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[2014] ZALAC 42
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Draken Industries CC v Maande and Others (JA69/2013) [2014] ZALAC 42 (19 August 2014)

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE LABOUR APPEAL
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
JUDGMENT
Not
reportable
Case
no: JA69/2013
In the appeal between:
DRAKEN
INDUSTRIES
CC

Appellant
and
COMMISSIONER
AC MAANDE

First

Respondent
NATIONAL
BARGAINING COUNCIL FOR THE
WOOD
AND PAPER SECTOR
Second

Respondent
CEPPWAWU
OBO B Mathole & 16
others                                                 Third

Respondent
Heard:

20 May 2014
Delivered:

19 August 2014
Summary: Review of
arbitration award- review test restated- employees dismissed for
allegedly misconducting themselves during strike.
Mutually
destructive evidence at arbitration proceedings. Balance of
probabilities favouring employees’ version. Commissioner

finding dismissal substantially unfair and reinstating employees.
Labour Court upholding award- Appeal- commissioner misapplying
his
mind to picketing rules and to certain evidence- such misapplication
not vitiating the entire award- Award falling within the
band of
reasonableness. Remedy- employer failing to prove trust relationship
irretrievably broken- reinstatement practical. Appeal
dismissed with
costs
CORAM:
DAVIS JA, MOLEMELA AJA et SUTHERLAND AJA
JUDGMENT
MOLEMELA AJA
Introduction
[1]
This is an appeal against the judgment of the Labour Court (Barnes,
AJ) dismissing an application for a review of an award rendered
by
the first respondent (commissioner). In his award, the commissioner
found that the appellant’s dismissal of seventeen
employees
represented by the third respondent was substantively unfair and
granted an order of retrospective reinstatement. The
court
a quo
found that the commissioner’s decision was one that a
reasonable decision-maker could reach and accordingly dismissed the
review application. The appeal is with leave of the court
a quo.
Background
facts
[2]
The salient facts are as follows: On or about the 8
th
July
2009, the third respondent gave notice to embark on a protected
strike as from 13 July 2009. On 9 July 2009, the appellant
gave
notice of a responsive lockout. The appellant apparently also took
the liberty of drafting picketing rules and communicated
them to the
third respondent. The third respondent did not respond. The protected
strike duly commenced on 13 July 2009. It is
common cause that during
the course of the strike the striking employees picketed outside the
gate of the appellant’s premises.
On 15 July 2009, the
appellant wrote a letter to the third respondent and informed the
latter that in the absence of any response
to the proposed picketing
rules the appellant accepted that the rules constituted agreed rules.
In the same communication, the
appellant pointed out that the third
respondent’s members that were on strike were in breach of the
picketing rules, that
they had been intimidating non-striking
employees, customers and temporary staff and had also blocked the
entrance to the business
premises. It is common cause that on one
occasion during the strike, a number of temporary employees were
gathered outside the
appellant’s premises. One of the
appellant’s managers talked to them through the boundary fence
of the premises and
offered six of them employment. However, the six
employees in question did not enter the premises. According to the
appellant,
the reason why they could not enter the premises was
because of the intimidation the striking workers subjected them to by
throwing
stones at them. The strike ended after about seventeen days.
When the striking employees returned to work, they were notified that

they were to be charged with misconduct. Seventeen of them were
subsequently charged with misconduct. They were divided into two

groups. The employees in Group “A” faced five charges,
while those in group “B” faced three charges.
[3]
The five charges faced by those in Group A were the following: See p
78 of record.
‘
GROUP
A
1.
Gross Misconduct- in that you engaged in
behaviour during the strike aimed at intimidating or threatening
non-striking employees,
not to go to work, thus trying to destroy the
trust relationship;
2.
Gross Misconduct- in that you engaged in
behaviour aimed at threatening or intimidating temporary labour by
amongst other things
throwing rocks at them, thus destroying the
trust relationship.
3.
Gross Misconduct- in that you engaged in
behaviour aimed at causing injury to fellow employees or temporary
employees and possibly
causing damage to company property by throwing
rocks and stones during the strike, thus destroying the trust
relationship.
4.
Gross Misconduct- in that you engaged in
behaviour in flagrant disregard of the picketing rule by preventing
customers, non-striking
employees or temporary staff to enter the
employer’s premises, thus destroying the trust relationship.
5.
Gross Misconduct- in that you engaged in
behaviour during strike aimed at damaging the employer’s
business interests by preventing
customers or potential customers
from entering the employer’s premises thus destroying the trust
relationship
.’
[4]
The three charges faced by those in Group “B” were the
following: See p79 of record.
‘
Group
B
1.
Gross Misconduct- in that you engaged in
behaviour during the strike aimed at intimidating or threatening
non-striking employees,
not to go to work, thus trying to destroy the
trust relationship;
2.
Gross Misconduct- in that you engaged in
behaviour in flagrant disregard of picketing rules by preventing
customers, non-striking
employees or temporary staff to enter the
employer’s premises, thus destroying the trust relationship.
3.
Gross misconduct- in that you engaged in
behaviour during the strike aimed at damaging the employer’s
business interests by
preventing customers or potential customers
from entering the employer’s premises, thus destroying the
trust relationship.’
[5]
One of the employees, Michael Raphela was also charged but had a
separate disciplinary hearing. According to the employer, Raphela
had
a separate hearing partly because of his illness and also because he
had pleaded guilty to all the charges. The sixteen employees
were all
found guilty on all the charges and were dismissed. A sanction of
dismissal was imposed. In a separate hearing, Raphela
was also found
guilty on all the charges and dismissed. At the arbitration hearing,
both procedural and substantive fairness were
placed in dispute. The
commissioner found that the appellant was entitled to proceed with
the final stages of the disciplinary
hearing in the absence of the
employees as they had opted not to attend the hearing due to their
representatives’ absence.
The commissioner found that the
dismissal was procedurally fair but substantively unfair. The
appellant launched a review application.
There was no
counter-application.
Labour
Court Proceedings
[6]
The labour court summarised the numerous submissions made by the
appellant under four grounds:-
‘
.1
Firstly, the appellant contends that the arbitrator made factual
findings that were
not based on the evidence before him and were made
on the basis of his own assumptions derived from fabricated,
speculative circumstances.
The appellant contends that the employee
gave no real factual evidence on he contested issues in the
arbitration and that the evidence
of the appellant’s witness
was therefore not properly in dispute. The appellant contends that
the findings of the arbitrator
are not rationally connected to the
evidence before him and are findings that no reasonable arbitrator
could reach.
.2
Secondly, the appellant contends that the arbitrator failed to
acquaint himself
with the code of good practice on picketing, failed
to evaluate the evidence in accordance with that code, and in effect
adopted
the view that lawful picketing includes violence and
intimidation. The arbitrator accordingly misconducted himself in
relation
to his duties as an arbitrator.
7.3
Thirdly, the appellant contends that the arbitrator’s reference
to section 186 (1)(d)
of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (“the
LRA”) and to the fact that one of the dismissed strikers was
re-employed
reveals that the first respondent considered the case to
be one in terms of section 186(1)(d) of the LRA and failed to apply
his
mind to the real issue in the case, namely whether the employees
were fairly dismissed for misconduct.
7.4
The final ground relates to the granting of re-instatement as a
remedy in the matter. The
appellant contends that no reasonable
arbitrator could have formed the view that reinstatement was the
appropriate remedy in the
matter.’
[7]
The Labour Court found that there were two mutually destructive
versions before the commissioner in respect of all the charges.
It
found that the dismissed employees did give factual evidence on all
the contested issues at the arbitration and found that the
employees’
version was, on the whole, more probable than that of the appellant.
It found that while it may be that a different
arbitrator may have
come to a different conclusion on one or more of the contested
incidents, it could not be said that the conclusions
reached by the
commissioner were conclusions that a reasonable arbitrator could not
have reached.
Issue
to be decided
[8]
In its Notice of appeal, the appellant raised numerous grounds of
appeal practically attacking every finding made by the court
a
quo
. Essentially the same grounds of review argued in the Labour
Court were reiterated in the heads of argument filed in this Court,

with some elaboration. At the commencement of the appeal hearing,
counsel for the appellant, Mr van Graan, placed on record that
the
appeal was being pursued only in respect of the court’s
findings on the probabilities and the remedy of re-instatement
that
it endorsed. The issue in this appeal is therefore whether the labour
court’s finding  that the commissioner’s
decision
that the dismissal was substantively unfair and its endorsement of
an order granting reinstatement were decisions
that a
reasonable decision-maker could reach.
Evaluation
[9]
The appellant argued that the Labour Court erred not reviewing and
setting aside the commissioner’s award. The test applicable
in
review applications is trite. See
Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum
Mines and Others Ltd
2008 (2) SA 24
(CC). This judgment was
followed in the SCA case of
Herholdt v Nedbank
[2013] 11 BLLR
1074
(SCA) par 25 at 1084 where, the court,
inter alia,
elaborated as follows:-
‘
For
a defect in the conduct of the proceedings to amount to a gross
irregularity as contemplated by section 145(2)(a)(ii), the arbitrator

must have misconceived the nature of the enquiry or arrived at an
unreasonable result.  A result will only be unreasonable
if it
is one that a reasonable arbitrator could not reach on all the
material that was before the arbitrator.  Material errors
of
fact, as well as the weight and relevance to be attached to
particular facts, are not in and of themselves sufficient for an

award to be set aside, but are only of any consequence if the effect
is to render the outcome unreasonable.
’
In
the case of
Gold
Fields Mining SA Ltd (Kloof Gold Mine) v CCMA and Others
[1]
this Court stated as follows:
‘
Where
the arbitrator fails to have regard to the material facts it is
likely that he or she will fail to arrive at a reasonable
decision.
Where the arbitrator fails to follow proper process he or she may
produce an unreasonable outcome (see
Minister
of Health and Another v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others
2006
(2) SA 311
(CC)).
But again, this is considered on the totality of the evidence not on
a fragmented, piecemeal analysis. As soon as it is done
in a
piecemeal fashion, the evaluation of the decision arrived at by the
arbitrator assumes the form of an appeal. A fragmented
analysis
rather than a broad-based evaluation of the totality of the evidence
defeats review
as
a
process.
It follows that the argument that the
failure
to have regard to material facts
may
potentially
result
in a wrong decision has no place in review applications. Failure to
have regard to material facts must
actually
defeat the constitutional imperative that the award must be rational
and reasonable- there is no room for conjecture and
guesswork.’
[10]
The evidence led at the arbitration proceedings covered `three
incidents, namely, Employees appearing under Group A allegedly

throwing stones at temporary employees, the driver of the appellant’s
client (Mathe) being denied access into the premises
and the
intimidation incident regarding three employees (Mr Maponya, Mr
Mahlape and Mr Lepebe) who testified that the striking
employees had
denied them access into the appellant’s premises by blocking
the gate. The evidence adduced at the arbitration
proceedings must be
considered in totality and not on a piecemeal basis. Mr van Graan
criticised the commissioner for finding that
it was improbable for
the stone throwing incident to have occurred since no one was struck
by any stone despite the fact that the
two groups were a mere ten
metres from each other. He stressed that a reviewing court is not
confined to the reasons advanced by
the commissioner but is at
liberty to consider whether on the evidence before the arbitrator
there was other evidence which justified
the commissioner’s
conclusion. The labour court in its judgment demonstrated that it was
alive to this power and hence did
not confine itself to the
commissioner’s reasons. What is important to consider is that
it is clear that the commissioner
was presented with two mutually
exclusive versions regarding what transpired at the gate, including
the alleged breach of picketing
rules. When evaluating evidence, this
must be done in such a way as to guard against a piecemeal
evaluation. Evidence must be considered
in its totality. In
Stellenbosch Farmers Winery v Martell et cie
2003 (1) SA 11
(SCA) at
5, the court stated as follows:-
“
On
the central issue, as to what the parties actually decided, there are
two irreconcilable versions.   So too on a number
of
peripheral areas of dispute which may have a bearing on the
probabilities.   The technique generally employed by courts

in resolving factual disputes of this nature may conveniently be
summarised as follows.  To come to a conclusion on the disputed

issues a court must make findings on (a) the credibility of the
various factual witnesses;  (b) their reliability;  and
(c)
the probabilities.  As to (a), the court’s finding on the
credibility of a particular witness will depend on its
impression
about the veracity of the witness.  That in turn will depend on
a variety of subsidiary factors, not necessarily
in order of
importance, such as (i) the witness’s candour and demeanour in
the witness-box, (ii)  his bias, latent and
blatant, (iii)
internal contradictions in his evidence, (iv) external contradictions
with what was pleaded or put on his behalf,
or with established fact
or with his own extracurial statements or actions, (v) the
probability or improbability of particular
aspects of his version,
(vi) the calibre and cogency of his performance compared to that of
other witnesses testifying about the
same incident or events.
As to (b), a witness’s reliability will depend, apart from the
factors mentioned under (a)(ii),
(iv) and (v) above, on (i) the
opportunities he had to experience or observe the event in question
and (ii) the quality, integrity
and independence of his recall
thereof.  As to (c), this necessitates an analysis and
evaluation of the probability or improbability
of each party’s
version on each of the disputed issues.  In the light of its
assessment of (a), (b) and (c)  the
court will then, as a final
step, determine whether the party burdened with the onus of proof has
succeeded in discharging it.
The hard case, which will
doubtless be the rare one, occurs when a court’s credibility
findings compel it in one direction
and its evaluation of the general
probabilities in another.  The more convincing the former, the
less convincing will be the
latter.  But when all factors are
equipoised probabilities prevail.”
[11]
When the evidence is analysed accordingly, the inconsistencies in the
written statement of Maponya and his evidence at the
hearing i.e. the
fact that the stone throwing incidents were not alluded to in the
statement come into play, the improbability
of stones thrown at a
distance of ten metres not striking a single person in a group; the
fact that the police, having been summoned
by the employer to the
scene,   did not make any arrests are factors that are all
taken into consideration when probabilities
are weighed.
[12]
While Hubble, Maponya and Lebepe testified that the striking
employees had blocked the entrance to the premises, evidence by
one
of the appellant’s witnesses, viz Mahlape seemed to suggest
otherwise. The three employees that testified vehemently
denied
having blocked the premises or having intimidated any persons. As
correctly pointed out by the commissioner, important evidence
that
casts doubt on the plausibility of the appellant’s version is
that, while Samson Mathe, a customer’s truck driver,
testified
that he was stopped by the striking employees from gaining access
into the premises, his employer’s evidence was
that upon
arrival at the gate, he entered the appellant’s premises in
another vehicle without any problems and later fetched
the truck from
the gate. He later exited without any incidence, all of which
evidence   negates the driver’s testimony
that the
striking employees stopped him from entering the premises and
threatened to set the truck alight. It is also odd that
his employer
would, upon taking the truck, leave him to his own devices outside
the premises while being aware of the threats and
the unruly
behaviour of the striking employees. The fact that he was left at the
gate suggests that the striking employees were
not as aggressive as
alleged by the appellant.
[13]
The appellant adduced evidence to the effect that the temporary
employees that wanted to offer their services to the appellant
were
intimidated and that stones and rocks were thrown at them. It is
common cause that one of the appellant’s managers was
able to
speak to these temporary employees through the fence and invited six
of them into the premises but they did not do so.
A possibility that
they did not enter simply because they were intimidated by the mere
presence of the striking employees at the
gate is not far-fetched and
thus cannot be ruled out, given the circumstances.
[14]
It was contended on behalf of the appellant that on their own
version, the employees had blocked the entrance to the appellant’s

premises. This contention ignores the evidence tendered on behalf of
the third respondent, to the effect that the customer who
went to
collect at the premises had unhindered access into the premises. It
also ignores Mogobole’s evidence that, although
the striking
employees were standing in front of the gate, “there was enough
space for anyone to pass”.
[15]
The appellant made much of the fact that one of the appellant’s
witnesses, viz Mahlape, testified that he “forced
himself”
into the employer’s premises. It needs to be borne in mind that
the same witness also testified that after
he was told that he would
not be allowed into the premises, one of the striking employees who
was also dismissed, viz Frank Seabe
said “you must let him
through”. The following exchange between him and the
appellant’s representative during
the arbitration hearing is
also significant :- (See p223 of the record)
‘
Mr
Roodt: Did they tell you anything else when you tried to enter the
premises?
Mahlape: These people?
Mr Roodt: Ja
Mahlape: They promised to
assault me but I forcibly entered the premises.
Mr Roodt: Was it one
person who said that they will assault you or …?
Mahlape: They did not say
that they are going to assault me. They only raised their arms but
they wanted to assault my daughter.’
[16]
Mahlape also disavowed his written statement in which he had
allegedly stated that the striking employees wanted to assault
him
(p233 vol 3). Although the commissioner stated that he would not
comment about Mahlape’s daughter being stopped from
going
through, it must be borne in mind that in any event, on this aspect,
too, there were two mutually destructive versions. Mahlape’s

evidence that Mogobolo stopped his daughter from passing through was
denied by both Mogobole and Magobate. The commissioner correctly

remarked that on probabilities it was unlikely that one employee
would force his way through a group of seventeen aggressive
employees.
Once Mahlape was allowed to go through, it is unclear why
the other two employees, Mathole and Lebepe would not have been
allowed
to go through on the same day.
[17]
The appellant was at pains to point out that the undisputed evidence
that the police were summoned to the appellant’s
premises on
about three occasions lends credence to the appellant’s
assertion that the striking employees were aggressive
and unruly.
This evidence cuts both ways, for it equally lends credence to the
evidence of the third respondent’s witnesses
to the effect that
no violent acts occurred, including the throwing of stones, as the
police would have arrested the perpetrators
as the throwing of stones
is a criminal offence. The third respondent’s version on this
aspect is bolstered by the undisputed
evidence that none of the
temporary employees were struck by any stones.
[18]
Having considered the conspectus of the record into account, I agree
with the labour court that the employee’s version
pertaining to
the alleged breach of the picketing rules pertaining to physically
preventing members of the public from gaining
access into or out of
the employer’s premises was more probable.
[19]
The contention that the commissioner’s reference to section
186(1)(d) of the LRA in respect the employee that was subsequently

re-employed reveals that he considered the case to be one in terms of
section 186(1)(d) of the LRA and thus failed to apply his
mind to the
real issue amounts to a distortion of the commissioner’s
reasoning and is devoid of any merit. The tenor of the
whole award
shows that the commissioner was alive to the fact that the real issue
between the parties was whether the seventeen
employees were fairly
dismissed for misconduct.
[20]
The appellant’s contention that the trust relationship had
broken down and that a continued employment relationship would
be
intolerable seems to be premised on the assumption that the dismissed
employees were dismissed on account of misconduct. Considering
that
the misconduct with which they were charged was not proven, it would
be unfair to premise the intolerability of the relationship
on this
unproven misconduct. In considering the appropriate remedy, the
commissioner was certainly entitled to take into account
that another
employee who had participated in the strike and was in the exact
position as the other dismissed employees was subsequently

re-employed. This indeed served to negate the appellant’s
allegations pertaining to intolerability of the working relationship.

The record does not show anything surrounding the dismissal that
could have served to show that the restoration of a normal working

relationship between the affected employees and the appellant was not
feasible. It would be unfair on the employee to find, in
the absence
of evidence adduced by the employer to show that the trust
relationship has broken down and cannot be restored, that
the
employment relationship is intolerable. See
Edcon v Pillemer
NO
[2006] 11 BLLR 1021
(SCA) at para 23,
where the court stated that:
‘
It
is inevitable that courts, in determining the reasonableness of an
award, have to make a value judgment as to whether a commissioner’s

conclusion is rationally connected to his/her reasons taking account
of the material before him/her. That this is the correct approach
has
been stated on a number of occasions by the LAC, this Court in the
Sidumo
matter as well as the Constitutional Court in the same matter. In my
view, Pillemer’s finding that Edcon had led no evidence
showing
the alleged breakdown in the trust relationship is beyond reproach.
In the absence of evidence showing the damage Edcon
asserts in its
trust relationship with Reddy, the decision to dismiss her was
correctly found to be unfair’. [Footnote omitted]
[21]
In
Equity
Aviation v CCMA and Others
[2008]
12 BLLR 1129
(CC) at para 36
,
Nkabinde J stated:
‘
The
ordinary meaning of the word ‘reinstate’ is to put the
employee back into the same job or position he or she occupied
before
the dismissal, on the same terms and conditions. Reinstatement is the
primary statutory remedy in unfair dismissal disputes.
It is aimed at
placing an employee in the position he or she would have been but for
the unfair dismissal. It safeguards workers’
employment by
restoring the employment contract. Differently put, if employees are
reinstated they resume employment on the same
terms and conditions
that prevailed at the time of their dismissal. As the language of
section 193(1)(a) indicates, the extent
of retrospectivity is
dependent upon the exercise of a discretion by the court or
arbitrator. The only limitation in this regard
is that the
reinstatement cannot be fixed at a date earlier than the actual date
of the dismissal. The court or arbitrator may
thus decide the date
from which the reinstatement will run, but may not order
reinstatement from a date earlier than the date of
dismissal. The
ordinary meaning of the word ‘reinstate’ means that the
reinstatement will not run from a date after
the arbitration award.
Ordinarily then, if a Commissioner of the CCMA orders the
reinstatement of an employee that reinstatement
will operate from the
date of the award of the CCMA, unless the Commissioner decides to
render the reinstatement retrospective.
The fact that the dismissed
employee has been without income during the period since his or her
dismissal must, among other things,
be taken into account in the
exercise of the discretion, given that the employee’s having
been without income for that period
was a direct result of the
employer’s conduct in dismissing him or her unfairly.’
[Footnote omitted]
[22]
In
Billiton
Aluminium SA LTD t/a Hillside v Khanyile
and Others
(2010) 31 ILJ
273 (CC)
at
para 27 the court held that these remarks made in the
Equity
Aviation
case “relate to the inquiry at the first level of engagement,
namely when a matter first comes before a court or commissioner.
A
commissioner or court, at that level, must act in accordance with the
provisions of section 193(1) and (2) in the manner explained
in
Equity
Aviation”
.
[23]
With regards to the submission pertaining to the impracticality of
re-instatement on account of the fact that other employees
had in the
interim been employed by the appellant, this evidence was also not
placed before the arbitrator. In
Mediterranean
Textile Mills v SACTWU and Others,
[2]
it
was held that the focal point and overriding consideration in an
enquiry concerning the practicability of re-instatement is the
notion
of fairness between the parties. The employment of other employees
does not, in itself, show that it was not reasonably
practicable for
the appellant to reinstate the unfairly dismissed employees.
[24]
Many criticisms were directed at the commissioner’s award. It
is not necessary to traverse all the minute details of
these
criticisms. The evidence that has already been canvassed above
demonstrates that this criticism was unjustified. Certainly,
there is
no justification for the contention that the commissioner’s
conclusions were based on “his own assumptions”
derived
from “fabricated speculative circumstances”. Having
perused the whole record, I agree with the Labour Court’s

finding that the commissioner gave cogent reasons for preferring the
dismissed employees’ version to that of the witnesses
of the
employer on all the contested issues. Indeed the probabilities
favoured the employees in question. The Labour Court correctly

recognised that another commissioner may perhaps have come to a
different conclusion on one or more of the contested incidents
but it
could not be said that the conclusions of the commissioner in the
case under consideration were not those that a reasonable
decision
maker could reach. With regards to the commissioner’s finding
that the temporary employees were intimidated, it
is important to
mention that (i) he also found that the striking employees did not
throw stones at the temporary workers; (ii)
he found that because the
striking workers were singing and dancing at the gate, their mere
presence at the gate “intimidated
or threatened the temporary
workers. To the extent that this may found to be a contradiction,
this would not suffice to render
the whole award reviewable. The same
is applicable to the commissioner regarding the picketing rules as
invalid despite the fact
that they, to a large extent, echo clause
6(7) of the code of good practice on picketing. See
Herholdt v
Nedbank
(SCA judgment). There was no basis for reviewing the
award and the court
a quo
correctly dismissed the review
application. The appeal thus stands to be dismissed. I can see no
reason why the costs of the appeal
should not follow the result.
[25]
The following order is made:
The appeal is dismissed
with costs.
______________
Molemela
AJA
I
agree
______________
Davis JA
I
agree
______________
Sutherland AJA
APPEARANCES
:
FOR
THE APPLICANT:
ESJ Van
Graan SC
Instructed
by Riki Anderson Attorneys (Pretoria)
FOR
THE RESPONDENT:            H
Van Der Riet SC
Instructed
by Cheadle Thompson & Haysom Attorneys
[1]
[2007] ZALC 66
;
[2014]
1 BLLR 20
(LAC)
at
para 21
[2]
[
2012]
2 BLLR 142
(LAC) para 28.