Department of Justice v Hartzenberg (JA16/00) [2001] ZALAC 7; 2002 (1) SA 103 (LAC) (5 June 2001)

80 Reportability

Brief Summary

Labour Law — Constructive dismissal — Employee alleging constructive dismissal due to pregnancy-related discrimination — Employee resigns and claims unfair labour practice — Appeal by employer against finding of constructive dismissal and compensation awarded — Incomplete record of proceedings due to missing evidence — Court unable to determine appeal on merits due to inadequate reconstruction of record — Appeal dismissed as proper record cannot be lodged.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The proceedings were an appeal to the Labour Appeal Court arising from an earlier decision of the Industrial Court. The appeal was brought by the Department of Justice as appellant against Heidi Hartzenberg as respondent.


The respondent had been employed as a prosecutor in the Department of Justice and, after her resignation, she instituted proceedings in the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court (per an additional member, Mrs Grobbelaar) heard the matter in two stages, dealing first with the merits and thereafter with quantum. On the merits, the court found in favour of the respondent. At the quantum stage it awarded compensation of R70 449,00 and allowed costs including the costs of two counsel and an actuary.


The appeal initially came before the Labour Appeal Court on 16 November 2000. At that hearing, it emerged that several cassettes containing the recording of much of the oral evidence were missing, with the result that the appellant had not placed a proper and complete record before the appeal court. The court made an interlocutory order affording the Department a month to compile a reconstructed record, failing which the appeal would be deemed dismissed with costs. The matter returned to the Labour Appeal Court after an attempted reconstruction proved unsuccessful and inadequate.


In substance, the underlying dispute concerned an allegation of constructive dismissal (advanced as an unfair labour practice) arising from the respondent’s resignation. However, the Labour Appeal Court’s decision ultimately turned not on the merits of the alleged constructive dismissal, but on the procedural and remedial consequences of an incomplete appeal record that could not be properly reconstructed.


Material Facts


The respondent was formerly employed by the Department of Justice as a prosecutor in the specialist commercial branch at the Pretoria Magistrates’ Court. In late September 1995 she became pregnant. With effect from January 1996, she was assigned to a training post in the same branch, which meant she was relieved of her prosecutorial duties. In early March 1996, she resigned from the public service on 24 hours’ notice.


After resigning, the respondent instituted proceedings in the Industrial Court. Her case, in essence, was that despite the resignation she had in reality been constructively dismissed, and that this occurred in circumstances amounting to an unfair labour practice. Among the allegations referred to in the Labour Appeal Court’s judgment was that, on account of her pregnancy, she was forced by superiors to accept the training post against her will, causing her unhappiness. The Labour Appeal Court did not determine the merits of these factual allegations in the appeal before it, because the appeal could not be properly adjudicated without a complete record.


The Industrial Court heard evidence on the merits. The respondent testified first. Her evidence-in-chief (nearly 40 pages) was fully recorded and transcribed, but the record then stopped. The respondent’s cross-examination and re-examination were missing, save for an attempted reconstruction. The Department called four witnesses (Adv Dicker, Mr Bezuidenhout, Ms Kannemeyer, and Ms Humphries). Their testimony was also missing, save for the attempted reconstruction.


It was undisputed before the Labour Appeal Court that the attempted reconstruction was inadequate. It was compiled from counsel’s incomplete and cryptic notes. Mrs Grobbelaar could not find her bench notes and was not prepared to certify the reconstruction as true and correct. The missing evidence related to the merits stage, and the appeal was understood to turn significantly on credibility. Despite a diligent search, the missing cassettes could not be found and there was no indication they would be recovered.


It was also placed before the Labour Appeal Court that the Industrial Court no longer operated save to finalise part-heard matters, and that pending matters were now performed by the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA). The Labour Appeal Court did not regard this matter as part-heard.


Legal Issues


The central legal question was the appropriate course for the Labour Appeal Court where a party’s right of appeal could not be meaningfully exercised because a complete and correct record could not be produced and a proper reconstruction was not achievable.


This required the court to determine, as a matter of procedural law and remedial discretion, what should be done when an appeal turns on credibility but the record is materially incomplete. The dispute before the Labour Appeal Court concerned the application of procedural principles (including rules regarding appeal records and reconstruction) to the circumstances of the missing record, and involved an evaluative balancing of prejudice in selecting a remedy.


A further issue was whether the Labour Appeal Court was bound by its earlier interlocutory order of 16 November 2000 (which contemplated dismissal if reconstruction was not produced timeously), given that it had later become apparent that a proper reconstruction could not be achieved.


Court’s Reasoning


The Labour Appeal Court approached the matter from the premise that an appeal court generally requires a proper and complete record to determine an appeal, particularly where credibility findings are important. It accepted that the attempted reconstruction was “hopelessly inadequate” for the proper determination of the appeal and emphasised that the trial court member (Mrs Grobbelaar) was not prepared to certify it. The court regarded the absence of a reliable record as decisive because the missing portions related to the merits, and the appeal turned significantly on credibility.


On the earlier interlocutory order, the court held it was not bound by the order made on 16 November 2000. It characterised that order as interlocutory, made at a time when reconstruction was believed feasible. The court accepted that the Department’s reconstruction was late, but considered the delay not undue and adequately explained. The court treated the key change in circumstances as the later realisation that a proper reconstruction could not be achieved, and it considered it wrong to penalise the appellant by dismissing the appeal due to a relatively minor delay when the fundamental problem was the irretrievable incompleteness of the record.


The court then located the issue within the Labour Appeal Court Rules, particularly Rule 5, noting that while Rule 5 does not expressly address the situation where a complete record cannot be lodged, it implicitly requires that an appeal record must be a complete and correct record subject to permissible omissions. The court referred to Waverley Blankets Ltd and Others; Waverley Blankets Ltd v Sithukuza and Others (1999) 20 ILJ 2564 (LAC) as distinguishable because, in that matter, there was no suggestion that a proper record could not be lodged.


The court considered comparative authority. It discussed the criminal appeal position as settled in S v Joubert [1990] ZASCA 113; 1991 (1) SA 119 (A), where an appeal record could not be reconstructed and the failure frustrated an accused’s right of appeal, entitling the accused to an acquittal. The court noted the “replica” principle and also referred to S v K 1991 (2) SACR 190 (B) as illustrating the frustration principle. However, the court treated the criminal appeal approach as context-specific, particularly because of the State’s duties in criminal proceedings and the nature of the relief (acquittal). It regarded the civil appeal position as less clear.


In surveying civil authority, the court cited a line of cases establishing that it is generally the duty of an appellant’s attorney to lodge a complete and correct record timeously and to seek condonation if compliance is not possible. It observed that, in the cited civil cases, there was no instance in which it had been suggested that material parts of the record were lost and could not be reconstructed, thereby limiting their direct application to the present facts.


The court considered Beaumont v Anderson 1949 (3) SA 562 (N), a matter where portions of a magistrates’ court record were lost and the magistrate was unable to furnish reasons. In that case, the court had declined to order a hearing de novo and instead remitted the case for the magistrate to re-hear only the plaintiff’s evidence, referencing EX PARTE FIRTH (46 LT 120). The Labour Appeal Court held that such a partial re-hearing would be inappropriate in the present matter because it would entail re-hearing most of the evidence, including the respondent’s cross-examination, and because credibility was important with both sides’ witnesses implicated. It further expressed concern about requiring the original presiding officer to revisit evidence after having formed perceptions of witnesses, and noted the infeasibility of remitting only part of the merits to a differently constituted court.


The court then addressed an alternative proposal advanced for the appellant: remitting the matter to Mrs Grobbelaar for a “reconstruction hearing” in which witnesses would be taken through prior cross-examination and re-examination within the parameters of notes, without any new cross-examination. The court rejected this proposal as too risky. It reasoned that the attempt might generate new disputes, might still fail to yield certification, and might invite the appeal court to resolve disputes about the reconstruction—an outcome the court regarded as inadvisable.


Having rejected these intermediate options, the court stated that the remaining choice was between allowing the respondent’s judgment to stand (thereby frustrating the Department’s right of appeal) or setting it aside and referring the matter for hearing de novo (thereby depriving the respondent of the existing judgment and causing additional costs and delay). The court weighed prejudice. It considered the respondent’s submissions regarding finality, expedition in labour matters, alleged delay by the Department’s attorney, the possibility of further appeal, and an asserted “trauma” in testifying again. It also considered the contention that it was the State’s fault the tapes were missing.


On fault, the court held it was not the appellant Department’s fault that the tapes were lost; the responsibility for safekeeping rested on the Department of Labour. It considered it too far-reaching to attribute fault across state departments in the manner suggested. It also noted the circumstances of the loss were unknown and that the State should not be blamed for the absence of Mrs Grobbelaar’s notes. The court rejected the trauma argument, but accepted that other prejudice points had some force. Nonetheless, it concluded that the appellant’s right of appeal was the overriding consideration. It reasoned that all witnesses remained available, and that if the matter were remitted, the respondent could again prove her case and would have her position on costs safeguarded; whereas if the appeal were dismissed, the Department would be fixed with a monetary liability and an adverse constructive dismissal finding that might not have been sustained on appeal. On this evaluative balance, the court found that a re-trial represented the “lesser inequity,” and clarified that it meant a re-hearing on all aspects of the case.


Finally, the court addressed the institutional consequence that the Industrial Court no longer operated except for part-heard matters. Relying on item 22A of Schedule 7 to the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 read with Government Notice No R214 published in the Government Gazette dated 19 February 1999, the court held the matter was not part-heard and therefore must be remitted to the CCMA. It recorded a letter indicating the National Senior Commissioner’s regret and an offer to make available an experienced commissioner to try the case de novo.


On costs, the court accepted a concession that the Department should pay the costs of the hearing on 16 November 2000 as those costs were wasted. For the remainder, it considered it fair that costs at first instance and on appeal should be costs in the cause of the re-hearing.


Outcome and Relief


The Labour Appeal Court set aside the judgments and orders of the Industrial Court and referred the matter to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration for a re-hearing de novo before a commissioner other than Mrs Grobbelaar.


The appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the hearing before the Labour Appeal Court on 16 November 2000 on the basis then ordered. All other costs at first instance and on appeal were ordered to be costs in the re-hearing.


Cases Cited


Waverley Blankets Ltd and Others; Waverley Blankets Ltd v Sithukuza and Others (1999) 20 ILJ 2564 (LAC).


S v Joubert [1990] ZASCA 113; 1991 (1) SA 119 (A).


S v K 1991 (2) SACR 190 (B).


Beaumont v Anderson 1949 (3) SA 562 (N).


EX PARTE FIRTH (46 LT 120).


Kahn v Radyn 1949 (4) SA 552 (C).


Nicol’s Motor Works v Breytenbach 1953 (4) SA 1 (T).


Anastassiades v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd 1955 (2) SA 349 (T).


Bekker v Dawkins Steenmakery 1959 (1) SA 32 (T).


Mashaba v Engelbrecht 1959 (1) SA 34 (T).


Van Der Riet v Rheeder 1965 (3) SA 712 (O).


Senator Versekerings Maatskappy Bpk v Lawrence 1982 (3) SA 132 (A).


Rennie NO v Gordon and Another NNO 1988 (1) SA 1 (A).


Rennie v Kamby Farms (Pty) Ltd 1989 (2) SA 124 (A).


SA Broadcasting Corporation v Corrective Action Holdings (Pty) Ltd t/a Mass Media Marketing 1999 (3) SA 601 (W).


Dos Santos v Unibank Ltd 2000 (1) SA 801 (W).


Mamabolo v Rustenburg Regional Local Council [2000] ZASCA 133; 2001 (1) SA 135 (SCA).


Legislation Cited


Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, item 22A of Schedule 7.


Government Notice No R214, Government Gazette dated 19 February 1999.


Rules of Court Cited


Labour Appeal Court Rule 5(7).


Labour Appeal Court Rule 5(10)(f), Rule 5(10)(g), and Rule 5(10)(h).


Labour Appeal Court Rule 5(15).


Labour Appeal Court Rule 5(12) and Rule 5(16).


Labour Appeal Court Rule 5(17).


Held


The Labour Appeal Court held that the attempted reconstruction of the missing portions of the record was inadequate and could not be certified as complete and correct, and that the appeal could not be properly determined because the missing evidence related to the merits and credibility issues.


It held that it was not bound by its earlier interlocutory order made when reconstruction had been thought feasible, and that the overriding consideration was the appellant’s right of appeal, which would otherwise be frustrated.


It held that the appropriate remedy was to set aside the Industrial Court’s judgment and order and to remit the matter for a full re-hearing de novo, and that because the Industrial Court no longer functioned for pending matters of this kind, the re-hearing had to take place before the CCMA before a commissioner other than the original presiding officer.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A party prosecuting an appeal bears the procedural obligation, under the applicable rules, to provide a complete and correct appeal record, subject only to permissible omissions, and an appeal court may be unable to adjudicate an appeal where material portions of the record are missing and credibility is central.


An interlocutory order regulating steps for reconstruction of a record may be revisited where later developments show that the assumptions underlying the order (such as the feasibility of proper reconstruction) were incorrect, and where adherence would produce an unjust result.


Where a civil appeal record is materially incomplete and cannot be properly reconstructed, and where the appeal cannot be fairly determined, the appeal court may be required to choose between allowing the existing judgment to stand (frustrating the right of appeal) and setting aside the judgment with a remittal for a hearing de novo; that choice involves an evaluative balancing of prejudice.


In selecting the appropriate remedy, the court may consider fault and responsibility for the loss of the record, but it will assess fault on the established facts and will not readily attribute responsibility across different state departments without a proper basis.


Where institutional changes have transferred the functions of a former tribunal, the appropriate forum for a rehearing will be determined by the applicable transitional provisions, and the matter may be remitted to the successor institution for a hearing de novo.

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[2001] ZALAC 7
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Department of Justice v Hartzenberg (JA16/00) [2001] ZALAC 7; 2002 (1) SA 103 (LAC); [2001] 9 BLLR 986 (LAC); (2001) 22 ILJ 1806 (LAC) (5 June 2001)

15
IN THE LABOUR APPEAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
HELD AT JOHANNESBURG
Case No: JA16/00
In the matter between :
The Department of Justice Appellant
and
Heidi Hartzenberg Respondent
JUDGMENT
COMRIE A.J.A:
The
respondent was formerly employed as a prosecutor in the Department
of Justice. She was stationed in the specialist

commercial branch at the Pretoria Magistrates Court. In
the latter part of September 1995 she fell
pregnant.
With effect from January 1996 she was assigned to the
training post in the same branch, which meant
that she
was relieved of her duties as prosecutor. In early March 1996
she resigned from the public service
on 24
hours notice. Thereafter she instituted proceedings in the
Industrial Court. In essence her case was that
although she had
resigned, she had in reality been constructively dismissed in
circumstances amounting to an unfair
labour practice. It is
not necessary for the purposes of this judgment to set out all
the details. I should mention, however,
that they included,
but were not confined to an allegation that on account of
her pregnancy, she was forced by
her superiors to accept the
training post, which was much against her will and made her
most unhappy.
The
case eventually came to trial before an additional member
of the Industrial Court, Mrs . Grobbelaar. Both
sides were
represented by counsel. It was heard in two stages : first
the “merits,” and then the quantum
.The court
a quo
found in favour of the respondent on the merits, and at
the second stage awarded the respondent compensation
in the
sum of R 70449,00. Costs of two counsel and of an
actuarywere allowed.
3. The Department appealed.
4. The appeal initially came before this Court on 16 November
2000. It appeared that several of the cassettes,
on
which much of the oral evidence had been recorded,
were missing. In consequence the Department, as appellant,

had failed to place a proper and complete record of appeal
before this Court. Furthermore, the Department
had not
by then taken steps mero motu to put together a
reconstructed record of the missing parts. The Court
made an
order to the effect that the Department was given one month
within which to compile a reconstructed
record, failing
which the appeal would be deemed to be dismissed with
costs.
5. Despite strenuous effort by Mr. Duvenage of the
State Attorney’s Office, the Department was unable to

comply timeously, and an attempted reconstruction was only
presented in the new year. The sources for the
attempt
were counsel’s incomplete and cryptic notes. Mrs. Grobbelaar
cannot find her own bench notes; she has
either
not kept them or she has mislaid them. The
missing evidence all relates to the first
stage of
the hearing, ie on the merits. The respondent testified
first. Her evidence in chief (running
to nearly 40
pages) is fully recorded and transcribed. That is where
it stops. Her cross-examination and
re-examination is
lost, save for the reconstruction (35 less than closely
typed pages). The Department
called four witnesses,
namely Adv .Dicker, Mr. Bezuidenhout, Ms. Kannemeyer and
Ms. Humphries. Their testimony,
in all its stages, is also
lost, save for the reconstruction(which runs to some 45 pages,
again less than closely
typed ). It is stated in the
affidavits that the Department’s witnesses gave their
evidence over a period of the
best part of two days. Even if
this period included the respondent’s cross-examination and
re-examination, the whole
reconstruction covers a mere 83
widely spaced pages.
6. It is not open to question that the attempted reconstruction
is hopelessly inadequate for the proper determination
of
this appeal, which turns in significant part on credibility.
Mrs. Grobbelaar, who has viewed the reconstruction,
is not prepared
to certify it as true and correct. I attach no blame to her, or
to the parties or to the legal representatives.
It is evident that
they have done their best and that a satisfactory version will
not be forthcoming. Despite a diligent
search, the missing
cassettes cannot be found, and there is no suggestion that
they will come to light in the
foreseeable future.
7. What are we to do now ? I do not think we are bound by the
order that was
granted by this Court on 16 November 2000. That order was
interlocutory in nature. It was made before reconstruction
was
attempted,
and while a proper reconstruction was believed to be feasible. It
is true that the Department was out of time in filing
the
attempted reconstruction, but the delay was not undue and in
my view has been adequately explained. We know now
what the
Court on 16 November did not know, that a proper reconstruction
cannot be achieved. That is the central feature, and
it would be
wrong in the circumstances to penalise
the Department (by dismissing the appeal or confirming its
dismissal) on account of a relatively minor and
understandable
delay.
8. Rules of Court commonly provide for the lodging by an
appellant of a full or complete and correct appeal
record
within a specified time. Rule 5 (7) of this Court requires
a copy of the record of the proceedings in the
Court
a quo
. Rules 5(10)(f), (g) and (h) provide:
“ Every copy of the record must -
include
the judgment given by the Labour Court;
(g) contain a correct and complete index of the evidence
and of all the documents and exhibits in the case, the date
and
nature of the exhibits being briefly stated in the index;
(h) contain only those documents that were referred to in
any proceedings in the Labour Court”.
Rule 5(15) provides:
“Any
reference in the record of evidence of any
witness to any document or exhibit contained in the
appeal record must reflect, in brackets in the margin
opposite the reference, the page number in the appeal
record of such documents or exhibit”
Rules 5 (12) and (16) deal with specified omissions from a record.
9. Although not expressly stipulated, it is implicit in Rule 5 that
the appealrecord to be lodged by an appellant, must be a complete
and correct record
subject to permissible omissions. Rule 5 (17) provides that if
an appellant fails to lodge the record timeously,
then
“the appellant will be deemed to have withdrawn the
appeal”unless an extension of time is granted. Rule 5
does
not deal with the particular position which presents itself here,
namely that a complete and correct record cannot be lodged.
In
Waverley Blankets Ltd and Others; Waverley Blankets Ltd v
Sithukuza and Others
(1999) 20 ILJ 2564 (LAC)
an
application to condone the late filing of the appeal record was
refused by this Court. There was, however, no
suggestion
that a proper record could not be lodged. The decision is thus
distinguishable.
10. The position with regard to criminal appeals from the
magistrates courts
was settled in
S v Joubert
[1990] ZASCA 113
;
1991 (1) SA 119
(A)
,
where the appeal record could not be reconstructed. It should be
borne in mind that in criminal appeals the State has duty to
safekeep the record at first instance, and the duty to transmit it.
It was held that the State’s failure to discharge these
duties
prejudiced an accused in that it frustrated this right of appeal,
and that he was consequently entitled to an acquittal.
The
“replica” principle was enunciated at 126 A. See
S v K
1991
(2) SACR 190
(B)
where the frustration principle
is well illustrated.
11. In civil appeals, however, the position is less than
clear. With the
exception of
Beaumont v Anderson
1949 (3) SA
562
(N),
I have not found a case directly in point. The case
law establishes that it is the duty of an appellant’s attorney to
lodge
a complete and correct record timeously; and to ensure that
the evidence is fully transcribed, and the exhibits and judgment
included. Upon actual or contemplated failure to comply in time,
the appellant is expected to bring a substantive application
for
condonation as soon as possible. It is normally a requirement that
the appellant’s prospects of success on appeal be
canvassed.
Failing such application, or if it is refused, the usual
order is that the appeal be struck from the roll,
although some
rules (including Rule 5(17) of this Court) provide that the
appeal is deemed to be withdrawn. A punitive costs
order is
sometimes granted. See
Kahn v Radyn
1949 (4) SA
552
(C);
Nicol’s Motor Works v Breytenbach
1953 (4) SA 1
(T);
Anastassiades v Argus Printing and
Publishing Co. Ltd
1955 (2) SA 349
(T);
Bekker
v Dawkins Steenmakery
1959 (1) SA 32
(T);
Mashaba
v Engelbrecht
1959 (1) SA 34
(T);
Van Der Riet
v Rheeder
1965 (3) SA 712
(O);
Senator
Versekerings Maatskappy Bpk v Lawrence
1982 (3) SA 132
(A);
Rennie NO v Gordon and Another NNO
1988
(1) SA 1
(A);
Rennie v Kamby Farms (Pty) Ltd
1989 (2) SA 124
(A);
SA Broadcasting Corporation v
Corrective Action Holdings (Pty) Ltd t/a Mass Media Marketing
1999 (3) SA 601
(W)
and the case cited at 602;
Dos Santos v
Unibank Ltd
2000 (1) SA 801
(W);
Mamabolo v
Rustenburg Regional
Local Council
[2000] ZASCA 133
;
2001 (1) SA
135
(S C A).
In the numerous cases
which I have cited,
there
is not a single instance where it was
suggested that material portions
of the record had been lost and could
not be reconstructed.
12.
Beaumont v Anderson
, supra, was an
appeal from the magistrates court. The pages of the handwritten
record of the plaintiffs evidence in chief
were lost, it would
seem irretrievably, with the consequence that the magistrate was
unable to furnish his reasons for judgment.
Broome J
pointed out that the appellant had a statutory right of appeal which
had been frustrated through no fault of his own. On
the other
hand the respondent had a judgment in his favour. The Court
declined to remit the case for hearing
de novo,
which
it thought would be unfair to the respondent, who had a
judgment in his favour. It continued:
“
His alternative prayer is that the case be
remitted to the
magistrate to re-hear the evidence of the plaintiff,
and that
is, in my opinion, the best way out of the
difficulty. A
similar course was followed in the case of
EX
PARTE
FIRTH
(46 LT 120)”.
13. While that course may have commended itself
to the Court on the
facts of that case, it would in my opinion be
entirely inappropriate in the present matter. It would
mean re
- hearing most of the evidence including, it
seems to me, the cross-examination of the respondent.
Credibility was important in this case, and her
credibility was as much at stake as that of the Department’s
witnesses.
It may also be asking too much of Mrs . Grobbelaar to
disabuse her mind of the perceptions which she has already
formed
of the witnesses. And it may perhaps be asking too much
of the Department to expect it to have confidence in
her ability to do so.
It is, of course, not feasible to remit only part of
the case on the merits for re - hearing before a differently
constituted
court.
14. An alternative course advanced by
Mr.
Pretorius
,
who led for the appellant, would be to
remit the matter to Mrs. Grobbelaar for a
“reconstruction” hearing. The
object of this exercise, he
explained, would
be to ascertain a complete and correct reconstruction.
There was little, if any dispute about what each of the
Department’s
four witnesses said in chief. So the
respondent, and each of the Department’s witnesses, would
be taken through
their previous cross-examinations and
re- examinations within the parameters disclosed by the various
handwritten
notes. No “new” cross-examination would be
permitted, but only questions relating to their previous testimony.
Mr. Pretorius
pointed out that all five witnesses
were still available, and that the Department’s witnesses have
deposed to affidavits
in which they comment on the attempted
reconstruction. There would thus be little or no scope for them
to tailor their evidence. The course proposed by
counsel is thus a variation on and extension of what was done in
Beaumont v Anderson,
supra.
15. I fear that such an endeavour is
likely to prove counter productive. There is every
prospect
that it will produce a host of new
disputes. Moreover, there is a real prospect that at the end of
the enquiry
Mrs . Grobbelaar may still find herself unable to
certify. Even if she does certify, it may not be possible to
eliminate
all disputes, in which event this Court may be asked
to resolve them. I am persuaded that the proposal is too risky,
and
that it would be inadvisable for us to adopt it in the
circumstances of this case.
16. What remains is a choice: either to let the
judgment in the respondent’sfavour stand, or to set it aside
and to refer
the matter for hearing
de
novo
. If
the judgment is allowed to stand, then the Department’s right of
appeal will be completely frustrated, thereby
prejudicing it. A remittal, on the other hand, will deprive the
respondent of
her judgment and will lead to the parties
incurring more costs. This may be especially hard on the
respondent,
who is an individual and who may not be possessed of
adequate funds.
Mr Bam
, who led for the
respondent, submitted that his client would be unduly
prejudiced by a remittal. He mentioned the matters
to which I have referred, as also the need for
finality and, in labour cases, expedition. He pointed to some
delay on
the part of the Department’s attorney in attempting to
rectify the position prior to thehearing of the appeal on 16
November
2000, though an appropriate costs
order was made on that occasion. Counsel pointed to
the possibility that a
trial
de novo
may lead to another appeal. He
suggested that in having totestify again, the respondent would
undergo further “trauma”. Finally,
he borrowed from the
criminal appeals and submitted that it was the State’s fault that
the tapes were missing. In evaluating
prejudice, he said,
such fault was a weighty consideration.
17. I deal with the last point first. It was not the
appellant Department’s fault
that the tapes were lost. The responsibility for
their safekeeping rested on
the Department of Labour. It would be too far
reaching, in my opinion, to carry any such fault from one
department of State
to another. Moreover, we do not know
the circumstances of the loss, so that it is difficult to
assess fault
or its extent. Certainly, the State should not be
blamed for the fact that Mrs. Grobbelaar’s notes are no longer
extant.
There is no merit in the “trauma” argument, but the
other points raised by
Mr. Bam
are not without
force. On balance, however, it appears to me that the
Department’s right of appeal is the overriding
consideration.
As has been pointed out, all the witnesses are
available. If the matter is remitted for re - trial the respondent
may prove her
case once again, in which event her position in
regard to costs will be safeguarded. But if the
appeal is dismissed, the Department will lose the
opportunity of persuading
this Court that the trial Court erred. It will be fixed
with liability in the sum
of R 70449,00 (plus costs) and with a finding that it
constructively dismissed the respondent, results which might have
not been
sustained on
appeal. It is always unfortunate when a re - trial has
to be ordered, but it seems to me to represent the lesser inequity.
A re
-trial in this respect means a re-hearing on all aspects of the
case.
18. The Industrial Court no longer operates save to
finalise part-heard matters
In other pending matters that court’s functions are
now performed by the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and
Arbitration.
See item 22 A of schedule 7 to the
Labour Relations Act
66 of 1995
read with Government Notice no.R214 promulgated in
Government Gazette dated 19 February 1999.I do not regard the
present matter
as part-heard. It follows that the case must be
remitted to the Commission. In a letter before the Court, the
National Senior Commissioner
expresses regret for what has happened
and offers to make available a commissioner who is experienced in
Industrial Court matters
to try the case
de novo
.
With
regard to costs,
Mr Pretorius
properly conceded that
the Department
should be liable for the costs of the hearing on 16 November 2000,
which
were in a sense wasted. For the rest, I am of the view that it would
be fair
to order that the costs at first instance and on appeal be in the
cause of the
re-trial.
20. The following order is made:
The judgments and orders of the Court
a quo
are set
aside and the matter is referred to the Commission for
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration for re-hearing
de novo
before a commissioner (other than Mrs Grobbelaar);
The appellant is to pay the costs of the hearing before this
Court on the 16 November 2000 on the basis then ordered. All
other costs at first instance and on appeal are to be costs in
the re-hearing contemplated in para 1 above.
____________________
R.G.
Comrie
Acting
Judge of Appeal
I agree
_________________
RMM
Zondo
Judge
President
I agree
_________________
K. van
Dijkhorst
Acting
Judge of Appeal
For the Appellant: Adv. G.C. Pretorius SC and Adv. L. Bolt
Instructed by: The State Attorney, Pretoria
For the Respondent: Adv. A.J. Bam SC and Adv. C. Pretorius
Instructed by: Messrs Maartens & Huysamen, Pretoria.
Date of Argument: 5 June 2001
Date of
Judgment: