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2024
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[2024] ZAFSHC 269
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L.M (born W) v L.M (850/2022) [2024] ZAFSHC 269; [2024] 4 All SA 854 (FB) (29 August 2024)
SAFLII Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Reportable:
YES/NO
Of
Interest to other Judges:
YES/NO
Circulate
to Magistrates: YES/NO
Case
number: 850/2022
In
the matter between:
L[…]
M[…] (born W[…])
Applicant
and
L[…]
M[…]
Respondent
In
Re:
L[…]
M[…] (born W[…])
Plaintiff
and
L[…]
M[…]
Defendant
CORAM:
VAN ZYL, J
HEARD
ON:
29 FEBRUARY
2024
DELIVERED
ON:
29
AUGUST 2024
[1]
This is a contempt of court application in which the following relief
is being sought in terms of the notice
of motion:
“
1.
That the respondent be found and declared to be in contempt of the
order granted by
his Lordship the Honourable Justice JP Daffue on 1
June 2023;
2.
That the respondent be committed to imprisonment for a period of 30
days, or
such sentence as this Court considers appropriate;
3.
In the alternative to prayer 2 above:
3.1
That the respondent be committed to imprisonment for a period of 30
days, which committal shall be suspended
for a period of one year, on
condition that the respondent complies with the order granted by his
Lordship the Honourable Justice
JP Daffue on 1 June 2023 within 14
days from date of service of this order on the respondent’s
attorney of record;
3.2
That should the respondent fail to comply with this order within 14
days as aforesaid, that the applicant
be allowed to approach the
Registrar of this Court to issue a warrant for the respondent’s
committal, on the same papers
duly supplemented as necessary;
4.
That the respondent be ordered to pay the costs of this application
on a scale
as between attorney and client;”
Background:
[2]
There is a long litigious background between the parties.
Although it is necessary to highlight some
aspects thereof, I do not
intend to set out all the details thereof.
[3]
The parties were previously married to each other and was divorced in
this court on 26 May 2022 in terms of
which divorce order a deed of
settlement concluded between the parties was also made an order of
court. In terms of the deed
of settlement the parties agreed
that their respective accrual claims in terms of the Matrimonial
Properties Act, 88 of 1984 (“the
Act”), will be
adjudicated on the following basis:
“
10.1
Each party shall, within thirty (30) days from the date of granting
of this order deliver its sworn statement containing
full particulars
of their estates as contemplated by section 7 of the Matrimonial
Properties Act, 88 of 1984.
10.2
Together with the delivery of their sworn statements contemplated by
subparagraph 10.1
supra
, the parties shall file, by way of
discovery, their discovery affidavits and also provide documentary
proof in respect of the assets
and liabilities so disclosed.
10.3
The Uniform Rules of Court regulating discovery, further particulars
for purposes of trial and pre-trial procedures
in terms of Rule 37
shall also apply.”
[4]
The plaintiff complied with the aforesaid clause 10 and on 30 June
2022 delivered an affidavit in terms of
section 7 of the Act together
with her discovery affidavit and annexures thereto.
[5]
The respondent failed to deliver the requisite affidavit in terms of
section 7 of the Act and also failed
to deliver a discovery affidavit
and annexures thereto.
[6]
The applicant consequently issued an application on 17 August 2022 to
compel the respondent’s compliance
and delivery of the
necessary affidavits (“the first application to compel”).
This application was issued after
numerous demands to comply with the
delivery of the necessary affidavits, were ignored by the
respondent.
[7]
The first application to compel was to be heard on 8 September 2022.
On 31 August 2022 the respondent
delivered the affidavits. The
first application to compel was consequently withdrawn with the
respondent to pay the costs
thereof.
[8]
According to the applicant, upon a perusal of the documentation
attached to the respondent’s affidavits,
it became apparent
that the documents that were provided were in fact incomplete as only
selected pages were provided. Letters
of demand were
subsequently addressed to the respondent’s attorney of record,
but to no avail.
[9]
On 7 December 2022 the applicant served a notice in terms of rule
35(6) calling upon the respondent to produce
and make the documents
referred to in the respondent’s discovery affidavit available
for inspection within five days of receipt
of the motice. On
the same date a notice in terms of Rule 35(3) was also served upon
the respondent’s attorney of record.
[10]
According to the applicant those notices were not duly complied
with.
[11]
The applicant consequently filed a second application to compel on 24
March 2023, in terms whereof the following relief
was sought:
“
1.
That the respondent be compelled to deliver a response to the
applicant’s notice in terms
of Rule 35(3), dated 6 December
2022, that complies with the rules of this Court within 10 (ten) days
from date of service of a
copy of the order so granted on the
respondent’s attorney of record;
2.
That the respondent be compelled to respond to the applicant’s
notice in terms of Rule
35(6), dated 6 December 2022, (by providing
complete copies of the documents disclosed in the defendant’s
discovery affidavit
dated 29 August 2022) in a manner that complies
with the rules of this Court, within 10 (ten) days from date of
service of a copy
of the order so granted on the respondent’s
attorney of record;
3.
The respondent be ordered to pay the costs of this application on the
scale as between attorney
and own client;”
[12]
The second application to compel was opposed by the respondent and
the matter was enrolled for hearing before Daffue,
J on 1 June 2023.
On that day an order was granted by agreement between the parties in
settlement of the application to compel
the respondent to comply with
the Rule 35(3) and Rule 35(6) notices delivered by the applicant. It
is this order that forms the
subject matter of the present
application (“the Order”).
[13]
I deem it apposite to repeat the contents of the Order herein:
“
IT
IS ORDERED BY AGREEMENT THAT:
1.
The respondent shall furnish the applicant with complete copies of
the documents referenced
as items 2.1 to 8 in the respondent’s
discovery affidavit dated 29 August 2022 on or before 23 June 2023;
2.
The respondent shall furnish the applicant with copies of the
documents specified in paragraphs
1, 2.1 to 2.2, 3.1.1, 5.1 to 5.2,
6, 10.2 and 10.5 to 10.7 specified in the applicant’s Rule
35(3) notice (dated 6 December
2022) that are in his possession and
which he may not validly object to produce on or before 23 June 2023.
3.
In the event that the respondent is unable or object to furnish any
of the documents contemplated
in paragraph 2 above, the respondent
must deliver an affidavit on or before 23 June 2023 stating under
oath:
3.1
The reasons why he is unable to furnish the applicant with the
documents. If the asserted reason
is that such documents are
not in the respondent’s possession, he must state their
whereabouts if known to him; and/or
3.2
In the event that the respondent objects to providing any document in
question, the basis why the respondent
asserts that he may validly
object to furnishing such document.
4.
The costs of the application are reserved for later determination.”
[14]
It is the applicant’s case that the respondent failed to duly
and properly comply with the Order in circumstances
where it
constitutes contempt of court and hence the present application.
Application
to strike:
[15]
The applicant filed a notice indicating that she will immediately
prior to the hearing of the main application, request
an order
striking out, with costs, portions of the respondent’s
affidavit as being scandalous, vexatious and/or irrelevant.
I
do not intend repeating the contents of the entire notice to strike
at this stage. From a reading thereof it in fact appears
that
the objections against the relevant portions of the respondent’s
answering affidavit are that the allegations are scandalous
in
respect of the applicant due to their defamatory nature and moreover
irrelevant to the adjudication of the merits of the application.
Legal
principles:
[16]
Rule 6(15) determines as follows:
“
The
court may on application order to be struck out from any affidavit
any matter which is scandalous, vexatious or irrelevant,
with an
appropriate order as to costs, including costs as between attorney
and client. The court may not grant the application
unless it
is satisfied that the applicant will be prejudiced if the application
is not granted.”
[17]
In
Helen Suzman Foundation v President of the Republic of South
Africa
2015 (2) SA 1
(CC) at para [28] the meaning of the
terms “
scandalous”, “vexatious”
and
“
irrelevant
” has been stated to be the following:
“
[28]
'Scandalous' allegations are those which may or may not be relevant
but which are so worded as to be abusive or defamatory;
a
'vexatious’ matter refers to allegations which may or may
not be relevant but are so worded as to convey an intention
to harass
or annoy; and 'irrelevant' allegations do not apply to the matter at
hand and do not contribute one way or the other
to a decision of that
matter. The test for determining relevance is whether the
evidence objected to is relevant to an issue
in the litigation.”
[18]
At paragraph [30] of the aforesaid judgment, the court stated, with
reference to the offending allegations, as follows:
“
Courts
should not ligtly allow vitriolic statements of this kind to form
part of the record or as evidence. And courts should
never be
seen to be condoning this kind of inappropriate behaviour embarked
upon under the guise of robustness. …”
[19]
In the matter of
National Director of Public Prosecutions v
Zuma
[2009] ZASCA 1
;
2009 (2) SA 277
(SCA) at paras [22] and [23] the Supreme
Court of Appeal confirmed that if the allegations complained of do
not apply to the matter
at hand or they do not contribute to the
determination of the matter either way, the allegations are
irrelevant. In that
matter, allegations that were purportedly
relevant to show motivation for actions taken were deemed to be
irrelevant as it had
nothing to do with the causes of action
concerned or the merits thereof.
[20]
In
Vaatz v Law Society of Namibia
1991 (3) SA 563
(Nm
HC) at 567 the court stated that scandalous or irrelevant matter may
be defamatory to the other party and the retention of
such matter
will therefore be prejudicial to such party.
Arguments
and application of the legal principles on the present facts:
[21]
Ms Donnelly, on behalf of the applicant, submitted that the
allegations referred to in the notice to strike have no bearing
on
the crisp issue which falls to be adjudicated upon, namely, whether
the respondent complied with the Order. Ms Donnelly
submitted
that the said allegations are defamatory in nature and have been made
with the sole intention to lower the esteem of
the applicant in the
eyes of the court. Ms Donnelly further submitted that the
allegations made by the respondent pertain
to facts which occurred
prior to the facts relevant to the present subject matter and are
therefore,
inter alia
, irrelevant.
[22]
Mr Bester, on behalf of the respondent, submitted that the court
should consider the conduct of the applicant during
the history of
this matter and the only way to get a full picture of her conduct, is
to consider her behaviour since she had deserted
the communal home
and removed the documents described.
[23]
I have duly considered the portions of the respondent’s
affidavit which the applicant seeks to be struck. They
contain
numerous allegations that are objectively defamatory of the applicant
and has no bearing on the cause of action. These
allegations
are consequently not only by their very nature scandalous and
vexatious, but they are also irrelevant.
[24]
I am satisfied that the said allegations are scandalous, vexatious
and/or irrelevant and that the retention of those
allegations will be
prejudicial to the applicant. My conclusion, however, includes
a restriction to paragraph 5 of the notice
to strike and with the
exclusion of paragraph 7 of the applicant’s notice to strike.
[25]
The following portions of the respondent’s affidavit are
consequently struck:
1.
Paragraphs B and C in their entirety;
2.
Paragraph 3.2 in its entirety;
3.
Paragraph 4.2 in its entirety;
4.
Paragraph 6.4 from and including the words “
before she …
”
until “…
without notice
”.
5.
Paragraph 6.5 from and including the words “
I submit
…”
until “…
any merit
”.
6.
Paragraph 7.4 in its entirety;
7.
Paragraphs 7.7 and 7.8 in their entirety;
8.
Paragraph 8.4 from and including the words “
I submit
…”
to “…
malicious applications
”.
9.
Paragraph 8.7 from and including the words “…
also
taking into account …”
to “…
demanding
from me
”.
10.
Paragraph 9.9 in its entirety.
[26]
I will make an order in this regard at the end of the judgment,
although the main application is to be adjudicated without
the
aforesaid portions of the respondent`s answering affidavit.
Contempt
of court:
Legal
principles:
[27]
The requirements to be satisfied to hold a party in contempt of court
are well known and were re-confirmed by the Constitutional
Court in
Matjhabeng Local Municipality v Eskom Holdings Ltd
2018
(1) SA 1
(CC) at para [73]:
1.
The existence of a court order.
2.
Service or knowledge of the court order.
3.
Non-compliance with the terms of the order.
4.
The non-compliance must be wilful and
mala fide
.
[28]
The requirements have to be proven by an applicant beyond reasonable
doubt. See
Fakie N.O. v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd
[2006] ZASCA 52
;
2006 (4)
SA 326
(SCA) at para
[42]
. See also
Tasima (Pty) Ltd v
Department of Transport
[2016] 1 ALL SA 465
(SCA)
[29]
As soon as the first three elements for contempt of court exist, a
presumption exists that contempt has been established
and
mala
fides
and wilfulness are presumed, unless the respondent is able
to lead evidence sufficient to create reasonable doubt as to its
existence.
Should the respondent be unsuccessful in discharging
the evidential burden, contempt has been established. See
Matjhabeng Municipality,
supra,
at para
[63]. See also
Pheko v Ekurhuleni City
2015 (5) SA 600
(CC) at para [36].
[30]
The Constitutional Court confirmed in
Nyathi v Member of the
Executive Council for the Department of Health, Gauteng
[2008] ZACC 8
;
2008
(9) BCLR 865
(CC) that “…
at the very least that
there should be strict compliance with court orders
”.
[31]
In
HLB International (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v MWRK
Accountants and Consultants (Pty) Ltd
2022 (5) SA 373
the
Supreme Court of Appeal reiterated that the principles applicable to
the interpretation of a court order are as follows:
[26]
The now well-established test on the interpretation of court orders
is this:
'The
starting point is to determine the manifest purpose of the order. In
interpreting a judgment or order, the court's intention
is to be
ascertained primarily from the language of the judgment or order in
accordance with the usual, well-known rules relating
to the
interpretation of documents. As in the case of a document, the
judgment or order and the court's reasons for giving it must
be read
as a whole in order to ascertain its intention.'
[27]
The manifest purpose of the judgment is to be determined by also
having regard to the relevant background facts which culminated in
it being made
. For as was said in
KPMG Chartered
Accountants (SA) v Securefin Ltd and Another
, 'context is
everything'.
[28]
A fairly recent illustration of the linguistic, contextual and
purposive approach to the interpretation of a judgment or order
is to
be found in
Elan Boulevard v Fnyn Investments
, in
which it was said that '(a)n order is merely the executive part of
the judgment and, to interpret it, it is necessary
to read the order
in the context of the judgment as a whole' …” (My
emphasis)
Arguments
and application of the legal principles on the present facts:
[32]
In the present matter, the terms of the Order are clear and
unequivocal and I do not understand the respondent to allege
the
contrary.
[33]
Considering that the order was granted by agreement between the
parties, the existence of the Order is common cause between
the
parties. The respondent is aware of the Order and its contents.
[34]
The first crisp issue which consequently needs to be adjudicated
upon, is whether the respondent has complied with the
terms of the
Order.
[35]
After the granting of the Order on 1 June 2023, an e-mail was
addressed to Mr Conradie by Mr Bester, dated 22 June 2023,
in terms
of which the respondent’s discovery affidavit deposed to in
alleged compliance with the Order was provided to Mr
Conradie.
The said affidavit is attached to the founding affidavit as annexure
“FA11”. In the affidavit
the respondent,
inter
alia
, stated the following:
“
2.
The
Court has ordered that I discover the below documents, which I do
herewith under the heading
Discovered Documents
.
Any
documents which are not discovered
, for whatever reason, are
separately addressed in this affidavit. I submit this affidavit
in conjunction with my previous
discovery affidavit and include all
relevant
documents, to the conclusion of the matter.
3.
…
4.
The
following documents are discovered as per the Discovered Documents
listing numbers.
Where full documents are not discovered
,
it is because these documents are classified and may not become
public knowledge.” (My emphasis)
The
respondent then listed 15 items, most of which include short
“explanations” in respect of the relevant documents.
The respondent then concluded as follows:
“
I
declare that the discovered documents include all assets and
liabilities of my personal and Mackos Plumbing, my only operational
company.
I
have nothing else to declare.”
[36]
Certain documents were also transmitted to Mr Conradie. According to
the applicant, upon a perusal of the documentation
it became clear
that, yet again, the respondent had failed to provide all the
necessary documentation as he was obliged to do.
[37]
I have to state that already on face value of the aforesaid
affidavit, it is evident that the respondent did not comply
with the
Order,
inter alia,
in that he did not discover full documents
as determined by the Order and he did not discover all the documents
described in the
Order.
[38]
Consequently, on 30 August 2023, the applicant’s attorney of
record, Mr Conradie, addressed a letter to the respondent’s
attorney of record in which he then already expressly and in detail
recorded in what ways the respondent had failed to comply with
the
Order. A copy of the said letter is attached to the founding
affidavit as annexure “FA17”.
[39
In the founding affidavit deposed to by the applicant, the applicant
dealt with the documents received from the
respondent’s
attorney of record in response to the Order and at paragraphs 52 to
123 thereof, the applicant again expressly
and in detail recorded in
what ways the respondent had failed to comply with the Order.
The said founding affidavit was deposed
to on 14 November 2023.
The applicant further states as follows in the founding affidavit:
“
126.
The respondent was furthermore called upon, in terms of FA17 to
comply with the provisions of the Order within 14 days
from date
thereof, failing which it was recorded that application would be made
for an order finding the respondent in contempt
of Court.
127.
No response was received to FA17 and consequently a further letter
dated 27 September 2023 was addressed to Mr
Bester, a true copy of
which is attached hereto and marked “FA18”.
128.
To date hereof no response has been received whatsoever.”
[40]
In the answering affidavit filed in the present application the
respondent,
inter alia
, averted as follows:
“
5.3
The applicant’s allegation that I have breached the court order
is totally devoid of truth…
…
6.1
I deny that the court order was breached or ignored in any way.
I have complied fully and to the
best of my abilities and am
convinced that all documents and information have been discovered
to calculate the accrual
.
…
6.3
I confirm, as I have done previously, that I have complied with the
order in full detail and deny that
I have breached any term of the
court order.
…
6.6
…I have nothing more to discover.
…
7.3
I have fully complied where I possibly could and with every term of
the court order and my attorney
was provided with every available
document, which he had then couriered to the applicant’s
attorney.
…
7.6
I have discovered all
relevant information
to the applicant
and stated under oath that I have nothing further to discover.
…
8.5
Even from the applicant’s own version, it is evident that
all
relevant documents
were discovered.
…
8.7
I respectfully submit that all
relevant documents
were
discovered to enable the court to calculate the accrual and that I
have nothing more to discover….
…
9.2
The Order was supplied to me by my attorney and I have gone to great
lengths to obtain all the
relevant documents
to discover to
the applicant.
…
9.5
I am advised that the Rules states that if I do not have a document,
I should state so under oath.
I have complied to this several
times, although
I believe that all relevant documents were
discovered
.” (My emphasis)
[41]
As correctly submitted by Ms Donnelly, it appears that the respondent
asserts,
inter alia
, that not all the documents forming the
subject matter of the Order are relevant; alternatively, the
applicant should be satisfied
with what the respondent deems to be
“sufficient compliance” to enable the court to calculate
the accrual.
[42]
In addition, in so far as the respondent attempts to allege that he
provided explanations under oath in respect of the
documents that he
does not have and/or the documents which he alleges “
are
classified and may not become public knowledge
”,
the respondent may be well advised to take a proper look at the whole
of Rule 35. In
Erasmus: Superior
Court Practice,
D.E. van
Loggerenberg, at
RS 22, 2023, D1 Rule 35-17, the learned
author,
inter alia,
states as follows with reference to
applicable authority:
“
The
discovery affidavit must indicate the existence of documents in
respect of which
objection
to discovery is raised and the grounds on which the objection is
based must be stated sufficiently clearly for the court,
if
necessary, to decide whether the documents are in fact privileged
from production.
This
does not mean that such a detailed description of the documents is
required as will render the privilege nugatory.”
(My
emphasis)
[43]
The respondent’s contention that he complied with the Order is
clearly contradicted by the indisputable facts placed
before court in
the founding affidavit, which facts the respondent failed to
contradict or even grapple with in his answering affidavit.
He relies
on bald unsubstantiated denials.
[44]
The fact that the respondent attempts to rely on the impossibility of
providing some of the documentation stated in the
Order, begs the
question why then the respondent had expressly agreed to the terms of
the Order and undertaken to provide the documents
specified therein.
[45]
I have to agree with the following submissions made by the applicant
in the replying affidavit:
“
37.3
This court has already ordered the delivery of the documentation that
is relevant.
37.4
The Order manifestly clearly directs the delivery of specified
documentation and not that which the respondent
is of the opinion is
relevant to the proceedings.
37.5
The respondent’s adopted stance in the paragraphs under reply
and failure to grapple with the allegations
in founding is however,
prove positive that the respondent opines that he may elect which
portions of the Order with which to comply.
37.6
This is confirmation of the wilful non-compliance with the order.”
[46]
It is not for the respondent to question the relevance of the
documentation stated in the Order, as the final determination
of the
required and relevant documentation had already been made by Daffue,
J by means of the Order.
[47]
The respondent, in effect, states in the answering affidavit that he
has failed to comply with the express terms of the
Order by stating
that all “
relevant
” documents have been provided.
This non-compliance is furthermore confirmed to be wilful as the
respondent in fact expresses
the opinion that the documents which
remain outstanding, are not relevant.
[48]
In the circumstances I agree with the submission of Ms Donnelly that
the respondent failed to discharge the evidentiary
burden that rested
on him to show an absence of wilfulness and
mala fides
in not
complying with the Order
,
moreover so since the respondent
has, in effect, confirmed under oath that he has no intention
whatsoever to comply with the express,
unequivocal and unambiguous
terms of the Order.
[49]
To my mind, the applicant is therefore in principle entitled to
succeed with the application.
The
sanction:
[50]
The following was stated in
MT v CT
2016 (4) SA 193
(WCC) at para [52] with regard to a finding of
contempt of court:
“
[52]
It has been repeatedly said that, aside from preserving the
dignity and moral authority of the institution of justice,
the purpose of finding a party to be in contempt is to ensure
compliance with the order previously ignored. Most often the
sanction will contain a punitive element (which is suspended either
wholly or in part) on condition that the order is complied
with.”
[51]
The applicant is seeking, as main relief, an order that the
respondent be committed to imprisonment for a period of 30
days.
Considering the recalcitrant conduct of the respondent, I do consider
a sanction of imprisonment as appropriate, but on the
basis that it
be suspended on condition that the respondent complies with the
Order, as suggested in the applicant`s alternative
relief in the
notice of motion.
[52]
I also consider a period of 3 weeks’ imprisonment as
appropriate in the circumstances. In this regard I am mindful of
the
fact that the respondent has, on his version, at least one
operational company and it may be to the fatal detriment of the
business of that company should the respondent be removed from the
business for a whole month, which in turn will be to the detriment
of
the applicant and the minor children.
[53]
I am, however, not willing to grant an order in terms whereof the
Registrar will be entitled to issue a warrant without
judicial
oversight. The applicant will have to approach court again, if
necessary.
Costs:
[54]
It is usual in contempt proceedings for the committal of a defendant
or the imposition of a fine that the defaulting
respondent be ordered
to pay the applicant’s costs on an attorney and client scale,
although the court’s discretion
is retained. In this regard the
following was stated in
Senatla Trading Enterprise 26 CC v
Bloem Water
[2014] JOL 31880
(FB) at para [8]:
“
[8]
The general rule that the costs follow the event implies that a
defaulting respondent shall usually be ordered to pay the costs
of
the proceedings for committal (
Singer
'
s
Estate v Kotze
1960 (2) SA 304 (C)
at 308H). The court will usually order the respondent to pay the
applicant's costs as between
attorney and client (
Martin
v French Hairdressing Saloons Ltd
1950 (4) SA 325 (W)
at 330H;
Hardy
Ventures CC v Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality
2004 (1) SA 199 (T)
at 204).
The
Court nevertheless retains a discretion.”
[55]
The conduct of the respondent and his attitude towards the court in
the history of this discovery dispute are deplorable
and highly
contemptuous. In exercising my discretion, I have no doubt that this
matter justifies an order of attorney and client
costs against the
respondent.
[56]
I have not been requested to adjudicate the reserved costs of 1 June
2023 and those costs therefore remain reserved as previously
ordered.
Order:
[57]
The following order is made:
1.
The following portions of the respondent’s affidavit are struck
out:
1.1.
Paragraphs B and C in their entirety;
1.2.
Paragraph 3.2 in its entirety;
1.3.
Paragraph 4.2 in its entirety;
1.4.
Paragraph 6.4 from and including the words “
before she …
”
until “…
without notice
”.
1.5.
Paragraph 6.5 from and including the words “
I submit
…”
until “…
any merit
”.
1.6.
Paragraph 7.4 in its entirety;
1.7.
Paragraphs 7.7 and 7.8 in their entirety;
1.8.
Paragraph 8.4 from and including the words “
I submit
…”
to “…
malicious applications
”.
1.9.
Paragraph 8.7 from and including the words “…
also
taking into account …”
to “…
demanding
from me
”.
1.10.
Paragraph 9.9 in its entirety.
2.
The respondent is found and declared to be in contempt of the court
order granted by Daffue, J on 1 June
2023.
3.
The respondent is committed to imprisonment for a period of three (3)
weeks, which committal is suspended
for a period of one (1) year, on
condition that the respondent complies with the court order granted
by Daffue, J on 1 June 2023
within thirty (30) days from date of
service of this order on the respondent’s attorney of record.
4.
Should the respondent fail to comply with this order within thirty
(30) days as aforesaid, the applicant
is allowed to approach court on
the same papers, duly supplemented as necessary, for appropriate
relief.
5.
The respondent is ordered to pay the costs of this application on a
scale as between attorney and client,
including the costs of the
application to strike..
C.
VAN ZYL, J
On
behalf of Applicant:
Adv J
Donnelly-Bornman
Instructed
by:
Hendre
Conradie Inc.
(Rossouws
Attorneys)
BLOEMFONTEIN
Reference:
(SCH379/0003-T2 (JHB/AB)
On
behalf of Respondent:
Mr S
Bester
Instructed
by:
Steve
Bester Attorneys
C/o
Lovius Block
BLOEMFONTEIN
Reference:
E02462*OVS/lv/S115/22