Appellant
And
MANDISA
YONA
.........................................................................................................
First
Respondent
FEIZAL
FATAAR
N.O
.............................................................................................
Second
Respondent
THE
COMMISSION FOR CONCILIATION,
MEDIATION
AND
ARBITRATION
........................................................................
Third
Respondent
Heard:
26 February 2015
Delivered:
12 May 2015
Summary:
Constructive dismissal –
employee’s subordinate appointed in an acting position for
which employee previously acted
on a number of times – as a
result employee suffering from severe depression and generalised
anxiety disorder – employee
booked off sick – employer
forming the view that employee not communicating about her absence –
evidence showing employee
submitting leave forms for every absence –
employee exhausting her sick leave cycle – employer advising
employee to
apply for temporary incapacity leave – application
for temporary incapacity leave dismissed – employer considering
employee’s absence as unpaid leave – employee resigning
and alleging constructive dismissal – commissioner finding
that
employee constructively dismissed. Appeal - principle that
onus
on employee to prove that employer rendering employment relationship
intolerable restated - evidence showing that employer through
its HR
Manager failed to advise employee to apply for extended sick leave
benefits – employer failing to accord fair and
compassionate
treatment to employee at the time of desperate need when she was
suffering from a severe work-related mental illness
– decision
to enforce employee’s absence as unpaid leave unfair –
employer’s conduct rendering the employment
relationship
unbearable – employee constructively dismissed - commissioner’s
decision falling within the ban of reasonableness
– Labour
Court’s judgment upheld – Appeal dismissed with costs.
Coram: Waglay JP,
Ndlovu
et
Landman JJA
JUDGMENT
NDLOVU JA
[1] This appeal is
against the judgment of the Labour Court (Lallie J) in which the
Court a
quo
dismissed with costs the review application
launched by the appellant against the arbitration award issued by the
second respondent
(the commissioner), acting under the auspices of
the third respondent (the CCMA), concerning disputes of the
commission of unfair
labour practice (relating to non-promotion) and
constructive dismissal.
[2] In his award,
the commissioner found in favour of the appellant on the unfair
labour practice dispute and in favour of the first
respondent (Ms
Yona) on the constructive dismissal dispute. Hence the appellant
launched a review application against the award
only in respect of
the constructive dismissal dispute, which is the subject matter in
this appeal. Leave to appeal having been
declined by the Court
a
quo
on 23 September 2013, was granted, on petition, by this Court
on 19 February 2014.
[3]
The appellant, The National Health Laboratory Service (the NHLS or
the appellant) is a juristic person established in terms
of the
National Health Laboratory Service Act
[1]
(the NHLS Act) and has its offices situate at Sandingham in
Johannesburg. Ms Yona was formerly employed by the appellant for a
broken service totalling 21 years – having initially served for
six years and later for 15 years, the latter period commencing
from 1
May 1995 – until she tendered her resignation on 1 June 2010.
She gave the appellant one month’s notice, thus
her last day of
work was 30 June 2010.
[4]
On 28 July 2010, Ms Yona referred a dispute to the CCMA claiming that
her resignation constituted a constructive dismissal in
terms of
section 186(1)(e) of the Labour Relations Act
[2]
(the LRA), due to the fact that the resignation was inspired by the
appellant’s unfair conduct that resulted in her continued
employment with the appellant being rendered intolerable. Together
with the referral of a dispute concerning constructive dismissal,
Ms
Yona also referred an unfair labour practice dispute in respect of
which, however, the commissioner found in favour of the appellant.
Hence, that part of the award was not challenged on review and is
therefore not part of this appeal.
[5] At the time of
her alleged constructive dismissal, Ms Yona was employed in the
capacity of what was known as the Complex Laboratory
Manager at the
appellant’s Port Elizabeth branch. When she resigned, her
salary was R34 000 per month. In terms of the appellant’s
organogram, Ms Yona reported to the Business Unit Manager (Business
Manager), a position which, before the dispute arose, was held
by Mr
Patrick Lucwaba, who in turn reported to the Executive Manager for
the coastal region. Ms Yona had a few subordinate junior
managers who
reported to her. It was common cause that one of those was Mr Igshaan
Gamieldien. It was also not in dispute that
for some unspecified
period, Ms Yona acted in the position of Mr Lucwaba whenever the
latter was not available.
[6]
At some point during 2009, Mr Lucwaba was promoted to the position of
Executive Manager, a situation which left the position
of Business
Manager vacant. On or about 4 May 2009, Mr Lucwaba called a staff
meeting at which he announced that he had appointed
Mr Gamieldien to
act as Business Manager pending the appointment of a permanent
incumbent in the post. Ms Yona was aggrieved by
that development and
felt very humiliated. According to her, this was because (1) Mr
Gamieldien who was her junior would essentially
become her senior;
(2) she did not understand why she was not appointed into the acting
position, especially because she had always
“acted” in
that position in Mr Lucwaba’s absence; (3) there was no
transparency in the acting appointment process,
since Mr Lucwaba did
not consult with her prior to appointing Mr Gamieldien; and (4) she
felt that when applications for the permanent
position of Business
Manager were considered in due course, Mr Gamieldien would stand at
an advantage over her, given that he had
been officially appointed as
acting business manager.
[7]
Consequently, Ms Yona initiated an internal grievance procedure
against Mr Lucwaba in which she complained about the issue referred
to above. A misconduct enquiry was held against Mr Lucwaba and
presided over by an independent chairperson, who concluded that
Mr
Lucwaba should apologise to Ms Yona for not consulting with her on
the issue of acting appointment of Mr Gamieldien. However,
the
chairperson endorsed Mr Gamieldien’s acting appointment which
he said must stand. Significantly, Mr Lucwaba did not tender
any
apology to Ms Yona, reportedly saying that he did not find the need
to do so since it was within his right, authority and prerogative
to
appoint Mr Gamieldien as Acting Business Manager and that he was not
obliged to have consulted with Ms Yona before doing so.
[8]
In the meantime, an advertisement was issued by the appellant, in or
about July 2009, inviting applications for permanent appointment
to
the position of business manager. Both Ms Yona and Mr Gamieldien
applied for the position. However, they were both unsuccessful
and
were advised accordingly per letters dated 20 August 2009. Ms Yona
further complained that prior to them being officially advised
of the
results of their applications, the Human Resources (HR) Manager, Mr
James Abraham, openly discussed the matter at a managerial
meeting
held on 19 August 2009, which included managers from outside Port
Elizabeth. According to Ms Yona, at that meeting, Mr
Abraham praised
Mr Gamieldien for his performance at the interview, even pointing out
that Mr Gamieldin’s only shortcoming
was his lack of experience
in the position of business manager. In other words, from the point
of view of Ms Yona, Mr Abraham had
implicitly suggested that she had
performed poorly at the interview.
[9]
The successful candidate for the position of Business Manager was Mr
Pascal Karuhige. Surprisingly, Mr Karuhige subsequently
declined the
post for some personal reasons. As a result, the post remained
vacant. In the circumstances, Mr Lucwaba extended Mr
Gamieldien’s
acting appointment, which meant that Mr Gamieldien was set to
continue being in charge over Ms Yona. This situation
exacerbated Ms
Yona’s frustration.
[10]
Shortly thereafter, Ms Yona fell ill and was continuously absent from
work, with effect from about 9 November 2009. She submitted
medical
certificates or sick notes to cover her period of indisposition. The
initial sick note was issued by a general medical
practitioner and
the subsequent ones by a specialist psychiatrist, Dr Jan Taylor of
Port Elizabeth. According to all medical certificates
Ms Yona was
diagnosed as suffering from “
severe depression and
generalised anxiety disorder.
”
She remained
absent on sick leave for an uninterrupted period of some five months
till the end of May 2010. As stated, to cover
her absence she
submitted several sick notes (each covering about a month or less) –
one after each time the other expired.
[11]
On 17 February 2010, Mr Abraham addressed a letter to Ms Yona which
read as follows:
‘
Dear
Ms Yona
ABSENCE FOR ILL
HEALTH REASONS.
We have received
your faxed sick note on 16 February 2010 and note for the record that
this note means that you will have been absent
from the workplace for
a significant period of time without following the necessary NHLS
Conditions of Employment Policy and Procedures:
.1. You have not
made telephonic contact with your Manager, Mr Igshaan Gamieldien,
Acting Business Manager, to inform him of your
absence or the reason
for your absence and we have subsequently had no choice but to
process your absence as “absence without
leave”.
2. You have
exhausted all forms of leave with the NHLS and due to you[r] lack of
communication with the NHLS, we are unable to determine
your future
operational obligations with the NHLS.
3. We are concerned
that due to your lack of communication with the NHLS that we cannot
determine the future status of your health,
your presence at work
within a reasonable time frame and/or the need to ensure that
operational requirement required of you as
a senior employee will be
fulfilled and needs to be address[ed] by the NHLS as a matter of
urgency.
To be able to comply
with the NHLS Conditions of Employment, your personal needs for
recuperation and the NHLS Health Insurers requirements,
I lodge this
friendly request with you to please complete the attached application
for disability and return the completed documents
to the Human
Resources Office, Port Elizabeth at your normal place of work as a
matter of urgency. May we request that you send
these documents back
to us by no later than Wednesday, 24 February 2010 to enable the NHLS
to apply for further health assistance
on your behalf. Please find
attached the application forms to be completed by yourself.
Yours sincerely
JAMES ABRAHAM
HR Manager
Coastal’
[12]
It is common cause that Ms Yona completed the application forms for
temporary disability and submitted them to the appellant
for
consideration. However, on 19 April 2010, Mr Abraham addressed
another letter to Ms Yona, in which Mr Abraham,
inter alia
,
advised as follows:
‘
Also,
may I take this opportunity to inform you that your application for
temporary incapacity/disability was not approved by our
insurers
(Alexander Forbes). Therefore, ‘extended sick leave’ is
not an option as we have no record of you applying
for an extension
of sick leave apart from the information submitted in your
application for ‘temporary disability’
and the decision
to process your absence as ‘unpaid leave’ remains in
force.’
[13]
Ms Yona’s final sick note issued by Dr Taylor (with the same
diagnosis of “
severe depression and generalised anxiety
disorder
”) booked her off-sick for the period 28 May 2010
to 2 July 2010. The sick leave was again processed as leave without
pay.
During May 2010, Ms Yona realised that her nett salary for that
month was, due to deductions for leave without pay, came to about
R1000,00. She found this situation unbearable. Consequently, on 1
June 2010, whilst on sick leave she tendered her resignation
in
order, according to her, to be able to access her funds from the
provident fund. In her letter of resignation, she stated,
inter
alia
, the following:
‘
Following
the treatment I have endured during my illness I hereby tender my
resignation as the PE Complex Lab Manager. This is an
official
month’s notice. This will give me time to peacefully
recuperate. My last day as the employee of the NHLS will be
30
th
June 2010.’
[14]
Ms Yona was very unhappy with the situation that she found herself
in. She believed that she was treated unfairly by the appellant.
On
28 July 2010, she referred her constructive dismissal dispute to the
CCMA for conciliation. The dispute remained unresolved
and, on 26
August 2010, the CCMA issued a certificate to that effect. The matter
proceeded to arbitration before the commissioner.
The arbitration
proceedings
[15]
At the arbitration hearing, Ms Yona gave evidence; after which, Mr
Lucwaba and Mr Abraham testified on behalf of the appellant.
[16]
At the conclusion of the arbitration hearing, the commissioner stated
as follows:
‘
An
employer may not act in a manner which causes the employment
relationship to become intolerable. In this case, the respondent,
through the actions of Abraham had caused that (sic) the employment
relationship between the applicant and itself to become intolerable.
This was done through a combination of arrogant and ‘don’t
give a damn’ attitude towards the applicant and a
deliberate
failure in his duty to uphold the respondent’s employment
policies. I say this for the reasons that follow hereunder:
In his letter dated
17 February 2010, Abraham states that the applicant had failed to
communicate with the respondent as to her
absence and the reasons for
her absence and that her absence should be treated as AWOL. Abraham
initially maintained this statement.
During cross-examination, he
conceded that at the time of the letter, he was aware that the
applicant had sent in her sick certificate
informing the respondent
that she had been booked off ill. In my view, he could not give an
explanation why, if he knew of the
medical certificate, he would
still write something that is false!
Abraham, in his
letter dated 19 April 2010, continues with making false statements.
He writes that as per his letter dated 17 February
2010, the
applicant has maintained a lack of communication regarding her
absence. Yet, he knew full well that the applicant has
been medically
booked off and despite the fact that she had applied for temporary
disability in the interim.
In his letter dated
17 February 2010, Abraham only mentions to the applicant that she
could apply for temporary disability cover.
He fails to mention and
highlight the respondent’s policy on extended sick leave and
that she could apply for it. When questioned
about this, he stated
that he had not done this as he believed that by paying the applicant
for the sick leave [it] would be fruitless
expenditure. According to
him, it was his duty to keep the respondent within its budgetary
confines.’
[17]
The commissioner issued his award on 21 December 2010, in terms of
which he found that the conduct of the appellant toward
Ms Yona was
such that it rendered her continued employment intolerable and that,
therefore, her resignation constituted a dismissal
as envisaged in
section 186(1)(e) of the LRA, which was unfair. The commissioner
awarded Ms Yona with compensation in the amount
equivalent to three
months’ salary which she earned at the time of her constructive
dismissal, namely R102 000 (i.e. R34
000 x 3). The appellant was
ordered to pay this amount not later than 14 January 2011.
[18]
The appellant was not satisfied with the outcome of the arbitration
proceedings. Hence the appellant took the matter up on
review, in
terms of section 145 of the LRA, with the Labour Court.
Proceedings
in the Labour Court
[19]
The appellant’s grounds of review can be summarised as follows:
1.
The commissioner failed to take into
account,
inter alia
,
that Ms Yona was a senior managerial employee and that by reason of
her ability, experience, insight and knowledge, she was able
to judge
for herself and take the necessary steps without the assistance and
intervention of Mr Abraham.
2.
The commissioner lost complete sight of the
real issue before him in that the commissioner attributed the anxiety
and depression
suffered by Ms Yona to the conduct of Mr Abraham. The
appellant submitted that the conduct of Mr Abraham was appropriate,
reasonable
and sensible in the circumstances. The commissioner’s
criticism of Mr Abraham was, therefore, unduly harsh.
3.
The commissioner misconstrued the
appellant’s sick leave policy as allowing for an automatic six
months’ paid sick leave,
subject to approval by a committee or
a panel of individuals whereas the true position was that the
extended sick leave application
was subject to the approval of the
appellant’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO).
[20] In conclusion,
the Court
a quo
stated,
inter alia
, as follows:
‘
A
reading of the record and the award proves that the commissioner
expressed in very strong language, the unacceptable way in which
Abraham, as a human resource manager, failed to assist the first
respondent when her health condition called for his assistance…The
commissioner’s decision is consistent with the definition of
constructive dismissal as interpreted by our courts…Viewed
through the constitutional standard the applicant acted unfairly in
making the applicant’s and the first respondent’s
employment relationship intolerable. Abraham’s failure to
assist the first respondent when, by virtue of his position he
could,
at a time she was ill and heading for not having a salary, destroyed
the relationship of confidence and trust between the
applicant and
the first respondent…It violated her right to fair treatment
at [the] workplace…[S]he was forced to
resign to access money
in her provident fund.’
[21]
Accordingly, the Court
a quo
found that the commissioner’s
decision fell within the bounds of reasonableness and the Court had
no basis to interfere with
it. As a result, the Court dismissed the
review application with costs.
The appeal
[22]
In its grounds of appeal, the appellant submitted that the Court
a
quo
erred in a number of respects, including the following:
1.
In failing completely to take into account and/or ignoring the fact
that Ms Yona herself testified that she was a senior managerial
employee who had knowledge of the appellant’s extended sick
leave policy and that she should have made an application for
such
benefits without the assistance and intervention of Mr Abraham.
2.
In failing to find that the commissioner was wrong in his
interpretation of the appellant’s extended sick leave policy
in
that,
inter alia
, it was not a committee that decided on the
extended sick leave but the appellant’s CEO.
3.
In failing to find that the sole cause of Ms Yona’s anxiety and
depression was the fact that, other than herself, she did
not want
anyone else to act in the position of business manager.
4.
In failing to take into account that, at the arbitration hearing,
“
the appellant was represented by a lay representative who
required the assistance of the commissioner from the outset in
respect
of clearly outlining the terms and conditions of the
appellant’s extended sick leave policy as was apparent from Mr
Abraham’s
evidence in chief as compared with his (Mr Abraham’s)
re-examination whereas the commissioner had provided such assistance
to [Ms Yona] who was legally represented. The failure to do so
resulted in the commissioner unreasonably and unjustifiably
criticising
Mr Abraham.”
[23]
Mr
Ram
, appearing for the appellant, submitted that Ms Yona
was in fact advised to apply for extended sick leave, which she did
not do.
At any rate, counsel submitted, it appeared that even if she
had applied for extended sick leave, the appellant’s insurer
(Alexander Forbes) would have refused the application, given the fact
that her application for temporary disability was also refused.
It
was further clear from the doctor’s report that the cause of Ms
Yona’s depression was simply because she was not
appointed to
act as business manager.
[24]
Mr
Le Roux
, appearing for Ms Yona, submitted that there could
be little doubt that, considered objectively, Ms Yona had good cause
to be aggrieved
about the acting appointment of her subordinate, Mr
Gamieldin, without prior consultation with her and without an
indication why
her subordinate was appointed ahead of her.
[25]
Counsel further submitted that matters worsened considerably for Ms
Yona when Mr Abraham openly announced the outcome of the
applications
for the position of Business Manager in the manner that Mr Abraham
did, which was bound to humiliate Ms Yona even
further. It was
submitted that Ms Yona also wanted to understand what, if anything,
was lacking on her part in terms of the skills
and attributes that
would have qualified her to act in the position of business manager.
[26]
It was further submitted that the appellant never directed Ms Yona’s
attention to the possibility of applying for extended
sick leave.
Instead, Mr Abraham, in his letter dated 17 February 2010 only
advised Ms Yona about applying for temporary disability
and in the
second letter of 19 April 2010, he only informed her that “
extended
sick leave”
was “
not an option”
for her.
Evaluation
[27]
To pass muster of judicial review for reasonableness under section
145 of the LRA, an arbitration award must be one falling
within the
range of decisions which a reasonable decision-maker could have made,
given the material presented to the commissioner.
[3]
This review test was restated and amplified by the Supreme Court of
Appeal in the recent decision of
Herholdt
v Nedbank (Cosatu as amicus curiae),
[4]
in which the SCA held as follows:
‘
While
the evidence must necessarily be scrutinised to determine whether the
outcome was reasonable, the reviewing court must always
be alert to
remind itself that it must avoid “judicial overzealousness”
in setting aside administrative decisions that
do not coincide with
the judge’s own opinions. ...A result will only be unreasonable
if it is one that a reasonable arbitrator
could not reach on all the
material that was before the arbitrator. Material errors
of fact as well as the weight and
relevance to be attached to
particular facts, are not in and of themselves sufficient for an
award to be set aside, but are only
of any consequence if their
effect is to render the outcome unreasonable.’
[5]
[Footnote omitted]
[28]
Section 186(1)(e) of the LRA provides that a (constructive) dismissal
occurs when “
an
employee terminated a contract of employment with or without notice
because the employer made continued employment intolerable
for the
employee.”
On constructive dismissal, this Court, in
Jooste
v Transnet Ltd t/a SA Airways
[6]
stated the following:
‘
In
considering what conduct on the part of the employer constitutes
constructive dismissal, it needs to be emphasised that a
“constructive
dismissal” is merely one form of dismissal.
In a conventional dismissal, it is the employer who puts an end to
the contract
of employment by dismissing the employee. In a
constructive dismissal it is the employee who terminates the
employment relationship
by resigning due to the conduct of the
employer. As Lord Denning said
in
Woods v WM Car Services (Peterborough)
[1982] IRLR 413
(CA) at 415 “The circumstances (of constructive
dismissal) are so infinitely various that there can be, and is, no
rule of
law saying what circumstances justify and what do not. It is
a question of fact for the tribunal of fact…’
[7]
[29]
In
Murray
v Minister of Defence,
[8]
the Supreme Court of Appeal said:
‘
That
substance, as was pointed before the 1995 LRA, is that the law and
the constitution impose ‘a continuing obligation of
fairness
towards the employee on … the employer when he makes the
decisions affecting the employee in his work’.
The
obligation has both a formal procedural and substantive dimension; it
is now encapsulated in the constitutional right to fair
treatment in
the workplace.
…
These
cases established that the onus rest on the employee to prove that
the resignation constitutes a constructive dismissal: in
other word,
the
employee must prove that resignation was not voluntary, and that it
was not intended to terminate the employment relationship
.
Once this is established, the enquiry is whether the employer
(
irrespective
of any intention to repudiate the contract of employment
)
had without reasonable and proper cause conducted itself in a manner
calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship
of confidence and trust with the employee.
Looking
at the employer’s conduct as a whole and its cumulative impact,
the courts have asked in such cases whether its effect,
judged
reasonably and sensibly,
was
such that the employee could not be expected to keep up with it
.’
[9]
[Footnote
omitted]
(Emphasis added)
[30]
In other words, a constructive dismissal occurs when an employee
resigns from employment under circumstances where he or she
would not
have resigned but for the unfair conduct on the part of the employer
toward the employee, which rendered continued employment
intolerable
for the employee. Ms Yona terminated her employment relationship with
the appellant, by resigning with a month’s
notice. She alleged
that the resignation constituted a constructive dismissal in terms of
section 186(1)(e) of the LRA. The appellant
denied that Ms Yona was
dismissed at all. Ms Yona bore the
onus
to prove her alleged
constructive dismissal. The test for proving a constructive dismissal
is an objective one. The conduct of
the employer toward the employee
and the cumulative impact thereof must be such that, viewed
objectively, the employee could not
reasonably be expected to cope
with. Resignation must have been a reasonable step for the employee
to take in the circumstances.
[31]
Mr
Ram
’s submission that Ms Yona was advised to apply
for extended sick leave was not borne out by the evidence presented
to the
commissioner. Nor was it supported by the objective evidence
in the appellant’s letters to Ms Yona dated 17 February and 19
April 2010, in which Mr Abraham, respectively, asked Ms Yona to apply
only for temporary disability and informed her that “
extended
sick leave [was] not an option.”
There is, accordingly, no
basis for this submission.
[32]
Mr
Ram
further submitted that it was clear from the facts of
this case that the cause of Ms Yona’s anxiety and depression
was that
she was not appointed to act as Business Manager when Mr
Lucwaba was promoted. He pointed out that this fact was also
confirmed
by Dr Taylor, the specialist psychiatrist, in his report
dated 8 March 2010 in which he,
inter alia
, recorded the
following:
‘
Her
illness arises solely from work. Above her was the business manager.
He got a senior position and was transferred but before
he left, he
appointed one of Ms Yona’s junior above her head to be business
manager. This was a tremendous shock and she
feels she is being
victimised. She lodged a grievance and the business manager was told
to apologise which he did not.
Ms Yona applied for
the post but was told in a meeting that someone else was appointed.
She lodged a grievance but this was ignored
and then Ms Yona went to
the CCMA.’
[33]
Of course, it was not in dispute that the origin of Ms Yona’s
medical problem had its genesis from the time that her
junior and
subordinate, Mr Gamieldin, was appointed ahead of her to act as
business manager, after the then business manager, Mr
Lucwaba, was
promoted to the position of Executive Manager for the coastal region.
In my view, the appellant was within its right,
as the employer, to
appoint anyone from its staff to act in the position of Business
Manager for the time being, pending the appointment
of the permanent
incumbent in the post. The fact that Ms Yona had previously always
acted in that position whenever Mr Lucwaba
was temporarily not
available, did not accord her with any vested right to lay claim on
the acting appointment as Business Manager
or promotion to that
position. Hence, this part of her complaint – the unfair labour
practice claim – was correctly
dismissed by the commissioner.
[34]
However, the issue at hand was in relation to Ms Yona’s alleged
constructive dismissal claim and not about her unfair
labour practice
complaint concerning her non-promotion to the position of Business
Manager and/or her non-appointment as acting
business manager. It is
clear that while her medical condition may have originated from Mr
Gamieldin’s appointment as acting
business manager, this was
not the direct cause of her resignation. Mr Gamieldin was appointed
to act as Business Manager in or
about May 2009. Ms Yona did not
resign immediately or shortly thereafter. She resigned over a year
later. I am inclined to accept,
on the facts, that her resignation
was a direct sequel to her not receiving the benefits of extended
sick leave, which she was
entitled to, or at least to apply for. She
was unfairly denied the opportunity to apply for this benefit by the
irresponsible conduct
on the part of Mr Abraham who, wittingly or
unwittingly, failed to explain to her in the letter of 17 February
2010 that she was
entitled to apply for extended sick leave as well.
[35]
The appellant’s argument that Ms Yona, as senior managerial
employee, had knowledge of the appellant’s sick leave
policy
and that she should have made an application for extended sick leave
benefits without the assistance and intervention of
Mr Abraham is not
sustainable. In my view, the argument completely and seemingly
deliberately overlooks the fact that, at the time,
Ms Yona was sick,
suffering from a serious mental illness, described as “
severe
depression and generalised anxiety disorder.
” She was in
dire need for assistance. At any rate, it begs the question why Mr
Abraham decided selectively to explain to
Ms Yona (in his letter of
17 February 2010) only about applying for temporary disability, if
she knew everything about the appellant’s
sick leave policy.
[36]
The appellant’s so-called “sick leave policy” is
contained in a document titled “Human Resources Standard
Operating Procedure” (the sick leave policy), which, to the
extent relevant to this matter, provides as follows:
‘
1.
PURPOSE
Employees who
exhausted their sick leave credits in a 3 year cycle and who
according to the relevant medical practitioner, requires
to be absent
due to disability, may be granted additional sick leave with full pay
in the event of serious illness. Measures will
be taken to ensure
that it is not abused.
2.
MANDATE
Employees
whose degree of disability has been certified by a registered and
competent medical practitioner, as temporary or permanent
shall, with
the approval of the CEO [or duly authorised designate] be granted
additional sick leave.’
[10]
[37]
In his letter of 19 April 2010, Mr Abraham tended to suggest that Ms
Yona was supposed to have made two separate applications
– one
for extended sick leave and the other for temporary disability.
Indeed, in his evidence too, he suggested the same
thing. This is
what he said:
‘
Okay
well, it’s more complicated than what I have been speaking
about here now … Our sick leave is underwritten by
our
insurers. So what happens with a temporary disability application and
extension of [leave], will go hand in hand, is the company
doesn’t
give the extension. …
[i]f
we don’t have the application for the extension first
,
then we can’t just go to the insurers and say well we have
decided to do something now here is an application for temporary
disability.
So the problem with
Mandisa’s application is she missed the first application
and it became very difficult to get everything else, all the ducks in
a row, to be able to coincide the temporary disability application
which was now before the extension for sick leave application.’
(Emphasis added)
[38]
Indeed, in the appellant’s heads of argument, counsel
reiterated that “
the
extended sick leave policy was applicable in situations where an ill
employee was awaiting the outcome of her/his application
for
temporary disability”.
[11]
In
other words, it was the appellant’s case that there had to be
two applications submitted by Ms Yona, the first application
being
for extended sick leave, and, the second being for temporary
disability. According to Mr Abraham, as referred to above, Ms
Yona
“
missed
the first application”
hence
it became “
very
difficult”
to assist her any further. I am unable to find any provision in the
sick leave policy in support of this testimony.
[39]
In my view, the ordinary reading of the sick leave policy makes it
clear that there was no real differentiation between an
application
for temporary disability and the one for extended sick leave. This
was all done in one application. The document simply
stipulates that
an employee who has exhausted his or her sick leave credits in a
three year cycle, but who requires to be absent
due to a medically
certified disability (permanent or temporary), may be granted
additional or extended sick leave with full pay,
subject to the
approval by the appellant’s CEO or duly authorised designate.
In my view, the policy does not envisage two
applications to be
submitted separately – first, one for temporary disability and
later, the second one for extended sick
leave, or vice versa. It
should ideally all be done in a joint application. Ms Yona ought to
have been advised accordingly by Mr
Abraham in his letter of 17
February 2010.
[40]
It was further submitted on behalf of the appellant that there would
have been no point, in any event, in asking Ms Yona to
apply for
extended sick leave, given the fact that her application for
temporary disability was refused by the appellant’s
insurer.
Indeed, in his letter of 19 April 2010, Mr Abraham informed Ms Yona
that “
your application for temporary incapacity/disability
was not approved by insurers (Alexander Forbes)”.
I am
perplexed by this statement, given the fact that there is nothing in
the sick leave policy which purports to confer power on
the
appellant’s insurers to approve the temporary incapacity leave.
Of course, the insurers may have been responsible for
paying out the
sick leave benefit, but the approval thereof remained the
responsibility of the appellant’s CEO or duly authorised
designate. In any event, counsel’s submission in this regard
was purely speculative because, as I have already alluded to,
the
sick leave policy envisaged a joint application, embracing both
components of extended sick leave and temporary disability.
Therefore, in that scenario, I do not visualise on what basis the
refusal of one component of the application could have possibly
been
predicted.
[41]
In my view, the appellant, through its HR Manager Mr Abraham, failed
dismally to accord fair and compassionate treatment to
Ms Yona at the
time of desperate need - when she was suffering from a severe
work-related mental illness and impecuniosity resultant
from her
denial by Mr Abraham of extended sick leave benefits. As if that was
not enough, Mr Abraham, in his letters of 17 February
and 19 April
2010 accused Ms Yona of failing to contact or communicate with the
appellant, which was factually incorrect because
the entire duration
of her absence was covered by valid sick notes which were all
submitted timeously to the appellant’s
HR department.
[42]
Again, during his evidence, Mr Abraham finally revealed, seemingly
unconsciously, that the reason Ms Yona was not asked to
apply for
extended sick leave was because granting her the extended sick leave
would have entailed what he described as “
fruitless
expenditure”
on the part of the appellant. As to how payment of legitimate
extended sick leave under the present circumstances would have
amounted
to fruitless expenditure, remains mystery to me. The NHLS
Act gives a clear mandate that “
all
expenditure incurred by the Service under this Act must be defrayed
from the funds of the Service”.
[12]
It seems to me that this was just the manifestation of the extent of
lack of care and compassion on the part of Mr Abraham toward
Ms Yona
at the time. It is common cause that this desperate situation
culminated in Ms Yona being paid a paltry R1000.00 or so,
as her nett
salary for the month of May 2010, occasioned by “leave without
pay” deductions. I am venturing to imagine
that the extent that
Ms Yona was mistreated at the hands of Mr Abraham, was such that she
was “subjected to a psychological
and traumatic degradation of
her human dignity”,
particularly
given
the
fact that she held a senior managerial position and, therefore,
presumably well respected amongst the staff, generally –
let
alone those under her - in the work place.
[13]
[43]
One of the appellant’s grounds of appeal was that the
commissioner failed to assist the appellant’s lay
representative
during the arbitration proceedings. Being an organ of
state, I find it rather shocking and shameful that the appellant
chose to
be represented by a lay person. Anyway, that was its
preference and, therefore, it was not expected of the appellant to
moan about
the performance of its chosen representative. I think it
was prudent of counsel for the appellant not to pursue such flimsy,
pathetic
and petulant complaint.
[44]
I am inclined to conclude, on the facts and circumstances of this
case, that Ms Yona’s resignation was neither voluntary
nor
intended to terminate her employment relationship with the
appellant.
[14]
Instead, her
resignation was clearly inspired by the unfair conduct on the part of
the appellant (through Mr Abraham) toward her.
Whether by his conduct
Mr Abraham intended to repudiate the appellant’s employment
contract with Ms Yona, it is immaterial.
[15]
Suffice to hold that the appellant’s unfair conduct toward Ms
Yona rendered her continued employment with the appellant
intolerable.
[45]
To my mind, therefore, the commissioner’s award
fell
within the range of decisions which a reasonable decision-maker could
have made, given the material presented to the commissioner.
That
being so the appeal falls to be dismissed. In accordance with the
requirements of the law and fairness, costs should follow
the event.
[46] In the result,
the following order is made:
The
appeal is dismissed with costs.
Ndlovu
JA
Waglay
JP and Landman JA concur in the judgment of Ndlovu JA
APPEARANCES:
FOR THE
APPELLANT: Mr R Ram
Instructed
by Shepstone Wylie Attorneys
FOR
THE FIRST RESPONDENT: Mr F le Roux c/o Francois le Roux Attorneys
[1]
Act
37 of 2000.
[2]
Act
66 of 1995.
[3]
Sidumo
and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others
2008 (2) SA 24
(CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC) at para 110.
[4]
2013
(6) SA 224 (SCA).
[5]
At paras 13 and 25.
[6]
[1995]
5 BLLR 1
(LAC).
[7]
At 9 E-F.
[8]
(
2008)
29 ILJ 1369 (SCA).
[9]
At
paras 11 and 12.
See
also:
Pretoria
Society for the Care of the Retarded v Loots
[1997] 6 BLLR 721
(LAC) at 725A-C;
Metropolitan
Health Risk Management v Majatladi & others
[2015] 3 BLLR 276
; (2015) 36 ILJ 958 (LAC) at para 21.
[10]
Clauses
1 and 2 of the sick leave policy.
[11]
Appellant’s
heads of argument, para 39.
[12]
Section
19 of the NHLS Act.
[13]
Compare:
Dunwell
Property Services CC v Sibande and Others
(2011) 32 ILJ 2652 (LAC);
[2012] 2 BLLR 131
(LAC) at para 39.
[14]
Murray
v Minister of Defence
,
above.
[15]
Murray
v Minister of Defence
,
above.