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[2014] ZALAC 1
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Colett v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation And Arbitration and Others (P293/2009, PA7/12) [2014] ZALAC 1; [2014] 6 BLLR 523 (LAC); (2014) 35 ILJ 1948 (LAC) (13 February 2014)
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE LABOUR APPEAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, PORT ELIZABETH
Case
no: P293/2009
PA7/12
DATE:
13 FEBRUARY 2014
REPORTABLE
In
the matter between:-
RENE
COLETT
..................................................................................
Appellant
And
COMMISSION
FOR CONCILIATION,
MEDIATION
AND ARBITRATION
.................................
First
Respondent
COMMISSIONER
COMFORT
ROBERT
NIEMAND N.O
........................................
Second
Respondent
GENERAL
MOTORS (SA) (PTY) LTD
.......................
Third
Respondent
Heard:
28 November 2013
Delivered:
13 February 2014
Summary:
Delay in prosecuting review application- principles restated-
unreasonableness of the delay and unsatisfactory explanation.
Appeal
dismissed with costs.
CORAM:
TLALETSI ADJP, C J MUSI et MOKGOATLHENG AJJA
JUDGMENT
C
J MUSI AJA
[1]
This is an appeal against the judgment of the Labour Court (Molahlehi
J) wherein it dismissed a review application, which was
launched by
the appellant, because the latter delayed in prosecuting the review
within a reasonable time. The appeal is with the
leave of the court a
quo.
[2]
The appellant was employed by the third respondent (General Motors
(SA) Pty Ltd) as a warranty auditor. The appellant was charged
and
convicted, at a disciplinary hearing, of deliberately and dishonestly
misrepresenting facts to dealers and his colleagues,
in order to have
his private motor vehicle repaired at the third respondent’s
costs. An internal appeal was unsuccessful.
[3]
The appellant referred the matter to the Commission of Conciliation
Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA). Subsequent to unsuccessful
conciliation proceedings, the appellant referred the matter to
arbitration. During the arbitration proceedings, the third respondent
called numerous witnesses to prove that the appellant’s
dismissal was substantively and procedurally fair. The protracted
arbitration proceedings culminated in the second respondent (the
Commissioner) issuing an arbitration award on 14 May 2009 wherein
he
found that the appellant’s dismissal was substantively and
procedurally fair because the third respondent proved that
he was
guilty of dishonesty. The issues in this matter and my conclusion
render it unnecessary for me to set out the evidence presented
during
the arbitration proceedings.
[4]
On 24 June 2009 – within the six weeks period prescribed by
section 145(1)(a)
of the
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995
– the
appellant launched review proceedings in the court a quo challenging
the award of the Commissioner.
1
On 30 June 2009, the third respondent filed a notice of opposition.
[5]
On 2 July 2009, the appellant was advised by the registrar, by way of
a directive, that the record is available. In terms of
rule 7A(8) of
the Labour Court Rules, the appellant had 10 days, after the record
was made available, within which to either amend,
add to or vary the
terms of his notice of motion and supplement his supporting affidavit
or deliver a notice that he stands by
his notice of motion. The
appellant did neither.
[6]
On 12 August 2009, the Registrar issued a further directive wherein
the appellant’s failure to comply with the earlier
directive
was noted and the appellant was again directed to make the record
available within 10 days and to thereafter comply with
the provisions
of rule 7A(8). This directive was ignored.
[7]
On 4 September 2009, the Registrar warned the appellant that should
he fail to comply with the earlier directive the matter
would be
archived. This directive was also ignored. The matter was archived on
9 October 2009.
[8]
On 1 June 2011, the appellant filed an explanatory affidavit wherein
he explained why he did not comply with the directives
and the rules.
The explanatory affidavit was not delivered to the third respondent,
it therefore did not answer thereto. Van Niekerk
J, as a result of
the explanatory affidavit, directed that the file should be uplifted
from the archives. The appellant was directed
to comply with the
provisions of rule 7A(8) within 10 days from 1 June 2011.
[9]
On 9 June 2011, the appellant filed his supplementary affidavit, the
transcribed record of the arbitration proceedings and the
rule 7A(8)
notice.
[10]
On 23 June 2011, the third respondent filed its answering affidavit
wherein it pertinently raised the issue of the delay in
prosecuting
the review. It prayed that the review be dismissed for want of
timeous prosecution.
[11]
On 13 July 2011, probably as a result of the issue of delay in
prosecuting the review being raised by the third respondent,
the
appellant launched an application for the “condonation of the
late prosecution of the review”. On 25 August 2011,
the notice
of motion in the condonation application was amended to read that the
appellant would apply “for the condonation
of the late
prosecution of the review application and the condonation of the late
application itself.” The application was
strenuously opposed.
[12]
The appellant’s explanation for the delay is as follows. Soon
after the third respondent filed its notice of opposition
his
erstwhile attorney, Mr Forbes, informed him that he was closing his
practice because he would be joining the CCMA on a full-time
basis.
[13]
During August 2009, he procured the services of his current
attorneys, Wikus van Rensburg attorneys. He confirmed that he
received the Registrar’s directives and that he did not comply
therewith. During October 2009, his attorneys received the
transcribed record. They requested him to peruse the record in order
to give them further instructions, so that they could draft
supplementary papers, as they were not his attorneys during the
arbitration proceedings. After perusing the record, he consulted
with
his attorneys on 22 January 2010 and requested them to give him an
estimate as to how much it would cost to proceed with the
matter. He
was told that it would cost between R25 000 and R30 000.
[14]
He was impecunious and decided to sell his house. Although the deed
of sale was signed in February 2010, the registration occurred
in
September 2010 as a result of which he had the necessary funds to
proceed with the matter. He duly instructed his attorney to
brief
counsel in order to pursue the matter.
[15]
In his replying affidavit, he stated that he applied for legal aid
but his application was turned down. He was informed by
a certain Ms
Elaine van Staden that the reason for the refusal was because he was
temporarily employed for three months at Key
Body Panels where he
earned R6 000,00 per month.
[16]
According to the appellant, it was not only his financial dire
straits that caused the delay but also because he was, health-wise,
in a bad way. He was undergoing treatment for depression from 2009 to
2011 when he recovered, fully. He attached a confirmatory
affidavit
by Dr Koch, a general practitioner, wherein the latter stated:
‘
I
confirm that I was treating Rene Colett for severe depression from
June 2009 and he fully recovered by the start of 2011. Furthermore,
I confirm that it is my opinion that Rene Colett was not competent to
manage his affairs, such as relating to his case. Rene’s
illness is attributable to his unemployment.’
[17]
The Labour Court found that the appellant’s approach and
attitude towards the Registrar’s directives should play
a
significant role in assessing the reasonableness of the delay. It
also pointed out that the directive by Van Niekerk J, that
the file
should be lifted, does not mitigate or condone the delay. The court a
quo correctly found that the appellant’s explanation
that his
attorneys gave him the record to peruse does not make sense because
it would mean that they left it to the appellant to
determine whether
there was a need to supplement the grounds of review.
[18]
The court a quo criticised the appellant for not stating why he did
not approach Legal Aid South Africa for assistance. The
fact that the
appellant only filed the explanatory affidavit on 1 June 2011 –
nine months after he secured the necessary
funds – was also
frowned upon by the court a quo. It also found that the fact that no
explanation was given as to why the
condonation application was not
brought sooner presented a serious challenge to the appellant’s
case.
[19]
In its initial judgment, the court a quo referred to facts and
circumstances of an unrelated case. At paragraph 37, of the
judgment,
it is stated that:
‘
The
delay of about four years is excessive and therefore the applicant
had an onerous duty of providing a satisfactory and convincing
explanation for that delay. This is even so having regard to the
fact that applicants were reminded not only once of their delay
but
on a number of occasions including giving their current attorney an
opportunity to address the problem of the delay. It is
in this
context that I find the explanation tendered by the applicants to be
so inadequate that it does not only stand to be rejected
but it
closes the door for the need to consider the prospect (sic) of
success. It has to be noted that Mr Nichause conceded that
the delay
was excessive. His contention as indicated earlier is that the
dictates of justice require that the delay should be condoned.’
[20]
At paragraph 40, the court a quo said:
‘
Mr
Nichause, persuaded this court to place the blame for the delay on
the attorneys and not Mr Kalipa. He, however, conceded that
he could
not provide any explanation for the year long delay when the matter
was handled by the first attorney. This does not assist
the case of
Mr Kalipa because there is no evidence as to what did he do to pursue
his case (sic).’
[21]
In the amended judgment paragraph 40 was excised but paragraph 37 was
left intact.
[22]
In his judgment relating to the application for leave to appeal the
learned judge explained the situation as follows:
‘
It
is greatly regrettable what happened in this matter. The first
mistake that occurred in relation to the two judgments occurred
when
the first judgment was accidentally emailed in the morning the
judgment was to be delivered. It transpired later that when
the
second judgment was send to Port Elizabeth from Johannesburg, the
first judgment had already been delivered in court. The
second
problem relates to the erroneous copying and pasting onto the
judgment paragraphs from NUMSA obo Kalipa v National Bargaining
Council for the Chemical Industries case number P05/2012, a judgment
which was delivered also on the same day.’
[23]
Mr Nyondo, on behalf of the appellant, argued that the court a quo
did not properly consider the extent and reasons for the
delay
because it allowed itself to be influenced by the evidence of another
case which depicted a level of lateness which is twice
that of the
appellant. The court a quo therefore, so the submission went, did not
exercise its discretion properly. Mr Nyondo submitted
that the
appellant was judged on the basis of evidence of another case or
“foreign evidence” as he called it. With
regard to the
condonation application, he argued that the court a quo was wrong in
not considering the prospects of success because
the prospects of
success must always be considered when an application for condonation
is considered.
[24]
Mr Partington, on behalf of the third respondent, submitted that on
appeal it is the final order of the court a quo that matters
and not
its reasoning or evaluation. Therefore, so he argued, if the final
order is unimpeachable then the court a quo’s
errors in
arriving at its order are neither here nor there. He further
submitted that the court a quo was correct in not considering
the
prospects of success, although he pointed out that there were, in any
event, no prospects of success in this matter.
[25]
It is unfortunate that the copying and pasting by the court a quo led
to this somewhat embarrassing situation which was undeservedly
pounced upon the appellant as a get out of jail free card.
[26]
In order to discern whether the error had an impact on the court a
quo’s judgment and order one has to look at the entire
judgment.
[27]
It is clear that the transposition of the two paragraphs into the
judgment was an error which the court a quo realised too
late. In an
attempt to rectify the situation the court a quo, mero motu, excised
the one paragraph only. The ineluctable inference
therefore is that
paragraph 40 of the judgment had no bearing on the reasoning and
conclusion of the court a quo, otherwise it
would have amended
instead of deleting it.
[28]
It is clear that paragraph 37 of the judgment could not have led the
court a quo to its conclusion that the condonation application
of the
appellant should fail. Paragraph 37 is amid other paragraphs dealing
specifically with the appellant’s reasons for
the delay. The
court a quo comprehensively dealt with the appellant’s reasons
for the delay and correctly criticised his
version, as I will show
presently. In my view the transposition of paragraph 37 into the
judgment did not cause any transmutation
of the court a quo’s
reasoning, evaluation or order. It was merely a technological mistake
that had no bearing on the court
a quo’s thinking. It referred
to many other damning acts and omissions to substantiate its
conclusion. Paragraph 37 was an
island in a sea of condemnation.
[29]
A court of appeal will not lightly interfere with the exercise of a
judicial discretion by a lower court. An appellant who
challenges the
exercise of a judicial discretion will have to show that such
discretion was not exercised judicially. More specifically
the
appellant will have to show that the court a quo either:
29.1
failed to bring an unbiased judgment to bear on the matter;
29.2
did not act for substantial reasons;
29.3
exercised its discretion capriciously or arbitrarily;
29.4
exercised its discretion upon wrong principle;
29.5
committed a misdirection of such a serious nature and degree as to
justify a conclusion that it acted improperly or unreasonably.
[30]
The legal position was summarised as follows by the Constitutional
Court:
‘
It
is trite law that a court considering whether or not to grant
condonation exercises a discretion. The discretion must, of course
be exercised judicially on a consideration of all the facts and ‘in
essence it is a matter of fairness to both sides.’
It is clear
that the SCA may decide an application for condonation without
considering the merits of the case, though it does
so only where
there is a gross and flagrant failure to comply with the rules.
Ordinarily, the approach of an appellate court to
the exercise of
such a discretion is that it will not set aside the decision of the
lower court ‘merely because the court
of appeal would itself,
on the facts of the matter before the lower court, have come to a
different conclusion; it may interfere
only when it appears that the
lower court had not exercised its discretion judicially, or that it
had been influenced by wrong
principles or a misdirection on the
facts, or that it had reached a decision which in the result could
not reasonably have been
made by a
court
properly directing itself to all the relevant facts and principles.’
2
[footnotes omitted]
[31]
The court a quo correctly pointed out that it had to consider the
following questions viz whether there was an unreasonable
delay and
if so whether it should be condoned.
[32]
In Associated Institution Pension Fund and Others v Van Zyl and
Others
3
it was said that:
‘
The
reasonableness or unreasonableness of a delay is entirely dependent
on the facts and circumstances of any particular case …The
investigation into the reasonableness of the delay has nothing to do
with the court’s discretion. It is an investigation
into the
facts of the matter in order to determine whether, in all the
circumstances of that case, the delay was reasonable. Though
this
question does imply a value judgment it is not to be equated with the
judicial discretion involved in the next question, if
it arises,
namely, whether the delay which has been found to be unreasonable,
should be condoned…’ [reference omitted]
[33]
If an appeal is therefore aimed only against the finding that the
delay was unreasonable then it is tantamount to an ordinary
appeal
against a factual finding that led to a wrong conclusion. The court
of appeal would then be at liberty to set aside the
decision of the
court a quo, if the appeal court, on the same facts, would have
arrived at a different conclusion. If the appeal
is against the
finding that the delay should not be condoned, then it is aimed at
the exercise of a judicial discretion and the
considerations
mentioned in paragraphs 29 and 30 above will apply. In this matter
both the finding that the delay was unreasonable
and the finding that
the delay should not be condoned are challenged.
[34]
When assessing the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a delay
sight must not be lost of the fact that labour disputes must
be
resolved without delay. The reasons for the expeditious resolution of
labour disputes were set out by Ngcobo J, as he then was,
as follows:
‘
The
LRA introduces a simple, quick, cheap and informal approach to the
adjudication of labour disputes. This alternative process
is
intended to bring about the expeditious resolution of labour
disputes. These disputes, by their very nature, require speedy
resolution. Any delay in resolving a labour dispute could be
detrimental not only to the workers who may be without a source of
income pending the resolution of the dispute, but it may, in the long
run, have a detrimental effect on an employer who may have
to
reinstate workers after a number of years…’
4
[footnotes omitted]
[35]
The first question does not have to detain us long because Mr Nyondo
conceded not only that the delay was unreasonably long
but also that
the explanation therefor is bad.
[36]
The review proceedings were launched on 24 June 2009. Nothing
happened thereafter until the appellant filed an explanatory
affidavit to have the file, which was archived for lack of
prosecution, uplifted on 1 June 2011. The rule 7A(8) notice which was
supposed to have been filed within 10 days after the record was made
available, i.e. within 10 days from 2 July 2009, was only
filed on 9
June 2011 in spite of numerous directives to comply with rule 7A(8).
The concession was properly made. The delay was
unreasonable.
[37]
In deciding not to grant condonation for the delay, the court a quo
found the explanation for the delay unsatisfactory and
unacceptable.
It did not deem it necessary to consider the prospects of success in
view of the bad explanation. Mr Nyondo took
issue with the court a
quo’s approach and insisted that the failure to consider the
merits amounted to misdirection.
[38]
There are overwhelming precedents in this Court, the Supreme Court of
Appeal and the Constitutional Court for the proposition
that where
there is a flagrant or gross failure to comply with the rules of
court condonation may be refused without considering
the prospects of
success.
5
In NUM v Council for Mineral Technology it was pointed out that in
considering whether good cause has been shown the well-known
approach
adopted in Melane v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1962(4) SA 531(A) at
532(C-D). should be followed but:
‘
(T)here
is a further principle which is applied and that is that without a
reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay,
the prospects of
success are immaterial, and without good prospects of success, no
matter how good the explanation for the delay,
an application for
condonation should be refused.’
6
[39]
The submission that the court a quo had to consider the prospects of
success irrespective of the unsatisfactory and unacceptable
explanation for the gross and flagrant disregard of the rules is
without merit.
[40]
The appellant admitted that he received three directions from the
Registrar calling upon him to comply with rule 7A(8). He
admitted
that he ignored the directives. No explanation was given for his
conduct. What is worse, is that after receiving the directives
he had
consultations (at least two i.e. October 2009 and January 2010) with
his current attorneys and he did not inform them about
the
directives.
[41]
In the directive of 9 September 2009, the Registrar informed the
appellant as follows:
‘
NB:
Late compliance with the directive without an explanatory affidavit
for non-compliance does not warrant retrieval of the archives,
therefore the file will remain in the archives until such affidavit
is filed. The file will then be handed to a Judge in chambers
for a
directive.’
Notwithstanding
this directive, the appellant only filed the explanatory affidavit on
1 June 2011 without an explanation as to why
it was not filed earlier
or why he ignored the directives of the Registrar.
[42]
The directives of the Registrar are not only meant to assist in the
management of cases in order to facilitate and enhance
efficiency,
but more importantly, they ensure that matters are expeditiously put
through the system so that disputes may be resolved
speedily and
effectively. Litigants should know that they ignore such directives
at their own peril.
[43]
The appellant’s over-arching explanation for the delay between
2009 and beginning of 2011 is his financial and medical
woes.
Although the court a quo found that he did not approach Legal Aid
South Africa, the appellant stated that he was informed
that he does
not qualify for legal aid because of his salary. This explanation is
very telling. In his explanatory affidavit to
have the file uplifted
he stated that he was employed at Key Body Panels from 1 September
2010 to 30 November 2010. In his replying
affidavit, in the
application for condonation, he stated that he was informed by the
Legal Aid Board (Ms Van Staden) that the reason
for declining his
application was the temporary job that he had at Key Body Panels. It
therefore means that the application for
legal aid was only made
between September 2010 and November 2010. There is no explanation as
to why he did not approach the Legal
Aid Board sooner. According to
him he received the proceeds of the sale of his house in September
2010. It is strange, to say the
least, that he waited until he had
funds before he applied for legal aid.
[44]
The opinion of Dr Koch that the appellant was not competent to manage
his affairs relating to his case between 2009 and beginning
of 2011
is a bitter pill that I am not prepared to swallow. On the
appellant’s own evidence he changed attorneys in August
2009,
he consulted with his current attorneys in August 2009, October 2009
and January 2009. He perused the record of the arbitration
proceedings from October 2009 to January 2010. He had two jobs during
that period. He worked at Grey Stone from June 2010 to August
2010
and at Key Body Panels from September 2010 to November 2010. He
decided to sell his house in February 2010. He gave his attorney
full
instructions in October 2010. It is therefore clear that he had the
necessary competence to deal with his matter during that
period.
[45]
Even if I decide to swallow the bitter pill, according to the doctor
and the appellant he recovered during the beginning of
2011. The
appellant did not explain why he did nothing between the beginning of
2011 and June 2011. Likewise he did not explain
why he only filed the
explanatory affidavit in June 2011 when he already had funds in
September 2010 and recovered fully in the
beginning of 2011. He also
did not explain why his attorneys did nothing between September 2010
and June 2011.
[46]
In my view, the court a quo’s reasoning cannot be assailed. I
am convinced that the court a quo exercised its discretion
judicially
when it decided not to condone the unreasonable delay without having
regard to the prospects of success. The appeal
ought therefore to be
dismissed.
[47]
This is probably one of the worst records I have ever seen. The
record was not properly paginated. There was no consolidated
index.
Documents were bound out of sequence, for example, the third
respondent’s answering affidavit was bound before the
appellant’s founding affidavits. Documents were unnecessarily
duplicated making the record voluminous. Where reference was
made in
the evidence of witnesses to documents contained in the appeal record
no cross reference was made to the page number in
the appeal record
where such document or exhibit is. This made it extremely difficult
to follow the evidence and comprehend the
record. Parties should
acquaint themselves with the rules of this Court when they prepare
appeal records. Flagrant non-compliance
with the rules will be met
with appropriate costs orders.
[48]
In terms of section 179(1) this Court may make a costs order
according to the requirements of the law and fairness. Section
179(2)
sets out some of the factors and circumstances which this Court may
consider before making costs orders.
7
The considerations set out in section 179(2) are not a numerus
clausus. The considerations mentioned in NUM v East Rand Gold and
Uranium Co Ltd are still relevant today as they were under the
industrial court and old Labour Appeal Court system.
8
In that case Goldstone J said the following:
‘
1.
The provision that 'the requirements of the law and fairness' are to
be taken into account is consistent with the role of the
industrial
court as one in which both law and fairness are to be applied.
2.
The general rule of our law that, in the absence of special
circumstances costs follow the event, is a relevant consideration.
However, it will yield where considerations of fairness require it.
3.
Proceedings in the industrial court may not infrequently be a part of
the conciliation process. That is a role which is designedly
given to
it. Parties, and particularly individual employees, should not be
discouraged from approaching the industrial court in
such
circumstances. Orders for costs may have such a result and
consideration should be given to avoiding it, especially where
there is a genuine dispute and the approach to the court was not
unreasonable. With regard to unfair labour practices, the following
passage from the judgment in the Chamber of Mines case supra at 77G-I
commends itself to me:
'In
this regard public policy demands that the industrial court takes
into account considerations such as the fact that justice
may be
denied to parties (especially individual applicant employees) who
cannot afford to run the risk of having to pay the other
side's
costs. The industrial court should be easily accessible to litigants
who suffer the effects of unfair labour practices,
after all, every
man or woman has the right to bring his or her complaints or alleged
wrongs before the court and should not be
penalised unnecessarily
even if the litigant is misguided in bringing his or her application
for relief, provided the litigant
is bona fide. . . .'
4.
Frequently the parties before the industrial court will have an
ongoing relationship that will survive after the dispute has
been
resolved by the court. A costs order, especially where the dispute
has been a bona fide one, may damage that relationship
and thereby
detrimentally affect industrial peace and the conciliation process.
5.
The conduct of the respective parties is obviously relevant,
especially when considerations of fairness are concerned.”
[49]
The appellant in this matter was not bona fide. His version lacked
candour. His approach to this Court was unreasonable if
regard is had
to the concessions that were made pertaining to the unreasonableness
of the delay and the unsatisfactory explanation.
Although this Court
is loath to make costs orders against particularly individual
employees, considering the peculiar circumstances
of this case, the
requirements of the law and fairness dictate that a costs order
should be made.
[50]
I accordingly make the following order:
(a)
The appeal is dismissed with costs.
C.
J. Musi AJA
I
agree.
Tlaletsi
ADJP
I
agree.
Mokgoatlheng
AJA
APPEARANCES
FOR
THE APPELLANT:Mr Nyondo
Instructed
by Wikus Van Rensburg Attorney Port Elizabeth
FOR
THE THIRD RESPONDENT: Mr Partington
Instructed
by Chris Baker and Associates Port Elizabeth
1
Section
145(1)(a) reads as follows: “Any party to a dispute who
alleges a defect in any arbitration proceedings under the
auspices
of the Commission may apply to the Labour Court for an order setting
aside the arbitration award within six weeks of
the date that the
award was served on the applicant, unless the alleged defect
involves corruption.”
2
See
Mabaso
v Law Society of the Northern Provinces and Another
[2004] ZACC 8
;
2005 (2) BCLR 129
(CC) at para 20.
3
[2004]
4 All SA 133
(SCA) at para 47 and 48.
4
CUSA
v Tao Ying Metal Industries and Others
[2009]
1 BLLR (CC) para 62.
5
See
Mbutuma
v Xhosa Development Corporation Ltd
1978 (1) SA 681
(A) at 687A;
Darries
v
Sheriff,
Magistrates’ Court, Wynberg and Another
1998 (3) SA 34
(SCA) 41C-D; and
Mabaso
v
Law
Society of the Northern Provinces
supra.
6
[1999]
ZALAC 22
17 August 1998 at para 10;
Mgobhozi
v Naidoo NO and Others
[2006] 3 BLLR 242
(LAC) at para 34
7
In
terms of section 179(2) (b) When deciding whether or not to order
the payment of costs, the Labour Appeal Court may take into
account
- the conduct of th parties in proceeding with or
defending the matter before the court, and during the proceedings
before the court.
8
[1991] ZASCA 168
;
1992
(1) SA 700
(AD).