Department of Finance And Economic Development (The Province of Gauteng) v Mosome and Others (JA1/2013) [2014] ZALAC 46 (19 September 2014)

80 Reportability

Brief Summary

Labour Law — Unfair dismissal — Insufficient evidence for reinstatement — Employee dismissed for insubordination; first arbitrator found dismissal unfair but awarded compensation instead of reinstatement. The Labour Court set aside the second arbitrator's award, reinstating the employee and ordering compensation. The appeal court held that the employment relationship had irretrievably broken down, making reinstatement impracticable. The appeal was upheld, and the Labour Court's judgment was set aside.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The proceedings were an appeal to the Labour Appeal Court against a judgment and order of the Labour Court (Molahlehi J). The appeal concerned the Labour Court’s decision to review and set aside an arbitration award (the “second arbitrator’s” award), and to substitute it with an order reinstating the employee and granting additional relief.


The parties were the Department of Finance and Economic Development (Province of Gauteng) as the appellant (employer), and Truly Mosome as the first respondent (employee). The General Public Service Sectoral Bargaining Council (GPSSBC) was cited as the second respondent, being the bargaining council under whose auspices the arbitration occurred. The commissioner who issued the second arbitration award, Zarina Walele, was cited as the third respondent.


The procedural history was central to the appeal. Following the employee’s dismissal for insubordination, a first arbitration resulted in a finding that dismissal was substantively unfair and an award of compensation rather than reinstatement. On review, Cele J set aside the first arbitration award only as to the relief and remitted the matter for a further hearing to adduce evidence on whether the appropriate remedy under section 193(2) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 should be reinstatement or compensation. A second arbitration followed, in which the second arbitrator again declined reinstatement on the basis that the employment relationship had irretrievably broken down, and awarded compensation.


The employee then brought a review application against the second arbitration award. The Labour Court set aside the second award and ordered reinstatement, together with a warning to be recorded on the employee’s employment record, and compensation equivalent to seven months’ salary. The employer appealed to the Labour Appeal Court.


The general subject-matter of the dispute, as ultimately framed on appeal, was whether the second arbitrator’s remedy determination under section 193(2)—specifically the conclusion that reinstatement was not competent because continued employment would be intolerable due to an irretrievable breakdown—was reviewable, and whether the Labour Court had correctly understood the scope and effect of the prior remittal order.


2. Material Facts


The employee was employed by the appellant as an advisor responsible for educational projects. Her immediate supervisor was Ms Kekana. The court treated it as apparent from the correspondence that the working relationship between the employee and Ms Kekana was strained rather than cordial.


On 8 July 2004, Ms Kekana addressed a letter to the employee criticising aspects of performance and conduct. The supervisor alleged, among other things, lack of initiative, lack of cooperation, negative criticism without proactive input, unexplained absence from the office, and failure to attend a scheduled meeting, and she called the employee to a meeting to discuss a planned project.


On the same date, the employee responded with a letter whose salient features were quoted in the judgment. The letter contained language and statements the employer regarded as disrespectful and insulting, including content that questioned the supervisor’s competence and suitability for her position, and refused to attend the scheduled meeting.


A disciplinary enquiry followed. The employee faced multiple charges including insubordination, framed (in substance) as gross insubordinate behaviour toward her supervisor through unacceptable and disrespectful language, including remarks implying the supervisor was “stupid” and did not deserve her post. The employee was found guilty of three charges (including insubordination) and was dismissed.


The dismissal dispute proceeded to arbitration under the GPSSBC. In the first arbitration award (dated 9 June 2009 as recorded in the judgment), the commissioner found the employee guilty of insubordination but concluded that dismissal was substantively unfair, and ordered seven months’ compensation rather than reinstatement, citing an irretrievable breakdown and no prospect of reconciliation.


The employee took that award on review. On 24 July 2008, Cele J set aside the first arbitration award only in respect of the relief granted, and remitted the matter to the bargaining council for further evidence on whether the employee should be reinstated or compensated under section 193(2). Cele J also ordered the employee to refund the compensation amount previously paid.


On remittal, a second arbitration was held before a different commissioner (the third respondent). Evidence was led (at least) from Ms Kekana, the departmental head Fati Manamela, and the employee. The second arbitrator concluded that the employment relationship had irretrievably broken down and that reinstatement was not competent, with compensation being the appropriate remedy.


The employee again sought review. The Labour Court set aside the second arbitration award and ordered reinstatement, a warning to be recorded, and seven months’ compensation. The employer appealed.


Where the court distinguished disputes of fact, it treated the arbitration as having presented two mutually exclusive versions regarding whether the employment relationship had irretrievably broken down. The second arbitrator accepted the employer’s version as more probable on the evidence led before her, including evidence that the breakdown extended beyond the employee’s relationship with Ms Kekana to include the relationship with the departmental head.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were concerned with the application of law to fact and the reviewability of an arbitrator’s remedial discretion, rather than a pure question of law alone.


The principal issues the Labour Appeal Court was required to determine were whether the Labour Court:


maintained a correct understanding of Cele J’s review-and-remittal order, particularly whether it meant the second arbitrator was effectively obliged to order reinstatement because substantive unfairness had already been determined; and


correctly concluded that the second arbitrator misdirected herself in determining that reinstatement was excluded by section 193(2)(b) on the basis that continued employment would be intolerable due to an irretrievable breakdown of the employment relationship.


A further issue was whether, on the record and reasoning reflected in the second arbitration award, the second arbitrator’s conclusion and remedy determination was one a reasonable arbitrator could reach, given that section 193(2) makes reinstatement the primary remedy unless one of the statutory exceptions applies.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court’s reasoning was anchored in the structure of section 193(2) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, which obliges the Labour Court or an arbitrator to order reinstatement or re-employment unless one of the listed exceptions exists. The exception most directly implicated was section 193(2)(b), which applies where the circumstances surrounding the dismissal are such that a continued employment relationship would be intolerable. The court also treated the remittal order and the scope of the second arbitration as determinative of the enquiry.


A major aspect of the reasoning was the interpretation of Cele J’s prior review order. The Labour Appeal Court rejected the Labour Court’s understanding that Cele J’s remittal meant the second arbitrator was obliged to order reinstatement. It characterised Cele J’s order as having set aside the first award only to the extent of the remedy, because Cele J was not satisfied that the evidence before the first arbitrator was sufficiently cogent to justify a non-reinstatement remedy under section 193(2). On this approach, the remittal was not a directive favouring reinstatement, but a direction to hold a fresh hearing (described as de novo in the judgment) for the reception of further evidence so that the arbitrator could properly exercise the remedial discretion under section 193(2).


In support of this, the court noted that evidence led in the first arbitration (including evidence from a witness who testified in the first arbitration but not in the second) was not treated as part of what the second arbitrator relied upon in making her remedy determination. This, in the court’s view, reinforced that the remittal contemplated a new evidentiary hearing directed at the appropriate remedy, rather than a narrow exercise constrained by the first arbitration’s factual findings.


Turning to the second arbitration award itself, the court held that the second arbitrator understood and appreciated the mandate given by the remittal, namely that the sole question before her was whether the employee should be reinstated or compensated under section 193(2). The court also accepted that the second arbitrator identified the relevant statutory exception, particularly section 193(2)(b), and approached the matter on the basis that she had to decide between two mutually exclusive versions by assessing which was more probable.


The Labour Appeal Court further found that the second arbitrator properly considered the correspondence between the supervisor and the employee, including the employee’s response letter, and characterised the employee’s letter as derogatory, insulting, contemptuous, and disrespectful. It emphasised that the content of the letter struck at the supervisor’s competence and legitimacy in her position, and that this kind of attack was relevant to whether the employment relationship could continue.


A key evaluative judgment endorsed by the court was that the second arbitrator was entitled, on the totality of the evidence, to conclude that the employment relationship was not only damaged between the employee and Ms Kekana, but also between the employee and the departmental head (Ms Manamela). The court treated this as important because the employee’s argument that Ms Kekana had since left employment did not, on the evidence accepted by the arbitrator, resolve the broader breakdown with the employer’s management structures.


The court also rejected the contention that the misconduct’s seriousness depended on wider publication. It accepted that the employee’s letter had been copied to the departmental head, and in any event considered that publication was not a prerequisite for finding that the conduct was serious and destructive of trust.


In discussing the assessment of remedy and the broader fairness enquiry, the court referred to the proposition (described as trite in the judgment) that the arbitrator must consider the totality of circumstances, including the seriousness of the misconduct, when determining sanction and remedy. In that context, it quoted a passage from Motsamai v Everite Building Products to the effect that the arbitrator must decide the appropriate sanction with regard to the evidence, the employer’s code, and the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, and that the decision must be reasonable in all the circumstances.


On the review standard implicit in the court’s approach, the Labour Appeal Court concluded that the second arbitrator’s decision not to reinstate was a decision a reasonable arbitrator could reach. It found no basis to conclude that the second arbitrator committed a reviewable irregularity in preferring compensation over reinstatement under section 193(2) on the evidence she accepted.


Finally, because the court considered the Labour Court to have misconstrued the first review judgment and to have erred in setting aside the second arbitrator’s award, it held that the appeal should succeed and the Labour Court’s substituted reinstatement order could not stand.


5. Outcome and Relief


The Labour Appeal Court upheld the appeal.


It set aside the Labour Court’s order and replaced it with an order that the appellant must compensate the first respondent in an amount equivalent to seven months’ salary, quantified in the order as R104 423.00.


The court made no order as to costs.


Cases Cited


Motsamai v Everite Building Products (full citation not provided in the judgment text).


Legislation Cited


Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, section 193(1).


Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, section 193(2), including section 193(2)(b).


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment text.


Held


The Labour Appeal Court held that the Labour Court erred in its interpretation of the earlier remittal order (Cele J’s judgment) and in setting aside the second arbitrator’s award. The remittal was for a fresh determination, on further evidence, of the appropriate remedy under section 193(2) and did not oblige the second arbitrator to order reinstatement.


It further held that the second arbitrator properly exercised the remedial discretion under section 193(2) and reasonably concluded, on the evidence before her, that the employment relationship had irretrievably broken down and that continued employment would be intolerable within the meaning of section 193(2)(b). As a result, reinstatement was not competent and an award of compensation was justified.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Section 193(2) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 establishes reinstatement or re-employment as the primary remedy for unfair dismissal, subject to specified statutory exceptions, including where continued employment would be intolerable (section 193(2)(b)) or where reinstatement is not reasonably practicable (section 193(2)(c)).


Where an earlier review order sets aside an arbitration award only as to remedy and remits the dispute for further evidence on remedy, the subsequent arbitrator’s mandate is to determine the appropriate remedy under section 193(2) on the evidence led on remittal. Such a remittal does not, merely because a prior award found dismissal unfair, necessarily compel reinstatement if the statutory exceptions in section 193(2) are established on the evidence.


An arbitrator determining remedy under section 193(2) must evaluate the evidence and decide, on the probabilities, whether the circumstances demonstrate an irretrievable breakdown and resultant intolerance of continued employment. Where the arbitrator applies the correct statutory framework and reaches a conclusion supported by an evaluative assessment of the evidence, the remedy determination will not be set aside on review merely because another decision could have been preferred; the question is whether the conclusion is one a reasonable arbitrator could reach on the material before them.


In assessing the appropriateness of dismissal and related remedial consequences, the seriousness of misconduct such as insubordination may be treated as materially relevant to whether the employment relationship can continue, because conduct striking at the core of authority and trust in the workplace may support a finding that reinstatement is inappropriate under section 193(2)(b).

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[2014] ZALAC 46
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Department of Finance And Economic Development (The Province of Gauteng) v Mosome and Others (JA1/2013) [2014] ZALAC 46 (19 September 2014)

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
THE LABOUR APPEAL
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Case no: JA1/2013
In the matter between:
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
(THE PROVINCE OF
GAUTENG)

Appellant
and
TRULY
MOSOME

First Respondent
GENERAL PUBLIC SERVICE
SECTORAL
BARGANING COUNCIL
(GPSSBC)

Second Respondent
ZARINA
WALELE

Third Respondent
Heard:

17 September 2013
Delivered:
19 September 2014
Summary: Section
193(2) of the LRA, Employee dismissed for insubordination. First
arbitrator finding employee unfairly dismissed
but order
compensation. Review of arbitration award. Court a quo setting aside
arbitration award and remitting to bargaining council
for further
evidence to be adduced on whether to reinstate or compensate
employee. Second arbitrator finding employment relationship
had
irretrievably broken down and confirming compensation – Review
of second arbitration awards. Court a quo setting aside
award and
reinstating employee. Appeal court a quo misconstruing first review
judgment – First reviewing court setting aside
award only for
determination of the appropriate remedy. – Evidence showing
employment relationship irretrievably broken down.
Reinstatement
reasonably impracticable. Arbitrator his mind to the evidence –
Appeal upheld – court a quo’s judgment
set aside.
Coram: Tlaletsi DJP,
Musi and Mokgoatlheng AJJA
JUDGMENT
MOKGOATLHENG AJA
[1] This is an appeal
against the judgment and order of the Labour Court (Molahlehi J) in
terms whereof it reviewed and set aside
the third respondent’s
(the second arbitrator’s) award made on 7 May 2009 wherein she
held that the reinstatement of
the first respondent pursuant to
Section
193(2) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (The
Act) was incompetent because the employment relationship between the
appellant
and the first respondent had irretrievably broken and was
rendered intolerable as envisaged in Section 193(2)(b). The
court-a-quo
reinstated the first respondent, ordered that a
warning be annotated in her employment record, and awarded her seven
months compensation
in the amount of R101, 423.00.
[2] The
court-a-quo
in
setting aside the second arbitrator’s award found that the
second arbitrator had misdirected herself because she had failed
to
take into account:
(i)
the first arbitrator’s finding that the first respondent’s
dismissal
was unfair;
(ii)
that the first respondent’s letter to her supervisor (Ms
Kekana) was in reaction
to the latter’s letter in which she had
unnecessarily used provocative language in addressing differences she
had with the
first respondent arising from their employment
relationship; and
(iii)
that the first respondent’s letter had to be considered against
the background that
there was an employment relationship conflict
between her and Ms Kekana.
The factual matrix
[3] The first respondent
was employed by the appellant as an advisor responsible for
educational projects. Ms Kekana was her immediate
superior and
supervisor.  It was apparent that the employment relationship
between the first respondent and Ms Kekana was
strained and not
cordial as evidenced by the correspondence exchanged between them.
[4] Ms Kekana in her
letter dated 8 July 2004 accused the first respondent of lacking
initiative in the conduct of her portfolio.
She contended that the
first respondent was uncooperative and guilty of negative criticism
to her initiatives without offering
any proactive input. She accused
the first respondent of being absent from her office for two days
without a valid reason and that
she had failed to attend a scheduled
meeting. She requested the first respondent to attend a meeting on 8
July 2004 at 13.00 hours
in her office to discuss a planned project.
She also invited the first respondent to communicate any suggestions
to her in connection
therewith.
[5] The first
respondent’s response in her letter dated 8 July 2004 to Ms
Kekana’s letter resulted in the appellant
charging her with the
misconduct of insubordination. For the purposes of understanding the
gravity of the insubordination charge,
it is necessary to quote
verbatim the salient features of the said letter:

Letter
from T Mosome to E Kekana DD Consumer Affairs
d/d 08.07.2004
To: Eva Kekana DD
Consumer Affairs
CC: Fati Manamela
Acting CD: Consumer Affairs
From: M.T. Mosome
Subject: Your Letter
Dated 8
th
JULY 2004
It’s true that
we spoke about Women’s Month, but nothing concrete came from
that discussion because it was a by the
way discussion not unless you
took it further with your colleague that you mentioned in your memo.
The Alex issue that
you are trying so hard to defend yourself with on that day we both
agree that we will meet even if I was going
out. In my opinion you do
education projects not because I’m making excuses if I have to
do them, but because your post I
can imagine will be so empty and
will no warrant that level you are in at present.
You are an
administrator responsible for administration of the office checking
whether our equipment and other necessary things
that make an office
effective are in place. If you ask me whether tis post suits this
level I doubt it. Some of my colleagues applied
for that post and
they had the qualifications, experience and the expertise to execute
those duties. You were five this post but
from day one like everybody
I wondered how did you get that post.
Let
me
remind you that before you came
to this department, if you can check with your supervisor projects
were done and I was part and
parcel of those who did them. Stop
lecturing me about my responsibilities and the fact that I have
signed a performance contract
because if I’m not doing what I’m
supposed to do in terms of that contract, you know what to do.
Ever since you came to
this department you have been bugging me about my whereabouts which
I’m surprised as you have important
things to do and not sit
around waiting for me. I’m not a schoolgirl for haves sake and
remember this is not a high school
where the principal will always
want to find out where are the pupils, but a department where adults
employee’s are entrusted
with their work and if they don’t
people like you know what to do.
As for being a
poisonous, critic and destroying the unit I have no comment because I
don’t know to which unit you are referring
to. I’m here
to do my work and not for glory, and if this is what you have
observed since working with me, that is unfortunate
and I’m
wondering what are you going to do about it.
If there is truth in
your statement that I make excuses when projects have to be done go
ahead and do them because you seem to be
the best person who does
that well, I wonder why do you need my inputs. I hope you get
audience this year unlike what happened
last year where you ended up
asking staff to bring a guest because of the money spend to hire
venue when there was no audience.
I won’t be
available for your meeting Tuesday 08 July 2004 at 13:00 I have other
important things to do. Besides doing the
book that you are referring
to in the memo, I’m busy with the project that I’m
involved with the Inspectors. Go ahead
and implement the Women’s
Month project I know you are an expect (jack of all trade) I mean.
I wonder where do you
get so much time to write these stupid letters. Today Truly is
fighting with everybody, tomorrow she does
not tell you her
whereabouts the next day she is poisonous, criticise without
solution, she will divide your unit when is this
nonsense going to
stop because I am sick of it.
Regards
Mosome M.T
2004.07/12
.’
[6] Consequent to the
above quoted letter, a disciplinary enquiry was convened, whereat the
first respondent was among others charged
with the misconduct of
insubordination in: “
dis
pl
aying gross insubordinate
behaviour towards Ms Kekana (her supervisor) by using unacceptable
language that demonstrated disrespect
by saying to her supervisor
that she must be stupid, she must stop calling her at home, (when she
was contacted while she was supposed
to be on duty), also telling her
supervisor does not deserve the post she holds
.”
[7] The third respondent
was found guilty of 3 charges including the offence of
insubordination at the disciplinary enquiry, and
was dismissed. She
referred the dispute to the second respondent for conciliation. On
failure to resolve the dispute, the second
respondent appointed the
first arbitrator to arbitrate the dispute.
[8] On 9 June 2009 the
first arbitrator found the first respondent guilty of insubordination
but found that her dismissal was substantively
unfair. The first
arbitrator also found that the employment relationship between the
appellant and the third respondent had irretrievably
broken down with
no prospects of a reconciliation. As a consequence the first
arbitrator did not order the reinstate merit of the
first respondent,
he instead ordered the appellant to pay her seven months compensation
in the amount of R101, 423.00.
[9] The first respondent
took the first arbitrator’s award on review. On 24 July 2008
Judge Cele set aside the first arbitrator’s
award only in
respect of the relief granted. The Learned Judge remitted the matter
to the second respondent to allow further evidence
to be led
regarding whether the first respondent should be reinstated or not as
envisaged in terms of Section 193(2). Further the
Learned Judge
ordered the first respondent to refund the amount of R101, 423.00 she
received in terms of the first arbitrator’s
award to the second
respondent before 31 August 2008.
[10] Judge Cele’s
order indicates that he was satisfied that the first respondent was
properly found guilty of insubordination
but was not satisfied with
the cogency of the evidence which predicated her non-reinstatement.
The Learned Judge in setting aside
the award only with regard to the
first arbitrator’s relief, shows that he was of the view that
the evidence adduced at the
first arbitration as envisaged in Section
193(2) was insufficient to have enabled the first arbitrator to
properly and judiciously
exercise his discretion as required by
Section 193(2). Consequently, because the Learned Judge elected not
to exercise his discretion
pursuant to Section 193(1), he ordered the
hearing of further evidence by the second respondent regarding this
exigency, the latter
in turn appointed third respondent as the second
arbitrator to hear such evidence pursuant to Section 193(2).
[11] Judge Cele’s
order is predicated on the basis that because the first arbitrator’s
award for compensation is not
rationally justifiable having regard to
the paucity of the evidential material before him, the latter could
not have reasonably
and properly exercised his discretion pursuant to
Section 193(2) in order to judiciously arrive at the decision that
the first
respondent should not be reinstated but should be
compensated.
[12] In my view, Judge
Cele’s order regarding the hearing of further evidence before
the second arbitrator pursuant to Section
193(2) cannot be
interpreted as an order to enable the second arbitrator to hear the
adducement of further evidence which should
obligate the second
arbitrator to order the reinstatement of the first respondent as the
court-a-quo
seems to have found. Judge Cele’s order
decreed that the second respondent should hold a
de novo
hearing for the consideration of evidence to enable the second
arbitrator to have sufficient cogent evidence before her to properly

exercise her discretion as envisaged in Section 193(2).
[13] The conclusion
regarding Judge Cele’s order for a
de novo
hearing is
borne out by the fact that the evidence of Charles Morolo who
testified in the first arbitration, but did not testify
in the second
arbitration, his evidence in the first arbitration was not considered
by the second arbitrator in the exercise of
her discretion pursuant
to
Section 193(2)
in making her award. The second
arbitrator only considered the evidence of Ms Kekana, Fati Manamela
and the first respondent whose
evidence was led at the second
arbitration in making her award.
[14] The first respondent
took the second arbitrator’s award on review. In my view,
having regard to the preceding analysis
the
court-a-quo
erred
in interpreting Judge Cele’s order that he, “
reviewed
the first arbitrator’s award to the extent that it provided for
the remedy for compensation, that in other words,
the award was not
reviewed and set aside insofar as the substantive unfairness of the
dismissal was concerned,
consequently the second arbitrator
was obliged to order the reinstatement of the first respondent.

(my emphasis)
[15] The
court-a-quo
also erred in finding that the second arbitrator in exercising her
judicial discretion in terms of Section 193(2), “
had a
further duty to ensure that in exercising that discretion she also
takes into account the findings that had already being
made in the
first arbitration award in the evaluation of the relief to be made in
the second award… that the first respondent’s
dismissal
in it’s proper analysis provided that the requirements for
awarding the primary remedy of reinstatement as a general
rule had
been satisfied, consequently, that the determination by the second
arbitrator was to determine whether the dismissal was
such that it
would be inappropriate to reinstate or re-employ the first
respondent…”
[16] Section 193(2
)
provides:

The
Labour Court or the arbitrator must require the employer to reinstate
or re-employ the employee unless –
(a)
the employee does not wish to be
reinstated  or re-employed;
(b)
the circumstances surrounding the
dismissal are such that a continued employment relationship would be
intolerable;
(c)
it is not reasonably practicable for
the employer to reinstate or re-employ the employee; or
(d)
the dismissal is unfair only because
the employer did not follow a fair procedure.’
[17] The second
arbitrator understood and appreciated the scope of her mandate as
evidenced by the following remarks:

The
dispute came before me as an arbitration. The dispute was remitted to
be heard before a new Commissioner to the GPSSBC by the
Labour Court
pursuant to a successful review by the applicant to allow further
evidence to be led by the parties on whether the
applicant should be
reinstated or compensated as provided in terms of
Section 193(2)
of
the
Labour Relations Act No 66 of 1995
as amended.’
[18] The second
arbitrator appreciated that the only issue before her was to
determine whether the first respondent after having
been found guilty
of insubordination by the first arbitrator was unfairly dismissed or
whether she ought to have been reinstated
or re-employed as
contemplated in Section 193(2) of the Act. Further the second
arbitrator appreciated that in terms of Section
193(2)(b) an
exception to the primary remedy of reinstatement or re-employment in
the case of a dismissal is provided, where pursuant
to Section
193(2)(b) “
the circumstances surrounding the dismissal are
such that a continued employment relationship would be intolerable.”
[19] The issue to be
determined is whether the second arbitrator applied her mind properly
to the evidential material before her
in exercising her discretion
pursuant to Section 193(2). The appellant and the first respondent
were legally represented by counsel
in the second arbitration. Both
counsel and the second arbitrator treated the hearing as a remittal
to hear and consider evidence
de novo
to enable the second
arbitrator to reconsider whether the first respondent should be
reinstated or re-employed as envisaged by
Section 193(2).
[20] The second
arbitrator was fully aware that in assessing the evidence before her,
she was faced with two mutually exclusive
versions, that she was
required to assess same on the balance of probabilities by accepting
one version as being more probable
than the other. Further the second
arbitrator appreciated that in reaching her conclusion she had to
consider that essentially
the first respondent denies that the
employment relationship between her and the appellant has
irretrievably broken down, that
in contradistinction the appellant
argued that the circumstances surrounding the first respondent’s
dismissal are of such
a nature that her reinstatement is not possible
because the employment relationship between the parties has
irretrievably broken
down.
[21] The letter written
by Ms Kekana to the first respondent was properly considered by the
second arbitrator who also took into
account the first respondent’s
response thereto. The second arbitrator found that the first
respondent’s letter was
derogatory, insulting, contemptuous and
disrespectful, that by innuendo and sarcasm the first respondent
insinuated that Ms Kekana
was stupid unqualified and did not deserve
or merit the position she was occupying, consequently, it was
questionable how Ms Kekana
was appointed to that post.
[22] The award of the
second arbitrator was well reasoned. She assessed the evidence placed
before her and came to her conclusions
appreciative of the fact that
pursuant to Cele J’s order the matter was remitted for the
determination of the exercise of
a judicial discretion by a different
arbitrator after the considering the totality of the evidence
pursuant to Section 193(2).
[23] The second
arbitrator applied her mind to the totality of the evidence,
analysed, evaluated and accepted the appellant’s
witnesses’
testimony as more probable then the first respondent’s
regarding the breakdown of the employment relationship
between the
parties and found that the appellant had conclusively established
that the employment relationship had irretrievably
broken down to
such an extent that the employment relationship could not be
resuscitated.
[24] On the totality of
the evidence, the second arbitrator found that the first respondent
had discharged the onus reposing on
it by showing that pursuant to
Section 193(2)(b), the circumstances surrounding the first
respondent’s dismissal are such
that a continued employment
relationship would be intolerable.
[25] I accept the second
arbitrator’s conclusion that these defamatory allegations
between the first respondent and the appellant,
struck at the core of
the employment relationship. Consequently, the second arbitrator
cannot be faulted in having found on the
totality of the evidence
that the reinstatement of the first respondent would be intolerable
because the employment relationship
had irretrievably broken down.
[26] The second
arbitrator correctly found that the first respondent cannot be
reinstated because it was not only the employment
relationship that
had broken down between the first respondent and Ms Kekana but also
that which had existed between the appellant’s
Department’s
Head Fati Manamela and the first respondent.
[27] Regarding the
employment relationship between Ms Kekana and the first respondent,
the former was not only employed in her personal
capacity but she was
also employed in a representative capacity as a supervisor of the
appellant’s department. Consequently,
it does not assist the
first respondent to argue that because Ms Kekana is the supervisor
with whom she had problems with, and
has left the appellant’s
employment, the employment relationship between her and the appellant
has not irretrievably broken
down.
[28] The second
arbitrator was acting within her mandate when she found employment
relationship between the parties had irretrievably
broken down after
considering the nature and gravity of the insubordination perpetrated
by the first respondent against Ms Kekana
that the reinstatement of
the first respondent was not possible. There is no merit in the first
respondent’s counsel’s
submission that the gravity of the
misconduct would have been different if the letter written by the
first respondent was published.
The first respondent published the
letter to Fati Manamela the Head of the appellant’s Department
of Finance. In any event,
it is not necessarily a requirement that
the first respondent’s utterances should be publicised in order
to be categorised
as gravely serious by the first respondent’s
superiors or the second arbitrator.
[29] The second
arbitrator had to consider the seriousness of the insubordination
committed by the first respondent in assessing
the whether the
sanction of dismissal was justifiable or substantively fair, and
whether there was a possibility of the continuance
of the employment
relationship. In assessing the remedy to be made in terms of Section
193(2) weight had to be accorded to substantive
fairness in as far as
it relates to the seriousness of the misconduct of insubordination
because the seriousness of the offence
plays a critical role in the
determination as to whether the employment relationship between the
parties has irretrievably broken
down or not.
[30] It is trite that in
determining the fairness of the first respondent’s dismissal,
the second arbitrator had to take into
account the totality of the
circumstances of the case in question in order to apply the
appropriate sanction. In this respect Waglay
DJP (as he then was) in
Motsamai v Everite Building Products
in dealing with the issue
of sanction had the following to say:

It
is now accepted that when a arbitrator arbitrates a dispute, it is
the arbitrator who must decide what is the appropriate sanction

having regard to: all of the evidence presented to him/her, the
company’s code of conduct, and, of course the nature and

seriousness [of the] misconduct. The fact that the decision is that
of the arbitrator does not mean that can be made in a vacuum.
Like
any other decision the decision that the arbitrator arrives at in
respect of the sanction must also be one that is reasonable
in all
the circumstances.’
[31] The second
arbitrator took into account that there had been a turbulent
relationship and disputes between the first respondent
and Ms Kekana,
which lead to the offensive letter the first respondent addressed to
the latter. It is apparent that the second
arbitrator rejected the
contention of the first respondent that the dismissal related to a
single incident of the letter she wrote
to Ms Kekana. The second
arbitrator specifically rejected the contention of the first
respondent that the relationship between
her and her superior was not

turbulent
”. In this respect the second arbitrator
found that: “
the letter addressed to the first respondent
certainly did not occur in isolation and that it may very well be the
result of the
culmination of events and situations between the first
respondent and her supervisor.”
[32] The second
arbitrator sets out the reasons why she imposed the sanction. The
sanction imposed by the second arbitrator is consistent
with
rationality and reasonableness. The decision to impose the sanction
of dismissal on the first respondent is within the purview
of
decisions in relation to sanctions a reasonable arbitrator could
reasonably reach.
[33] Because the
insubordination affected the heart of the employment relationship, it
cannot be argued that the second arbitrator
did not rationally and
properly exercise her discretion pursuant to Section 193(2) of the
Act. Having regard to the evidence placed
before the second
arbitrator there is absolutely no basis for the finding that she
committed any irregularity in ordering that
the first respondent
should be compensated as opposed to being reinstated.
[34] In conclusion the
decision reached by the second arbitrator not to reinstate the
appellant is a decision that a reasonable
arbitrator could reach.
The Order
[35] In the premises I
make the following order:
(a)
the appeal is upheld;
(b)
the
court-a-quo’s
order is set aside and replaced with the following order;
(c)
the appellant is ordered to
compensate the first  respondent the equivalent to 7 months
salary in the amount of R104 423.00;
and
(d)
there is no order as to costs.
____________________
Mokgoatlheng
AJA
Tlaletsi
DJP and Musi AJA concur in the judgment of Mokgoatlheng AJA
APPEARANCES:
FOR THE APPELLANT:

Mr Tshabalala
Instructed by: Ncube
Incorporated Attorneys
FOR THE FIRST
RESPONDENT:
Mr T Magano
Instructed by Ndhlovu
Attorneys