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[2014] ZALAC 25
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Western Cape Department of Health v MEC Van Wyk and Others (CA1/2013) [2014] ZALAC 25; [2014] 11 BLLR 1122 (LAC); (2014) 35 ILJ 3078 (LAC) (5 June 2014)
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE LABOUR APPEAL
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, CAPE TOWN
REPORTABLE
CASE NO: CA 1/2013
In
the matter between:
WESTERN
CAPE DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH Appellant
and
MEC VAN WYK AND
OTHERS
First
Respondents
PHSDSBC
Second
Respondent
ARTHI
SINGH N.O.
Third
Respondent
DEMOCRATIC
NURSING ORGANISATION OF
SOUTH
AFRICA
(DENOSA)
Fourth
Respondent
Heard:
20 March 2014
Delivered:
05 June 2014
CORAM:
Tlaletsi DJP, Davis JA
et
Coppin AJA
Summary:
Interpretation and application of collective agreement. Employer
translating employees in terms of OSD for Nurses in terms
of
Resolution 3 of 2007-– employees employed in the
Gastroenterological Unit -employer translated employees to the
general
stream- employees contending to be translated to speciality
nurses. Principles relating to the interpretation of collective
agreement
restated- employer having no prerogative to interpret and
apply a collective agreement without a specific authority in the
collective
agreement to do so- the arbitrator entitled to determine
whether the employer’s interpretation is fair and not contrary
to
the spirit and purpose of the collective agreement- arbitrator
interpreting OSD in light of the spirit and the purpose of the
collective
agreement -Arbitrator finding that employer failing to
comply with the provisions of the collective agreement; employer
ordered
to translate employees to speciality nurses- Labour Court
upholding arbitrator’s decision and dismissing the review
application
with costs. Arbitrator’s decision reasonable-
Appeal dismissed with costs.
JUDGMENT
TLALETSI
DJP
Introduction
[1]
The appellant (the Western Cape Department
of Health) is appealing against the judgment and order of the Labour
Court, in a review
application brought in that court by the appellant
against an arbitration award issued by the third respondent (“the
arbitrator”)
under the auspices of the second respondent (the
Public Health and Social Development Sectoral Bargaining Council)
hereafter referred
to as “the Bargaining Council”.
[2]
The
arbitration concerned a dispute between the appellant and the fourth
respondent (The Democratic Nursing Organisation of South
Africa
(DENOSA), a trade union duly registered in terms of the Labour
Relations Act
[1]
and acting on
behalf of its members (first respondents), who are the employees of
the appellant. The dispute was about the interpretation
and
application of a collective agreement.For the purpose of this appeal
the union and its members shall be referred to as “the
respondents”.
Factual Background
[3]
The factual matrix that led to this dispute
is common cause. On or about 10 September 2007, the Department of
Health in its capacity
as the employer concluded a collective
agreement with the respective trade unions representing the nurses
employed by the Department.
The collective agreement was incorporated
into Resolution 3 of 2007 and was commonly referred to as
Occupational Specific Dispensation
for Nurses (“the OSD”).
[4]
Clause 3.2.5.3 of the OSD for nurses which
deals specifically with the translation of professional nurses
(Registered nurses) provided
that:
‘
3.2.5.3
Translation of Professional Nurse (Registered Nurse) to speciality
posts
i.
A Professional Nurse (Registered Nurse) who
occupies a post in a nursing speciality and who –
a.
is in possession of a post-basic clinical
nursing qualification listed in Government Notice R212, as amended,
shall translate to
the appropriate speciality post; and
b.
is not in possession of a post-basic
clinical nursing qualification listed in Government Notice R212, as
amended, but who has been
permanently appointed in a post in a
speciality unit and has been performing these duties of the
speciality post satisfactorily
on 30 June 2007, shall be translated
as a once-off provision to the first salary scale attached to the
production level
.
ii. A Professional Nurse
(Registered Nurse) referred to in (i)(b) shall not progress by means
of grade progression to the higher
salary scale attached to a post in
the clinical speciality without first having obtained the required
educational qualification
in the clinical speciality listed in
Government Notice R212.
iii.
A Professional Nurse (Registered Nurse) who
is managing a nursing speciality unit, and who is not in possession
of a post-basic
clinical nursing qualification listed in Government
Notice R212, as amended, but who has been performing these duties of
managing
the speciality unit satisfactory on 30 June 2007, shall be
translated as a once-off provision to the appropriate salary scale
attached
to the corresponding management level.” [Emphasis
provided]
[5]
The individual employees are employed in
the Gastroenterological Unit at Groote Schuur hospital which is a
level three tertiary
academic hospital. They complained that their
employer in applying the OSD translated them to the general stream
instead of to
the speciality stream which would have made them to
benefit in terms of the OSD. They complained further that their
colleagues
(gastroenterological nurses) at Tygerberg and Worcester
hospitals, who had been trained by them, were translated to the
speciality
stream and as a result have derived benefits provided by
the OSD. The appellant contended that gastroenterology does not fall
within
a speciality stream and that it being a speciality unit, the
employees could not be regarded as performing speciality functions
and could therefore not benefit in terms of the OSD.This led to the
referral of the dispute to the Bargaining Council which was
arbitrated by the third respondent.
Arbitration
proceedings
[6]
At the arbitration proceedings, the
respondents tendered the evidence of Dr Dion Levin, a specialist
gastroenterologist at Groote
Schuur Hospital. He described the field
of gastroenterology as a sub-speciality. He testified that for a
doctor to operate in the
field of gastroenterology he/she was
required to study for a period of four years in order to become a
specialist. He/she is required
to undergo further training in order
to become a sub-specialist. He mentioned that the nurses working with
the specialist doctors
are required to be trained specialist nurses
since the procedures that are conducted in the unit require highly
skilled personnel.
He confirmed that the individual employees are
highly skilled and they trained nurses from other units across the
world. He testified
further that nurses in his unit are different
from nurses working in the theatre since they are required to
actively participate
in the procedures and are therefore required to
be more skilled.
[7]
Maria van Wyk who is one of the employees
also testified. She mentioned that they are all professional nurses.
She is a Chief Professional
Nurse and an Operational Manager. She has
25 years’ experience in the field of gastroenterology. She is
skilled because of
her extensive practical training and the
experience that she acquired. She however does not have a formal
qualification in the
field. She mentioned that their unit falls under
the medical and surgical science speciality. They also trained nurses
in their
units. She confirmed that her colleagues at Tygerberg and
Worcester hospitals, who were trained by them and were performing
exactly
the same functions as them were translated as speciality
nurses. They also had to be translated as speciality nurses. She
confirmed
further that there is currently no post-basic qualification
for gastroenterology nurses.
[8]
The appellant tendered the evidence of
Tendani Mabuda, who is the Director of Nursing Sciences at the
appellant. He testified that
he was directly involved in the
interpretation and application of the OSD for nurses. He was also
part of the committee that determines
which fields would be regarded
as speciality. He mentioned that it is a requirement that a
speciality stream be aligned to a post-basic
qualification and since
there is no post-basic training for gastroenterology, it is not
regarded as a speciality unit. Nurses and
doctors, he testified, are
governed by professional bodies and what may be a speciality for
doctors is not necessarily a speciality
for nurses. He testified that
the translation of the individual employees in this case was done
correctly and that the translation
for their colleagues at Tygerberg
was incorrectly done. Although their incorrect translation was done
in 2007, he became aware
thereof in 2009 and a decision has been
taken to have the translation reversed.
[9]
The arbitrator, in considering the evidence
presented as well as the relevant clause 3.2.5.3, remarked that:
9.1
the agreement does not define and list speciality post. The appellant
in deciding which
units should be regarded as speciality units must
act fairly.
9.2
from the nature of the work performed in the gastroenterology unit
and Dr Levin’s description
of the field as a sub-speciality,
there is no reason why the unit cannot be “classed under the
broad specialist category
of medical and surgical science which is
provided in Government Notice R212.”
9.3.
the fact that there is no post-basic qualification does not in any
way diminish the highly specialised
nature of the work performed by
the nurses.
9.4
it emerged during evidence that the Theatre and the ICU are also not
listed in Government
Notice R212 and yet they are regarded as
speciality.
9.5
the appellant’s interpretation of the term “speciality
function” and its
insistence that the gastroenterology unit is
not a speciality unit is too narrow and does not fit the purpose of
the collective
agreement which is to advance the careers of the
nurses with a view to attracting and retaining nursing professionals.
9.6
the appellant has on two previous occasions viewed similar units as
speciality units and
the nurses holding the same position as the
individual employees have been translated. The appellant has to date
not reversed the
said translation dispute it claims that the
translations were incorrectly done at great expense.
[10]
The arbitrator finally found that the
appellant had failed to comply with the provisions of the collective
agreement, failed to
apply its mind or exercised its discretion
capriciously and found a need to intervene and give effect to the
collective agreement.
The arbitrator thereafter made the award that
the appellant was “
ordered to
translate all the individual employees to the speciality stream,
retrospectively from 1 July 2007
”
and made no order to costs.
The Court
a quo
[11]
The appellant sought to review the award of
the arbitrator on the grounds that the arbitrator exceeded her powers
by finding that
the gastroenterology unit is a speciality unit for
purposes of applying the OSD which was the prerogative of the
employer. Secondly,
that the arbitrator ignored relevant evidence
contained in circular 139/2007 which clearly defined which units are
speciality units
as well as the evidence of Mabuda.
[12]
With regard to the first ground of review
the Labour Court found that the arbitrator did not exceed her powers.
The court
a quo
held that the arbitrator properly and rationally interpreted the
relevant OSD provisions in light of the evidence before her and
further that she had to assess whether the employer exercised its
prerogative fairly and came to the conclusion that it had not.
As
regards the second ground, the court
a
quo
held that the arbitrator clearly
considered Mabuda’s evidence and was not persuaded to come to a
different conclusion. Regarding
circular 139/2007 the court below
held that:
“
The
circular that the applicant refers to, did serve before the
arbitrator. She does not refer to it in her award, yet it does not
appear from the transcript that it was “excluded”, as Ms
Nyman argues. Nor does it “clearly define” speciality
units, as she argues. Circular 139/2007 is an internal one that was
not sent to the trade union parties to the collective agreement.
It
does not deal with gastroenterology units at all and it does not
amend the collective agreement.”
The
application for review was consequently dismissed with costs. The
appellant applied and was granted leave to appeal to this
Court by
the Labour Court with costs being costs in the appeal.
The Appeal
[13]
The grounds of appeal upon which the
appellant is challenging the decision of the court
a
quo
are listed in the notice of appeal
and are simply that the court
a quo
erred:
13.1
in finding that the GR139/2007 did not define “speciality post”
when the correct finding
should have been that the Head of
Department, in accordance with his delegated powers, had the final
say on what constitutes “speciality
units” and
“speciality posts”;
13.2
in confirming the arbitrator’s reliance on Dr Levin’s
evidence which was in fact irrelevant;
13.3
in not rejecting the arbitrator’s reasoning with reference to
Mabuda’s evidence, whose
evidence could not be challenged;
13.4
in not finding that the arbitrator’s reasoning in its entirety
was defective and unreasonable
in relation to the evidence led and
should have set aside and corrected the award to one dismissing the
dispute.
[14]
It is in my view important to state what
the objectives of the OSD are. These are found in clause 1 which
states that:
‘
1.1
To introduce an occupational specific remuneration and career
progression system for Professional Nurses (Registered Nurses).
Staff
Nurses (Enrolled Nurses) and Nursing Assistants (Enrolled Nursing
Assistants) who fall within the registered scope of PHSDSBC
that
provides for –
1.1.1
career pathing;
1.1.2
pay progression;
1.1.3
grade progression;
1.1.4
recognition of appropriate experience;
1.1.5
increased competencies
1.1.6
and performance
with a view to attracting
and retaining nursing professionals in all the identified occupations
to the public health sector.
1.2.
To introduce differentiated salary scales for identified categories
of nursing professionals
based on a new remuneration structure.
1.3
To incorporate the existing scarce skills allowance payable to
identified categories of
speciality nurses into salary.’
[15]
The purpose of the OSD is, therefore,
inter
alia
, to introduce a new remuneration
and career progression system for nurses, with the view to attracting
and retaining nursing professionals
in the public health sector. In
terms of clause 3.2.5.3 referred to above, for a professional nurse
to be translated to an appropriate
speciality post he/she had to have
a post-basic clinical nursing qualification listed in GR212. If the
professional nurse does
not have the said post-basic clinical nursing
qualification listed in GR212, he/she had to be a nurse who has been
permanently
appointed in a post in a speciality unit and who had been
performing the duties of the speciality post satisfactorily on 30
June
2007. The latter would be translated as a once-off provision to
the first salary scale.
[16]
The individual employees are not in
possession of a post-basic clinical nursing qualification. They could
only be translated as
the second category, namely, that relating to
nurses who are permanently in a post in a “
speciality
unit
” and had been performing
their duties in that “
speciality
unit
” satisfactorily. It is
common cause that the respondent employees are permanently employed.
It is also not disputed that
they have been performing their duties
satisfactorily, to the extent that they have been used to train other
nurses employed in
their field. What seems to be standing in their
way to be translated into OSD category is the fact that the unit in
which they
are employed is not regarded as a “
speciality
unit
“by the appellant.
[17]
It is common cause that the OSD collective
agreement does not define what a “
speciality
unit
” is. The appellant contends
that in the absence of such a definition in the OSD, the Department
had the prerogative to determine
which of its units should be
regarded speciality units. The main and perhaps the only basis for
the appeal by the appellant is
that the arbitrator failed to
recognise the fact that the appellant’s classification of the
gastroenterology unit as a non-speciality
unit cannot be interfered
with, unless it is found that the appellant acted in an arbitrary
manner, with bias, malice or ulterior
motive.
[18]
There is nothing in the OSD that suggests
that in the absence of the definition of a “
speciality
unit
” it shall be the prerogative
of the appellant to give meaning to that term. The OSD agreement is a
product of collective
bargaining and not something the appellant may,
unilaterally, vary or interpret. There is therefore no reason why the
appellant’s
interpretation of the OSD collective agreement
should be preferred over that of the trade union. As pointed out by
the respondents’
counsel, were managerial prerogative be
permitted to be the determining factor in deciding how to interpret
and apply a collective
agreement, this would undermine our industrial
relations framework and the primacy of collective bargaining.
[19]
It
was submitted on behalf of the appellant that s41 (1) of the Public
Service Act
[2]
(“PSA”)
empowers the national Minister of Health to make regulations
regarding inter
alia
,
any matter required or permitted by the PSA and any matter referred
to in s3(1)
[3]
of the PSA and
to make regulations relating to inter
alia
,
innovation and any matter to improve the effectiveness and efficiency
of the public service and its service delivery to the public.
It was
pointed out that the Minister, in turn, is permitted to delegate to
the Director-General (the “DG”) any power
conferred on
the Minister by the PSA, except the power to make regulations. The
DG, therefore, goes the argument, by a circular
dated 28 September
2007 which was addressed to,
inter
alia
,
the Provincial Departments of Health, was exercising his managerial
prerogative through powers delegated to him by the national
Minister of Health upon the implementation of the OSD collective
agreement. On the basis of the said circular, an OSD Moderation
Meeting was convened in the Western Cape Province on 29 November 2007
in order to “
establish
a uniform interpretation and application of speciality nursing
services throughout the Department for the purposes of
the alignment
exercise
”.
The decisions of this meeting were recorded in Circular 139 of 2007
which recommended how the OSD should be applied to
the different
units in the province.
[20]
It is common cause that the process adopted
by the DG is a process undertaken outside the bargaining process and
was not sanctioned
by the OSD collective agreement. Parties that
concluded the collective agreement with the employer party at
national level were
not part of this process. It would be incorrect
and unfair, in my view, to hold that the PSA gives the appellant,
through its DG,
a prerogative to impose its understanding of the
bargained collective agreement on the other parties thereto, without
a specific
authority for such prerogative in the collective
agreement. Fundamentally, the appellant’s reliance on the PSA
does not take
account of s5(4) of the PSA which provides that:
‘
Any
act by any functionary in terms of this Act may not be contrary to
the provisions of-
(a) any collective
agreement contemplated in item 15 (i) of Schedule 7 to the Labour
Relations Act; or
(b) any collective
agreement concluded by a bargaining council established in
terms of the said Act for the public service
as a whole or for a
particular sector in the public service.’
and s5(6) which provides
that:
‘
(a)
Any provision of a collective agreement contemplated in subsection
(4), concluded on or after the commencement of the
Public Service
Amendment Act, 2007
, shall, in respect of conditions of service of
employees appointed in terms of this Act, be deemed to be a
determination made by
the Minister in terms of
section 3
(5).
(b) the Minister may, for
the proper implementation of the collective agreement, elucidate or
supplement such determination by means
of a directive, provided that
the directive is not in conflict with or does not derogate from the
terms of the agreement.’
[21]
The
arbitrator had the authority to determine, in the event of
disagreement as to the correct interpretation of the OSD collective
agreement by the parties, the interpretation and how the agreement
should be applied.
[4]
The
managerial powers of the DG cannot, in my view, trump the statutory
powers of the arbitrator when interpreting and applying
the
collective agreement.
[22]
In
interpreting the collective agreement the arbitrator is required to
consider the aim, purpose and all the terms of the collective
agreement. Furthermore, the arbitrator is enjoined to bear in mind
that a collective agreement is not like an ordinary contract
[5]
.
Since the arbitrator derives his/her powers from the Act he/she must
at all times take into account the primary objects of the
Act. The
primary objects of the Act are better served by an approach that is
practical to the interpretation and application of
such agreements,
namely, to promote the effective, fair and speedy resolution of
labour disputes.
[6]
In addition,
it is expected of the arbitrator to adopt an interpretation and
application that is fair to the parties.
[23]
Reverting to the facts of this case, the
issue before us is whether the court
a
quo
was correct in upholding the
arbitrator’s interpretation and application of clause
3.2.5.3(i) of the OSD collective agreement.
It is clear in my view
that the arbitrator was alive to what was required of her. She
considered the aim and purpose of the OSD
collective agreement. The
arbitrator considered the evidence placed before her by the parties
namely, among others: that the individual
employees performed work
which was more specialized than that performed by those in the
general nursing stream; the gastroenterological
nursing falls under
the medical and surgical science speciality; the employees’
specialist training occurred on the job;
and they trained nurses in
similar units who were themselves translated to the speciality
stream.
[24]
The arbitrator considered the evidence of
Mabuda and that of Dr Levin on the type of work and the environment
in which the employees
worked. She was entitled to do so in order for
her to properly give meaning to the concepts “
speciality
function
” and “
speciality
units
”. She was entitled to
determine whether the appellant’s interpretation of these
concepts through the evidence of Mabuda
and the circulars issued by
the Department was correct. She found that its interpretation was
incorrect and contrary to the spirit
and the purpose of the
collective agreement. The evidence of Dr Levin was crucial to the
issue that the arbitrator had to determine.
He is a specialist
medical practitioner in the unit under consideration and worked with
the individual employees. It would be illogical
to expect the
arbitrator to reject Dr Levin’s evidence solely because he is
not a nurse, and accept Mabuda’s evidence
that the
gastroenterology unit is not a speciality unit because it is a nurse
that is saying so. One would have thought that the
specialist in the
field of gastroenterology, Dr Levin, was better placed to give such
an opinion. It is apparent that in this matter
that the arbitrator
did apply the fairness standard in his interpretation and application
of the OSD collective agreement.
[25]
In my view, the court
a
quo
did not err in its finding that the
arbitrator did not exceed her powers and that the award is not
reviewable. In my view, the decision
of the arbitrator is not a
decision that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach. It is a
correct decision that is justified
by the material placed before the
arbitrator. For the above reasons, the appeal falls to be dismissed.
[26]
What remains to be decided is the issue of
costs. Both parties submitted that costs should follow the result. In
my view, the requirements
of the law and fairness dictate that costs
should be awarded to the successful party.
[27]
In the result, the following order is made:
The
appeal is dismissed with costs.
_____________________
Tlaletsi DJP
Deputy
Judge President of the Labour Appeal Court
Davis
JA and Coppin AJA concur in the judgment of Tlaletsi DJP
APPEARANCES:
FOR THE APPELLANT:
Adv R Nyman
Instructed by
State Attorney, Cape Town
FOR THE RESPONDENTS:
Adv S Harvey
Instructed
by Channels Albertyn Attorneys, Rondebosch.
[1]
Labour
Relations Act 66 of 1995
.
[2]
Public
Service Act 103 of 1994. Section 41(1) provides that Subject to the
Labour Relations Act and
any collective agreement, the Minister may
make regulations regarding-
(a)
any matter required or permitted by this Act to be prescribed;
(b)
any matter referred to in section 3 (1), including, but not limited
to-
(i)
the allocation, transfer and abolition of functions in terms of
section 3
(4) and the staff performing such functions;
(ii)
employment additional to the establishment and restrictions on the
employment
of persons, other than permanently or for fixed periods
or specific tasks, in the public service as a whole;
(iii)
the appointment of unpaid voluntary workers who are not employees
and their functions;
(iv)
the co-ordination of work in a department or between two or more
departments;
(v)
a code of conduct for employees;
(vi)
the disclosure of financial interests by all employees or particular
categories
of employees and the monitoring of such interests; and
(vii)
the position of employees not absorbed into a post upon its
re-grading;
(c)
the reporting on and assessment of compliance with this Act and the
review for appropriateness
and effectiveness of any regulations,
determinations and directives made under this Act;
(d)
the designation or establishment of one or more authorities vested
with the power
to authorise a deviation from any regulation under
justifiable circumstances, including the power to authorise such
deviation
with retrospective effect for purposes of ensuring equality; and
(e)
any ancillary or incidental administrative or procedural matter that
it is necessary
to prescribe for the proper implementation or
administration of this Act.
[3]
Section
3(1) The Minister is responsible for establishing norms and
standards relating to-
(a)
the functions of the public service;
(b)
the organisational structures and establishments of departments and
other organisational
and
governance
arrangements in the public service;
(c)
the conditions of service and other employment practices for
employees;
(d)
labour relations in the public service;
(e)
health and wellness of employees;
(f)
information management in the public service;
(g)
electronic government;
(h)
integrity, ethics, conduct and anti-corruption in the public
service; and
(i)
transformation, reform, innovation and any other matter to improve
the effectiveness
and efficiency of the public service and its
service delivery to the public.
[4]
Section
24 of the Act.
[5]
See
Northern
Cape Forests v SA Agricultural & Allied Workers & others
(1997) 18 ILJ (LAC)
[6]
SA
Municipal Workers Union v SA Local Bargaining Council and Others
(
2012)
33 ILJ 353 (LAC) at para [15].