Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd t/a Sasko v Janse Van Rensburg (CA10/2002) [2003] ZALAC 24 (23 December 2003)

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[2003] ZALAC 24
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Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd t/a Sasko v Janse Van Rensburg (CA10/2002) [2003] ZALAC 24 (23 December 2003)

IN
THE LABOUR APPEAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
DIE ARBEIDSAPPÈLHOF VAN SUID-AFRIKA
Johannesburg
REPORTABLE
RAPPORTEERBAAR
CASE
NO: CA 10/2002
SAAK
NR: CA 10/2002
In
the matter between:
In
die saak tussen:
PIONEER
FOODS (PTY) LTD t/a SASKO
PIONEER
VOEDSEL (EDMS) BPK h/a SASKO Appellant
and
en
STEPHANUS
NICOLAAS JANSE VAN RENSBURG
Respondent
JUDGMENT-UITSPRAAK
WILLIS
JA:
[1] The legal representatives of both
parties addressed the court in English. I am mindful of the fact that
this judgment may well
be read by a wider audience, many of whose
members may be unfamiliar with Afrikaans. I have therefore prepared
the judgment in English.
Both of the parties are Afrikaans-speaking;
the papers were prepared in Afrikaans; the evidence was led in
Afrikaans; the judgment
of the court
a
quo
was given in Afrikaans;
the Heads of Argument in the appeal were prepared in Afrikaans; and
counsel for both parties are Afrikaans-speaking.
In the absence of
any clear language policy in the courts, I consider it appropriate
that a translation of this judgment be given
in Afrikaans. It
follows at the end of the judgment in English. . In the event that
there is a conflict between the Afrikaans and
the English versions,
the English shall prevail.
[2]
The court
a quo
(
per
Revelas J) found that the
dismissal of the respondent ( applicant in the court
a
quo
) was unfair and made
the following order:
“
1. The termination of
the applicant’s services was unfair.
2. The respondent is
ordered to pay the applicant compensation in the amount of R196
846,20 being twelve months’ salary;
3.The respondent is
ordered to pay the costs of this application.”
[3] The employer (who was the
respondent in the court
a
quo
) appeals against the
aforementioned finding and order of the court
a
quo.
For the sake of
convenience, I shall refer to the appellant as “the employer” and
the respondent as “the employee.”
[4] Bokomo Co-op and Sasko (Pty) Ltd
merged during 1997 to form the employer. It was this fact which led
ultimately to the termination
of the services of the employee. The
employee’s services were terminated on 31
st
October, 2000 as a result of the employer’s operational
requirements. At all material times, the restructuring of the
employer
was in progress.
[5] The employee was informed on 4
th
September 2000 that he should attend a meeting the next day. The
meeting indeed took place. Mr Lourens, the employer’s general
manager, Mr Koch, the employer’s sales manager for the Western
Cape, Mr Leng, the employer’s human resources manager, the
haasbroel,
the employer’s sales manager for the Cape Metropole and
the employee were present. Apart from Mr Haasbroek, all these persons
testified
in the trial in the court
a
quo.
At this meeting, the
following was discussed:
that the operational
requirements of the employer could possibly lead to the fusion of
the posts of senior representative (which
at that time was held by
the employee) and the business development post ( which at that time
was held by one Mr Swart) into one
post which would be known as a
“marketing position”.
A proposal that the
employee and Mr Swart make application for the new position;
That the services of the
unsuccessful candidate be terminated as that candidate would then be
redundant.
During this meeting, the employee was
given a letter in terms of
section 189
(3) of the
Labour Relations
Act, No 66 of 1995
as amended (“the LRA”). In response to that
which had been conveyed to him, the employee agreed that the fusion
of the two posts
made sense to him and he would accept the selection
process. At that stage he made no other proposal. He made written
application
for the new post on 6
th
September, 2000. At the same time he made an alternative proposal in
respect of an early pension in the event that he was not appointed
to
the new post. The employer had no authority to confer an early
pension. The employee was informed in writing on 7
th
September 2003 that the pension fund rules would not allow this. The
interview for the post took place on 8
th
September, 2000. The employee’s application was unsuccessful. He
was informed accordingly on 11
th
September 2000. The position was awarded to Mr Swart. It is common
cause that there was a good rapport between the employee and
Mr Leng.
It is also common cause that, at the relevant time, there were no
other suitable positions available in the group. The employee
himself
conceded this. It may well be so that the management at the time of
the meeting on 5
th
September 2000 thought that Mr Swart would have a better chance of
being successful in the interview. Indeed, the court
a
quo
came to this
conclusion. Nevertheless, this conclusion stands in conflict with the
evidence of Mr Koch who testified that in his
opinion the two
candidates would have had an equally good chance. Mr Leng said that
the employee indeed possessed the skills which
were necessary for the
new post. It is indeed noteworthy that Mr Swart who was called by the
employee, conceded that he could not
dispute the evidence of Mr
Lourens that the purpose of the interviews was to treat the employee
and Mr Swart on an equal footing.
Mr Swart also testified that he was
shocked and disturbed when he was told that the two positions would
be merged and that he and
the employee would be invited to apply for
the new position. This seems to indicate that he himself was not sure
that he would be
the successful candidate before the outcome was
announced. Mr Swart said, under cross-examination, that he was never
given any assurance
before the outcome was announced that he would be
successful. Mr Swart was asked during his evidence-in-chief why he
considered the
dismissal of the employee to have been unfair. He gave
a number of reasons. Essentially, he said he considered it wrong that
such
a fine person with a good record of service with the employer
should lose his job. Undoubtedly, it was sad and unfortunate that
this
should have occurred but none of Mr Swart’s reasons would
amount to unfairness as recognised by law.
[6] The employee was appointed by
Bokomo Co-op as a representative in 1989. He therefore had more than
ten years’ service at the
time of his interview on 7
th
September, 2003. He was 55 years’ old at that stage. He received a
severance package. The amount thereof is not in issue. The employee
obtained a position with a competitor of the employee in October,
2000, the month after his dismissal.He was paid by both his old
and
new employers for this month. During the hearing of the matter, it
became clear that the employee had succeeded in being in almost
continuous employment from the time of the termination of his
services with the employer.
[7]
The employee’s case is that he was confronted with a
fait
accompli
and that he was
denied his right to proper consultation and a proper consideration of
alternative and less drastic solutions. It
was submitted, on behalf
of the employee, that management had made up its mind before the
interviews took place that the employee
would be the one who would
lose his job. There is no direct evidence to this effect. The facts
proven do not compel one to draw this
conclusion as a nessesary
inference. Mr Swart at one stage claimed to have been under the
impression that he would be successful
because he was better
qualified but this does not justify the inference contended for by
the employee. Furthermore, that inference
is undermined by Mr Swart’s
own evidence as to his nervousness at the time. The employee did not
ask for re-instatement. He asked
for compensation only. The court
a
quo
found in favour of the
employee in the light of the abovementioned facts. The learned judge
found that the interviews were a “sham”.
There is no dispute that
insofar as the objective reasons for the termination of the
employee’s services were concerned, the employer
was
bona
fide.
[8] It is not clear whether the court
a quo actually found that Mr Swart had been assured, prior to the
interviews that he would
be successful or whether it found that Mr
Swart may have been under that impression. To the extent that the
court
a quo
did make a firm finding in this regard it was not, as indicated
earlier, permitted by the evidence. The employee’s legal
representative
submitted, during the course of argument, that the
employer should have done more. When asked to make concrete
suggestions as to
what else the employer could reasonably have done,
he was bereft of ideas. The employee’s legal representative was
constrained
to agree that had it been his client who had been
successful, rather than the other way round, that he would not be
able to submit
that there had been any unfairness.
[9]The case hinges therefore on
whether or not the requirements of
section 189
of the LRA were
properly complied with. It is common cause that there was no
applicable “
collective
agreement
” or “
workplace
forum
” or “
trade
union
”. The employee
raised no objection that any relevant information in terms of
section
189
(3) of the LRA had been withheld from him. The employee’s legal
representative was unable to suggest what relevant information
could
have been provided. In my opinion in only remaining question is
therefore whether a “meaningful joint consensus-seeking process”
(see subsection 189 (2) of the LRA) took place between the parties
between 4
th
and 11
th
September, 2000. In my opinion, more could not reasonably have been
expected from the employer in the circumstances. The employer
set out
its difficulties, it presented a proposal (with reasons) and this was
accepted by the employee. The employer considered the
employee’s
proposal regarding an early pension and this was, unavoidably,
rejected.
[10] In
S.A.
Clothing & Textile Workers Union & Others v Discreto- A
Division of Trump & Springbok Holdings
(1998) 19 ILJ 1451 (LAC) the court said at 1454I-1455A:
“ For the employee fairness is found in the requirement of
consultation prior to a final decision on retrenchment……The
function
of a court scrutinising the consultation process is …. to
pass judgment on whether the ultimate decision arrived at was genuine
and not merely a sham.”
[11] Suppose that the management
believed that, at the time of the interview on 5
th
September 2000, that Mr Swart stood a better chance of obtaining the
position. Does this mean that the whole process was a sham (’n
“skyn”) I do not think so. It is well known that the result of an
interview for a job opportunity is not necessarily a foregone
conclusion. The employer has discharged the burden of proof that the
reasons why the employee and Mr Swart were invited to apply
for the
new position were
bona fide
(“genuine”). As I have already said, the employee agreed with the
proposed procedures.
[12] The court
a
quo was
therefore wrong in
finding that the dismissal of the employee was unfair.
[13]
There is no reason why costs should not follow the result.
[14]
The following order is made:
The appeal is upheld;
The order of the court
a
quo
is set aside and the
following is substituted therefor:
“
The
application is dismissed with costs”
(3)
The respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the appeal
AFRIKAANS TRANSLATION
AFRIKAANSE
VERTALING
WILLIS
AR
:
[1] Die regsverteenwoordigersvan beide
die partye het die hof in Engels aangespreek. Ek neem kennis van die
feit dat hierdie uitspraak
wel gelees mag word deur ‘n wyer gehoor,
waarvan ‘n aantal lede onvertroud met Afrikaans mag wees. Ek het
dus my uitspraak in
Engels voorberei, Beide partye is
Afrikaans-sprekend; die stukke is in Afrikaans voorberei; die
getuienis is in Afrikaans gelei;
die uitspraak van die hof
a
quo
is in Afrikaans
gelewer; die Hoofde van Betoog in die appèl is in Afrikaans
voorberei; en die advokate vir beide partye is Afrikaans-sprekend.
In
die afwesigheid van enige duidelike taalbeleid in die howe, dink ek
dat dit toepaslik sal wees dat ‘n vertaling van hierdie
uitspraak
in Afrikaans gelewer word. Om diè rede het ek ’n Afrikaanse
vertaling van die uitspraak voorberei. Dit volg aan die
einde van die
uitspraak in Engels. Indien daar ‘n konflik is tussen die
Afrikaanse en die Engelse weergawes sal die Engelse weergawe
heers.
[2]
Die hof
a
quo
(
per
Revelas R) het bevind dat
die ontslag van die respondent
(applikant in die hof
a
quo) onbillik was en het
die volgende bevel gemaak:
“
1. Die applikant se diensbe
ëindiging
was onbillik.
2. Die respondent word
gelas om aan die applikant kompensasie ten bedrae van R196 846.20
synde twaalf maande se salaris te betaal.
3.
Die respondent word gelas om die koste van hierdie aansoek te
betaal.”
[3] Met verlof van die hof
a
quo
kom die werkgewer
(respondent in die hof a quo) in hoër beroep teen gemelde bevinding
en bevel. Gerieflikheidshalwe, sal ek na die
appellant as “die
werkgewer” en die respondent as “die werknemer” verwys.
[4]
Gedurende 1997 het Bokomo Koöp en Sasko (Edms) Beperk saamgesmelt om
die werkgewer te vorm. Diè feit het uiteindelik gelei
tot die
diensbeëindiging van die werknemer. Die werknemer se dienste is op
31 Oktober 2000 beëindig weens die werkgewer se bedryfsvereistes.
Die herstruktuering van die werkgewer was op alle tersaaklike tye
aan die gang.
[5] Op 4 September 2000 is die
werknemer meegedeel dat hy ‘n vergadering die volgende dag moet
bywoon. Die vergadering het wel plaasgevind.
Mnr Lourens, die
werkgewer se algemene bestuurder, mnr Koch die werkgewer se
verkoopsbestuurder in die Wes-Kaapse platteland, mnr
Leng die
werkgewer se menslike hulpbronne bestuurder, mnr Haasbroek die
werkgewer se verkoopsbestuurder in die Kaapse Metropool en
die
werknemer was teenwoordig gewees. Al die bogenoemde persone het in
die verhoor in die hof
a quo
getuig, behalwe mnr
Haasbroek. By hierdie vergadering is die volgende bespreek:
dat die bedryfsvereiste
van die werkgewer moontlik tot die samesmelting van die poste van
senior verteenwoordigerpos (op die stadium
beklee deur die
werknemer) en die besigheidsontwikkelingspos (op die stadium beklee
deur ‘n ene mnr Swart) tot een pos, wat
as `n “bemarkingpos”
sou bekend staan, kon lei;
‘
n voorstel dat die
werknemer en mnr Swart aansoek doen vir die nuwe pos;
dat die diens van die
onsuksesvolle kandidaat beëndig sou word omdat die kandidaat
oortollig sou wees.
Gedurende die vergadering is die
werknemer ‘n brief gegee in terme van artikel 189 (3) van die Wet
op Arbeidsverhoudinge nr 66 van
1995 soos gewysig (“die Wet”).
Die werknemer het, in beantwoording op wat aan hom oorgedra word, te
kenne gegee dat die samesmelting
van die twee poste vir hom sin maak,
en dat hy akkord sou gaan met die keuringsproses. Hy het nie op
daardie stadium enige ander
voorstelle gemaak nie. Op 6 September
2000 het hy skriftelik aansoek gedoen vir die nuut geskepte pos.
Terselfdetyd het hy ’n alternatiewe
voorstel aangaande ‘n
vervroegde pensioen geopper indien hy nie in die pos aangestel sou
word nie. Die werkgewer het geen volmag
gehad om die pensieon te
vervroeg nie. Op 7 September 2003 is die werknemer skiftelik deur die
werkgewer in kennis gestel dat die
aftreefonds se reëls dit nie so
toelaat nie. Op 8 September 2000 het die werknemer se onderhoud vir
die pos plaasgevind. Die werknemer
se aansoek was onsuksesvol. Hy is
op 11 September 2000 sodanig ingelig. Die pos is aan mnr Swart
toegeken. Dit is gemene saak dat
die werknemer en mnr Leng goed oor
die weg gekom het. Dit is ook gemene saak dat op daardie relevante
stadium daar geen ander geskikte
vakature in die groep was nie. Die
werknemer het self dit toegegee. Dit mag wel so wees dat bestuur ten
tye van die vergadering
op 5 September 2000 gedink het dat mnr Swart
’n beter kans gehad het om in die onderhoud suksesvol te wees. Die
hof
a quo
het dan ook tot die bevinding gekom. Nietemin, staan diè bevinding
in teenstryd met die getuienis van mnr Koch wat getuig het dat
die
twee kandidate, in sy opinie, ’n ewe goeie kans sou gehad het. Mnr
Leng het gesê dat werknemer wel oor die vaardighede beskik
het wat
nodig was vir die nuwe pos. Dit is dan ook verder noemenswaardig dat
mnr Swart, wat deur die werknemer geroep is, toegegee
het dat hy
nie die getuienis van mnr Lourens, dat sy doel met die onderhoude was
om vir die werknemer en mnr Swart gelyk te behandel,
kan betwis nie.
Mnr Swart het ook getuig dat hy geskok en onsteld was toe hy vertel
is dat die twee vakature saamgesmelt sou word
en dat hy en die
werknemer uitgenooi sou word om aansoek te doen vir die nuwe
vakatuur. Die blyk ‘n aandiuding te wees dat hy homself
nie seker
was dat hy die suksesvolle kandidaat sou wees alvorens die uitslag
aangekondig is nie. Mnr Swart het gesê, onder kruis
ondervraging,
dat hy nooit enige versekering gegee is alvorens die uitslag
aangekondig was dat hy suksesvol sou wees nie. Mnr Swart
is gevra
gedurende sy getuienis in hoof hoekom hy die ontslag van die
werknemer as onbillik sou beskou. Hy het ‘n aantal redes
gegee. Hy
het hoofsaaklik gesê dat hy dit as verkeerd beskou dat so ‘n
ordentlike persoon met ‘n goeie diens rekord by die wekgewer
sy
werk moet verloor. Dit was sonder twyfel hartseer en ongelukkig dat
die werknemer sy werk verloor het maar geen van Mnr Swart
se redes
sou neerkom op onbillikheid soos erken in die reg.
[6] Die werknemer is gedurende 1989
deur Bokomo Koöp as verteenwoordiger aangestel. Hy het dus meer as
tien jaar diens ten tye van
sy onderhoud op 7 September 2003 gehad.
Hy was 55 jaar oud op die stadium. Hy het ‘n uittredingspakket
ontvang. Die bedrag hiervan
is nie ter sake nie. In Oktober 2000, die
maand na sy afdanking het Die werknemer ‘n betrekking verkry by ‘n
mededinger van
die werkgewer Hy is deur beide sy ou en nuwe werkgewer
betaal hierdie maand. Gedurende die verhoor van die saak het dit
duidelik
geword dat die werknemer basies voortdurent werk gehad het
vanaf die beëndiging van sy dienskontrak met die werkgewer.
[7] Die werknemer se saak is dat hy
gekonfronteer is met ’n
fait
accompli
en dat hy sy reg tot behoorlike konsultasie en behoorlike oorweging
van alternatiewe en versagtende oplossings ontsê is. Daar is
betoog,
namens die werkmemer dat die bestuur tot ‘n besluit gekom het al
voorens die onderhoude plaasgevind het en dat die werknemer
die een
sou wees wat sy werk sou verloor. Daar is geen direkte getuienis in
diervoege nie. Die feite bewys dwing nie ‘n mens om
slegs tot
hierdie gevolgtrekking te kom as ‘n noodwendige afleiding nie.
Mnr Swart het op een stadium beweer dat hy onder die
indruk was dat
hy suksesvol sou wees omdat hy beter bekwaam was maar dit regverdig
nie die afleiding soos betoog is deur die werknemer
nie. Vervolgens
word die afleiding ondergrawe deur Mnr Swart se eie getuienis
aangaaande sy senuweeagtigheid op daardie tydstip.
Die werknemer
het nie vir heraanstelling in die verhoor gevra nie. Hy het slegs om
vergoeding gevra. Die hof
a
quo
het, na aanleiding van
bogenoemde feite, in die guns van die werknemer bevind. Die geleerde
regter het bevind dat die onderhoude
‘n “skyn” was. Daar is
geen geskilpunt aangaande die objektiewe redes vir die
diensbeëindiging van die werknemer dat die
werkgewer
bona
fide
was.
[8] Dit is nie duidelik
of die hof a quo eintlik bevind het dat Mnr Swart wel verseker was,
alvorens die onderhoude, dat hy suksesvol
sou wees of dat dit bevind
is dat Mnr Swart onder die indruk mag verkeer het. Dat die hof a quo
dermate wel tot die vaste bevinding
gekom het in die verband, was die
hof nie, soos vroeër aantoon is, toegelaat na aanleiding van die
getuienis nie. Die werknemer
se regsverteenwoordiger het betoog,
gedurende in die loop van sy argument, dat die werkgewer meer moes
gedoen het. Toe hy gevra is
om tasbare voorstelle te maak oor wat die
werkgewer redelikerwys kon gedoen het, is hy stom geslaan. Die
werknemer se regsverteenwoordiger
is gedwing om saam te stem dat
indien sy klient suksesvol sou gewees het, in plaas van anders om,
hy geen bewering sou kon opper
dat daar enige onbillikheid was nie.
[9] Die saak berus dus op die vraag of
die vereistes van artikel 189 van die Wet behoorlik nagekom is of
nie. Dit is gemeensaak dat
daar geen toepaslike “
collective
agreement
” of “
workplace
forum
” of “
trade
union
” was nie. Die
werknemer het geen beswaar geopper dat enige relevante inligting in
terme van artikel 189(3) van die Wet van hom
weerhou is nie. Die
werknemer se regsverteenwoordiger was nie in staat on enige
voostelle te maak aangaande informasie wat verskaf
sou kon word nie.
Na my mening is die enigste oorblywende vraag dus of daar ’n
“meaningful joint consensus-seeking process”
(sien sub-artikel
189 (2) van die Wet) tussen 4 en 11 September 2000 onder die partye
plaasgevind het of nie. Myns insiens, in diè
omstandighede, kon daar
nie meer, redeliker wys, van die werkgewer, verwag word nie. Die
werkgewer het sy probleme uiteengesit, sy
voorstel (met redes) gegee
en diè is deur die werknemer aanvaar. Die werknemer se voorstel om
’n vervroegde pensioen is deur
the werkgewer oorweeg en is
onvermydelik verwerp.
[9] In
S.A.
Clothing & Textile Workers Union & Others v Discreto- A
Division of Trump & Springbok Holdings
(1998) 19 ILJ 1451 (LAC) het die hof te 1454I-1455A gesê:
“ For the employee fairness is found in the requirement of
consultation prior to a final decision on retrenchment……The
function
of a court scrutinising the consultation process is …. to
pass judgment on whether the ultimate decision arrived at was genuine
and not merely a sham.”
[10] Veronderstel dat die bestuur
geglo het, ten tye van die onderhoud op 5 September 2000, dat mnr
Swart ‘n beter kans sou staan
om die pos te verkry. Beteken dìt
dat die hele proses ’n skyn (“sham”) was? Ek dink nie so nie.
Dit is welbekend dat die uitslag
van ’n onderhoud om ‘n
werksgeleentheid nie noodwendig ‘n vooruitgemaakte saak is nie.
Die werkgewer het die bewyslas gekwyt
dat die redes waarom die
werknemer en mnr Swart uitgenooi is om aansoek te doen vir die nuwe
pos,
bona fide
(“
genuine
”)
was. Soos ek reeds gesê het, het die werknemer met die voorgestelde
prosedures saamgestem.
[11] Die hof
a
quo
het dus gefouteer in
die bevinding dat die ontslag van die werknemer onbillik was.
[12]
Daar is geen rede waarom kostes nie die uitslag moet volg nie.
[13]
Die volgende bevel word gemaak:
Die appèl slaag;
Die bevel van die hof
a
quo
word ter syde gestel
en word met die volgende vervang:
“
Die aansoek word met
koste afgewys.”
Die respondent word
gelas om die koste van die appèl te betaal.
DATED IN JOHANNESBURG THIS
DAY OF
GEDATEER
TE JOHANNESBURG HIERDIE DAG VAN
SEPTEMBER
2003.
N.P.WILLIS
JUDGE OF THE LABOUR APPEAL COURT
REGTER VAN DIE ARBEIDSAPPÈLHOF
I agree. The decision to
render the judgment in English with an Afrikaans translation was
that of my brother Willis JA alone. I express
no view as regard to
language practise in a case such as this.

(Ek stem saam. Die besluit om
die uitspraak in Engels te lewer met ’n Afrikaanse vertaling was
die van my ampsbroer Willis AR alleenlik.
Ek spreek geen mening uit
aangaande taalgebruik in ’n geval soos die nie. )
R.M. ZONDO
JUDGE PRESIDENT OF THE LABOUR
APPEAL COURT REGTER-PRESIDENT VAN DIE ARBEIDSAPPÈLHOF
I agree. I too express no
view as to language policy. (Ek
stem saam. Ek spreek ook geen mening
uit aangaande taalbeleid nie.)
C. R. NICHOLSON
JUDGE
OF THE LABOUR APPEAL COURT
REGTER VAN DIE ARBEIDSAPPÈLHOF
Appellant’s
Counsel:
A.C.
Oosthuizen SC
Appellant se Advokaat:
A.C. Oosthuizen SC
Appellant’sAttorneys:
Deneys Reitz Inc.
Appellant
se Prokureurs: Deneys Reitz Ingelyf
Respondent’s
Attorneys: Willem Jacobs & Associates
Respondent se Prokureurs:
Willem Jacobs & Assosiate
Date van appeal: 21
st
August 2003
Datum
van appèl: 21 Augustus 2003
Date of judgment: 23
December 2003
Datum van uitspraak: