Tsela Tsweu Consulting Engineers (Pty) Ltd v Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality (4222/2023) [2024] ZAFSHC 327 (19 September 2024)

55 Reportability
Public Procurement

Brief Summary

Review — Tender disqualification — Applicant sought review of decision by Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality disqualifying its tender bid for not meeting requirements — Applicant argued it complied with tender specifications despite failing to tick a required box — Respondent maintained disqualification was justified due to non-compliance — Court held that the Applicant's failure to meet the tender requirements was sufficient grounds for disqualification, and the application was dismissed with costs.

About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
>>
2024
>>
[2024] ZAFSHC 327
|

|

Tsela Tsweu Consulting Engineers (Pty) Ltd v Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality (4222/2023) [2024] ZAFSHC 327 (19 September 2024)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Reportable
/ Not reportable
Case
no:
4222/2023
In
the matter between
TSELA
TSWEU CONSULTING ENGINEERS
(PTY)
LTD
APPLICANT
and
MANGAUNG
METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY
RESPONDENT
Neutral
citation: Tsela Tsweu Consulting Engineers (Pty) Ltd v Mangaung
Metropolitan Municipality
Coram:
Chesiwe J
Heard:
22 April 2024
Delivered:
This judgment was handed down in open court and
electronically by circulation to the parties’ representatives
by email and
released to SAFLII. The date and time for hand-down is
deemed to be 13h00 on 19 September 2024.
Summary:
Review
application
in
terms of Rule 53 read with Rule 6 (12) in which the Applicant seeks
the review and setting aside of a decision by the Respondent
for a
submitted Tender
-
Applicant
disqualified for not meeting the requirements of the tender bid –
Respondent decision be reviewed and set aside,
alternatively declared
unlawful.
ORDER
1.
The application is dismissed with costs,
including costs of one Counsel on scale B.
JUDGMENT
Chesiwe
J
Introduction
[1]
This is a review application in terms of Rule 53
read with Rule 6 (12) in which the
Applicant
seeks the review and setting aside of a decision by the Respondent
for a submitted Tender No. MMM/BID 670:2022/2023 –
W2103:
PROVISION OF PANEL OF PROEFESSIONAL ENGINEERING SERVICES TO THE
MANGAUNG METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY FOR A PERIOD ENDING 30
JUNE 2025,
whereby the Applicant was disqualified for not meeting the
requirements of the tender bid.  The application is
opposed.
The
relief claimed
[2]
Applicant seeks the following relief as
noted in the Notice of Motion:

1.
That the Tsela Tsweu’s non-compliance with the court rules
related to time periods and service
is
condoned and the application is heard as an urgent review application
in accordance with the provisions of Rule 53, read with Rule
6(12).
2.
That the Municipality’s decision to disqualify the Applicant’s
bid for Tender NO. MMM/BID 670: 2022 / 2023
= W2103: PROVISION OF
PANEL OF PROEFESSIONAL ENGINEERING SERVICES TO THE MANGAUNG
METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY FOR A PERIOD ENDING
30 JUNE 2025, is
reviewed and set aside, alternatively is declared unlawful.
3.
The Respondent is ordered to place the Applicant – in
accordance with section 8 of the Promotion of Administration
Justice
Act, 3 of 2000- on the panel for which it had solicited bids and to
which the decision mentioned in prayer 2 applies.
4.
Alternatively to prayer 3 above, the Respondent is ordered to
re-evaluate the Applicant’s bid for said tender, with
the
proviso that the Respondent’s bid is found as having been
compliant with all the requirements and the bid is to be further

evaluated for functionality.
5.
The Respondent ordered to pay the costs of this application.
6.
Further and/or alternative relief.”
Background
[3]
The
Respondent on the 12 October 2022, had called for tenders in which
various professional engineering firms would provide services
related
to civil works, municipality and transportation infrastructure. The
tender was advertised in the local newspaper as well
as on the
Respondent’s notice board.  The deadline for the
submission for the tender was 31 October 2022.  Applicant

submitted its bid timeously.
[4]
The
front page of the tender document required that prospective
contractors were to indicate which services that were marked A –

H it tendered for, with a
proviso
that failure to adhere to the requirements such bid will be
disqualified. Applicant submitted its bid for sections A, B, C, E and

F.  Applicant with nine (9) other bidders did not select the
relevant section for which they were bidding for.
[5]
Subsequent
to the submission of the tender, the Applicant heard nothing from the
Municipality until 19 July 2023.
When
the Applicant allegedly heard a rumour
that the tender has been awarded to various bidders.  Based on
not receiving any feedback
from the Respondent, Applicant requested
for reasons for being disqualified.  The reasons and the record
of the proceeding
were provided on 4 August 2023.   Applicant
approached its Attorneys and launched the current review application
on an
urgent basis.  According to the Applicant, it became
evident when the opposing affidavit was filed, that the reasons for
being
disqualified were stated in the opposing affidavit.
[6]
For
determination by this Court is whether the Applicant’s bid had
met the requirements of the tender documents and whether
the
disqualification was unlawful.
[7]
Council
on behalf of the Applicant, in oral argument submitted that: The
Applicant had complied with the tender documents and had
the
Municipality studied the documents properly, it would have seen that
the Applicant had ticked the correct box.  That the
Respondent
in not accepting the Applicant’s bid, it acted irrational and
committed an irregularity in disqualifying the Applicant
for missing
to tick one box on the tender document. And the omission of not
ticking the correct box, does not change the material/contents
of the
bid.   Counsel submitted that the rest of the tender
document was complied with and was correctly completed. And
requested
that the Court ought to grant Applicant the relief sought in the
Notice of Motion.
[8]
Counsel
on behalf of the Municipality, in oral argument, submitted as
follows:  Applicant did not meet the requirements of
the tender
documents, by not indicating its selection for the services that it
was bidding for.  Counsel stated that the table
on the documents
is the entry point for meeting the requirements.  That it is the
Applicant’s own fault in not ticking
the required box for the
services it was going to tender for.  And that the Applicant has
conceded that it did not complete
the first page of the tender
documents.
Urgency
[9]
The
matter was set down to be argued on 10 August 2023.  On 4 August
2023, the Respondent sent the requested documents to the
Applicant
and as a result urgency became moot.  Even though prayer one of
the Notice of Motion is that the matter is still
to
be heard as an urgent review
application.
[10]
R
ule
6(12) provides that in an urgent application,  the Court may
condone non-compliance with the Rules regarding forms and

service.
[1]
The
Court, in dispensing with the forms and service provided for in the
Rules, may also make such orders as it deems fit.
However, the
procedure set out in Rule 6(12) is not there for the taking.
Applicant has to set forth explicitly the circumstances
which it
avers renders the matter urgent.  More importantly, the
Applicant must state reasons why it claims that it cannot
be afforded
substantial redress at a hearing in due course.  The question of
whether a matter is sufficiently urgent to be
enrolled and heard as
an urgent application is underpinned by the issue of absence of
substantial redress. The Rules allow Courts
to come to the assistance
of such a litigant where, if the latter were to follow, the normal
course laid down by the Rules will
not obtain substantial redress.
Applicant
must
make out its case in that regard.
[11]
In
terms of Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure for Judical Review of
Adminsitrative Action,
[2]
(“the
PAJA Rules”) the court may shorten a period prescibed in the
PAJA Rules regarding review proceedings before it.
[12]
In
Millenium
Waste Management v Chairperson, Tender Board
,
[3]
the SCA said the following: “It appears that in some cases, the
High
Court is approached promptly for relief but these cases are not
expeditiously heard and as a result by the time the matter
is finaly
determined, practical problems militating against the setting aside
of the challenged decision would have arisen.
Consequenlty the
scope of granting an effective relief to vindicate the infringed
rights becomes drastically reduced.
It
may help if the High Court to an extent possible, gives priority to
these matters.”
(my
emphais
)
[13]
Applicant on discovering that
the bid was unsuccesseful,  immediatley requested its
legal representative
to request reasons from the
Municipality.  The Municipality failed to provide the requested
reasons and the Applicant launched
an urgent application under case
number 3932/2023. However, the documents were provided before the
application could proceed.
The Applicant then launched the
current application under case number 4222/2023.  Which in my
view is to be regarded as urgent,
as Rule 53 (b) provides that within
15 days after receipt of the Notice of Motion the Applicant is to be
supplied with the record
of the proceedings.
[14]
Applicant was within its constitutional
right to obtain the record of proceedings as it is imperative to have
the record for purposes
of the review application. Applicant did not
comply with the truncated time periods as set out in the notice of
motion, as such
truncated times had to be revised due to the
late delivery of the  the tender documents.
[15]
It
has been emphasized by the Courts in several review matters that
without the records, a Court cannot perform its
constitutionally
entrenched review function.
[4]
The consequences of lack of such information
will,
in turn,
affect
a litigant’s rights in terms of Section 34 of the
Constitution
[5]
, and thus
violate those rights and such a litigant
will
not
have
a fair public hearing before Court, without the record of
proceedings.   Consequently, I find that Applicant’s

application fell to be treated as urgent, as
tenders
generally
have a limited lifespan.
Authorities
relating to reviews
[16]
Section
217 of the Constitution
[6]
, is
the starting point for an evaluation of the proper approach to an
assessment of the constitutional validity of State procurement

processes.  It reads as follows:
1.

When
an organ of state in the national, provincial or local sphere of
government, or any other institution identified in national

legislation, contracts for goods or services, it must do so in
accordance with a system which is
fair,
equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective
.
2.
Subsection (1) does not prevent the
organs of state or institutions referred to in that subsection from
implementing a procurement
policy providing for - (a) categories of
preference in the allocation of contracts; and (b) the protection or
advancement of persons,
or categories of persons, disadvantaged by
unfair discrimination.
3.
National legislation must prescribe a
framework within which the policy referred to in subsection (2) must
be implemented.”
[17]
In
order to comply with s 217(3) the legislature adopted the
Preferential
Procurement Policy Framework Act
[7]
(“the PPPFA”).
“Acceptable tender” is defined in s 1 of the PPPFA as
“any tender which, in
all respects, complies with the
specifications and conditions of tender as set out in the tender
document”.
[18]
In
Chairperson:
Standing Tender Committee and Others v JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty)
Ltd and others
[8]
,
Scott JA pointed out that the definition of “acceptable tender”
must be construed against the background of s 217
of the
Constitution and continued as follows: “In other words, whether
the tender in all respects complies with the specifications
and
conditions set out in the contract documents must be judged against
these values.”  In terms of s 2(1)(f) of the
PPPFA “the
contract must be awarded to the tenderer who scores the highest
points (calculated in accordance with s 2(1)(b),
unless objective
criteria in addition to those contemplated in paragraphs (d) and (e)
justify the award to another tenderer.”
[19]
The
proper legal approach pertaining to procurement processes was set out
in the following
dictum
by Froneman, J in
Allpay
Consolidated v Chief Executive Officer, SASSA
[9]
, which I quote:

[22]
This judgment holds that:
a.
The suggestion that ‘inconsequential
irregularities’ are of no moment conflates the test for
irregularities and their
import; hence an assessment of the fairness
and lawfulness of the procurement process must be independent of the
outcome of the
tender process.
b.
The materiality of compliance with legal
requirements depends on the extent to which the purpose of the
requirements is attained.
c.
The constitutional and legislative
procurement framework entails supply chain management prescripts that
are legally binding.
d.
The fairness and lawfulness of the
procurement process must be assessed in terms of the provisions of
the Promotion of Administrative
Justice Act, 3 of 2000 (PAJA).
e.
Black economic empowerment generally
requires substantive participation in the management and running of
any enterprise.
f.
The remedy stage is where appropriate
consideration must be given to the public interest in the
consequences of setting the procurement
process aside.”
[20]
Applicant
in its founding affidavit at para 10 the following is noted:

10.5
In the tender document itself, prospective contractors were required
to indicate which sections A – H it tendered for.
Tenderers
were entitled to submit a tender for the entire spectrum and I append
as “FA1”, the front page of the tender
document.
10.6
The court will see that tenderers were required to – on the
very front page – indicate for which of the services
the tender
is submitted.
10.7
Tsela Tsweu indicated that it submitted bids for sections A, B, C, D,
E, and F.  I refer the court to the appendix for
the
commensurate description of the works associated with sections
identified….”
[21]
The
Applicant in its founding affidavit goes further at para 12.4 and
12.5 as follows:

12.4
This obviously an error.  I had personally attended to the
filling -in of the Tsela bid and had personally ticked the
boxes on
the first page of the tender as indication that Tsela submitted a bid
for categories A, B, C, E, and F.
12.5
This is an error committed in the evaluation, apparently an oversight
but it does not materially impact upon the decision the
Municipality
had taken to disqualify the Tsela Bid.  This - I am told –
constitutes a ground for review under section
6 of PAJA.”
[22]
The
Respodent in its opposing affidavit gave a detail and extensive
explanation of the different stages which the tender process
goes
through, in order to select the bidders that met the requirements.
Respondent indicated that failure to meet the bid
document as it was
listed per item would result in the bidders bid being disqualified:

1.  All
bidders must select their selection (s) of choice to bid for, on the
table below.”
[23]
In
response to the Respondent’s opposing affidavit and it
explaining the reason for the disqualification of the Applicant,
at
paragraph 5.5 of its replying affidavit (page 80) stated as follows:

I
do admit – due to a
bona fide
oversight – that I
did not fill in the part of the Tsela Tender.  I had laboured
under the impression that should I
fill in the tender as I told the
court I did in my Supplementary Affidavit, that it would be
sufficient.  I understood the
tabulated form of this document to
mean that the substance of the bid, a clear indication must be given
and that the table was
there for illustrative purposes.  Given
what the tender elsewhere required, this apprehension was more than
reasonable.”
[24]
Applicant
actually conceded that it did not complete the box as required in the
tender document.  Applicant on its own version
could explained
that it tick
ed
the box to indicate that
the tender was submitted for A, B, C, E and F, but concedes in the
Replying Affidavit. And in the Supplementary
Affidavit indicates
that, it cannot explain how the box was not ticked, even though it
remembers ticking the box to indicate the
service it tenders for.
Ten (10) bidders did not select or tick the require box and were also
disqualified.  Even though
Applicant’s bid went up to
the
SCM Minimum
Requirements and was found to be
responsive.
[25]
At the
stage of Project Minimum Requirements, where all bidders had to
select their section of choice from the table provided, failure
to do
so resulted in being disqualified. Applicant failed to comply at the
Project Minimum Requirements by not ticking the required
box.
Clause F2.1 (c) of the Tender Data under Tenderer’s obligation
it clearly stated that: “All bidders must
select their
section(s)
of choice for, on the table below…”
[26]
According
to the Respondent, Applicant has been on the panel for number of
years and has assisted the it in implementing projects
as a principal
agent.
[10]
Meaning
that this was not Applicant’s first time in completing tender
documents with the Respondent.  Applicant
for the years it had
worked with the Respondent is expected to have sufficient experience
and knowledge as to how tender
processes
work.
Applicant‘s error in not complying with the requirements cannot
not be placed at the door of the Respondent, nor can
the Respondent
be faulted for having complied strictly with the requirements.
Applicant must take the responsibility for
not having ticked the box
or there being an oversight on its part.
[27]
A
tender process implemented by an organ of State is an “administrative
action” within the meaning of the
Promotion
of Administrative Justice Act
[11]
(“PAJA”).
(See:
Logbro
Properties CC v Bedderson NO and Others
2003 (2) SA 460
(SCA) at para [5]).  Parties in a tender process
are entitled to a lawful and procedurally fair process and outcome.

However, not every administrative error, whether innocent or not, can
rightly be said to be ‘unlawful’ or ‘improper’.

If Applicant’s right to a fair tender process was indeed
unlawful or improper or the Bidding Committee failed to follow the

correct procedures, then the Court would ordinarily direct that the
tender be reconsidered.
[28]
The
Bid Evaluation Committee (BEC), went through several stages in terms
of the sections that were chosen by the successful bidders,
that is A
– H to ensure that no bidder is prejudiced.  And each
bidder was evaluated according to the sections that
they chose.
Applicant was disqualified already at round one and the BEC could not
be evaluated since no section was chosen.
From the time
the tender was advertised to the end of the evaluation process, the
Municipality had an open tender process
and there was transparency at
each and every stage of the evaluation.
[29]
It
is well established that the executive in all spheres is constrained
by the principle that they may exercise no power and perform
no
function beyond those conferred upon them by law. The BEC therefore
recommended the appointment of the successful companies
in respect of
the sections that were chosen.  These were the bidders who made
their intentions known, and this is where the
Applicant failed to
make its intention known for its tender.
[30]
It
is trite that proper compliance with the procurement process is
necessary for the process to be lawful for a fair outcome in
a tender
award, the process itself must be fair.
[12]
Fundamental to a fair process is the requirement that all bidders
should be treated equally, they should be entitled to tender
for the
same thing to ensure that a proper evaluation is done of what is
available at what price.  This also ensures cost
effectiveness
and competitiveness.
[13]
[31]
In
AllPay
Consolidated Investment Holding (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief
Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency
and
Others
,
[14]
the Court stressed the importance with the compliance of the
requirements for a valid tender process, that is issued in accordance

with the constitutional and legislative procurement framework.
Legally what required is that, those requirements are not
there
merely for internal prescripts that may be
regarded
at a whim.
[32]
In
Pepper
Bay Fishing
, the following was said:

As
a general principle an administrative authority has no inherent power
to condone failure to comply with the peremptory requirements.
It
only has such powers if it has been afforded the discretion to do
so….The decision-maker derives all his (delegates)
powers and
authority from the enactment constituted by the general notice.
If the general notice therefore affords him no
discretion, he has
none.  The question whether he had a discretion is entirely
dependent on a proper construction of the general
notice.”
[33]
Counsel
for the Applicant submitted that there
was
no reason as to why the Applicant should not have been added to the
list
of the successful tenderers, so
that they are on the list should their services be required by the
municipality. And that the mere
bona
fide
omission of not ticking the
box, should not be the reason to disqualify the Applicant.
[34]
The
Respondent for obvious reasons is confined to the budget that was
allocated to its
respective department
when
the tender was approved and published.  The funds would have
accordingly been utilised to meet the requirements of the
successful
tenderer in respect of that department. To simply add on the
Applicant, would indeed affect the department’s budget,

including the contract obligations that the respective department
already signed with the successful tenderers. There would therefore,

be no purpose in adding the Applicant to the list.
[35]
The
relief sought by the Applicant will have a direct impact on the
Respondent as the tender has been finalized and closed. It would
also
be unfair on the unsuccessful bidders who were also disqualified for
the same reason of not ticking the said box on the tender
document.
The Respondent is already bound to the new contract with the
successful bidders/tenderers and also bearing in mind the
possible
adverse financial implications that the it will
suffer if the Applicant was to be added to the tender process for a
tender that
is already awarded.
[36]
I
considered the requirements as set out in
Trencon
Construction (Pty) Ltd v Industrial Development Corporation of South
Africa Limited and Another
,
[15]
and took into consideration  what the court said in
Intertrade
Two (Pty) Ltd v Mec for Roads and Public Works, Eastern Cape and
Another
,
[16]
Plasket J cautioned that: “Courts, when considering the
validity of administration action, must be wary of intruding even

when with the best motives, without justification into the terrain
that is reserved for the administrative branch of government.

These restrains on powers of the courts are universal in democratic
societies such as ours and necessarily mean that there are
limits on
the powers of the courts to repair damage that has been caused by a
breakdown in the administrative process.”
Evaluation
of evidence
[37]
It
is clear that Applicant did not comply with the bid in terms of the
requirement of the tender document.  Applicant completed
and
complied with the required section on the inside of the document, but
not on the front page of the document.
[38]
On
the first page of the bid document, the bidder is required to set out
and indicate the section it is bidding for.  The Deponent
of the
founding affidavit insisted that the boxes were ticked and in the
Replying affidavit conceded that the boxes were not ticked.
The
filled-out form was indeed, not ticked in the required boxes to
indicate the services that were being bidding for.  The
versions
of the Applicant and that of the Respondent cannot both be correct.
The one version must be false.  The Respondent
has shown
evidence that the form was incomplete.  Thus, the version of the
Respondent must be the correct one.
[39]
The
Standard Conditions of the Tender, Clause 2.14 provides that the
information and data be completed in all respects
and that tenders
that do not provide all the data and information that is requested
will not be regarded by the employer as responsive.
Furthermore
Clause F.2.17
[17]
, confirms
that if the tenderer fails to comply with the requirements of the
tender documents, such tender will be rejected as non-responsive.
[40]
I
am satisfied that no irregularities occurred during the appointment
of the succefull bidders, as the whole process was followed
in terms
of the tender process. There is nothing unconstitutional about the
tender process, as long as it was open, transparent
and fair. The
Respondent complied with s 217 of the Constitution.  There is
nothing wrong that the Respondent did, and for
the fact that the
rotational arrangement was not implemented for the first time.
Applicant  has been part of the this tender
process and is not
new to the completion of the tender documents.    In
the documents submitted for reasons for
the Respondent’s
decision, there is nothing that one can deduce to an act of
irregularity or unlawfulness on the part of
any person. The tender
documents were open, in public and in the presence of the Anti-Fraud
Department and Risk Management, Supply
Chain Management and there is
no evidence that the process was tainted.
[41]
In
Steenkamp
NO v Provincial Tender Board Eastern Cape
[18]
,
the Constitutional court stated that, tender processes  require
strict and equal compliance by all competing tenderers; compliance

with the requirement for a valid tender process, issued  in
accordance  with the constitutional and legislative procurement

framework, and it is
legally
required and are not merely internal prescripts that may be
disregarded at a whim
.
[19]
(my emphasis).
[42]
In my
view, if the Respondent’s decision was irrational, unlawful and
hopelessly irregular, then such decision needs to be
set
aside.  Which is not the case in this regard.
[43]
The
bid of the Applicant was therefore validly disqualified premised on
its failure to comply with the expressed terms and conditions
of the
tender bid documents.
I
am thus not satisfied that the Applicant should be granted the relief
sought.  It would be wrong to direct the Respondent
to enter
into a contract with the criteria as set out by the Applicant.
This means the Court is requested to rewrite the
contract between the
successful contractors and the municipality, as well as the
Applicant.
Thus,
the relief sought by the Applicant ought not to be granted.
[44]
In
Manong
& Associates (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works and
Another,
[20]
the
court said that State tenders have become a fertile ground for
litigation and this was further emphasised in the unreported
case of
Red Ant
Security Relocation and Eviction Services (Pty) v Department of Human
Settlements (Western Cape)
,
[21]
that: “Tendering has become a verifiably ‘messy business
and the courts are increasingly drawn in the quagmire in review

proceedings.”
Costs
[45]
The
basic rule of costs is that all costs are in the discretion of the
Court.  The Court’s discretion is wide, though
not
unfettered and must be exercised judicially upon a consideration of
the facts of each case.  In essence it is a matter
of fairness
to both sides, taking into consideration the circumstances of the
case; carefully weighing the issues; consider the
conduct of the
parties and; consider any other circumstance which may have a bearing
on the issue of costs.
[46]
The
Respondent seeks punitive costs against the Applicant. In my view the
Applicant did not  act unreasonably to bring the
matter to
court.  It only exercised its adminstartive right with reagrd to
the tender process and cannot be punished for having
approached
Court.  Thus,  costs on a punitive scale are not warranted.
In any event costs follow the successful
party.
[47]
Having considered
that the application, there is no reason why the Applicant should not
be ordered to pay the costs of the application.
Order
[48]
Therefore, the following order is made:
1.
The application is dismissed with costs,
including costs of one Counsel on scale B.
S.
CHESIWE, J
I
concur.
W
J. GROENEWALD, AJ
Appearances
For
the Applicant:
Adv.
S Grobler
Instructed
by:
Peyper
Attorneys
Bloemfontein
For
the Respondent:
Adv.
D R Thompson
Instructed
by:
Rampai
Attorney
Bloemfontein
[1]
Commissionner,
SARS
v
Hawker
Air
Services (Pty) Ltd
[2006] ZASCA 51
;
2006 (4) SA 292
at 299 par 9.
[2]
Promulgated
in Government Notice R966 of 9 October 2019 in accordance with
section 7(3) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice
Act 2000,
(PAJA).
[3]
2008
(2) SA 481
(SCA), par 34
[4]
Democratic
Alliance v The Acting National Director of Public Prosecution
(288/11)
2012 ZASCA 15
20 March 2012.
[5]
Act
108 of 1996
[6]
Ibid
[7]
Act
5 of 2000
[8]
[2005]
4 ALL SA 487
(SCA) at paragraph [19]
[9]
2014
(1) SA 604
(CC) at para [22]
[10]
See
Opposing Affidavit p
age
56, para 56.
[11]
Act
3 of 2000
[12]
Westinghouse
v Eskom2016 (3) SA 1 (SCA) par 38
[13]
Tetra
Mobile Radio (PTY) v MEC, Department of Public Works and others 2008
(1)  SA 438 (SCA) para [9]
[14]
AllPay
Consolidated Investment Holding (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief
Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency
and
Others
[2013] ZACC, 42
[15]
2015
(5) SA 245 (CC)..
[16]
[2007]
149, 2007 (6) 442 (CK), [2008] ALL 142 (CK) (Intertrade) at para 46.
[17]
Page T
1.2 -9
[18]
Steenkamp
NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape
2007 (3) SA 121
(CC)
para
[60]
[19]
Ibid
[20]
[2009]
ZASCA 110, 2010 (2) SA 167 (SCA); [2010] 1 ALL SA 267 (SCA)
[21]
(Western
Cape)
WCHC
Case No 9370/2021, unreported