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2024
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[2024] ZAECMKHC 106
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Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v State Structured Mezzanine Investment (Pty) Ltd and Another (1824/2021) [2024] ZAECMKHC 106; [2024] 4 All SA 773 (ECG); 2025 (3) SA 498 (ECMk); 87 SATC 358 (17 September 2024)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN
CAPE DIVISION, MAKHANDA)
CASE
NO.:
1824/2021
Reportable
Yes
In
the matter between:
THE
COMMISSIONER FOR THE SOUTH
AFRICAN
REVENUE SERVICE
Applicant
and
THE
STATE
STRUCTURED
MEZZANINE
INVESTMENT
(PTY) LTD
First
Respondent
JEAN
PRIEUR DU PLESSISS
Second
Respondent
JUDGMENT
Cengani-Mbakaza
AJ
Introduction
[1]
The South African Revenue Service (SARS), an organ of the state as
contemplated in sections 217
and 239 of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa,
[1]
(the
Constitution) has through its Commissioner instituted an application
before me, seeking an order compelling the first respondent
to comply
with a request to produce relevant material in terms of section 46 of
the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 (the section
46 request as
provided for in terms of the TAA). The relevant material sought by
SARS pertains to the tax- years from 2009 to 2013.
[2]
The first
respondent (SMI), a company duly registered in terms of the company
laws of the Republic of South Africa and a registered
taxpayer with
SARS, with a unique taxpayer’s reference number, is the subject
of the TAA. SMI has opposed SARS’s application
and the reasons
for this opposition will be outlined later in this judgment.
[3]
The second respondent is a registered taxpayer and is designated as
the public officer of the
first respondent under section 246 of the
TAA.
[2]
As
the public officer, the second respondent represents the first
respondent in respect of the relief sought against the first
respondent and is therefore an interested party in these proceedings.
The
background facts
[4]
On 01 June 2017, SARS notified SMI that an audit would be conducted
for the tax- years 2009 to
2013. Additionally, SARS requested the
relevant material for the tax- years 2014 to 2016, in the event that
the audit scope would
be extended to include these years as well.
[5]
On 06 February 2020, SARS issued a further request under section 46
of the TAA to SMI via its
attorneys, requiring the provision of
signed loan agreements for the 2009 to 2013 tax- years within 21
business days. The request
pertained to loan agreements between SMI
and several entities, including Slip Knot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd
(Slipknot), Four Rivers,
Blue Beacon and One Vision Investment 233
(Pty) Ltd (One Vision).
[6]
On 17 February 2020, due to SMI’s failure to respond, SARS sent
a follow-up letter, care
of its attorneys, requesting that the
relevant material must be submitted no later than 05 March 2020.
[7]
On 05 May 2020, since no response had been received to the section 46
request, SARS sent a further
letter to the SMI. On 06 May 2020, the
SMI’s legal representatives responded to SARS requesting a
21-day extension to submit
the requested material. They explained
that SMI had started collating information, but due to the
significant amount of data requested,
the process was taking longer
than anticipated.
SMI’s
objection to SARS’s section 46 request
[8]
The opposition to the SARS’s request can be traced back to the
letter written by SMI’s
attorneys on 20 May 2020 (the objection
letter), in which they first raised the objections to the section 46
request.
[9]
In its objection letter, SMI questioned SARS’s authority to
issue a section 46 request for
the years of assessment in respect of
which the audit period has already prescribed. SMI held a view that
due to the prescription
of the relevant time period, no assessment
can be issued by the SARS, even if an audit were to be conducted. In
a nutshell, SMI
queried the purpose of the audit given the assumption
they had regarding auditing.
[10]
Further to the objection letter, SMI claimed that SARS’s
reliance on ‘random audit’ is
a mere pretext to comply
with section 40 of the TAA. SMI asserted that the audit is not
genuinely random, but rather a contrived
reason to conduct the audit.
In the objection letter, SMI further submitted that the section 46
request constitutes an administrative
action, which is subject to
judicial review, alternatively, the section 46 request remains
reviewable under the principle of legality,
which requires an
administrative action to be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.
SMI asserted therefore that it was prepared
to comply with the
section 46 request on condition that SARS complies with the
Constitution and the law.
SARS’s
response to the objection letter
[11]
On 14 July 2020, SARS responded
to the objection letter and confirmed that the audit period was from
2009 to 2013 years of assessment.
SARS indicated that the TAA does
not limit the timeframe within which SARS can request information.
Instead, it restricts SARS’
ability to raise additional
assessments to a period of three years from the date of the original
assessment beyond which no further
assessment can be made. SARS urged
SMI to comply with the section 46 request.
[12]
The further correspondence exchanged between SMI and SARS from 18
August 2020 to 09 December 2020 clearly
indicates that SMI
consistently and vigorously objected to the SARS’s section 46
request.
SARS’
case
[13]
The facts as stated in an affidavit by Stephen Luff, an employee of
SARS and a specialist in the Specialist
Audit Division, can be
summarised as follows: SMI and Slip Knot, the holding company of SMI
brought an application for provisional
liquidation alternatively
business rescue of Four Rivers in Gauteng Division of the High Court,
Pretoria under case number 69839/2014
(the provisional liquidation
application). In support of the provisional liquidation application,
Mr Du Plessis (the second respondent
in this matter) deposed to an
affidavit which, in part, is corroborated by an answering affidavit.
The second respondent is a Director
of both SMI and Slip Knot.
[14]
The other key role players in the provisional liquidation application
are Four Rivers, a company that conducts
business in property leasing
and trading, and Naidoo who together with Mrs Kasturi Naidoo were the
sole shareholders and directors
of Four Rivers. One Vision, an
intermediary company forming part of and controlled by Slip Knot
Group of Companies (SKG) and used
by SKG, as part of a Black Economic
Empowerment (BEE) structure to hold a controlling share in BEE
entities which is targeted at
procuring government leases at
beneficial rates and Blue Beacon Vision is a company that is used by
SGK to obtain and secure government
leases.
[15]
In a provisional liquidation application, SMI’s claim is based
on a loan agreement between Slipknot
and Four Rivers dated 15
December 2009 as well as a settlement agreement between Slipknot,
Four Rivers, Naidoo and SMI dated 25
August 2010. SMI is a creditor
of Four Rivers in the amount of R283 761 853 (excluding
interest).
[16]
Slipknot initially conducted the business of providing funding to the
mezzanine which business was later
taken over by Slipknot on behalf
of SMI. Naidoo acknowledged being indebted to SMI in the amount of
R180 412 646 which arises from
the loan agreement. Four Rivers has
made a payment of R252 091 496 towards the loan agreement.
Furthermore, it is claimed that
a significant portion of the payment
made by the Four Rivers towards the loan agreement consists of a
payment of R203 792 709 made
on 17 October 2011. This payment was
funded by Standard Bank when Four Rivers raised finance to secure
commercial leases for certain
properties owned by Four Rivers.
[17]
SARS states that it could not intervene in the provisional
liquidation application because Four Rivers had
not been found to owe
tax debt to SARS at that point. After receiving the liquidation
application, the responsible SARS official
reviewed the allegations
made by Mr Du Plessis in the founding affidavit. The SARS responsible
official examined Four River’s
business affairs based on
extracts from annual financial statements (AFS) and corporate income
tax declarations for the 2010-2013
tax- years of assessment.
[18]
The initial investigation revealed discrepancies, which led to
further investigation by SARS. SARS found
larger turn-over
discrepancies between the income tax and VAT declarations submitted
by Four Rivers for the 2010-2013 years of
assessment. The
discrepancies were as follows Four Rivers, R3.3 million, and SMI: R2,
1 million, Slipknot: R1.07 million. Some
irregularities were found in
Four Rivers’ rental income from government leases compared to
Slipknot's financing of the underlying
property portfolio. Four
Rivers received R19.7 million in lease payments and Slipknot received
over R200 million from Four Rivers
in five years.
[19]
A significant discrepancy was found in the interest deductions for
income tax purposes, but Slipknot declared
significantly less
interest as gross income in each year of assessment. The mismatch, as
alleged by SARS, suggests potential underreporting
of income or over
claiming of deductions. Meanwhile, Four Rivers’ interest paid
to Slipknot was the main contributor to its
excess losses amounting
to R16.7 million from 2010-2013. Four Rivers correctly applied
accounting and tax treatment for an upward
fair value adjustment of
fixed property owned and leased by its government entities. This
resulted in reduced losses or accounting
profits, in 2012 (R580, 611)
and 2013 (R192, 087). Furthermore, indications of potentially larger
tax evasion schemes have emerged
based on returns submitted by the
auditor and a Director of Two Rivers Trading for Four Rivers,
Slipknot, SMI, One Vision and Blue
Beacon.
[20]
A comparison of the 2013 AFS of Four Rivers, SMI and Slipknot
revealed a significant mismatch of hundreds
of millions of rand in
interest expenses and taxable income. Specifically, SMI’s AFS
show loans from Four Rivers of R33,
295,527 (2012, and R33, 379,205
(2013). Four River’s AFS reflect interest-bearing borrowings of
R174, 265,778 (2012) and
R164, 438,800 (2013). Slipknot’s AFS
does not show any loan receivable from Four Rivers and does not
disclose the subordination
of loans. SARS alleges that the notes to
the AFS misleadingly describe these loans as ‘rental expenses
income’ and
‘sales expenses’ instead of loan
transactions. Furthermore, SARS indicates that even if the loan and
income stream
owed by Four Rivers were subordinated, the total amount
due could not exceed R33 million as reflected in the SMI’s 2013
AFS.
[21]
The SARS analysis drew two possibilities, namely, that Four Rivers
overstated interest expense which should
be limited to actual
interest payable or accrued income; or SMI or slip Knot understated
the interest receipts and underpaid tax
for the corresponding tax
periods. Therefore, SARS asserts that a section 46 request is made to
conduct a comprehensive audit for
the corresponding financial years.
SMI’s
case
[22]
A perusal of the papers filed, indicates that the application was
initiated on 21 June 2021. The answering
affidavit was delivered on
27 August 2021. SARS delivered its replying affidavit on 06 October
2021. The court grants condonation
to both parties for failing to
file the relevant papers on time. In opposing SARS’s section 46
request, SMI, through an affidavit
filed by the second respondent,
suggests that SARS has not provided sufficient justification or
explanation for why the requested
documents are necessary or relevant
to the investigation or audit as required by the TAA.
[23]
SMI contends that by bringing this application to court, SARS is
prematurely seeking judicial intervention
in an ongoing audit
process. It suggests that SARS has neglected to follow the clear,
practical steps outlined in the TAA. SMI’S
case is that a
simple explanatory letter from SARS, either in an interim letter of
finding or otherwise would have been sufficient
to address concerns
and avoid the need for court involvement. SMI warns that allowing
SARS to involve the court in routine administrative
matters will
overload the court, undermining the efficiency of the tax
administration system and wasting resources.
[24]
Furthermore, SMI contends that SARS’ partly belated explanation
for the relevance of the requested
information amounts to an abuse of
the court process. SMI notes that there is no substantiation
whatsoever provided for the 56
loan agreements listed in the request.
According to SMI, it appears that SARS may intend to extrapolate its
reasoning regarding
the Four River agreement and apply it to the
remaining agreements, attempting to establish a
modus operandi
.
This according to SMI is completely illogical and unsupported
assumption.
[25]
SMI’s case goes further to suggest that the Four Rivers
agreement was an arm’s length transaction
providing start-up
capital to an external company, bridging finance activities that
focused on maximizing profits with adequate
security. The Four Rivers
loan was significantly larger than the other loan agreements
requested by SARS and had a different purpose.
It was intended to
enable Four Rivers to acquire property, and is typical in such
transactions, it carried a higher interest rate.
The 32 loan
agreements requested by SARS are within the SKJ Group including loans
to operational companies and a family trust.
These agreements aim to
minimize intragroup funding costs, with interest rates determined by
different commercial considerations.
The security arrangements are
also less stringent compared to loans to external parties. Notably,
these entities regularly file
tax returns with SARS, and no
discrepancies similar to those alleged in the Four River agreement
have been identified. Moreover,
SARS has made no allegations
regarding these operational loans.
The
issues
[26]
The crisp issue for determination is whether SARS has satisfied the
jurisdictional facts as required in terms
of section 46 of the TAA.
The
legal framework
[27]
The information requested by SARS is governed by the provisions of
the TAA. This Act aims to
streamline tax collection by
standardising tax administration, outlining taxpayer’s rights
and obligations, and defining
administrative roles to ensure
efficient tax collections.
[3]
SARS,
under its commissioner’s guidance, is responsible for
administering TAA.
[4]
This
includes gathering comprehensive information related to tax liability
for past, present or future periods, identifying taxable
events and
ensuring compliance with tax obligations, verifying the accuracy of
submitted tax returns, information and documents,
confirming tax
payer’s identities for liability assessment, determining tax
liability, assessing and refunding overpaid taxes
etcetera.
[5]
This
encompasses all aspects of tax administration.
[28]
Section 46 of the TAA under Chapter 5 which is titled, ‘Information
gathering’, empowers SARS
to request relevant material from a
taxpayer or any other person, in writing or orally within a
reasonable period, for tax administration
purposes. Section 46 of the
TAA provides,
‘
46
Request for relevant material
(1)
SARS may for
the purposes of the administration of the tax Act in relation to a
taxpayer, whether identified by name or otherwise
objectively
identifiable, require the taxpayer or another person to, within a
reasonable period, submit relevant material (whether
orally or in
writing) that SARS requires.’
[29]
According to Section 1 of the TAA, ‘relevant material ’refers
to information, documents or things
that SARS considers likely to be
relevant for administering a tax Act, as mentioned in Section 3 of
the TAA. This includes anything
that could potentially be useful or
important for SARS to know when carrying out its tax administrative
duties.
[6]
[30]
In essence, the TAA grants SARS extensive powers to investigate and
gather information before any issue arises
or a dispute emerges.
Under section 46, SARS can request any information it believes may
potentially impact a person’s tax
liability, even if there is
no ongoing tax dispute or issue.
The
parties’ legal submissions and the analysis by the court
[31]
Both parties submitted their heads of argument, presenting
substantial points that merit thorough discussion
and a comprehensive
assessment by the court. The court expresses its gratitude for both
parties’ assistance, particularly
the valuable insight in the
heads of argument, which have informed this judgment. SMI initially
raised points
in limine
to SARS’s written request
specifically alleging a conflict of interest and a lack of authority.
These were later resolved
through an agreement between the parties.
Following a progressive analysis of the issues raised, SMI decided to
withdraw the preliminary
objections.
[32]
Notwithstanding the withdrawal of the preliminary issues, SMI
reiterated the same defences that were previously
presented in an
objection letter to SARS. Regarding these defences, I engaged with
the parties and through this interactive process,
SMI’s
defences to SARS’s section 46 request were modified and
refined, resulting in a more targeted approach. Mr Botha
SC, counsel
for SMI argued that SARS’s section 46 request constitutes a
‘fishing expedition’, as they have not
provided adequate
reasons for seeking the requested information. Conversely, Mr
Sholto-Douglas SC, counsel for SARS refuted this
contention,
presenting a diametrically opposed view.
[33]
To avoid unnecessary elaboration, I will combine Mr Botha SC’s
argument with his subsequent submissions,
wherein he asserted that,
pursuant to Section 35 of the Constitution
[7]
,
SMI has a right to remain silent and not to incriminate itself.
Furthermore, counsel argued that for the requested information
to be
considered relevant, it must be admissible in a court of law. In
support of this, counsel contended that the affidavit relied
upon by
SARS in motivating its request is based on hearsay evidence lacking
both admissibility and probative value.
[34]
These arguments are misconceived, particularly, because SARS’s
role is to determine the taxpayer’s
taxable income, and to that
end, it may conduct the information-gathering exercise, even before
any issues or disputes arise between
the authority and the taxpayer.
The information-gathering powers are internationally recognised. In
Australia
and New Zealand Banking group Ltd v
Konza
[8]
,
The court acknowledged the utility of ‘fishing expedition’
in specific circumstances and stated that the prohibitions
against
the ‘fishing expeditions’ are inapplicable to the
administrative process of tax assessment. The Commissioner
is
mandated to ascertain a taxpayer’s taxable income, which
necessitates extensive anticipatory inquiries. Such inquiries
are a
critical precursor to assessment, enabling the Commissioner to gather
relevant material before potential disputes of factual
issues
materialise.
[35]
Information-gathering exercise is crucial to a tax authority’s
audit activities and without the power
to obtain confidential
information, the burden of taxation would unfairly fall on diligent
taxpayers alone. This is because revenue
authorities lacking such
power would be unable to identify and address non-compliance by
negligent or dishonest taxpayers. Robust
information-gathering
capabilities enable the authority to verify compliance, detect
non-compliance and maintain the integrity
of the tax system.
[36]
The TAA establishes a clear distinction between civil proceedings,
criminal proceedings and the disclosure
of relevant material,
providing a framework for each with distinct objectives, procedures
and consequences. Section 35’s
protection is specific to
accused, arrested or detained persons and does not extend to SMI in
this context, as it is not a party
to any criminal activity. It is
acknowledged that taxpayers have certain rights, which must be
respected and protected. However,
the taxpayer’s rights should
not impede SARS’s authority and ability to discharge its
statutory duties by obtaining
the relevant material. Rather,
taxpayers’ rights should strike a balance between protecting
these rights and ensuring SARS’s
ability to effectively
administer the tax system.
[37]
Counsel further argued that the period for assessment has been
prescribed, rendering any attempt to obtain
information for the
2019-2013 tax- years futile, as SARS can no longer take action for
those years. Counsel referenced section
99(2) of the TAA, which
allows the Commissioner to issue revised assessments after the
three-year period has expired, in cases
where the full amount of tax
was not assessed due to fraud, misrepresentation, or non-disclosure
of material fact. He argued therefore
that SARS must make out a case
in terms of section 99(2) of the TAA before it can request for
information in terms of section 46
of the TAA.
[38]
While SARS attempted to justify its request by citing potential
irregularities involving Four Rivers, SMI
and other companies, I
agree with Mr Sholto-Douglas SC, that a section 46 request is a
distinct process. SARS has the authority
to issue such a request for
tax administration purposes, as defined in Section 3(2) of the TAA.
This includes gathering information
relevant to a taxpayer’s
liability for past, present and future tax periods. As noted earlier,
this is merely an information-gathering
exercise, and the relevance
of the required material is determined by SARS, not the taxpayer.
[39]
Consequently, in the context of this specific information-gathering
exercise, the provisions of section 99(2)
of the TAA are
inapplicable. The assertion that SARS’s request for information
is motivated by a desire to open another assessment
is highly
speculative. Consistent with the principle of rationality as
emphasized by Mr Botha SC in his submissions, SARS had clearly
indicated in its letter dated 06 February 2020
[9]
that
the relevant material sought was financial information which was
required for the purposes of conducting an audit, thereby
providing a
rational basis for the request.
[40]
Our courts have emphasized that the provisions of Section 46 of the
TAA are peremptory. In
Commissioner
for the South African Revenue Services v Brown
[10]
,
Smith J referred to the case of
Natal
Joint Municipality Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality[2012]
2 All
SA 262
SCA
at
paragraph 18
[11]
and
held:
‘
There
can be little doubt, having regard to the ‘language used in the
light of ordinary rules, of grammar and syntax, the
context in which
the provision appears and the apparent purpose of the Act that the
provisions of Section 46 are peremptory. This
explicit and
unambiguous wording of the section simply does not allow for any
interpretation.’
[41]
In this instance, SARS’s request is solely based on the loan
agreements between SMI and the companies
that are listed in the
request. In my considered opinion, SMI’s request for an
extension effectively constitutes an acknowledgement
of its statutory
obligation to provide the relevant material as deemed necessary by
SARS. Through the court’s interaction
with Mr Botha SC, it
became clear that the relevant material is readily available. In my
view, SMI’s initial awareness of
this obligation and the
availability of the relevant material mean that its subsequent change
of heart does not absolve it of its
duty to comply with the section
46 request.
[42]
Pursuant to the principle of legality, the peremptory provisions of
section 46 of the TAA pertaining to a
request for relevant material
necessitate compliance, leaving no discretion to refuse.
[12]
The
argument that SARS is interfering with the ongoing audit process by
bringing this court application is unfounded. Despite sending
multiple letters requesting the relevant material, SARS received no
meaningful response, necessitating the court application. For
information-gathering purposes, the justification provided by SARS in
its letter dated 06 February 2020 is considered adequate
to compel
the disclosure of the relevant material. The section 46 request
satisfied the requirements of reasonable specificity
as contemplated
in section 46(6) of the TAA. I am therefore satisfied that all the
jurisdictional requirements in terms of section
46 of the TAA have
been met.
Costs
[43]
The fundamental principles governing costs are longstanding and
well-settled.
[13]
The
purpose of awarding costs is to indemnify a successful party against
the expenses and expenditures they incurred during the
legal
proceedings. After careful consideration and having regard to the
intricate nature of this case, I exercise my discretion
to award
costs on Scale ‘C’, in accordance with Rule 67A(3) of the
Uniform Rules of Court.
Order
[44]
In the result,
the following order is issued:
1.
The application to compel the respondents to submit the relevant
material as listed in the
letter dated 06 February 2020, as provided
in terms of sect
ion 46 of the
Tax
Administration Act 28 of 2011
is
granted. The respondents are ordered to furnish the relevant material
to the applicant free of alterations or retraction.
2.
The relevant material must be provided to the applicant within 21
days from the date of this
order.
3.
The respondents are ordered to pay costs on Scale ‘C’ as
contemplated in
Rule 67A
(3) read with Rule 69 of the Uniform Rules
of Court, jointly and severally, one paying the other to be absolved.
_________
N
CENGANI-MBAKAZA
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
APPEARANCES:
Counsel
for the Applicant
: Adv Sholto-Douglas
SC with
Adv
K Reynolds
Instructed
by
:
Joubert Galpin
Searle
Gqeberha
C/o
Owen Huxtable Attorneys
Makhanda
Counsel
for the Respondents
:
Adv
A
Botha SC with
Adv
J Pretorius
Instructed
by
:
Pieterse
Sellner Erasmus TRM
Gqeberha
C/o
Owen Huxtable Attorneys
Makhanda
Heard
on
:
16 May 2024
Judgment
Delivered on
:
17 September 2024
[1]
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108, 1996
[2]
Section 246(2) (a) of the TAA states that the appointed public
officer must be a senior official of the company. The second
respondent is the director of SMI.
[3]
The purpose of the Act is governed by Chapter 2, Part A which deals
with general administrative provisions. Section 2 of the
TAA
provides, ‘The purpose of this Act is to ensure the effective
and efficient collection of tax by-(a) aligning the administration
of the tax acts to the extent practically possible;(b) prescribing
the rights and obligations of taxpayers and other persons
to whom
this Act applies;(c) prescribing the powers and duties of persons
engaged in the administration of a Tax Act; and (d)
generally giving
effect to the objects and purposes of tax administration.
[4]
See section 3(1) of the TAA.
[5]
See section 3(2) (i)-(iii), the relevant part in this instance is
also section (3) (2) (b)-(e) of the TAA.
[6]
Section 1 of the TAA defines relevant material as follows: ‘relevant
material’ means any information, document or
thing that in the
opinion of SARS Is foreseeably relevant for the administration of a
tax Act as referred to in section 3’.
[7]
Section 35 of the Constitution, specifically outlines the rights of
individuals who have been detained, arrested or accused of
a crime,
thereby upholding their fundamental rights and ensuring a fair
judicial process.
[8]
[2012] FCA 196
Para 59, per Kenny, Edmonds and Robertson JJ, The
strong reasons which inhibit the use of curial processes for the
purposes of
a ‘fishing expedition’ have no application
to the administrative process of assessing a taxpayer to income tax.
It
is the function of the Commissioner to ascertain the taxpayer’s
income. To ascertain this he may need to make a wide-ranging
of
inquiries, and to make them long before nay issue of fact arises
between him and the taxpayer. Such an issue will in general,
if not
always, only arise after the process of assessment has been
completed. It is the process of investigation before assessment
that
s 246 is principally, if not exclusively directed.’ This case
was quoted with approval in Commissioner or South African
revenue
Service v Company 2024 JDR 0900 (WCC) para 30.
[9]
In a letter dated 06 February 2020 SARS addressed a letter to
SMI. The contents of the letter are as follows: …..’
SARS has notified you in a letter dated 20171113 that an audit is
being conducted in respect of the 2009 to 2016 tax period(s).
To
assist SARS in conducting the audit you are required to provide
copies of the relevant material indicated below within 21
business
days from the date of this letter.
Financial
information
:
Signed loan agreements with the following entities for the 2009-2013
YOA: AA Pest control, Air Craft Investments (Pty)
Ltd, Bestvest 153
(Pty)Ltd, Canton Trading 118 (Pty)Ltd, Cape Killarney Prop Inv,
Changing Tides 21 (Pty)Ltd, FXT Property Trust,
Greystone Trading
1564 CC, La Colline Properties CC, Mantella Trading 473 CC, Montreau
1 (Pty) Ltd, Network Deals Prop Holdings,
Niel Swart Family Trust,
Rapipro 223 (Pty) Ltd, Shadowvoice 1 (Pty)Ltd, Smithrand (Pty)Ltd,
Techsure Fin, Westand, Zaptron Investments
756 (Pty)Ltd, Zaptron
Investments 786 (Pty) Ltd, Four Rivers Trading 422 (Pty) Ltd, JGA
Slabbert, Slipknot Investments 777 (Pty)Ltd,
Greenvest 101 (Pty)Ltd,
Blue Bacon Investments 206 (Pty)Ltd, Cinzaco 107 (Pty)Ltd, Fairfield
Place 57 (Pty)Ltd, Falcodor 136
CC, Great Force Investment 56 (Pty)
Ltd, Kidd Lane Trust, Nederburg Trust, Nelbut Properties (Pty)Ltd,
Newinvest 125 (Pty) Ltd,
One Vision Investments 233 (Pty)Ltd, Paka
Properties (Pty)Ltd, Pearce Street Trust, Saduco Eight Thousand CC,
Sherpa Trade and
Invest 39 (Pty)Ltd, Snowy Owl Properties 38
(Pty)Ltd, Sothern Spirit Properties 112 (Pty) Ltd, Tacora
Investments (Pty)Ltd, Venscora
122 (Pty) Ltd, Sign and Seal Trading
(Pty) Ltd, Olympic Park Trading 126 (Pty) Ltd, Tutuni Investments 33
(Pty) Ltd, Barkophor
Investments (Pty)Ltd, Atrolor (Pty)Ltd, Arudoc
CC, JP Duplessis, Jean Prieur Du Plessis Family Trust, Afropulse 497
(Pty)Ltd,
Hemipak Investments (Pty)Ltd, Sweet Pea Properties, Four
Rivers/36 Merriman and Dalton Trading (Pty) Ltd.’
[10]
(561/2016)[2016] ZAECPEHC17 (05 May 2016].
[11]
See also Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services v J
Company footnote 7 (supra) at para 27.
[12]
Section 46 (4) of the TAA provides, ‘A person or
taxpayer receiving from SARS
a
request for relevant material
must
submit the relevant material to SARS
at the place, in the format(which must be reasonably accessible) to
the person or taxpayer) and………….’.(accentuation
added)
[13]
See D e Van Loggerenburg Erasmus Superior Court Practice Volume 2:
Uniform Rules and Appendices, Part D5 ’Costs in general
‘an
overview of the law of costs.