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[2001] ZALAC 7
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Department of Justice v Hartzenberg (JA16/00) [2001] ZALAC 7; 2002 (1) SA 103 (LAC); [2001] 9 BLLR 986 (LAC); (2001) 22 ILJ 1806 (LAC) (5 June 2001)
15
IN THE LABOUR APPEAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
HELD AT JOHANNESBURG
Case No: JA16/00
In the matter between :
The Department of Justice Appellant
and
Heidi Hartzenberg Respondent
JUDGMENT
COMRIE A.J.A:
The
respondent was formerly employed as a prosecutor in the Department
of Justice. She was stationed in the specialist
commercial branch at the Pretoria Magistrates Court. In
the latter part of September 1995 she fell
pregnant.
With effect from January 1996 she was assigned to the
training post in the same branch, which meant
that she
was relieved of her duties as prosecutor. In early March 1996
she resigned from the public service
on 24
hours notice. Thereafter she instituted proceedings in the
Industrial Court. In essence her case was that
although she had
resigned, she had in reality been constructively dismissed in
circumstances amounting to an unfair
labour practice. It is
not necessary for the purposes of this judgment to set out all
the details. I should mention, however,
that they included,
but were not confined to an allegation that on account of
her pregnancy, she was forced by
her superiors to accept the
training post, which was much against her will and made her
most unhappy.
The
case eventually came to trial before an additional member
of the Industrial Court, Mrs . Grobbelaar. Both
sides were
represented by counsel. It was heard in two stages : first
the âmerits,â and then the quantum
.The court
a quo
found in favour of the respondent on the merits, and at
the second stage awarded the respondent compensation
in the
sum of R 70449,00. Costs of two counsel and of an
actuarywere allowed.
3. The Department appealed.
4. The appeal initially came before this Court on 16 November
2000. It appeared that several of the cassettes,
on
which much of the oral evidence had been recorded,
were missing. In consequence the Department, as appellant,
had failed to place a proper and complete record of appeal
before this Court. Furthermore, the Department
had not
by then taken steps mero motu to put together a
reconstructed record of the missing parts. The Court
made an
order to the effect that the Department was given one month
within which to compile a reconstructed
record, failing
which the appeal would be deemed to be dismissed with
costs.
5. Despite strenuous effort by Mr. Duvenage of the
State Attorneyâs Office, the Department was unable to
comply timeously, and an attempted reconstruction was only
presented in the new year. The sources for the
attempt
were counselâs incomplete and cryptic notes. Mrs. Grobbelaar
cannot find her own bench notes; she has
either
not kept them or she has mislaid them. The
missing evidence all relates to the first
stage of
the hearing, ie on the merits. The respondent testified
first. Her evidence in chief (running
to nearly 40
pages) is fully recorded and transcribed. That is where
it stops. Her cross-examination and
re-examination is
lost, save for the reconstruction (35 less than closely
typed pages). The Department
called four witnesses,
namely Adv .Dicker, Mr. Bezuidenhout, Ms. Kannemeyer and
Ms. Humphries. Their testimony,
in all its stages, is also
lost, save for the reconstruction(which runs to some 45 pages,
again less than closely
typed ). It is stated in the
affidavits that the Departmentâs witnesses gave their
evidence over a period of the
best part of two days. Even if
this period included the respondentâs cross-examination and
re-examination, the whole
reconstruction covers a mere 83
widely spaced pages.
6. It is not open to question that the attempted reconstruction
is hopelessly inadequate for the proper determination
of
this appeal, which turns in significant part on credibility.
Mrs. Grobbelaar, who has viewed the reconstruction,
is not prepared
to certify it as true and correct. I attach no blame to her, or
to the parties or to the legal representatives.
It is evident that
they have done their best and that a satisfactory version will
not be forthcoming. Despite a diligent
search, the missing
cassettes cannot be found, and there is no suggestion that
they will come to light in the
foreseeable future.
7. What are we to do now ? I do not think we are bound by the
order that was
granted by this Court on 16 November 2000. That order was
interlocutory in nature. It was made before reconstruction
was
attempted,
and while a proper reconstruction was believed to be feasible. It
is true that the Department was out of time in filing
the
attempted reconstruction, but the delay was not undue and in
my view has been adequately explained. We know now
what the
Court on 16 November did not know, that a proper reconstruction
cannot be achieved. That is the central feature, and
it would be
wrong in the circumstances to penalise
the Department (by dismissing the appeal or confirming its
dismissal) on account of a relatively minor and
understandable
delay.
8. Rules of Court commonly provide for the lodging by an
appellant of a full or complete and correct appeal
record
within a specified time. Rule 5 (7) of this Court requires
a copy of the record of the proceedings in the
Court
a quo
. Rules 5(10)(f), (g) and (h) provide:
â Every copy of the record must -
include
the judgment given by the Labour Court;
(g) contain a correct and complete index of the evidence
and of all the documents and exhibits in the case, the date
and
nature of the exhibits being briefly stated in the index;
(h) contain only those documents that were referred to in
any proceedings in the Labour Courtâ.
Rule 5(15) provides:
âAny
reference in the record of evidence of any
witness to any document or exhibit contained in the
appeal record must reflect, in brackets in the margin
opposite the reference, the page number in the appeal
record of such documents or exhibitâ
Rules 5 (12) and (16) deal with specified omissions from a record.
9. Although not expressly stipulated, it is implicit in Rule 5 that
the appealrecord to be lodged by an appellant, must be a complete
and correct record
subject to permissible omissions. Rule 5 (17) provides that if
an appellant fails to lodge the record timeously,
then
âthe appellant will be deemed to have withdrawn the
appealâunless an extension of time is granted. Rule 5
does
not deal with the particular position which presents itself here,
namely that a complete and correct record cannot be lodged.
In
Waverley Blankets Ltd and Others; Waverley Blankets Ltd v
Sithukuza and Others
(1999) 20 ILJ 2564 (LAC)
an
application to condone the late filing of the appeal record was
refused by this Court. There was, however, no
suggestion
that a proper record could not be lodged. The decision is thus
distinguishable.
10. The position with regard to criminal appeals from the
magistrates courts
was settled in
S v Joubert
[1990] ZASCA 113
;
1991 (1) SA 119
(A)
,
where the appeal record could not be reconstructed. It should be
borne in mind that in criminal appeals the State has duty to
safekeep the record at first instance, and the duty to transmit it.
It was held that the Stateâs failure to discharge these
duties
prejudiced an accused in that it frustrated this right of appeal,
and that he was consequently entitled to an acquittal.
The
âreplicaâ principle was enunciated at 126 A. See
S v K
1991
(2) SACR 190
(B)
where the frustration principle
is well illustrated.
11. In civil appeals, however, the position is less than
clear. With the
exception of
Beaumont v Anderson
1949 (3) SA
562
(N),
I have not found a case directly in point. The case
law establishes that it is the duty of an appellantâs attorney to
lodge
a complete and correct record timeously; and to ensure that
the evidence is fully transcribed, and the exhibits and judgment
included. Upon actual or contemplated failure to comply in time,
the appellant is expected to bring a substantive application
for
condonation as soon as possible. It is normally a requirement that
the appellantâs prospects of success on appeal be
canvassed.
Failing such application, or if it is refused, the usual
order is that the appeal be struck from the roll,
although some
rules (including Rule 5(17) of this Court) provide that the
appeal is deemed to be withdrawn. A punitive costs
order is
sometimes granted. See
Kahn v Radyn
1949 (4) SA
552
(C);
Nicolâs Motor Works v Breytenbach
1953 (4) SA 1
(T);
Anastassiades v Argus Printing and
Publishing Co. Ltd
1955 (2) SA 349
(T);
Bekker
v Dawkins Steenmakery
1959 (1) SA 32
(T);
Mashaba
v Engelbrecht
1959 (1) SA 34
(T);
Van Der Riet
v Rheeder
1965 (3) SA 712
(O);
Senator
Versekerings Maatskappy Bpk v Lawrence
1982 (3) SA 132
(A);
Rennie NO v Gordon and Another NNO
1988
(1) SA 1
(A);
Rennie v Kamby Farms (Pty) Ltd
1989 (2) SA 124
(A);
SA Broadcasting Corporation v
Corrective Action Holdings (Pty) Ltd t/a Mass Media Marketing
1999 (3) SA 601
(W)
and the case cited at 602;
Dos Santos v
Unibank Ltd
2000 (1) SA 801
(W);
Mamabolo v
Rustenburg Regional
Local Council
[2000] ZASCA 133
;
2001 (1) SA
135
(S C A).
In the numerous cases
which I have cited,
there
is not a single instance where it was
suggested that material portions
of the record had been lost and could
not be reconstructed.
12.
Beaumont v Anderson
, supra, was an
appeal from the magistrates court. The pages of the handwritten
record of the plaintiffs evidence in chief
were lost, it would
seem irretrievably, with the consequence that the magistrate was
unable to furnish his reasons for judgment.
Broome J
pointed out that the appellant had a statutory right of appeal which
had been frustrated through no fault of his own. On
the other
hand the respondent had a judgment in his favour. The Court
declined to remit the case for hearing
de novo,
which
it thought would be unfair to the respondent, who had a
judgment in his favour. It continued:
â
His alternative prayer is that the case be
remitted to the
magistrate to re-hear the evidence of the plaintiff,
and that
is, in my opinion, the best way out of the
difficulty. A
similar course was followed in the case of
EX
PARTE
FIRTH
(46 LT 120)â.
13. While that course may have commended itself
to the Court on the
facts of that case, it would in my opinion be
entirely inappropriate in the present matter. It would
mean re
- hearing most of the evidence including, it
seems to me, the cross-examination of the respondent.
Credibility was important in this case, and her
credibility was as much at stake as that of the Departmentâs
witnesses.
It may also be asking too much of Mrs . Grobbelaar to
disabuse her mind of the perceptions which she has already
formed
of the witnesses. And it may perhaps be asking too much
of the Department to expect it to have confidence in
her ability to do so.
It is, of course, not feasible to remit only part of
the case on the merits for re - hearing before a differently
constituted
court.
14. An alternative course advanced by
Mr.
Pretorius
,
who led for the appellant, would be to
remit the matter to Mrs. Grobbelaar for a
âreconstructionâ hearing. The
object of this exercise, he
explained, would
be to ascertain a complete and correct reconstruction.
There was little, if any dispute about what each of the
Departmentâs
four witnesses said in chief. So the
respondent, and each of the Departmentâs witnesses, would
be taken through
their previous cross-examinations and
re- examinations within the parameters disclosed by the various
handwritten
notes. No ânewâ cross-examination would be
permitted, but only questions relating to their previous testimony.
Mr. Pretorius
pointed out that all five witnesses
were still available, and that the Departmentâs witnesses have
deposed to affidavits
in which they comment on the attempted
reconstruction. There would thus be little or no scope for them
to tailor their evidence. The course proposed by
counsel is thus a variation on and extension of what was done in
Beaumont v Anderson,
supra.
15. I fear that such an endeavour is
likely to prove counter productive. There is every
prospect
that it will produce a host of new
disputes. Moreover, there is a real prospect that at the end of
the enquiry
Mrs . Grobbelaar may still find herself unable to
certify. Even if she does certify, it may not be possible to
eliminate
all disputes, in which event this Court may be asked
to resolve them. I am persuaded that the proposal is too risky,
and
that it would be inadvisable for us to adopt it in the
circumstances of this case.
16. What remains is a choice: either to let the
judgment in the respondentâsfavour stand, or to set it aside
and to refer
the matter for hearing
de
novo
. If
the judgment is allowed to stand, then the Departmentâs right of
appeal will be completely frustrated, thereby
prejudicing it. A remittal, on the other hand, will deprive the
respondent of
her judgment and will lead to the parties
incurring more costs. This may be especially hard on the
respondent,
who is an individual and who may not be possessed of
adequate funds.
Mr Bam
, who led for the
respondent, submitted that his client would be unduly
prejudiced by a remittal. He mentioned the matters
to which I have referred, as also the need for
finality and, in labour cases, expedition. He pointed to some
delay on
the part of the Departmentâs attorney in attempting to
rectify the position prior to thehearing of the appeal on 16
November
2000, though an appropriate costs
order was made on that occasion. Counsel pointed to
the possibility that a
trial
de novo
may lead to another appeal. He
suggested that in having totestify again, the respondent would
undergo further âtraumaâ. Finally,
he borrowed from the
criminal appeals and submitted that it was the Stateâs fault that
the tapes were missing. In evaluating
prejudice, he said,
such fault was a weighty consideration.
17. I deal with the last point first. It was not the
appellant Departmentâs fault
that the tapes were lost. The responsibility for
their safekeeping rested on
the Department of Labour. It would be too far
reaching, in my opinion, to carry any such fault from one
department of State
to another. Moreover, we do not know
the circumstances of the loss, so that it is difficult to
assess fault
or its extent. Certainly, the State should not be
blamed for the fact that Mrs. Grobbelaarâs notes are no longer
extant.
There is no merit in the âtraumaâ argument, but the
other points raised by
Mr. Bam
are not without
force. On balance, however, it appears to me that the
Departmentâs right of appeal is the overriding
consideration.
As has been pointed out, all the witnesses are
available. If the matter is remitted for re - trial the respondent
may prove her
case once again, in which event her position in
regard to costs will be safeguarded. But if the
appeal is dismissed, the Department will lose the
opportunity of persuading
this Court that the trial Court erred. It will be fixed
with liability in the sum
of R 70449,00 (plus costs) and with a finding that it
constructively dismissed the respondent, results which might have
not been
sustained on
appeal. It is always unfortunate when a re - trial has
to be ordered, but it seems to me to represent the lesser inequity.
A re
-trial in this respect means a re-hearing on all aspects of the
case.
18. The Industrial Court no longer operates save to
finalise part-heard matters
In other pending matters that courtâs functions are
now performed by the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and
Arbitration.
See item 22 A of schedule 7 to the
Labour Relations Act
66 of 1995
read with Government Notice no.R214 promulgated in
Government Gazette dated 19 February 1999.I do not regard the
present matter
as part-heard. It follows that the case must be
remitted to the Commission. In a letter before the Court, the
National Senior Commissioner
expresses regret for what has happened
and offers to make available a commissioner who is experienced in
Industrial Court matters
to try the case
de novo
.
With
regard to costs,
Mr Pretorius
properly conceded that
the Department
should be liable for the costs of the hearing on 16 November 2000,
which
were in a sense wasted. For the rest, I am of the view that it would
be fair
to order that the costs at first instance and on appeal be in the
cause of the
re-trial.
20. The following order is made:
The judgments and orders of the Court
a quo
are set
aside and the matter is referred to the Commission for
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration for re-hearing
de novo
before a commissioner (other than Mrs Grobbelaar);
The appellant is to pay the costs of the hearing before this
Court on the 16 November 2000 on the basis then ordered. All
other costs at first instance and on appeal are to be costs in
the re-hearing contemplated in para 1 above.
____________________
R.G.
Comrie
Acting
Judge of Appeal
I agree
_________________
RMM
Zondo
Judge
President
I agree
_________________
K. van
Dijkhorst
Acting
Judge of Appeal
For the Appellant: Adv. G.C. Pretorius SC and Adv. L. Bolt
Instructed by: The State Attorney, Pretoria
For the Respondent: Adv. A.J. Bam SC and Adv. C. Pretorius
Instructed by: Messrs Maartens & Huysamen, Pretoria.
Date of Argument: 5 June 2001
Date of
Judgment: