S v Mapasa and Others (CC32/2024) [2024] ZAECELLC 39 (26 August 2024)

60 Reportability
Criminal Procedure

Brief Summary

Criminal Procedure — Trial-within-a-trial — Admissibility of confessions and admissions — Accused challenging the voluntariness of their statements — Accused 1 alleged torture and inadequate explanation of rights; accused 2 and 3 disputed the voluntariness of their statements and the explanation of their rights — Court conducted a trial-within-a-trial to determine the admissibility of the confessions and admissions — Evidence led from police officers regarding the procedures followed in obtaining the statements — Court found that the admissions and confessions were made freely and voluntarily, and that the rights of the accused were adequately explained.

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[2024] ZAECELLC 39
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S v Mapasa and Others (CC32/2024) [2024] ZAECELLC 39 (26 August 2024)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN CAPE
DIVISION-EAST LONDON)
Case No: CC 32/2024
In the matter between:
THE STATE
and
SINDILE
MAPASA

Accused 1
KHAYA
GCINANI

Accused 2
LINDISWA
MGQITHI

Accused 3
JUDGMENT
(TRIAL-WITHIN-A-TRIAL)
MOLONY
AJ
:
[1]
The three accused in this matter face charges of assault with intent
to cause grievous
bodily harm, kidnapping and murder.
[2]
The trial was meant to commence on 23 July 2024 however, due to
various unavoidable
intervening factors, only commenced on 31 July
2024.
[3]
The state led the evidence of one witness, before the need arose to
commence a trial-within-a-trial
in regard to an admission made by
accused 3.
[4]
It must be noted that the defence did not agree that the admission is
in fact an admission,
but nonetheless alleged that the statement
which allegedly constituted an admission, was not made freely and
voluntarily.
[5]
Out of an abundance of caution, and in order to avoid any potential
prejudice to accused
3 by having sight of the statement in question,
this court deemed it necessary for a trial-within-a-trial to be held
in regard
to the admissibility of the admission.
[6]
It then transpired that accused 1 was disputing the admissibility of
a confession,
and accused 2 was disputing the admissibility of a
pointing out, and that there was some overlap in the evidence of some
of the
state witnesses in regard to all three accused.
[7]
The trial-within-a-trial accordingly dealt with the admissibility of
accused 1’s
confession, accused 2’s pointing out and
accused 3’s admission. This adjustment to the process required
that two state
witnesses needed to be recalled, however this
proceeded without objection and was, in my view, appropriate under
the circumstances.
[8]
The state led the evidence of ten
(10)
police officers, all of
whom were experienced police officers.
[9]
The impugned confession, pointing out and admission documentation
were provided to
me by agreement, but the sections in issue were
covered with blank pages, meaning that I had access to the
pro-forma
portions of the documentation, but not the sections dealing with the
content which related to the merits of the matter.
[10]
Whilst there were one or two aspects which arose during the course of
the trial-within-a-trial
which may have best been dealt with by
having sight of the covered portions of the documents, in my view
those aspects were not
sufficiently material to necessitate that
occurring.
[11]
The three accused elected not to testify in the trial-within-a-trial.
[12]
Broadly stated, and based upon the versions put on their behalf to
the state witnesses, accused
1 alleged that he had been physically
assaulted and tortured in order for the police to obtain his
confession, and that his confession
was not obtained freely and
voluntarily, and without undue influence. He furthermore alleged that
his
Constitutional
rights had not been adequately explained to
him.
[13]
Accused 2 alleged that his pointing out was not done freely and
voluntarily, and without undue
influence. He also disputed that his
Constitutional
rights had been adequately explained.
[14]
Accused 3 alleged that her admission was not made freely and
voluntarily, and also that her
Constitutional
rights had not
been adequately explained.
[15]
In order for the matter to be placed in the appropriate context, it
must be noted that the charges
in this matter emanated from two
dockets, one opened at the
Duncan Village
police station, and
the other at the
Scenery Park
police station. It appears that
the scene where the body of the deceased was found fell under the
purview of
Scenery Park
, whilst the assault
GBH
and
kidnapping charges fell under the purview of the
Duncan Village
police station.
[16]
The alleged offences occurred in 2019. It appears that at some point
charges were withdrawn
(apparently due to delayed DNA results)
and were only reinstated in 2024. All three accused were arrested in
2019, prior to charges being withdrawn. In 2019 there was
a fourth
accused, who could not be traced when charges were reinstated.
[17]
A summary of the material evidence led and the applicable legal
position will be provided in
what follows.
[18]
Captain Matiwane
is a police officer stationed in
East
London
who has 32 years of experience. He was the officer who
recorded accused 3’s admission in writing.
[19]
Captain Matiwane
was, at the time, informed that accused 3
wished to make a confession, and so she was brought to
Captain
Matiwane
for this purpose. It transpired, according to the state,
that the contents of the document did not amount to a confession, but
rather constituted an admission.
[20]
Captain Matiwane
confirmed going through the requirements of
the relevant
pro-forma
with accused 3, which included an
extensive explanation of accused 3’s
Constitutional
rights.
Captain Matiwane
conducted his engagement with accused
3 in
isiXhosa
, and had been satisfied that she had the
necessary understanding of what was being explained to her. At no
point did she raise
concerns or objections about anything. Had any
such concerns or objections been raised, he would have recorded such
information
and stopped the process.
[21]
Photographs were taken by
Captain May
(
inter alia
of
accused 3 before and after giving her statement to Captain Matiwane)
which demonstrated that accused 3 did not suffer any obvious
physical
injury. The photograph album in this regard was admitted as exhibit

G’
.
[22]
Neither
Captain Matiwane
nor
Captain May
were involved
in any way in the investigation of this matter prior to the statement
being taken.
[23]
Captain Matiwane
explained to accused 3 that a charge of
murder was involved, and the pro-forma confirms that it was explained
to her that direct
imprisonment could result if she was convicted in
a serious case as a result of her statement.
[24]
It was put to
Captain Matiwane
in cross-examination that
accused 3 had told him that she did not know why she was being
brought to him, to which he had responded
that he also did not know
why she was brought to him, as she had already made a statement.
Captain Matiwane
denied this.
[25]
It was also put to
Captain Matiwane
during cross-examination
that accused 3 had been told, prior to being brought to him, that she
was going to him to make a statement.
[26]
Later it was put that she had been told she was going to his office
to have photographs taken.
It was also put to
Captain Matiwane
that accused 3 denied that her rights were read to her, and that she
had just made a statement, she was not asked anything.
Captain
Matiwane
reiterated that he had explained her rights to her as
well as asked her all of the questions contained in the
pro-forma
.
[27]
Warrant Officer Vinqi
, the current investigating officer in
this matter, has twenty
(20)
years of police service.
[28]
He testified that he arrested accused 3, explained to her why she had
been arrested and verbally
informed her of her rights
(in
isiXhosa)
– the rights he explained were contained in his
pocket book which he carried at all times.
[29]
He specifically testified to informing her of the right to remain
silent, that anything she said
could be written down and used as
evidence, that she had the right to consult a legal practitioner of
her own choice, or if she
did not have one, she could apply for one
to be provided.
[30]
According to
Warrant Officer Vinqi
accused 3 then began to
narrate to him what had occurred in regard to the offences in
question. This was part of a conversation
they had after her arrest
(which he referred to as an interview).
[31]
He asked if she wanted what she was saying to be reduced to writing,
as he did not have the authority
to do so
(meaning that he was not
of sufficient rank to take a confession)
. Accused 3 said she
wanted a statement to be recorded in writing.
Warrant Officer
Vinqi
then made the necessary arrangements for a confession to be
taken.
[32]
Warrant Officer Vinqi
was referred, under cross-examination on
behalf of accused 3, to his arrest statement in relation to all three
accused. The statement
in question was ultimately admitted as exhibit

F’.
[33]
The statement was deposed to on 31 October 2019 at 15h50 in the
afternoon. The statement,
inter alia
, confirmed that
Warrant
Officer Vinqi
, when arresting accused 3, explained to her that he
was arresting her for kidnapping and assault
(it appears that at
that point there were still 2 dockets),
that he explained her
rights to her verbally, and that she understood and agreed.
[34]
Much was made of the fact that reference was made to a prior
statement made by accused 3
(labelled A6 in the docket),
which, it was not in dispute, was deposed to on 31 October 2019 at
22h00
(i.e. sometime after exhibit ‘F’).
Warrant
Officer Vinqi
testified that he did not take the statement which
was
A6
, but that it was already in the docket when he obtained
it.
[35]
The statement labelled
A6
was not sought to be admitted into
evidence, and absent further evidence I can draw no conclusions from
this discrepancy other
than that there appears to be a discrepancy.
It furthermore does not appear to be in dispute that accused 3 had in
fact made two
statements.
[36]
Warrant Officer Vinqi
was furthermore criticised for the
absence of an
SAP14A
statement
(which contains an
explanation of rights)
in the docket. He testified that he had
furnished them, but when he looked for them in the docket he could
not find them. He then
asked for the docket from the prosecutor at
one point in his evidence in order to look through it for this
purpose.
[37]
It was put to
Warrant Officer Vinqi
that no interview occurred
with accused 3 and that after her arrest accused 3 was taken to the
cells. About 2 or 3 days later she
was taken from the cells and told
she was going to make a statement
(although later it was put that
she was told she was going to make a statement
and
have photographs taken).
No detail was given, and she was not
told she was being taken to make a confession. This was denied by
Warrant Officer Vinqi
.
[38]
Warrant Officer Vinqi
also, after accused 3 returned from
making her confession to
Captain Matiwane
, caused her to sign
a document called a ‘
Constitutional Warning’ (which
was admitted as exhibit ‘E’),
which
inter alia
,
informed her of her rights. He did so in order to attach this
document to the confession, and was adamant about this being
appropriate
procedure. The same occurred in regard to accused 2
(this
document was admitted as exhibit ‘K’).
It is clear
that this document is essentially superfluous, given the time when it
was signed, however this does not invalidate
the evidence of
Warrant
Officer Vinqi
,
Captain Matiwane
, and later
Colonel
Middleton
in regard to the prior occasions when accused 2 and 3’s
rights were explained.
[39]
Accused 2, as part of his narration of events to
Warrant Officer
Vinqi (and after his rights were verbally explained in isiXhosa)
,
told
Warrant Officer Vinqi
that he, accused 2, could take him
to where they left the person. This was how the pointing out came to
be arranged.
[40]
Warrant Officer Vinqi
testified that accused 2, in particular,
only noted, after his rights were explained, that he did not have
money for a legal representative,
but said nothing in regard to the
option of legal aid.
Warrant Officer Vinqi
was taken to task
on this point by the legal representative for accused 2, as it was
allegedly unlikely that accused 2 would have
said this, since accused
2’s legal representative was receiving payment for representing
accused 2. In my view this aspect
is neither here nor there in regard
to probabilities, as no explanation was tendered at any point in
regard to how accused 2 was
funding his legal representation.
[41]
It was put on accused 2’s behalf that
Warrant Officer Vinqi
had not explained accused 2’s rights to him, which was disputed
by
Warrant Officer Vinqi
.
[42]
In regard to accused 1
Warrant Officer Vinqi
testified to
having verbally explained the necessary rights
(which were listed
during his evidence)
in
isiXhosa
to accused 1 prior to his
confession being taken. It seems accused 1 initially denied any
involvement in the offences, and only
decided to give the full story
after learning that the other accused had done so.
[43]
It was put to
Warrant Officer Vinqi
that he and a white police
officer had assaulted and tortured accused 1
(by handcuffing his
hands behind his back whilst he was in a chair, and placing a tube
over his head which had been sprayed inside
with pepper spray –
this caused accused 1 to urinate himself).
During this process
accused 1 was exhorted to confess to the crimes
(although it does
not appear any detail was provided about the crimes to accused 1)
by Warrant Officer Vinqi and the white police officer).
It was
also put that
Warrant Officer Vinqi
had not explained any
rights to accused 1.
Warrant Officer Vinqi
disputed all of
this.
[44]
Lieutenant Colonel Matshini
was the officer who took accused
1’s confession, and utilised the same
pro-forma
(which
included the necessary explanation of rights)
as that used in
regard to accused 3’s confession.
[45]
Lieutenant Colonel Matshini
conducted the interview in
isiXhosa
, and was satisfied that he and accused 1 understood
each other. The documentation in this regard was admitted as exhibit

I’
, and the relevant photograph album
(showing
inter alia accused 1’s appearance before and after the
confession was taken)
was admitted as exhibit ‘
H’.
[46]
Lieutenant Colonel Matshini
testified that he was not involved
in the investigation in this matter prior to the taking of accused
1’s confession.
[47]
It was put to
Lieutenant Colonel Matshini
that there were
things which accused 1 said to him which had not been written down,
and that
Lieutenant Colonel Matshini
had written down certain
things, both in the statement and in the answers to questions in the
pro-forma
, which accused 1 had not said. The exact problematic
sentences were not disclosed.
Lieutenant Colonel Matshini
denied this. It was furthermore put that accused 1’s rights
were not explained, and that
Lieutenant Colonel Matshini
had
told accused 1 that he was compelled to give a statement without a
legal representative, upon accused 1 querying that aspect
and showing
reluctance. This was all denied by
Lieutenant Colonel Matshini
.
[48]
It was also put on accused 1’s behalf that he had been tortured
by
Colonel Middleton (who conducted the pointing out involving
accused 2)
and
Warrant Officer Vinqi
, and that if
Lieutenant Colonel Matshini
had asked accused 1 if he had been
assaulted or threatened in any way, he would have informed
Lieutenant
Colonel Matshini
of this – but
Lieutenant Colonel
Matshini
had never asked him this question.
Lieutenant Colonel
Matshini
denied this.
[49]
Captain May (now Lt. Col. May),
who took the photographs of
accused 1 and 3, testified and confirmed the evidence of
Captain
Matiwane
and
Lieutenant Colonel Matshini
in in all
material respects.
[50]
Colonel Middleton
testified in regard to the pointing out
conducted with accused 2. In this regard a
pro-forma
(admitted
as exhibit ‘J’),
was once again utilised, which,
inter alia
, included an explanation of rights and extensive
questioning to determine whether or not the pointing out was
occurring
inter alia
freely and voluntarily, and without undue
influence.
[51]
Colonel Middleton
conducted the process in
English
,
having ascertained from accused 2 that he was fluent in English and
was content to conduct the process in
English
. An interpreter,
Sergeant Nkosana
, was on hand at all times and explained to
accused 2, in
isiXhosa
, that he could ask for anything to be
interpreted that he did not understand.
[52]
Accused 2 alleged that he was simply required to sign the pointing
out documentation
(he did not know which police officers filled it
out)
and was taken in a vehicle to the pointing out
(he
disputed two vehicles being used),
but never pointed anything
out. He was, prior to the pointing out, informed by an unidentified
person at a police station to point
out the place, and was threatened
that he was facing life imprisonment. During argument it was
suggested that it was
Colonel Middleton
and
Warrant Officer
Vinqi
who had made such threats.
[53]
Colonel Middleton
testified that he had completed the pointing
out documentation appropriately and that accused 2 had participated
in the pointing
out. Two vehicles were utilised, one containing
accused 2 and
Colonel Middleton
, and one containing the
photographer
(Warrant Officer George).
[54]
One aspect which required attention was the fact that the photograph
reflecting the final odometer
reading of the vehicle driven by
Colonel Middleton
reflected a reading which differed from that
recorded by
Colonel Middleton
in the pointing out
documentation, as the final reading upon return from the pointing
out.
[55]
The difference was
(upon calculation)
one of some 16
kilometres.
Colonel Middleton
was at a loss to explain this as
he stated he would need to see the contents of the covered portion of
the pointing out documentation,
as this listed the required
information.
[56]
He was not cross-examined in this regard, nor was any detail provided
on behalf of accused 2
(aside from saying he was taken to where
the body was found)
as to where he had been taken, how many times
they had stopped, and for how long they may have travelled. In my
view this aspect
is therefore of no significance.
[57]
Sergeant Nkosana
and
Warrant Officer George
testified
and confirmed the evidence of
Colonel Middleton
in all
material respects.
[58]
During the evidence of
Colonel Middleton
it emerged that he
had been erroneously identified as the white police officer who had
allegedly assaulted and tortured accused
1.
Warrant Officer Vinqi
was asked how many white police officers there were at the
Duncan
Village
police station at the relevant time. He responded that
there was only one, that being
Captain Jackson
.
[59]
Captain (now Colonel) Jackson
later testified as well. He was
not on the list of witnesses, but was called by the state
(with no
objection by accused 1)
given what had emerged during
Warrant
Officer Vinqi’s
evidence.
[60]
Colonel Jackson
denied any involvement in the investigation of
this matter in 2019, denied any involvement in the arrest of any of
the accused
in 2019, and denied assaulting or torturing accused 1
with
Warrant Officer Vinqi
.
[61]
What he did confirm was that he, during 2024, had assisted the
current investigating officer
(Warrant Officer Mbambo, who fell
under his command)
to trace and notify the accused that this
matter was being reinstated. This involved meeting with and
introducing himself to accused
1.
[62]
Colonel Jackson
was requested
(for the first time during
cross-examination)
to obtain his diary from 2019, presumably in
order to trace his whereabouts
inter alia
on the day that
accused 1 alleged he had been tortured.
[63]
I allowed a fairly extensive adjournment for this purpose, but
Colonel Jackson
was unable to find the relevant diary, and
assumed he had destroyed it
(believing he was permitted to do so
in terms of the relevant standing orders).
I draw no inference
from this, as the issue of the diary was raised belatedly and the
diary had never formed part of the docket.
[64]
Section 35(1) of the Constitution
provides that everyone who
is arrested for allegedly committing an offence has,
inter alia
,
the right to remain silent and the right not to be compelled to make
any confession or admission that could be used in evidence
against
that person.
[65]
To be admissible, a confession, an admission or a pointing out must,
in addition to being relevant
and being made voluntarily, be
constitutionally compliant.
[66]
Section 35(5) of the Constitution
provides that evidence
obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of
Rights
must
be excluded if the admission of that
evidence would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to
the administration of
justice.
[67]
The onus is on the state to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
relevant confession or pointing
out or admission was made freely,
voluntarily and without undue influence. It is also for the state to
prove that the accused’s
fundamental rights were not infringed
in the process.
[68]
In regard to the use of
pro-formas
in such matters, the following was stated in the matter of
Ngcobo
and Other v Minister of Police
(4755/2017) [2023] ZAKZPHC 126 (20 October 2023)
:

[81]
The defendant obtained ‘confessions’ from the plaintiffs
in the guise of warning statements.
Both Mlangeni and Mncwabe
coincidentally did not use the prescribed pro forma for taking
confessions. They knew that there was
a prescribed pro forma for
taking confessions. Such pro forma is a product of team expertise and
guidance from courts. It is followed
to ensure that safeguards for
taking confessions are complied with to ensure that suspect’s
constitutional rights are not
infringed and that the process accords
with the accused’s right to a fair trial. Each question in the
pro-forma serves a
particular purpose. The pro forma serves as a
contemporaneous record of what took place during the taking of the
confession. The
failure to use the prescribed pro forma is courting
disaster.”
[69]
None of the accused testified in the trial-within-a-trial, as was
their right. This means the
evidence of the state stands uncontested.
What now needs to be determined is whether or not the state’s
evidence meets the
burden of proof required.
[70]
This court was invited by the defence to infer what essentially
amounted to a conspiracy amongst
all of the police officers involved,
in order to successfully gain a conviction in regard to all 3 accused
in this matter.
[71]
Reference was made to the fact that the confession, admission and
pointing out were not recorded
by way of video, as this would
allegedly have placed the police officers’ conduct beyond
reproach.
[72]
It was proposed that it be inferred that
Warrant Officer Vinqi
was an unreliable and dishonest witness based upon
inter alia
his demeanour, and the fact that
Constitutional Warning
statements were taken in regard to accused 2 and 3 after the pointing
out and admission had already been made.
[73]
I was invited to view
Warrant Officer Vinqi’s
demeanour
when testifying for the second time as evasive, due to the way he
stood and the fact that he faced the bench when answering
questions
under cross-examination.
[74]
My own observation was simply that
Warrant Officer Vinqi
appeared fatigued due to the length of time that he was required to
testify, and so leaned against the wall behind him and crossed
his
arms whilst facing the bench when answering questions. In my view
there was nothing particularly significant about
Warrant Officer
Vinqi’s
demeanour or stance when testifying.
[75]
It was asked that negative inferences be drawn in regard to Col.
Jackson assisting
Warrant Officer Mbambo
in tracing the
accused in 2024, when charges were to be reinstated, along with
Colonel Jackson
being unable to find his diary from 2019.
[76]
In the matter of
Gcam-Gcam v The State
2015 (2) SACR
501
(SCA) the following was stated at paragraphs 48 and 49 in regard
to the approach to be adopted in a trial-within-a-trial:

...All that was
required of the appellant was to present a version that was
reasonably possibly true, even if it contained demonstrable

falsehoods.
[49] When confronted
with confessions made by suspects to police officers whilst in
custody — even when those officers are
said to be performing
their duties independently of the investigating team — courts
must be especially vigilant. For
such people are subject to the
authority of the police, are vulnerable to the abuse of such
authority and are often not able to
exercise their constitutional
rights before implicating themselves in crimes. Experience of courts
with police investigations of serious
crimes has shown that
police officers are sometimes known to succumb to the temptation to
extract confessions from suspects through
physical violence or
threats of violence rather than engage in the painstaking task of
thoroughly investigating a case. This is
why the law provides
safeguards against compelling an accused to make admissions and
confessions that can be used against him in
a trial.”
[77]
I was referred to the unreported decision of
Mr
Justice Brooks
in the matter of
S
v Gqoki and Others
(CC14/2018)
[2023] ZAECMHC 8 (26 February 2023)
, in
which, in the circumstances of that matter,
Mr
Justice Brooks
found himself
compelled to state at paragraphs 52 & 53 that:

[52]
It is a reality of our times that members of the public are more
trusting of members of the judiciary than
they are of members of the
South African Police force. The emergence of cases such as the
present in which police brutality is
revealed goes a long way towards
the deterioration of the reputation of the South African Police
Service in the eyes of members
of the public. One of the direct
effects that the deterioration of this reputation has is afforded by
the example of an explanation
given by many an accused person
appearing in our courts who states that no mention of an assault was
made to a commissioned police
officer because he or she was just
another member of the same force at whose hands the accused had
suffered. Yet all of this could
be avoided, from the poor level of
integrity demonstrated in some investigations to the failure of the
prosecution to secure the
admission into evidence of a confession, if
police investigators were obliged to use magistrates for the recordal
of confessions.
[53]
The time may well have arrived for the legislature to give serious
consideration to the amendment
of the CPA to remove the possibility
that a confession might be recorded by a commissioned officer of the
same force which is charged
with investigation duties. This would go
a long way to ensure that the quality of investigative work shows the
improvement which
is necessary to ensure an improvement in the rate
of successful prosecutions for serious crimes in this country. I have
little
doubt that if members of the South African Police Services
were aware that at some point during their investigation there may
well
be magisterial scrutiny of the background leading to the
recordal of a confession, there would be a resistance on the part of
the
investigation team to resort to the improper use of police force
or violence.”
[78]
I have given anxious consideration to the circumstances of this
matter, the evidence led, and
the relevant legal requirements, and
have been vigilant in my analysis of the evidence presented by the
state. Being vigilant does
not, however, equate to making baseless
assumptions.
[79]
Aside from minor discrepancies, I could find little fault with the
evidence of the state witnesses,
and there is no evidence or obvious
inconsistency or error with which to infer the devious intentions
suggested by the defence.
To do so would accordingly, in the
circumstances of this particular matter, amount to nothing more than
speculation.
[80]
The police officers impressed as honest
and forthright witnesses. There was nothing inherently improbable or
materially contradictory
in their evidence.
[81]
The versions advanced on behalf of the
accused meant that any incriminating contents of the confession and
pointing out
(including all of the
physical stops during the pointing out),
were manufactured by police officers who had no connection to the
investigation. The degree of organisation of multiple police
officers
from different police stations required in order to achieve such a
result would have had to be extensive and invasive,
and such an
inference finds no support or even suggestion in the evidence before
this court.
[82]
In regard to the admission
(to the extent that it was
incriminating),
all information in the statement was in fact
provided by accused 3, however she was allegedly not aware of her
rights and had not
been informed of the fact that she had been taken
to make a confession.
[83]
In regard to accused 1, the erratic manner in which
Colonel
Jackson
came to be identified as one of the police officers who
had assaulted and tortured accused 1, despite accused 1 having known
of
his identity and appearance from earlier in 2024 when charges were
reinstated, suggests that this was a belated accusation on the
part
of accused 1.
[84]
The charges in this matter were only reinstated in 2024. Despite the
lapse of time there is no
evidence to suggest that accused 1
(who
was apparently the only accused to suffer an assault and torture)
has ever raised this issue prior to the start of this trial in 2024.
[85]
Given all of the above I am satisfied that the state has proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that
the confession of accused 1, the
pointing out by accused 2, and the admission by accused 3 were made
freely and voluntarily and
without undue influence, and that none of
the relevant
Constitutional
rights were infringed.
Ruling
:
[86]
I accordingly rule that the confession of accused 1, the pointing out
of accused 2 and the admission
of accused 3 are admissible in
evidence in the main trial.
N MOLONY
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT
Appearances
:
For
the State:
Adv
Mgenge
instructed by
Deputy
Director of Public Prosecutions
MAKHANDA
For
Accused 1:
Mr
Sigcau
instructed
by
Legal
Aid South Africa
KING
WILLIAM’S TOWN
For
Accused 2:
Mr
Mquqo
instructed
by
Private
Instructions
EAST
LONDON
For
Accused 3:
Adv
Mtini
instructed
by
Legal
Aid South Africa
KING
WILLIAM’S TOWN
Heard
on:
23,
24, 26 & 31 July 2024 and
01,
02, 20, 21, 22 & 26 August 2024
Judgment
delivered:
26
August 2024