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[2013] ZALAC 35
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Martin And East (Pty) Limited v National union mineworkers and Others (CA23/2012) [2013] ZALAC 35; (2014) 35 ILJ 2399 (LAC) (10 March 2013)
IN THE LABOUR APPEAL
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
CASE
NUMBER
: CA23/2012
DATE
:10
MARCH 2013
In
the matter between:
MARTIN
AND EAST (PTY) LIMITED
Applicant
and
NATIONAL UNION
MINEWORKERS
AND
7
OTHERS
Respondents
J U
D G M E N T
DAVIS,
JA
:
This
is an appeal against judgment of the court
a
quo
of 2 August 2012, a date which I
emphasise as I wish to return to its significance presently in this
judgment.
The
court
a quo
found that the dismissals of the second and further respondents were
automatically unfair and ordered that they be reinstated with
retroactive effect as to the date of their dismissals, on the terms
applicable to these employees, at the appellant in their positions,
and further appellant was to pay their costs.
Much of the factual
matrix is common cause, the details of
which
are comprehensibly set out by the court
a
quo;
hence I will merely summarise the
key elements thereof. On 23 August 2010 some 124 employees
gathered at Borchards Quarry
(“BQ”) from 06:30. At
least four of the five elected shop stewards were present. Once
the work force had
assembled it appears that they refused to board
the trucks which would have taken them to work at various sites.
The had
agreed, apparently amongst themselves, that no one will board
the trucks and proceed to work.
At
approximately 07:00 Mr Megan Adolus from the appellant telephoned one
of the respondents, Mr Nelson Ngqisha, to enquire as to
the reason
for the refusal of employees to board the trucks. Adolus was
told by Ngqisha that the employees demanded a meeting
with the
appellant’s human resources manager, Mr Chris Escreet, at BQ to
address certain grievances. Adolus proposed
to the shop
stewards that they proceed to head office for a meeting but Ngqisha
explained that the employees had insisted that
Escreet should meet
them at BQ.
A
series of telephone conversations then took place. It appears
that between 7:00 to 9:00 employees and the shop stewards
remained
steadfast in their refusal to return to work and for the shop
stewards not to proceed to head office. The demand
continued to
be made that Escreet come to the BQ site to meet the employees and
the shop stewards. At 9:00 Escreet telephoned
Ngqisha and
repeated the demand to which I have made reference. Escreet
advised that he had contacted an official of the
first respondent
whom he had informed that he was willing to meet with the shop
stewards but at appellant’s head office.
Transport would
be made available to take the delegation to head office so that a
meeting could take place.
Various
ultimatums then were raised. Of relevance is that eventually a
meeting did take place at head office, in the afternoon,
to discuss
the grievances. The delegation of four shop stewards and three
observers proceeded to head office and a meeting
took place with
Escreet and other members of the appellant. Various issues were
discussed. The delegation indicated
that the workforce was
unhappy that monthly meetings between managers and the shop stewards
were not held regularly. The
last monthly meeting had been held
in April 2010.
Appellant
denied that communication was a problem but agreed, nonetheless, to
hold monthly meetings with the shop stewards in the
future. A
further issue which was raised concerned the employees’
request, which apparently had been raised previously,
to adjust their
working hours on Fridays on which date they were paid, to allow them
to complete work two hours early and to “work”
in the two
hours lost during the course of the week. Appellant indicated
that it maintained the position not to adjust working
hours in
accordance with this request, alleging it was not viable to so do.
A
previous practice in terms of which the appellant would reimburse
shop stewards for travel expenses incurred in attending meetings
had
been abolished in 2010. This issue was also raised. There
was a complaint that the shop stewards had not been receiving
faxes
sent to them by the appellant. Appellant denied this but
undertook to ensure that all correspondence which was generated
between it and the first respondent would now be forwarded to the
shop stewards.
According
to the delegation, a long standing practice whereby the company had
provided transport enabling employees to attend memorial
services of
colleagues had been discontinued in April 2010. This was denied
by the appellant. A further concern was
that according to the
employees the appellant did not do enough towards training, whereas
the appellant responded that all training
was done in terms of a
proper skills plan.
At
the end of the meeting, Escreet advised the delegation that
disciplinary action would be taken against all those involved in
the
events of the day, notwithstanding that they returned to work in the
afternoon. According to Escreet, this particular
decision was
justified because in 2007 and 2009 some employees had participated,
in what he had referred to as a wildcat strike.
The
delegation reported the contents of the meeting to the workforce and
conveyed to Escreet that this report back had taken place.
The
second and further respondents, together with Alfred Mlonyeni and
Elvis Lukheleni, was issued with notices to attend a disciplinary
hearing initially scheduled for 8 September 2010 but which was
eventually held on 15 September 2010. The charges against
them
were; 1) unprotected strike action on 23 August 2010; in that they
refused to render service to the company as instructed;
2) gross
insubordination in that they refused to render services after being
instructed to do so by the company; 3) unacceptable
conduct in that
they disrupted the business of the company and caused the company to
suffer losses due to their unprotected strike
action.
They
were all found guilty as charged. The parties were then
invited to submit mitigating and aggravating evidence which
was duly
done on 28 September 2010. On 14 October 2010 the chairperson
of the hearing recommended that they be dismissed
but in the light of
the appellant’s attitude in this respect also recommended that
the second and further respondents be
given a written warning,
coupled with 3 months unpaid suspension as an alternative to
dismissal.
In
terms of this alternative, they were given until 15 October 2010 to
revert to the management of appellant to submit that they
accepted
the alternative sanction. On 15 October 2010 the appellant
imposed a sanction of three months unpaid suspension,
coupled with a
final warning, effective as at 15 October 2010. On 28 October
the first respondent referred an unfair labour
practice dispute to
the Commission of Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (“CCMA”)
challenging the final written
warning and the suspension to which I
have made reference.
The
matter was set down for conciliation on 23 November 2010 but could
not be resolved. A certificate of outcome was issued.
On
24 November 2011 appellant addressed a letter to the first respondent
expressing the view that it was not open to the applicants
to
challenge the sanction imposed (pursuant to the alternative
punishment) as it had been concluded by an agreement.
Appellants
recorded that should any employee protest the alternative sanction,
to which I have already made reference, which was
the case in light
of the referral to the CCMA, the appellant would consider the offer
to have been rejected and would then proceed
to impose a sanction of
dismissal. The appellant invited the first respondent on behalf
of its members to agree to the three
month unpaid suspension coupled
with a final written warning instituted on 5 October 2010.
It
recorded that, as an agreement was not forthcoming, the alternative
sanction would be considered to have been refused and the
sanction of
dismissal would be implemented.
On
29 November 2010 the CCMA issued a notice setting down the case of
unfair labour practices for arbitration on 28 January 2011.
The
following day appellant addressed a letter to the first respondent
advising, in the light of the earlier correspondence, that
it would
now assume that the alternative sanction had not been accepted and it
would therefore implement the sanction of dismissal.
Dismissal
notices were issued on 30 November 2010 and, as a result of these
events, the matter came before the court
a
quo
, the result of which I have already
set out above. I should add that Mr Mlonyeni was also issued
with a dismissal notice,
but as at 11 January 2011 he had withdrawn
from the CCMA dispute. Mr Lukheleni was subsequently
reinstated.
A
range of legal issues were raised on appeal but the critical question
which was put to counsel was whether the second and third
respondents’ dismissal was automatically unfair as contemplated
in section 187(1) read together with section 4 and 5 of the
Labour
Relations Act 66 of 1995 (“LRA”) in that the respondents
had been dismissed for carrying out the functions of
a trade union or
employees who acted as representatives (i.e. the delegation).
There
were further questions relating to the acceptance or non-acceptance
of the alternative sanction but, as I have indicated,
the primary
issue which had to be determined in the first place was whether there
had been an automatically unfair dismissal affected
upon the
respondents, pursuant to their capacity as shop
stewards/representatives. The debate turned on the initial
question
relating to the onus which applies in cases where there has
been an allegation that a dismissal should be regarded automatically
unfair.
In
Kroukam v SA Airlink (Pty) Ltd
2005 (26)
ILJ
2153 (LAC) para 28 this court found that parties in the position of
the respondents bear an evidential burden to produce evidence
which
is:
“
Sufficient
to raise a credible possibility that an automatically unfair
dismissal has taken place, after which the company is required
to
produce evidence to show that the reason for the dismissal did not
fall within the circumstance is envisaged in s187 for constituting
an
automatically unfair dismissal”.
If
this Court drills down into the
dictum
in the
Kroukam
case, what must be borne in mind is that there is an overall onus
placed on an employer to justify the dismissal. There is
an
initial evidential burden which is borne by the employees, in this
case the respondents, to raise the inference that the dismissal
falls
within the scope of unfair dismissals. See also
Ngoza&
Others v Scorpions Legal Protection
2008 (29)
ILJ
1039 (LC) at 1045 where it was held that the only onus upon the
employee in a s187 case is to prove that the dismissal falls within
s187 of the Act.
In
this case, the question which arises is the following: all of the
employees were charged with participating in an unprotected
strike.
Only the second and further respondents received the specific
sanction of dismissal coupled to the alternative of
three months
unpaid suspension. That in itself must raise a question as to
the reason for a difference between the treatment
which was meted out
to the overwhelming number of participants in the unprotected strike
as opposed to those who are before this
court as respondents.
Framed
in this fashion, a reasonable inference can be drawn that raises a
credible possibility that the respondents were discriminated
against
because they were the shop stewards or representatives of the
employees. The appellant is required to rebut this
inference
and hence discharge the overall onus which rests upon it. In
this case, the appellant must produce evidence
to show that the
reason for the dismissal was because they instigated or promoted the
strike, not because they acted in their capacity
as shop stewards or
representatives communicating the grievances of employees to
management.
Mr
Snyman, who tenaciously appeared on behalf of the appellant,
contended that there was no other reason as to why a strike would
have taken place with hitherto contented workers or, at the very
least, workers who had never previously raised the kind of concerns
which were now claimed to be the cause of the strike. He
submitted as evidence of appellant’s case that the concerns
expressed at the meeting were those which affected the shop stewards
and not the overwhelming number of participants in the strike.
It
is unfortunate that an appeal should be based upon so incorrect a
submission. The inaccuracy is evident from my summation
of the
facts. There were at least three aspects raised with
Escreet which concerned the workers directly: The issue
of the Friday
work; the ability of employees to attend funerals of colleagues;
concerns in the relation to training. Contrary to
Mr Snyman’s
submissions, these concerns were articulated, they were on the record
and they were not exclusive to the shop
stewards. It was
patently incorrect to characterise the entire fabric of demands as
falling within the sole and exclusive
concern of the interests of the
shop stewards/representatives.
Mr
Snyman also made, what I can only describe as a somewhat novel
proposition. In his view, it is sufficient for the employer
to
believe that it was the workers, faced with dismissal, who commenced
and instigated the strike. No matter that this particular
perception is then shown to be incorrect, it remained sufficient to
justify the dismissals. This legally unsubstantiated
submission
runs counter to the very culture of rationality and justification
which was introduced by way of the
Labour Relations Act into
workplace governance.
In
a case such as the present, if a decision is made to dismiss the
group of workers, it is not sufficient for the employer to rely
on a
figment of his imagination, however much that imagination has been
conceived in good faith. The decision must be linked
to a
reasonable inference which a reasonable employer could draw from the
evidence read as a whole. When Mr Snyman was invited
by this
court to provide clear evidence, in effect all he could produce was
an assertion by Mr Escreet that the latter believed
that the only
reason that the strike had taken place was due to the actions of the
respondents.
It
may well be that Mr Escreet, proudly holding to a record which had
shown little by way of industrial turbulence under his watch,
could
not bring himself to accept that there were justifiable and plausible
reasons as to why the employees were sufficiently angry
to have
ceased working and thus demanded a meeting. To the argument
which was raised that, after a few hours, everyone returned
to work
and that therefore those who ended the strike by informing the
workforce of the contents of the meeting were the same who
started
it, the answer is that this again is based solely on a belief of
Escreet, which has no justification on the evidence read
as a whole.
I
am inclined to agree with Mr Kahnowitz, who appeared on behalf of the
respondents, that when the evidence is read as a whole,
it appears
that what the appellants argued was that somehow one morning a 120
generally happy but gullible workers were herded
like sheep by a
handful of agitators who incited them to down tools for no
inconceivable reason.
Accordingly,
on this ground alone, and given appellant’s concessions that
there was no direct evidence to support its decision,
the respondents
were subjected to more severe treatment. Mr Kahnowitz said that the
justification which does not rest on evidence
amounts to the
following; the event could not have happened without leaders; the
respondents’ witnesses were poor and their
denials could not be
believed; it must therefore follow that Escreet’s opinion that
those who came to the meeting were instigators.
As
I have indicated, this is not sufficient evidential basis to
discharge the onus which rests on appellant in circumstances where
at
least
prima facie
,
the respondents have raised the point that there is no credible
reason as to why there should be discrimination between one group
and
the other. The facts appear to describe a situation whereby
workers were disgruntled, shop stewards/representatives communicated
this to the appellant’s representatives. A meeting was
held, the workers, after a report from the delegation, returned
to
work. Respondents were then handed a sanction which was entirely
different from that imposed upon the balance of the participants
in
the strike.
There
is no credible reason for this differentiation on the evidence other
than as shop stewards/representatives they were singled
out for
special treatment. It is correct that the Act does not provide
blanket protection for shop stewards. They have an
obligation to
their employers to conduct themselves responsibly and in a manner
which is conducive to industrial peace.
As
was held in
National Union of
Mineworkers and Others v Black Mountain Mining (Pty) Ltd
2010 (31)
ILJ
387 at para 42 if worker representatives –
“…
engage
in disorderly or disrespectful conduct (although it was acknowledged
that it is not always clear to what extent such behaviour
should be
tolerated by an employer), they can be disciplined. I agree
with the submission that the test would seem to be
whether a shop
steward’s conduct can be said to fall within the realms of fair
and acceptable bargaining conduct and whether
it can be said to be
reasonably related to the performance by the shop stewards of their
functions as such. I am further
in agreement that if a shop
steward’s behaviour does not satisfy this test and the employer
takes disciplinary action they
cannot rely on the privileges that are
otherwise attached to their position”.
This
approach is an accurate reflection of the law. It is also
correct to say that one of the reasons for s187 is that it
protects
those who represent workers when they conduct themselves in terms of
the mandate given to them and the roles which they
have, in this case
as shop steward/representative or part of a worker delegation. If
they are to be discriminated against, the
notion of industrial
democracy and of meaningful representation which is fair and fearless
would be guttered by the kind of conduct
which was evident from the
appellant in this case.
There
is no plausible basis by which, in this case, on the available
evidence, a court could come to any other conclusion, in my
view,
than that these respondents had communicated complaints to the
appellant, that they performed their designated tasks and
that there
was no evidence of a credible nature other than the belief of
Escreet, to conclude that they had engaged in disorderly,
disrespectful, irresponsible conduct beyond that which was within the
scope of their mandate as shop stewards/representatives.
It
is clear that the initial argument raised, namely whether the
dismissals were automatically unfair as contemplated in section
187(1) read together with sections 4 and 5 of the LRA, was correctly
upheld, albeit that there were further findings by the court
a
quo
. On its own this particular
conclusion is sufficient to dismiss the appeal.
Before
I conclude there is a further comment I wish to make. I
indicated that the events in this case took place in 2010.
The
Labour Relations Act was
designed to ensure an expeditious resolution
of industrial disputes. This means that courts, particularly
courts in the position
of the court
a
quo,
need to be cautious when leave to
appeal is granted, as should this Court when petitions are granted.
There
are two sets of interests to consider. There are the interests
of the parties such as appellant, namely who are entitled
to have
their rights vindicated, if there is a reasonable prospect that
another court might come to a different conclusion.
There
are also the rights of employees who land up in a legal
“no-man’s-land” and have to wait years for an
appeal (or two) to be prosecuted.
This
was a case which should have ended in the labour court. This
matter should not have come to this court. It stood
to be
resolved on its own facts. There is no novel point of law to be
determined nor did the Court
a quo
misinterpret existing law.
There
was no incorrect application of the facts; in particular the
assessment of the factual justification for the
dismissals/alternative
sanctions.
I
would urge labour courts in future to take great care in ensuring a
balance between expeditious resolution of a dispute and the
rights of
the party which has lost. If there is a reasonable prospect that the
factual matrix could receive a different treatment
or there is a
legitimate dispute on the law, that is different. But this kind
of case should not reappear continuously in
courts on appeal after
appeal, subverting a key purpose of the Act, namely the expeditious
resolution of labour disputes.
IN
THE RESULT THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED WITH COSTS
.
__________________
DAVIS,
JA
MOLEMELA
& SUTHERLAND AJA AGREED