Allround Tooling (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA (DA2/97) [1998] ZALAC 8 (15 June 1998)

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[1998] ZALAC 8
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Allround Tooling (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA (DA2/97) [1998] ZALAC 8 (15 June 1998)

IN THE LABOUR APPEAL COURT OF SOUTH
AFRICA
(HELD AT DURBAN)
Case no: DA 2/97
In the matter between
ALLROUND TOOLING (PTY)
LTD
Appellant
and
NATIONAL UNION OF METAL WORKERS
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Respondent
JUDGMENT
Introductory
[1] The appellant, Allround Tooling
(Pty) Ltd, manufactures ‘Okapi’ knives, pangas, machetes and
agricultural tools in its factory
at Isithebe in Kwazulu-Natal.
[2] At the time of the dismissal of
the second and further respondents, the first respondent, the
National Union of Metal Workers
of South Africa (‘the union’),
represented slightly more than half of the appellant’s employees.
[3] The second and further
respondents were employees of the appellant who were dismissed on 24
March 1995 for participating in
an illegal and unprocedural strike.
The appellant dismissed one hundred and twenty-nine of its workforce
of two hundred and seven.
One hundred and seventeen of the
dismissed employees are respondents in this appeal. They are
referred to in this judgment as
‘the respondents’.
[4] Following on the dismissals, the
union and the respondents instituted proceedings in the industrial
court initially in terms
of s 43, and subsequently in terms of s
46(9), of the Labour Relations Act, 28 of 1956 (‘the Act’). In
the s 46(9) proceedings,
the industrial court found that the
dismissals were unfair and ordered the appellant to reinstate the
respondents. Compensation
was not touched on in the judgment. The
appellant appealed against that determination. The parties
subsequently agreed to refer
the issue of compensation to private
arbitration.
Condonation
[5] On 10 December 1997 the
respondent’s attorney, Mr C J Tanner, was informed by the
Registrar of this Court that the respondent’s
heads of argument
had to be served and filed on or before 30 March 1998. The heads of
argument were filed on 21 April 1998, three
weeks late. The appeal
was set down on 5 June 1998. On that day an application for
condonation for the late filing of the heads
of argument was filed.
The explanation for the delay was contained in one paragraph in
these terms:
‘
Subsequent
to receipt of the Appellant’s heads of argument and the
commencement by me of the process of reading the record and
preparing heads of argument, it became apparent to me that I would
not be able to finalise adequate heads of argument before 10
March
1998. ‘
Tanner went on to say in the
affidavit that the appellant’s attorney had no objection to the
late filing of the heads of argument;
that, rather than filing
short, inadequate heads of argument, he decided to provide detailed
heads of argument; and that it was
impractical to instruct someone
else to do the work at that late stage.
[6] When the application for
condonation was argued on 5 June it was pointed out to Tanner by the
Court that he should have filed
the application for condonation by
no later than 21 April, that there was no explanation for his
failure to do so, and that there
was no explanation at all for his
failure to prepare the heads of argument in the period of more than
three and a half months that
he was given to do so. After Tanner
had given an oral explanation from the bar, the Court ruled that the
appeal would proceed
on the merits and that Tanner would be given an
opportunity to file a supplementary affidavit on or before 10 June.
[7] One 10 June a supplementary
affidavit was filed. The explanation for the failure to file the
application for condonation with
the heads of argument on 21 April
was that Tanner forgot to do so. The explanation for not commencing
work on the
appeal timeously was that from 23
December 1997 to 22 January 1998 Tanner was on holiday; thereafter
he was intimately involved
in litigation in the industrial court
until 10 February due to the illness of the advocate he had
originally briefed to appear
on his client’s behalf; in late
February and March he commenced reading the record in this matter;
he decided to draw the heads
of argument after receipt of the
appellant’s heads of argument which were due on 16 March; after
receipt of the appellant’s
heads of argument he found that he did
not have sufficient time to file the heads of argument timeously due
to a ‘substantial
work load’; and that, in the result, it took
five weeks to prepare the heads of argument.
[8] Tanner was obliged to apply for
condonation, without delay, as soon as he realised that the
respondent’s heads of argument
were late: c.f.
Croeser v
Standard Bank
1934 AD 77
at 79:
R v Mkize
1940 AD 211
at
213;
Reeders v Jacobsz
1942 AD 395
at 397;
Commissioner of
Inland Revenue v Burger
1956 (4) SA 446
(A) at 449G;
Meintjies
v H D Combrinck (Edms) Bpk
1961 (1) SA 662
(A) at 264B;
Rennie
v Kamby Farms (Pty) Ltd
1989 (2) SA 124
(A) at 129G;
Napier v
Tsaperas
1995 (2) SA 665
(A) at 671B-D. Tanner knew by no later
than 21 April that the respondent’s heads of argument were three
weeks late. He should
have filed the application for condonation no
later than on that day. Instead the application was filed six weeks
later on the
day of the appeal. The only explanation for his
failure to make timeous application for condonation is that he
forgot to do so.
It goes without saying that that is not a
reasonable nor acceptable explanation. It is an explanation which
borders on contempt
for the Court and is manifest of an
unprofessional and irresponsible attitude towards the interests of
the respondents, of which
more later.
[9] It is accepted that Tanner was
able to commence working on the heads of argument only after
disposal of the industrial court
case on 10 February 1998. He then
had six weeks in which to prepare the heads of argument. Instead,
he took nine weeks to do
so.
[10] What Tanner failed to do was to
allocate time to the preparation of the heads of argument. Instead
work on the heads of argument
competed - unsuccessfully - with the
other demands of his practice. The respondents’ interests were
ranked below those of other
clients. It is not an acceptable
explanation for delay that a practitioner is too busy. If the
nature or size of a practitioner’s
practice renders it impossible
for him to render a professional service and to comply with the
provisions of the Labour Appeal
Court rules he must not take on the
work:
Sennet & Wessels (Pietersburg) BK v Prins
, LAC
judgment JA 72/97 para 18. In the absence of an acceptable
explanation for non-compliance with the rules of Court, condonation
will not be granted:
Classiclean (Pty) Ltd v CWIU a.o.
, LAC
judgment JA 60/97 para 5;
Joerning & Sons (Pty) Ltd t/a
Joernings Pharmacy a. o. v Coetzee
, LAC judgment CA 14/97 para
22. Tanner did not provide an acceptable explanation for not
timeously filing the heads of argument.
In the result, the
application for condonation is refused.
Background to the dismissals
[11] By the beginning of 1995 it had
become apparent to the appellant that costs should be cut. Partly
due to the drought in the
province demand for pangas by the sugar
cane industry had dropped. As sales declined, stock piling
occurred, with a concomitant
decline in productivity. The
appellant’s banker demanded that the overdraft of R 1,3 million be
reduced.
[12] On Monday, 13 February, Mr W P J
Voss, the managing director, and Mrs R A Voss, his wife and the
financial director, met with
union shopstewards and supervisors to
discuss working short time. Management’s proposal was to work a
shorter day from Monday
to Thursday. Discussions continued during
the course of the week. The employees preferred to take a Monday
off, and to be paid
only for the days worked. Management agreed to
the proposal.
[13] On Monday, 20 February, the
weekly paid workers did not work. The appellant found the
experiment impractical. It needed all
its employees in order to
deal with its customers and clients.
[14] On the following day Voss met
with the shopstewards to explain to them that the factory had to
operate with its full compliment
of employees each working day. He
proposed that the factory open at 07H00 (normal time) and close at
14H30. The shopsteward’s
objection to that proposal was that
night shift was not affected by the proposal and the transport costs
of the employees would
increase as they would be required to use
taxi’s out of peak time, and so pay more for taxi fares.
Following on further meetings,
by the end of the week Voss had
agreed to meet both concerns: the night shift would work only four
nights a week and the appellant
would meet the extra costs of
transport.
[15] On Monday, 27 February, the
appellant implemented short time. At 14H30 non union members,
including supervisors, knocked off
work. Union members, however,
remained behind in the factory. They could not work productively
because their supervisors and
co-workers had left. On Tuesday, 28
February, the appellant sent the union a telefax in which it
stressed that short time was
essential to avoid retrenchments. A
meeting was called for Monday, 6 March, to consult on retrenchments.
[16] On 1 March the appellant and its
industrial relations consultants, Bannerman Bush Dickinson and
Associates (‘the consultants’)
communicated with the workers and
the union respectively. The appellant informed its employees that
it intended to commence with
retrenchments as soon as possible in
view of the lack of co-operation of the employees, which had taken
the following form:
‘
1. Employees are working slow!
2. Employees are not leaving the
premises at 2:30pm and by doing so wasting electricity.
3. Wasting pertol for forklifts.
4. Some employees are deliberately
switching off the heating elements so that the machines are cold the
next morning and by so doing
g delaying production.
5. Working without permission
(Accidents may occur!).
6. Producing a lot of scrap!’
In its telefax to the union the
consultants requested the union to advise its members to desist from
their conduct and short time
was described as ‘...a measure
designed to try and avoid retrenchments.’
[17] On 2 March, the union,
represented by its local organiser, Mr B V Simelane, responded in
two telefaxes sent to the appellant.
In the one he proposed a later
date for the proposed meeting and requested the number of people who
would be affected by a retrenchment.
In the second telefax, he
expressed his concern about discussing retrenchments ‘whereas we
got an issue on the table which is
short time.’ The consultants
responded to the second telefax by making the allegation that the
refusal to meet on 6 March was
viewed as a delaying tactic and
insisted that a meeting be held on that day. It was again stressed
that the union members were
engaging in actions calculated to
disrupt the effort to minimise the possibility of retrenchment.
[18] During the course of the week,
27 February to 3 March, union members refused to work short time.
On Friday, 3 March, the appellant
stopped the short time regime.
[19] The meeting proposed for 6 March
did not take place. On that day the consultants gave the union
particulars of the number
of persons whom the company intended to
retrench, namely, forty, and the departments in which the
retrenchments would take place.
It was proposed that a meeting take
place in 9 March. On the following day Simelane responded by
averring that he was not available
on 9 March and proposing 13 March
as the date of the meeting. On 8 March, the consultants again
alleged that he was engaging in
delaying tactics and insisted that
the meeting take place in 9 March. Simelane refused to meet on 9
March.
[20] On 8 March the consultants
informed the union that its client was not willing to discuss the
issue of short time anymore and
that in future the parties would
meet to discuss the possibility of retrenchments.
[21] On 16 March, the meeting which
the appellant had been trying to arrange since 28 February, took
place. The appellant was represented
by Voss, the consultants by Mr
J Hagglund, and the union by Simelane and shopstewards. The
appellant explained why it was not
willing to discuss short time
anymore and insisted that a process of consultations on
retrenchments begin. The parties agreed
to meet on Monday, 20
March.
[22] On Monday, 20 March, the parties
met. The appellant was represented by Voss, the consultants by
Bush, and the union by Simelane
and shopstewards. During the
discourse of the discussions, Simelane proposed lay-offs as an
alternative to retrenchment. The
appellant expressed its
willingness to lay-off employees but no agreement could be reached
on how lay-offs would be effected.
A meeting was arranged for 08H00
on Friday, 24 March, to continue the discussions. The meeting ended
in an acrimonious exchange
between Simelane and Bush. According to
Simelane, Bush attacked him personally as a union official. Bush
was very abusive towards
him and shouted at him. Simelane thought
that Bush was treating him as his subordinate. Bush’s evidence
was that Simelane pointed
a finger at him and said:’You better
change your attitude....and you must watch out because if you don’t
watch we will close
your company down in Isithebe’.
[23] After the meeting the appellant
gave its employees an ‘internal briefing’. It was said that the
meeting was held on the
question of ‘retrenchment’. The
briefing was in these terms:
‘
1. Management met today with Mr
Simelane and Shop Stewards to discuss the question of retrenchment.
2. Management reminded Mr Simelane
and Shop Stewards that these discussions began on the 13th February
1995.
3. These discussions resulted in the
implementation of Short Time.
4. The Short Time failed due to the
lack of co-operation by Workers to save costs.
5. The Union and Shop Stewards have
now suggested a Lay Off.
6. Management has stated that it is
prepared to consider Lay Offs for a period of 10 Months.
7. This Short Time will not be
revolving. That means that the group selected will be the only
ones to be Laid Off.
8. Those Laid Off will be assisted
with claiming Unemployment Insurance.
9. A further meeting has been
arranged for Friday, 24th March 1995.’
[24] On the afternoon of Thursday, 23
March, Simelane, the shopstewards, and union members held a meeting.
Simelane reported to
the members what had transpired at the meeting
of 20 March. As a result of what they were told, the employees
decided that they
would demand from the appellant that Bush no
longer represent the appellant in discussions with the union. It is
not clear from
the evidence of Simelane and other witnesses for the
union precisely what the decision entailed. There is a suggestion
that the
decision was that demonstrations would take place during
the morning tea break at about 09H00.
[25] On Friday, 24 March, the factory
opened at the usual time of 07H00 and commenced operating. At 08H00
Simelane did not arrive
for the meeting which had been arranged on
Monday, 20 March. After waiting for half an hour, Hagglund
telephoned the union offices
and reminded Simelane of the meeting.
Simelane undertook to leave immediately.
[26] At 09H00 members of the union
left their work stations and congregated, singing, toyi-toying and
waving placards. The placards
called for the removal of Bush from
the appellant’s negotiating team.
[27] Mrs Voss, on seeing that one of
the trucks was not being allowed to leave the premises, went to
assist the truck driver. In
the course of attempting to persuade the
employees to allow the truck to leave, she was pushed around by the
employees. She was
concerned that she would be squashed by the
gathering of people. She managed to get back to the offices, very
upset by the way
she had been treated.
[28] Simelane arrived at the premises
at about 10H00. At about 10H10 management issued an ultimatum
calling for a return to work
by 11H30 or face dismissal. Simelane
conveyed the ultimatum to the employees and, on his version, advised
the workers to return
to work. Simelane again met with members of
management. The appellant’s representatives made it clear to
Simelane that under
no circumstances would they agree to the demand
that Bush or any other member of the firm of labour consultants
would be removed
as a member of the negotiating team. Simelane was
advised to persuade his members to return to work.
[29] At about 11H40 the company
issued a second ultimatum, calling for a return to work at 13H00.
Simelane and the shopstewards
were asked to convey the ultimatum to
the striking workers. Simelane’s evidence was that he did so;
that he strongly advised
a return to work; that the workers refused
to heed his advice and accused him of being a ‘sell-out’.
[30] At about 12H20, Mrs Voss,
accompanied by Mr E Mleya, spoke to the workers in the change room.
She tried to persuade them to
return to work before the expiry of
the ultimatum. The workers refused to do so.
[31] After speaking to the employees,
Simelane and the shopstewards returned to the appellant’s offices.
Simelane informed management
that he had telephoned office bearers
of the union and that he wished to fetch them in order to meet with
the workers. Mr and
Mrs Voss and Hagglund testified that Simelane
did not tell them in clear terms that he had lost the confidence of
the workers and
that he wished office bearers to intervene to
persuade the workers to return to work. Nevertheless, it is common
cause, and the
transcription of that meeting reveals, that Simelane
did say that he wished to fetch the office bearers and to take them
to the
factory.
[32] Before the ultimatum expired,
Simelane left to fetch Mr S T Makhanya, the chairperson and Mr B
Makhathini, the vice chairperson,
of the union in that area. Before
his motor vehicle could leave the premises, Hagglund asked him where
he was going. In Voss’s
affidavit in the s 43 application, he
stated that Simelane informed Hagglund ‘that he was leaving to
fetch a more senior union
official who could intervene in the
strike’. Hagglund must have conveyed that to Voss on his return
to Voss’s office.
[33] The striking workers did not
return to work at 13H00. At 13H45 they were dismissed.
[34] Later that afternoon Simelane
returned to the factory with Makhanya and Makhathini. They spoke to
the workers who were still
on the premises. The evidence of
Simelane and Makhanya was that the workers agreed to return to work
on Monday, 27 March. The
evidence of the witnesses for the
appellant was that an undertaking in those terms was not conveyed
to them that afternoon.
[35] On Monday, 27 March, the factory
opened at the usual time. The employees who had not been on strike
on the Friday were allowed
on to the premises. The dismissed
employees were refused entry. From amongst the ranks of the
dismissed employees stones were
thrown onto the premises and at
motor vehicles. Abuse was shouted at those employees who had
returned to work. The appellant
decided to advise the employees who
were at work to return home. For all practical purposes, the
factory closed down that week.
The fairness of the dismissals
[36] The appellant moved its factory
from Johannesburg to Isithebe in 1983. Some of the respondents
commenced employment with the
appellant then. A majority of the
respondents commenced employment during the 1980's.
[37] Prior to the events described
earlier in this judgment, the relationship between the appellant and
its employees, including
the respondents, was cordial, fairly
constructive, and characterised by mutual respect.
[38] Faced with reduced sales and
lower productivity, the appellant was entitled to take remedial
steps. One of the steps it was
entitled to take was to reduce the
wage bill by working shorter hours. By the time the shorter hours
were introduced on Monday,
27 February, the appellants had consulted
with the employee’s representatives, tried the employee’s
suggestion of closing one
day a week - without success, and met the
employee’s concerns about the night shift and the additional
transport costs. In those
circumstances, the appellant cannot be
criticised for implementing short time on 27 February.
[39] At that time the employees had
not been told that short time was an alternative to retrenchment.
That is not, however, a justification
for their refusal to work
short time. Voss had explained to the employees’ representatives
the need to reduce costs. During
the week that the short time
regime was in place the respondents were told on the Wednesday of
the week that as they had refused
to work short time, retrenchments
would be effected. In spite of knowing that their refusal to work
short time would result in
retrenchments, they persisted in their
refusal to co-operate.
[40] By 3 March, when short time was
stopped, there was no further obligation on the appellant to
continue to consider short time
as an alternative to retrenchment.
[41] By the time discussions began in
earnest on retrenchments at the meeting of Monday, 20 March,
management and its advisors had
formed the view, not unreasonably,
that Simelane was not co-operating in meeting with them to consult.
Despite that perception,
fruitful discussions did take place at the
meeting. A further alternative to retrenchment, lay offs, was
discussed. A meeting
was arranged for Friday, 24 March, to continue
the discussions.
[42] What went wrong at the meeting
of 20 March was the altercation between Simelane and Bush. The
industrial court listened to
the tape recording of the meeting and
formed the opinion that ‘...Bush did lay down the law to Simelane
and would not give him
any real opportunity of punting the short
time proposal’. Despite Bush’s denial that he had done so,
Simelane and the shopstewards
believed that Simelane had been badly
treated by Bush.
[43] Instead of taking the matter up
with the appellant, Simelane did nothing until Thursday, 23 March.
What he did then was not
to inform the company of his grievance but
the members of the union. Not surprisingly, the members reacted
adversely to what they
were told and emotionally took the decision
to call for the dismissal of Bush as the appellant’s agent the
next day. What further
exacerbated matters was that the members’
representative was badly treated during the course of discussing
retrenchments - always
an emotional issue.
[44] What should have happened on
Friday, 24 March, was that the members’ representatives, Simelane
and the shopstewards, should
have been mandated to raise the issue
of the treatment of Simelane by Bush with the company. Instead, the
decision was taken to
hold a demonstration during the tea break.
[45] Friday, 24 March, started
disastrously when Simelane did not arrive for the 08H00 meeting. He
subsequently explained that
he had diarised the meeting incorrectly
for 10H00. I agree with the finding of the industrial court that it
is ‘rather more
likely that Simelane found it convenient not to be
around when [the demonstration] happened so that he could
disassociate himself
and seek to establish himself with management
by going on to diffuse the situation.’ The demonstration which
commenced at 09H00,
and turned into a strike, put an end to
discussions on lay offs or retrenchment. When Hagglund spoke to
Simelane before 09H00,
Simelane did not warn Hagglund that a
demonstration was about to take place. It came as a complete
surprise and shock to the appellant
when the demonstration
commenced. Not only had it had no warning of the demonstration, the
appellant was not even aware of the
grievance.
[46] The demonstration was converted
into a strike. The union led no evidence to explain how that
happened. The strike was illegal
for want of compliance with any of
the provisions of s 65 of the Act. The strike was illegitimate in
that it commenced without
a prior demand having been made on the
appellant and the demand was one which the employees were not
entitled to make. The employees
had no more right to determine who
should represent the appellant than the appellant had to determine
who should represent the
employees in negotiations.
[47] The intense annoyance of the
appellant with what had occurred is entirely understandable. It
does not follow, however, that
the appellant’s response of issuing
the first ultimatum was fair. On the contrary, despite the
provocation under which the appellant
was acting, it acted over
hastily in issuing the first ultimatum. The ultimatum was drafted
at 10H10, a little more than an hour
after the strike had commenced.
The strike was noisy and threatening, but not violent. The
appellant had no clear idea of why
the employees were striking. The
slogans on the placards gave an indication of what the grievances
were, but those grievances had
not been conveyed to management by
any representative of the employees. At the time the decision to
issue the ultimatum was taken,
therefore, no attempt had been made
by the company to establish contact with the employees, to identify
their grievances, and to
attempt to meet those grievances. The
evidence of Voss, on a number of occasions during his evidence, was
that he did not want
to dismiss the strikers. His intention in
issuing the ultimatum was to obtain a return to work. He went so
far as to say that
he did not intend to give effect to the first
ultimatum. Unfortunately, the striking employees were unaware of
Voss’s intention.
What was conveyed to them, in unequivocal
terms, in the ultimatum was:
‘
You are advised that if you do not
return to work by 11H30 today you will be summarily dismissed.’
The threat of summary dismissal
must have heightened emotions at a
time when the aim should have been to reduce tension. It did not
help matters that the ultimatum
was to expire little more than an
hour after it was read out to the strikers.
[48] At 11H30, when the strikers did
not return to work, the decision was taken to issue a second
ultimatum. Voss’s intention,
according to his evidence was that
he was ‘trying to get them back to work’. He did not explain
why, the first ultimatum having
failed to achieve the object of a
return to work, Voss thought a second ultimatum would achieve that
result. The ultimatum called
for a return to work by 13H00.
Simelane and the shopstewards left Voss’s office at about noon in
order to communicate it to
the employees. The period of an hour was
too short. See:
Plaschem (Pty) Ltd v Chemical Workers Industrial
Union
(1993) 14 ILJ 1000 (LAC) at 1006H-I;
Performing Arts
Council of Transvaal v Paper Printing Wood and Allied Workers Union
a o
(1994) 15 ILJ 65 (A) at 75A-E; 76B-D. The employees were
due to be paid in the normal course, and to knock off work, at
14H00.
There was no compelling reason why the employees should be
given an ultimatum of an hour when two hours later they were to stop
work anyway. Had the ultimatum expired at 07H00 on Monday, 27
February, after the striking employees had had a weekend to cool
down and to calmly reflect on the consequences of their conduct and
having obtained the advice of the local union leadership, the
probabilities are that they would have returned to work.
[49] At 13H00, when there was no
return to work, the appellant faced the decision whether to carry
out its threat or not. At 11H30,
when the first ultimatum had
expired, the appellant had not carried out the threat. At 13H00
there was an additional factor to
be taken into account. Before
Simelane left the premises, he had indicated in the meeting and at
his car to Hagglund that he
intended to fetch union leaders and to
take them to the appellant’s premises. The witnesses for the
appellant testified that
they did not appreciate that Simelane
intended to use the union leaders to persuade the workers to return
to work. A reading of
the transcript of the meetings of 24 March
reveals that Simelane’s statement of intention to fetch the union
leaders was brushed
off. For example, Hagglund said to him that he
was the union leader and he should tell the workers to return to
work. It should
have been clear to management and to Hagglund by
13H00 that Simelane had not succeeded in persuading the strikers to
return to
work and that is precisely why he was calling in the help
of union leaders. Bearing in mind that the strikers were due to
stop
work, in any event, at 14H00, the appellant had nothing to lose
by waiting for the return of Simelane and the union leaders to

continue discussions on a return to work.
[50] A factor which distinguishes
this strike from most wildcat strikes is that the loss of production
of the day could not, and
did not, cause the appellant significant
financial harm. Due to a drop in demand for its products,
stockpiling had occurred.
A month before the strike, on 20
February, the respondents had not worked for the day when the first
version of short time was
tested by the appellant.
[51] The dismissal of the respondents
constituted an unfair labour practice.
[52] Reinstatement was the proper
remedy, despite the misconduct of some of the respondents on the
Monday after the dismissals.
Had the appellant not acted with such
haste, the dismissals might have been avoided. While Voss was of
the view that it would
be time consuming and costly to retrain the
dismissed employees, the managers of the two factories of the
appellant, Messrs Shabalala
and Magqabi, were much more sanguine.
[53] The appeal is dismissed, with
costs.
[54] The order of the industrial
court dated 20 December 1996 is amended by the deletion of the date
‘20 January 1997' in paragraph
3 and the substitution thereof of
the date ‘30 June 1998'.
Myburgh J P
I agree
Froneman D J P
I agree
Nicholson J A
Date of Hearing: 5 June 1998
Date of Judgment: 15 June 1998
Appearance for Appellant: Mr R Haslop
of Woodhead Bigby & Irving
Appearance for Respondent: Mr C
Tanner of Chennells Albertyn & Tanner
This judgment is available on the
internet at: http://www.law.wits.ac.za/labourcrt.