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[2024] ZAECMKHC 98
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Van Kerken v Eskom Holdings SOC Limited and Another (3771/2024) [2024] ZAECMKHC 98 (5 September 2024)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
[EASTERN CAPE DIVISION
– MAKHANDA]
CASE NO.:3771/2024
In the matter
between:-
THOMAS
IGNATIUS VAN KERKEN
APPLICANT
and
ESKOM
HOLDINGS SOC LIMITED
FIRST
RESPONDENT
MANFRED
L. THATHE
SECOND
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
NORMAN J:
[1] On 02 September
2024 at 15h00 applicant brought this application on an urgent basis
and sought the enrolment of the matter
outside the normal court
rules. This court issued a directive that:
“
1.
Applicant must serve on the respondent by no later than 12h00 on 03
September 2024.
2. Respondents are
to file their answering affidavit by no later than 04 September 2024
at 13h00.
3. Applicant is to
file her reply by 16h00 on 04 September 2024.
4. Application will
be heard on 05 September 2024 at 09h30.”
[2] It appeared
that the respondents were not made aware of the directive and their
legal team travelled from Bloemfontein
to be at court on 03 September
2024 as indicated in the notice of motion. At the request of the
parties the court enrolled the
matter for hearing on 4 September 2024
instead of 05 September 2024.
[3] The applicant
sought the following order:
“
1.
An order directing the First and Second respondents to restore to the
possession of the Applicant
the following:
1.1
Electricity
supply to Farm
Vimy
Ridge, Comm 120, account number 8[…] district Grahamstown.
1.2
Electricity
supply to Farm Dikkopvlakte, Comm 119, account number 81[…]
district Grahamstown.
1.3
Electricity
supply to Farm Vimy Pump Installation, Comm 88, account number 9[…],
district Grahamstown.
1.4
Electricity
supply to Farm Buffelsdrift, Comm 96, account number 5[…]; and
1.5
That
the Sheriff be directed to restore the electricity supply,
immediately, after the Court made an order.
2. That the
forms and service provided for in terms of the Rules of Court of the
above Honourable Court be dispensed with
and that the matter be heard
as one of
Urgent
in terms of Rule 6(12).
3. Cost of this
Application on an Attorney and Own Client Scale and Scale B for one
(1) Advocate.”
[4] The applicant
further placed the respondents on certain time frames:
(a) for the delivery
of their notice of intention to oppose by email on or before 16h00 on
Monday 02 September 2024;
(b) to deliver
answering affidavits, if any, together with any relevant documents on
or before 16h00 on Monday 02 September
2024;
(c) the applicant
to deliver its replying affidavit on or before 22h00 on Monday 02
September 2024 and that the application
as aforementioned was to be
made on Tuesday 03 September 2024 at 10h00.
[5] The applicant,
Mr Thomas Ignatius van
Kerken
, in his
founding affidavit stated that he currently resides on Farm
Dikkopvlakte,
Grahamstown, Eastern
Cape. The first respondent is Eskom Holdings SOC Limited an
electricity supplier. The second respondent
is an employee of Eskom,
Mr Manfred L. Thathe.
Applicant’s case
[6] Applicant
described himself as the account holder in respect of all the
electricity accounts with Eskom. He alleged that
he had been
unlawfully deprived of electricity supply to which he, at all times,
had undisturbed and peaceful access. He is a livestock
farmer farming
at the farms
Vimy, Dikkopvlakte and
Buffelsdrift
in the district of Grahamstown and has been so
farming in excess of two decades. He describes his farming enterprise
as enormous.
An integral part of his farming involves livestock and
growing feed such as lucerne and oats, amongst others, to provide
feed to
the livestock which is essential during drought. To grow
these crops, to feed his sheep, goats and
sybokke
water must be pumped with electricity to the various
irrigation systems to ensure that the plants grow and stay in a
condition to
feed in excess of 1500 herds of sheep,goats and
sybokke
combined.
[7] All the
above-mentioned farms do not have any other source of water and as
such drinking water for the livestock is also
pumped with
electricity. This period is breeding season and is thus a crucial
time to have electricity and water for two critical
reasons: First,
if the feed, that is lucerne and oats, do not get proper irrigation,
the plants will expire, alternatively,
wilt
which in turn will result in the ewes that are in the process
of giving birth to contract a disease known as
bloodnier.
That will inevitably result in a total loss of their livestock
and result in the death of their young animals. Second, should the
ewes not get water when giving birth they will not be able to produce
sufficient milk to feed their newborn offspring. That will
also lead
to the inhumane deaths of both the ewes and their offspring.
[8] The applicant
stated the following, amongst others:
“
3.6
On
30 August 2024, a Friday, in the late afternoon the
Second
Respondent
acting on behalf of the
First
Respondent
,
without my knowledge and consent, and unlawfully switch off my
electricity supply and by acting in this vexatious manner, hindered
me to approach the court for relief as it was impossible to obtain
legal representation and the courts are closed over weekends
and as
such my livestock and feed has been without water for days on end. It
is clear that the Second Respondent acted strategically
to get this
effect and to deprive me of seeking immediate intervention from the
above Honourable Court.”
[9] He stated that
the purpose of the application is to get an order that the
respondents be ordered to restore the electricity
supply to which he
had enjoyed undisturbed and peaceful access. He contended that he was
deprived of the supply unlawfully by the
respondents. He stated that
he is a client of the first respondent and was at all times in
undisturbed and peaceful possession
of electricity. The deprivation
of his undisturbed possession of electricity constitutes a direct act
of spoliation. He contended
that the respondents have gone about this
procedure in a wrong way because they should issue summons against
him and follow the
correct procedure. The respondents, by their
conduct had taken the law into their own hands and were attempting to
circumvent the
legal process.
[10] In dealing
with urgency, he submitted that, the matter is inherently
urgent due to the fact that he has been deprived
of his undisturbed
possession of the electricity supply. Should this court fail to
intervene he would suffer irreparable
harm because he had been
farming for decades and this is the only method of income that he
has. He had been advised that spoliation
is always considered to be
urgent. He is already suffering as a result of the illegal
disconnection of electricity for several
days. His livestock
will not survive if immediate intervention of the court does not take
place. He would suffer severe
prejudice and financial harm. He
asked that the court must show its displeasure with the conduct of
the respondents for taking
the law into their hands by granting a
punitive costs order against them. He also asked that the respondents
should be ordered
to pay costs for the sheriff should such costs be
incurred.
[11] The applicant
simply attached three Eskom invoices without making reference to
those invoices in his founding affidavit
or attaching them as
annexures as is the procedure.
Respondents case
[12] Mrs Margarita
Elizabeth Schoeman deposed to an affidavit on behalf of the first and
second respondents. She is employed
in the position of Officer
Revenue and Credit Management within Eskom. She had delegated
authority to depose to the affidavit and
to oppose the application.
She complained that the truncated periods were extremely
unreasonable, unfair and prejudicial to Eskom
as it was only given
less than a day, to file its answer, after service of the unissued
application on the respondents.
[13] The
respondents raised a point that the application lacks urgency as
urgency was self-created. They contended that the
applicant seeks to
restore a contractual right in respect of which the applicant
essentially seeks specific performance. They stated
that such right
is not protected by the
mandament van spolie
. She stated that
the applicants failed to disclose to the court that there are
contractual obligations between the applicant and
Eskom in terms of
the commercial agreement that is in place between them. Applicant
received a notice of disconnection for non-payment
dated 13 August
2024 amongst others, by email on 19 August 2024 from Eskom. In that
notice it was stated that should applicant
fail to pay the arrear
amount by the 26
th
August 2024, the applicant’s
electricity supply, in terms of the commercial agreement, concluded
with Eskom, would
be terminated. She further stated that the
applicant was well aware that non-payment of his contractual
obligations under the contract
would result in disconnection but he
failed and/or refused to pay his invoice. The disconnection happened
solely as a result of
the applicant’s own inaction. It was only
then that the applicant deemed it prudent to rush to court for
assistance on self-created
urgency.
[14] The
respondents further stated that there was a reaction to the notice of
disconnection which was sent to Eskom by Ms
Carine van Kerken who is
the person who has been corresponding on behalf of the applicant with
Eskom. She replied that the documents
have been forwarded to the
relevant Eskom division and that the email was merely for Eskom’s
records. On 20 August 2024,
Mr Daven Marais of Eskom responded to the
email of the applicant sent by Ms Carine van
Kerken
by stating that the applicant’s response does not
suspend the notice of disconnection and that same remains valid and
in place.
Ms Schoeman attached the email correspondence and
requested that it be considered as part of the evidence. She further
stated that
on 29 August 2024 Mr Adrian Cawthorn of Eskom attempted
to implement the disconnection. However, a supervisor or manager of
the
applicant intervened and requested Mr Cawthorn to speak with the
applicant’s attorney over the phone. According to the Mr
Cawthorn that attorney conveyed to him that there was an existing
court order which prevented Eskom from disconnecting the electricity
supply to the applicant. He told him not to proceed with the
disconnection. Mr Cawthorn left the property following such
conversation with the person that was identified as the attorney of
the applicant.
[15] Having gone
back to the office he established that there was no court order. On
Friday, 30 August 2024 he, together with
his colleague Mr Ntsika
Menze, returned to the applicant’s property to effect the
disconnection of the electricity supply.
She contended that the
applicant’s reliance on spoliation was misplaced. She stated
that the invoices attached evinced the
extended indebtedness of the
applicant to Eskom for a period of 31 to 60 days. She moved for the
dismissal of the application with
costs on a scale as between
attorney and client. She stated that the application is vexatious and
is an abuse of process of court.
She also asked that counsel’s
fees be ordered to be on scale C.
[16] In his
replying affidavit and in response to the allegations that the
truncated time frames were unfair to the respondents,
the applicant,
stated that on 29 August 2024 his legal representatives had warned Mr
Cawthorn that should they persist with the
disconnection they would
bring an urgent application. He also stated that there was a real
threat and that he would lose in excess
of R1million due to the
starvation of his livestock and their young. He contended that the
respondents created urgency by switching
off the electricity supply
after court hours on a Friday afternoon because that left his
livestock without necessary water supply
and thus endangered their
lives. He reiterated the fact that he had been advised that in a
mandament
van spolie
only two points should be considered by
the court and no merits need be dealt with. The first being that the
applicant had peaceful
and undisturbed possession of electricity and
secondly that the said undisturbed possession of electricity was
unlawfully disposessed
from the applicant.
[17] I shall quote,
for context, the applicant’s response to certain allegations
made in the answering affidavit
by the respondents:
“
12.
What the applicant however conveniently failed to disclose to this
honourable court is the fact that Eskom following non-payment
by
applicant of his contractual obligations in terms of the commercial
agreement in place between the applicant and Eskom received
a notice
of disconnection for non-payment dated 13
th
of August 2024 by inter alia email on 19
th
of August 2024.
13. I append as
annexure “ESK1” a copy of the email and as annexure
“ESK2” hereto a copy of the disconnection
notice for
non-payment.
The applicant’s
reply to that is:
AD PARAGRAPH 12
THEREOF:
The contents of this
paragraph is noted. However, I am advised by my legal representative
whose advice I accept to be true and correct
that the court should
not dwell into the merits of the matter in an application for a
mandament van spolie. The court should consider
only two main
factors. The first being that the applicant had peaceful and
undisturbed possession of electricity. And secondly
was said
undisturbed possession of electricity was unlawfully dispossessed
from the applicant? If the answer is yes the applicant
has
undisturbed peaceful possession and yes it was unlawfully
dispossessed from the applicant the court must restore the
undisturbed
possession of the electricity supply. The court simply
cannot dwell into the merits of this matter. When the applicant had
to deal
with the allegations of the respondent where they state facts
of what transpired prior to the 30
th
of August 2024 the
response was simply, the contents of this paragraph 12, supra is
repeated verbatim.”
[18] As
aforementioned in paragraph 12 the applicant was emphatic that the
court should not enter the merits. His response
to paragraph 12 of
the answering affidavit, supra, is repeated verbatim in respect of
many positive facts made or alleged by the
respondents which
required proper responses. He disputed that his legal
representatives had conveyed to Mr Cawthorn that
a court order
existed. He stated that Mr Cawthorn was informed that should they
disconnect electricity an urgent application for
mandament
van
spolie
would be brought against Eskom.
Legal submissions
[19]
Mr Snyman appeared for the respondents and Mr Olivier for the
applicant. Mr Olivier submitted that the respondents switched
off
electricity prematurely in that the notice given ought to have caused
them to switch off electricity on 02 September 2024 and
not on 30
August 2024. He submitted that conduct constitutes an unlawful act or
unlawful conduct and that on its own create a spoliation
to which
order the applicant is entitled. He submitted that when electricity
was switched off the applicant was in lawful possession
thereof. He
submitted that the possession of the applicant falls within the
quasi-
possession
because for farming he depended on the electricity supply. He relied
heavily on the decision by JP Daffue J in
Harrismith
Intabazwe Tsiame Residents Association (Pty) Ltd and Others v
Maluti-A-Phofung Local Municipality and Another
[1]
(
the
Harrismith decision )
.
On the issue of
quasi
- possession
he referred the court to paragraph 38 where JP Daffue J stated,
amongst others:
“
[38]
In
order to discern why the one case is actionable under the mandament
while the other is not, it is necessary to identify the
distinguishing feature. As I have said, the distinguishing feature
appears to me to be whether or not the alleged right to electricity
is an incident of, or an adjunct to, the alleged right which the
claimant has against the spoliator to be in occupation of the
premises. If the alleged right to electricity is an incident of the
claimant's occupation of the premises in this sense, one can
then
justly conclude (a) that the alleged right to electricity
is the subject of quasi-possession for purposes of the
mandament;
and (b) that a spoliation of the said quasi-possession is
simultaneously an act of spoliation in relation
to the premises
themselves.
”
[20]
Mr Snyman argued that the facts in the
Harrismith
judgment relied upon by the applicant are distinguishable from the
case at hand in that, amongst others, the electricity
supply
was interrupted in circumstances where the consumers in the
Harrismith
case
were not in breach of their payment obligations towards the
Maluti–A-Phofung Local Municipality; the municipality acted on
the termination notices after two years, and the relevant consumers
had declared disputes pertaining to their accounts. He submitted
that
in this case the applicant was forewarned that if he did not pay the
minimum amount that was in arrears there will be a disconnection.
Applicant was further reminded that the termination notice was valid.
The applicant ignored that in the hope that if his animals
died he
will seek damages from Eskom. He argued that if the court
were to come to the rescue of the applicant that
would mean that a
party would fail to honour its obligations, wait for Eskom to
disconnect electricity supply and thereafter rush
off to court. The
applicant failed to honour his contractual obligations, he argued. He
submitted that this court must follow the
decision of the Supreme
Court of Appeal in
Eskom
Holdings SOC Ltd v Masinda
[2]
and refuse to grant the relief sought.
Discussion
[21]
In
Mangala
v Mangala
[3]
Munnik J remarked as follows regarding spoliation as a remedy:
“
It is true that
a spoliation order is a remedy which in the nature of things should
be a speedy one, but the fact that there has
to be restitution before
all else simply means that, once an applicant has proved that he was
in peaceful possession and his possession
was disturbed, the
respondent must restore that position before entering into the merits
of the ownership or otherwise of the subject
matter. It does not
follow that, because an application is one for a spoliation order,
the matter automatically becomes one of
urgency. The applicant must
either comply with the Rules in the normal way or make out a case for
urgency in accordance with the
provision of Rule 6 (12) (b).”
[22]
Rule 6(12) (b) of the Uniform Rules of Court provides that in
every affidavit or petition filed in support of any application
under
paragraph (a) of this subrule, the applicant must set forth
explicitly the circumstances which render the matter urgent and
the
reasons why the applicant claims that the applicant could not be
afforded substantial redress at the hearing in due course.
The
applicant failed to satisfy this requirement. He simply stated that
he was advised that spoliation is always considered to
be urgent and
that he will suffer irreparable harm if electricity is not restored.
He did not respond meaningfully to the
allegations relating to the
sequence of events leading up to the disconnection. It is well
established that an applicant cannot
create its own urgency by simply
waiting until the normal rules can no longer be applied, as the
applicant did in this case. I
accept the respondents’ version
in that regard as uncontroverted. The manner in which the notice of
motion was tailored lacked
proper consideration for the respondents.
The application was issued on 2 September 2024. The respondents were
called upon to file
their notice to oppose and answering affidavit on
the same day at 16h00. They were called to appear on Tuesday,
03 September
2024 at 10h00. Those time frames were very inconsiderate
and unreasonable in the circumstances where the applicant was made
aware
about the disconnection on 16 August 2024. He did not
disclose the events that led to the disconnection of electricity
supply
as he is obliged to. It is such conduct that attracts a
punitive cost order. However, for the reasons which I will deal with
later
I am not persuaded that this is one of those cases where the
court should make such a cost order.
[23]
In
Ngqukumba
v Minister of Safety and Security and Others
,
[4]
Madlanga J remarked as follows about the essence of spoliation:
“
[10] The
essence of mandament van spolie is the restoration before all else of
unlawfully deprived possession to the possessor.
It finds expression
in the maxim spoliatus ante omnia restituendus est (the despoiled
person must be restored to possession before
all else). The
spoliation order is meant to prevent the taking of possession
otherwise than in accordance with the law. Its underlying
philosophy
is that no one should resort to self-help to obtain or regain
possession. The main purpose of the mandament van spolie
is to
preserve public order by restraining persons from taking the law into
their own hands and by inducing them to follow due
process.”
[24]
It is also a possessory remedy, the unlimited and exclusive
function of which is to restore the
status quo ante
, and
therefore, it matters not that the spoliator might have a stronger
claim to possession than the person spoliated or that the
latter has
indeed no right to possession. The purpose of a
mandament van
spolie
is a speedy restoration of possession to the person who
has been unlawfully deprived of possession.
[25]
Mandament
provides
for interim relief pending a final determination of the parties’
rights, and only to that extent is it final. In
Bon
Quelle (Pty) Ltd v Otavi Municipality
[5]
the court held that a
spoliation order is no more than a precursor to an action over the
merits of the dispute. In
Tswelopele
Non-Profit Organisation & others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan &
others
,
[6]
the court dealt with the nature of the
mandament
and
remarked:
“
Its object is
the interim restoration of physical control and enjoyment of
specified property– not its reconstituted equivalent.”
[26]
In
Masinda
,
the Supreme Court of Appeal gave clear and unambiguous reasons why
restoration of electricity could not be ordered. First, Eskom
in that
case did not do the electrical installation at Ms Masinda’s
home. Eskom found that that installation did not
comply with
the necessary requirements of safety. Second, the installation was
illegal and unlawful and constituted a danger to
the public. Third ,
the order of the court a quo was problematic in that it went
beyond requiring the re- establishment of
what there was before,
whereas spoliation only requires the status
quo
ante
to
be restored.
[7]
Most importantly, the Supreme Court of Appeal set the correct
approach in matters of this nature , and found that the supply
of electricity to Ms Masinda was therefore dependent upon it being
paid for in advance. The Supreme Court of Appeal specifically
found
that a personal right, was purely a contractual right that cannot be
construed as an incident of possession of the property.
It found that
the
mandament
does not protect such a contractual right and it upheld the appeal
and
substituted the court a quo’s decision by dismissing the
application
.
The same principle applies herein.
[27]
In
Masinda
, Leach JA analysed various decisions where there
was termination of water, telephone services and electricity and came
to a conclusion
in paragraphs 20 to 22 that:
“
[20] In
these cases the mere existence of the water supply which was
terminated, was held in itself to be insufficient to
constitute an
incident of the possession of the properties, and that more than a
purely personal right was required in order to
show that to be the
case.
[21] This was
echoed in Telkom v Xsinet, a case which is probably
the most comparable to the present in that
it involved the supply by
Telkom of electronic impulses to the Xsinet’s premises, thereby
providing the telephone and bandwidth
system used by it to conduct
its business as an internet service provider. Alleging that Xsinet
was indebted to it in respect of
another service, Telkom disconnected
the supply. This court did not accept that the use of the bandwidth
and telephone services
constituted an incident of the possession of
the property, even though those services were used on Xsinet’s
premises. It
observed that it would be both artificial and illogical
to conclude that the use of the telephone, lines, modems, or
electrical
impulses had given Xsinet possession of the connection of
its property to Telkom’s system. It also rejected the
contention
that Telkom’s services could be restored by the
mandament as those services constituted ‘a mere personal right
and
the order sought is essentially to compel specific performance of
the contractual right in order to resolve a contractual dispute’.
[22]
As
was pointed out in Zulu, the occupier of immovable property
usually has the benefit of a host of services rendered at the
property. However the cases that I have dealt with above graphically
illustrate how, in the context of a disconnection of the supply
of
such a service, spoliation should be refused where the right to
receive it is purely personal in nature. The mere existence
of such a
supply is, in itself, insufficient to establish a right constituting
an incident of possession of the property to which
it is delivered.
In order to justify a spoliation order the right must be of such a
nature that it vests in the person in possession
of the property as
an incident of their possession. Rights bestowed by servitude,
registration or statute are obvious examples
of this. On the other
hand, rights that flow from a contractual nexus between the parties
are insufficient as they are purely personal
and a spoliation order,
in effect, would amount to an order of specific performance in
proceedings in which a respondent is precluded
from disproving the
merits of the applicant’s claim for possession
.
Consequently, insofar as previous cases may be construed as holding
that such a supply is in itself an incident of the possession
of
property to which it is delivered, they must be regarded as having
been wrongly decided.”
(footnotes
omitted) (my underlining).
[28]
The undisputed facts of this case are that the applicant and Eskom
have a commercial relationship where Eskom supplies
electricity to
the applicant’s farms and bills applicant for the supply.
The tax invoices show that the meter
numbers, consumption and
arrears, total amounts due, are, amongst others, recorded therein.
The ‘
deprivation
of a prior supply
of
electricity’
as Gorven AJA (as he then was) termed it in,
Blendrite
v Moonisami
[8]
, is regulated by that contractual relationship which is purely
personal in nature. As found by the Supreme Court of Appeal in
Masinda
such supply does not constitute an incident of possession of the
farms to which it is delivered. It follows that spoliation
in
these circumstances finds no application. The application must
accordingly fail.
Costs
[29]
I now proceed to the issue of costs. In light of the
decision taken in this matter I do not find it necessary
to delve
into the unreasonable truncated time frames given to the respondents
by the applicant. The respondents were able to put
up their answering
affidavits including brief heads of argument within two days. The
applicant, throughout, in the founding affidavit
made it apparent
that he acted on legal advice in bringing the application and the
posture adopted therein. I cannot punish
him by mulcting him
with a punitive cost order. Similarly, to the extent that his legal
adviser invoked spoliation, a principle
that has led to the Supreme
Court of Appeal in
Masinda
to examine several decisions as a
result of different approaches by the courts on this principle, they
too, do not deserve censure
for that. Nevertheless, the costs
must follow the result.
[30]
I accordingly make the following Order:
The
application is dismissed with costs, such costs to be on Scale B as
set out under Rule 69 (7), to be paid by the applicant,
and may be
taxed as set out under Rule 67 A (4) (a).
T.V.
NORMAN
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
APPEARENCES:
For
the APPLICANT
Instructed
by
ADV
OLIVIER
CLOETE
& COMPANY
112A
HIGH STREET
MAKHANDA
TEL:
046 622 2563
EMAIL:
philip@cloeteandco.co.za
REF:
ENG3/0001/AB
Instructed
by:
ENGELEBRECHT
ATTORNEYS
For
the RESPONDENTS
Instructed
by
ADV
SNYMAN
NEVILLE
BORMAN & BOTHA
22
HILL STREET
MAKHANDA
REF:
MR POWERS/CHARNE
Matter
heard on
04 September 2024
Judgment
delivered on 05
September 2024
[1]
Harrismith
Intabazwe Tsiame Residents Association (Pty) Ltd and Others v
Maluti-A-Phofung Local Municipality and Another
(567/2022)
[2022] ZAFSHC 151
(14 June 2022).
[2]
Eskom
Holdings SOC Ltd v Masinda
2019
(5) SA 386
SCA.
[3]
Mangala
v Mangala
1967
(2) SA415 ECD at 416 para-F.
[4]
Ngqukumba v
Minister of Safety and Security and Others
(CCT 87/13)
[2014] ZACC 14
;
2014 (7) BCLR 788
(CC);
2014 (5) SA 112
(CC);
2014
(2) SACR 325
(CC) (15 May 2014.
[5]
See
Bon
Quelle (Edms) Bpk v Munisipaliteit van Otavi
1989 (1) SA 508
(A) at 512A-B.
[6]
Tswelopele
Non-Profit Organisation and Others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan
Municipality
(303/2006)
[2007] ZASCA 70
; [2007] SCA 70 (RSA);
2007 (6) SA 511
(SCA) (30 May 2007).
[7]
Zinman
v Miller
1956
(3) SA 8 (T).
[8]
Blendrite
v Moonisami
2021
(5) SA 61
at page 66 at para [16].