THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
Case Number: 3834 / 2024
In the matter between:
PRISTINE SEAFOODS (PTY) LTD Applicant
and
COLLECTIVE DREAM STUDIOS (PTY) LTD First Respondent
ADVOCATE DARRYL COOKE N.O. Second Respondent
Coram: Wille, J
Heard: 13 September 2024
Delivered: 9 October 2024
JUDGMENT
WILLE, J:
INTRODUCTION
[1] This is a review application of a ‘remittal award’ (and the ‘further award’ )
concerning arbitration proceedings instituted by the first respondent against the
applicant piloted about four years ago. The dispute arose nearly a decade ago and
initially conc erned the sale and purchase of five marine fishing vessels. The
purchaser took delivery of the fishing vessels, and the vessels sailed from these
shores to commence their fishing operations.1
[2] About a year later, the first respondent concluded another discrete agreement
in terms of which the first respondent sold two further marine vessel s to the
‘purchaser’ and delivery of these vessels took place (locally) a couple of months after
the agreement was concluded.2
[3] The total purchase price was not paid in connection with this second
agreement, and this agreement contained a reservation of ownership clause pending
full payment of the purchase price. It was not disputed that possession of the
subject marine vessels would pass t o the purchaser on delivery. However, it was
recorded explicitly that if all the payments were not made in terms of the agreement,
ownership in the vessels would revert to the first respondent.3
[4] Because the total purchase price was not paid and there was a shortfall in the
purchase price, a demand for payment was made, and the first respondent invoked
the arbitration clause con tained in the sale agreements. The first respondent’s
demand for payment was met with the allegation from the purchaser that the
purchased marine vessels suffered from latent material mechanical defects. Thus,
the purchaser made an election (so it said) to abide by the terms and conditions of
the agreements but to claim a reduction in the purchase price because of fraud
1 The vessels went to Mozambique, where they conducted their fishing operations through a
“subsidiary”.
2 These two vessels sailed to Mauritius, from which location the purchaser ran its Mauritian fishing
operations.
3 It was not disputed that the purchaser (“Afritex”) did no t pay the purchase price for the vessel
“Noelle Marie” in full.
committed by the first respondent in connection with the condition of the marine
vessels sold to the purchaser.4
[5] In addition, the purchaser contended for alleged loss of profits and reserved
the right to proceed against the first respondent’s representative in his personal
capacity for the recovery of the damages suffered by the purchaser because of his
alleged fraudulent non-disclosures.5
[6] Thereafter, the original purchaser ceded and assigned all its rights and
obligations to the applicant concerning the two purchase and sale a greements. This
cession (from a foreign company to the applicant being a local company) effectively
prevented the first respondent from obtaining security for its costs in the ensuing
legal proceedings.6
CONTEXT
[7] Amidst settlement negotiations between the first respondent and the erstwhile
purchaser, the applicant (as cessionary) commenced action proceedings against the
first respondent for a reduction in the purchase prices of the marine fishing vessels
and the alleged loss of profits because of the alleged latent defects to the marine
fishing vessels that were allegedly fraudulently concealed by the first respondent’s
representative.7
[8] Even though the first respondent had notified the cedent in writing of a change
of domicile for legal proceed ings, the applicant saw fit to cause a summons to be
served on the first respondent’s previous domicile address. This address and
location had since been reduced to a pile of rubble when the summons was ‘served’
by the sheriff, and these action proceeding s, not surprisingly, did not come to the
attention of the first respondent.8
4 The claim was that th e reduced price contended for exceeded the balance owing on the purchase
price,
5 In summary, the applicant alleged that the first respondent’s representative committed fraud.
6 In the subsequent action proceedings, the first respondent could not obtain security for costs.
7 This was by way of a summons.
8 This much is a common cause fact.
[9] This culminated in the granting of a default judgment against the first
respondent, which necessitated the launch of a rescission applica tion by the first
respondent to set aside the default judgment. The applicant filed a notice of
intention to oppose this recission application but failed to file any answering papers.
This judgment was ultimately rescinded.9
[10] After that, the first respondent caused one of the marine fishing vessels to be
judicially attached as security for its claim against the applicant, and the vessel so
attached remains under attachment. The applicant and the first respondent then
agreed that arbitral proceedings would determine, among other things, this vessel's
ownership.10
[11] Notwithstanding that the parties agreed to arbitral proceedings (in terms of the
agreements wherein the applicant sought to enforce by claiming a reduction in the
purchase prices of the vessels supplied by the first respondent), the applicant
insisted that the matter proceed by way of action proceedings.11
[12] Unsurprisingly, a special plea followed at the instance of the first respondent,
which ultimately determined that the action proceedings be stayed, pending the
outcome of the arbitration between the parties.12
[13] After over half a decade of litigation, the second respondent returned an
award in favour of the first respondent. The applicant was ordered to re deliver the
vessel to the first respondent. In addition, the applic ant was: (a) directed to pay the
first respondent a monthly amount until the vessel was re -delivered to the first
respondent, and (b) to pay interest on the aforesaid monthly amount from the date of
the award until the date of payment.13
[14] In favour of the applicant, the arbitrator declared that the applicant was
entitled to a reduction in the purchase price of the vessels in respect of the following
9 On 14 May 2018. A punitive costs order was awarded against the applicant.
10 This is what the arbitration essentially was about. The vessel is the “Nolle Marie”.
11 The applicant progressed with action proceedings.
12 The first respondent filed a special plea for a stay of the action proceedings.
13 The “leading” award.
defects: (a) the excessive sediment in the fuel tanks of all the vessels, except one of
them; (b) the leaks in the refrigeration systems on all the vessels; (c) a non -
functional bait freezer in one of the vessels, and (c) rotten deck planking on two of
the vessels. The actual amounts that would eventually be allocated to these defects
were conveniently referenced as the ‘actionable defects’ and stood over for later
determination.14
THE ‘REVIEW’ APPLICATIONS
[15] More than a year ago, the applicant launched an application for a review and
setting aside of and/or substitution of the leading award, alternatively, the remittal of
the leading award. The first respondent brought a counter -application seeking an
order t hat: (a) the subject vessel be re -delivered to the first respondent, (b) the
applicant sign all the necessary documentation and take such necessary steps to
transfer ownership of the subject vessel to the first respondent on an urgent basis,
and (c) certain of the prayers in the leading award be made an order of the court.15
[16] By way of a subsequent court order, the leading award was remitted to the
second respondent for the re -hearing and reconsideration. The costs associated
thereby were ordered to stand over for later determination. The aspects of the
leading award that required reconsideration by the second respondent needed to be
specified but were regrettably left unspecified. The leading award was only ‘remitted’
and thus remained binding on the applicant.16
[17] After that, the remittal hearing occurred before the second respondent, and he
heard further arguments on the leading award that had been remitted to him and
arguments regarding the quantification of the actionable defects and costs. The first
respondent made a tender concerning the quantum of these actionable defects. The
applicant accepted this tender.17
14 This was procedurally correct as “cancellation” of the agreements was never an issue for
determination.
15 This was formulated as a counter-application.
16 This is so also because the terms of the leading award were not amended.
17 This issue at least was settled between the parties.
[18] The remittal award and further award followed, which confirmed the tender.
Significantly, the second respondent did not alter the leading award in any manner
whatsoever other than ‘cost -related’ issues. T he applicant was ordered to pay one -
third of the first respondent’s costs in the arbitration incurred before the publication of
the leading award and subsequent expenses relating to the quantum determination
and costs (save for those parts of the arbitration in respect of which costs orders had
already been made).18
[19] After the remittal award and further awards were handed down, the applicant
chartered the current application to review and set aside the enti re remittal award
(including, as I understand it, the leading award and the further award) and the
substitution thereof with an order for the initial relief sought by the applicant in the
initial arbitration proceedings.19
CONSIDERATION
RES JUDICATA
[20] The first respondent advances that the second review is an abuse of the court
process because the applicant is precluded from bringing this second review
application concerning the same issues (and ‘awards’) by applying the principle of
res judicata. It says this because this review application: (a) was between the same
parties; (b) seeks the same relief on the same grounds, and (c) was brought after the
first review application was litigated to finality.20
[21] The first respondent’s case is that the applicant, by operation of the doctrine
of issue estoppel, was prevented from revisiting the validity of the leading award and
the further awards, albeit now c lothed in a second review application, irrespective of
the relief now sought.21
18 Other than those costs relating to the quantum determination and the associated costs to that.
19 The applicant sought the same re lief save for a validity declaration and a belated constitutional
challenge.
20 The first respondent also contended for this position because the remittal order was not detailed.
21 This is so because the applicant sought the same relief.
[22] Issue estoppel applies where an issue of fact or law is an essential element of
a prior final judgment (in this case, the actual ‘awards’). The issue may not be
revisited in subsequent proceedings before another court, even if a different cause of
action is relied upon or other relief is claimed.22
[23] Our courts have recognized that a strict application of issue estoppel could
result in unfairness in some unusual c ircumstances. However, this is typically
applied in cases where the nature of the issue is in dispute or at least open to some
doubt. The first application for review and the second application for review
undoubtedly dealt with the same issues before the same parties.23
[24] Issue estoppel applies when relief based on other causes of action is sought
in a subsequent case if it involves determining the same issue of fact or law.24
[25] I take the following from Ekurhuleni, where it was held as follows:
‘…the submission that res judicata does not apply because of the lack of
sameness in the cause o f action is misconceived. Sameness is determined
by the identity of the question previously set in motion…’25
[26] Issue estoppel developed precisely because requiring sameness between the
two causes of action allows parties to re -litigate the same issue by garbing these up
in different causes of action. The authority not to apply issue estoppel for reasons of
justice and equity needs to be evaluat ed regarding what is often referred to as the
Henderson principle. This principle provides, among other things, that when a given
matter becomes a subject of litigation:
‘…the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and
will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the
same subject of litigation in respect of a matter which might have been brought forward
22 Smith v Porritt and Others 2008 (6) SA 303 (SCA) at para [10].
23 The second review application was no more than a repetition of the first review application.
24 Aon SA (Pty) Ltd v Van Den Heever 2018 (6) SA 38 (SCA) at [40].
25 Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Germiston Municipal Retirement Fund 2017 (6) BCLR 750
(CC) at [31].
as part of the subject in a contest, but which was not brought forward, only because
they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their
case…’26
[27] This doctrine has been fully assimilated into our law. The principle applies
equally to claims of res judicata and allegations based on issue estoppel. Further,
and most importantly, the applicant elected to persist with precisely the same issues
in the second review application even though there was seemingly no urgent need
for this relief, bearing in mind that the leading award had only been remitted by way
of the first application for review.27
[28] The core relief sought in the first review application is identical to the relief
sought in the second. Further, the amended notice of motion in the second review
application, in es sence, remains the same as the review relief sought in the central
prayers of the original notice of motion. The applicant belatedly seeks a
constitutional and a ‘validity’ declaration in the additional prayers. The first review
application failed regard ing the constitutional and validity declaration, and this has
yet to be the subject of any appeal. What one is left with is that the applicant seeks
the same relief on the same grounds.28
[29] The first respondent contends that the attempt by the applicant to re-litigate its
failed review application on the same grounds as before amounts to an abuse of the
process and warrants a punitive costs order against the applicant’s attorneys of
record. I agree that the applicant is attempting to re -litigate a ‘resuscitated’ award,
which was only sent back to the second respondent through a remittal. Put another
way, if the leading award had been reviewed, the award would have been completely
set aside and sent to a new arbitration tribunal.29
[30] Thus, for issue estoppel to apply, it is unnecessary for the previous court to
expressly determine the issue because it would undermine the purpose of res
26 Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 at 114-115, [1843-1860] All ER Rep 378 at 381-2.
27 The leading award was only remitted, a nd the details of the remittal were absent from the remittal
order.
28 Nothing had changed from the core averments in the founding affidavit in the first review
application.
29 The terms of the leading award were not set aside.
judicata and issue estoppel to hold otherwise. It would allow litigants to freely exit
from any award granted that expressly addresses the issue of fact or law that was
structural to the decision.30
[31] Accordingly, the doctrine of issue estoppel applies as set out in the first
respondent’s contentions involving res judicata . The doctrine ine vitably precludes
the same issues from being raised again in the fresh review proceedings as the
footing for any new causes of action, whether in contract, delict or constitutionally
framed. To allow this would undermine the finality of judicial decision -making (and
arbitral decision-making) and cast doubt over the trustworthiness of judicial decisions
(awards).31
[32] Put another way, it would be grossly unfair if the doctrine were not to apply, as
the applicant would then be allowed to escape the consequences of both awards
and have the matter arbitrated afresh. This would undermine the rule of law and
open the door to recurring legal challenges to the same conduct, c ontrary to
conventional legal principles.32
FAIR HEARING AND BIAS
[33] Where an arbitrator, for some reason, misconceives the nature of the enquiry
in the arbitration proceedings with the result that a party is denied a fair hearing or a
fair trial of the issues, that may constitute a gross irregularity. The applicant’s case is
entirely different. The applicant contends that the second respondent was required
to render a decision that, when objec tively considered, was fair and that a
reasonable and rational decision-maker would have made when faced with the same
evidence presented during the proceedings. This is undoubtedly an impermissible
attempt to equate the review of administrative decisions tainted by an error of law
with the review of private arbitration awards.33
30 The same issues of fact and law that were structural to the leading award featured in the remittal
award.
31 The leading award was final in nature, as it was not set aside by the remittal order.
32 The leading award was not set aside by the remittal order.
33 Total Support Management (Pty) Ltd and Another v Diversified Health Systems (SA) (Pty) Ltd and
Another 2002 (4) SA 661 (SCA) at para [24].
[34] The applicant contends for the legal position that the alleged factual and legal
errors per se result in the unfairness and unreasonableness of the awards. Thus, the
applicant attacks the rationality of the awards. Self -evidently, it cannot be that the
alleged grave errors of fact and law determine whether the decision was fair,
reasonable, rational or impartial, even in private arbitrations.34
[35] The applicant avers that the arbitrator’s findings display a perception of bias.
This complaint goes to the second respondent’s alleged compromised imp artiality
and independence. This is a constitutional argument invoking the immutable
principles of natural justice, in which judicial impartiality and independence are the
bedrock of any fair and just legal system.35
[36] The test to be applied involves the reasonableness of the apprehension of
bias and the reasonableness of the litigant holding such apprehension. The
applicant says that the seco nd respondent’s impartiality was compromised and, as a
result thereof, the fairness of the arbitration proceedings became irreparably
compromised, with the applicant being disadvantaged as a result thereof. Because
of the presumption of judicial impartial ity (which applies equally to arbitrations), the
applicant bears the onus of rebutting this presumption.36
[37] The immutable need for an absence of bias on the part of an adjudicator
requires and involves the adj udicator being able to assess and decide the facts and
disputes before him or her with an open mind. Bias or reasonable suspicion of bias
equates with actual and apparent bias. Some foreign jurisprudence is helpful in this
regard. The test essentially boils down to the following question:
‘…whether a fair -minded observer, having considered the facts, would
conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased…’37
[38] Self-evidently, an arbitrator, like a judge or similar judicial officer or
adjudicator, must act impartially and judiciously. Thus, the standard of impartiality
34 A clear distinction must be drawn between appeals and reviews.
35 Section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
36 The applicant failed in this connection.
37 James Maurici (2007) “The Modern Approach to Bias”, Judicial Review, 12:4 , 251-260.
required of judicial officers exercising public powers is the same as that ex pected of
arbitrators. A private arbitration does not fall within the purview of administrative
action and arises through the exercise of private rather than public powers.38
[39] The applicant could not provide details (or sufficient details) regarding these
allegations of impartiality. Thus, nothing before me cast a long shadow over the
arbitration process or the awards that flowed from them. The claims made by the
applicant did not cumul atively (nor separately) endorse or sustain the
reasonableness of the applicant’s contentions that the impartiality of the second
respondent was compromised or that he was biased.39
[40] The applicant’s argument goes instead to the results of the arbitration awards
and not the method, as the applicant makes out no case that the procedure followed
by the arbitrator prevented it from having a fair opportunity to present its case. The
applicant seeks to rely on alleged incorrect findings of fact and law, none of which
amount to irregularities on the arbitrator's part, thus preventing the applicant from
having a fair hearing.40
[41] There is a difference between an allegation of bias and an allegation that a
party did not enjoy a fair hearing. Sometimes, these concepts overlap, but drawing a
clear distinction is essential. De termining whether the arbitration was fair is a matter
of objective judicial assessment.41
[42] At the same time, bias (as already alluded to) is assessed through the eyes of
a reasonable, fair -minded, informed observer. A trial is unfair (and so is an
arbitration) when the judicial conduct disrupts the presentation of the case and
prevents the court (or tribunal) from properly appraising the case on its merits.42
[43] The alleged complaints about these adverse findings and rulings (if they exist)
are grounds for appeal and are not rev iew grounds. I say this because it is
38 Ramsden, The Law of Arbitration: South African and International Arbitration at page 66.
39 Insufficient detail was provided by the applicant on this score.
40 These are all grounds of appeal (if they exist).
41 Ramsden, The Law of Arbitration: South African and International Arbitration at page 66.
41 Technology Corporate Management v De Sousa 2024 (5) SA at [261].
42 Technology Corporate Management v De Sousa 2024 (5) SA at [261].
advanced that the arbitrator misdirected himself on questions of fact and on issues of
law. The applicant relies on these to contend for the po sition that the arbitrator
committed gross irregularities or committed misconduct.43
[44] These complaints by the applicant are not indicative that the second
respondent, in any manner, did not apply his impartial mind to the matter. The
central complaint by the applicant is that the arbitrator ignored persuasive
jurisprudence and instead reli ed on principles from academic authors and lower
courts to find that the applicant could not rely on the fact that the applicant’s
obligation to perform had not yet arisen because of the first respondent’s alleged
lack of performance.44
[45] The second respondent carefully reasoned that he did not ignore the binding
jurisprudence relied on by the applicant but rather explained that the facts of that
matter (as referenced) were very different from those in the p resent matter. The
second respondent also relied upon a judgment from our apex court in support of his
reasoning and explained why he arrived at the conclusions that he reached.45
[46] In addition, the second respondent also explained (in his remittal award) that
he was not persuaded to alter his leading award. At best, for the applicant, these
issues may be interpreted as an error of law (I do not believe they are) by the second
respondent. Still, I need help understanding how this translates to an allegation of a
clear perception of bias on the part of the second respondent. Self-evidently, it could
not be said that the second respondent's finding on this score i s judicially
reviewable.46
OWNERSHIP AND RE-DELIVERY
[47] Under this rubric, the applicant relies on what it believes to be alleged
incorrect fact -finding. T he second respondent considered the alleged engine,
electrical, and mechanical defects and explained why the complaints were not
43 As referenced in sections 33 (1)(a) and (b) of the Arbitration Act.
44 Smith v Van der Heever NO1996 (4) SA 950 (A)
45 Botha and Another v Rich NO and Others 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC) at [45].
46 These are appeal grounds (if they indeed even exist).
actionable in law. In the second respondent’s remittal award, he explained why his
reasoning was not susceptible to a re -consideration and the applicant did not fully
engage with this.47
[48] In summary, the applicant sought to elevate several perceived alleged errors
of fact and law on the part of the second respondent in the hope of reachin g an
artificial threshold which would equate to the denial of a fair hearing. This process is
no doubt impermissible as it fails to appreciate the clear distinction between an
appeal and a review. In addition, no issues were highlighted in the remittal order that
specifically required another determination or re-hearing by the second respondent.48
REMAINING ISSUES AND THE COUNTER-APPLICATION
[49] As alluded to previously, the case by the applicant is predicated upon alleged
errors of law and fact -finding errors. As already stated, these are impermissible
grounds to contend for a review of the leading, remittal, and further awards. T he
legal position that finds application in this application and the counter -application is
set out in the now -settled jurisprudence, illustrating the test to be applied where an
alleged error of law may give rise to an irregularity. The ‘test’ has been described as
follows:
‘…the error of law gives rise to the irregularity; the reviewable irregularity
would be the refusal to hear that party and not the error of law. Likewise, an
error of law may lead an arbitrator to exceed his powers or to misconceive the
nature of the inquiry…’49
[50] This, in turn, goes to the nature of the enquiry in the setting of an alleged
gross irregularity in private arbitration proceedings. The duties of an arbitrator and
the scope of an arbitrator’s powers are best illustrated in the following terms:
47 This was supported by the fact that the remittal order did not “set aside” the leading award.
48 The second respondent, in any event, gave the applicant another arbitral “hearing”
49 Telcordia Technologies Inc v Telkom SA Ltd 2007 (3) SA 266 (SCA) at [69].
‘…An arbitrator has “the right to be wrong” on the merits of the case, and it is
a perversion of language and logic to label mistakes of this kind as a
misconception of the nature of the inquiry– they may be misconceptions about
meaning, law or the admissibility of evidence but that is a far cry from saying
that they constitute a misconception of the nature of the inquiry…’50
[51] In addition, our apex court has considered the correct proced ural approach to
a review of a private arbitration award. The legal test to be adopted in this case may
be summarised as follows:
‘…In each case, the question will be whether the procedure followed afforded
both parties a fair opportunity to present their case…’51
[52] It cannot be suggested (by any stretch of the imaginat ion) that the applicant in
this case was not afforded a fair opportunity to present its case during both these
extended arbitration proceedings. Thus, the applicant’s case does not meet the
threshold for judicial review and the counter-application must succeed.52
COSTS
[53] The first respondent vigorously contends for a costs order ‘ de bonis propriis’
against the applicant’ s firm of attorneys of record because of the frivolous and
technical approach adopted in connection with this second review application. I am
afraid that I must disagree as some of the points for consideration were at least
‘arguable’ legal concerns. Fur ther, many difficulties arose because of the lack of
detail in the remittal order.53
[54] I must, however, record that the entire approach by the applicant’s legal team
leaves much to be desired. Whether this approach amounted to a material
departure from the responsibility of their office has, in my view, not been clearly
50 Telcordia Technologies Inc v Telkom SA Ltd 2007 (3) SA 266 (SCA) at [85].
51 Lufuno Mphaphuli & Associates (Pty) Ltd v Andrews and Another 2009 (4) SA 529 (CC) at [261].
52 The applicant was afforded a complete opportunity to present its case to the second respondent.
53 The remittal order did not specify the issues required for “reconsideration” by the second
respondent.
demonstrated in thes e papers. What is abundantly clear is that the unfortunate
approach adopted by the applicant’s legal team most certainly necessitated the need
to employ senior counsel on behalf of the first respondent. Further, a costs order on
the attorney and client scale is warranted.54
ORDER
[55] The following order is granted:
1. The applicant’s application for the review and setting aside of the
award of the second respondent dated 12 January 2024 in terms of
section 33(1) of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 (‘’the Act’’) is dismissed.
2. The applicant is with this ordered to redeliver the ‘ Noelle Marie’ to the
first respondent.
3. The applicant is directed to take all steps necessary to transfer
ownership of the ‘Noelle Marie’ into the first respondent’s name.
4. The applicant shall pay the first respondent US$15,000 monthly from
1 August 2017 until the ‘Noelle Marie’ is redelivered to the first respondent.
5. The applicant shall pay the first respondent interest on the aforesaid
monthly amounts at 10.5% per annum from 12 January 2024 until the
payment date (both days inclusive).
6. The applicant is e ntitled to a reduction in the purchase price of the
vessels in respect of the following defects:
a. excessive sediment in the fuel tanks of all the vessels, except
the Mackenzie Marie
54 The applicant contended for a “re-hearing” the same issues that were presented in the initial review
application
b. leaks in the refrigeration systems on all the vessels
c. non-functional (leaking) bait freezer on the Mackenzie Marie ,
and
d. rotten deck planking on the Noelle Marie and the Conlan James.
(“the actionable defects”)
7. The first respondent shall pay the applicant US$56,400, together with
interest at 10.5% per annum, from 12 January 2024 until the payment date as
compensation for the actionable defects (both days inclusive).
8. The amount owed by the first respondent to the applicant, as set out in
paragraph 7 above, shall be set off against the amount owed by the applicant
to the first respondent, as set out in paragraph 4 above.
9. The applicant shall pay one -third of the firs t respondent’s costs in the
arbitration incurred before 17 March 2023 and subsequent costs relating to
the quantum determination and costs hearing, which took place on 28 to
30 November 2023 (save for those parts of the arbitration in respect of which
costs orders had already been made).
10. The cost orders in the arbitration made before 17 March 2023 are
made and confirmed as court orders.
11. The applicant is directed to pay the costs of the review application and
the counter-application on the scale as between attorney and client, including
the costs of counsel on scale C.
__________
E. D. WILLE
Cape Town