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[2024] ZAFSHC 219
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Nala Local Municipality v Handax Machinery (Pty) Limited and Another (570/2024) [2024] ZAFSHC 219 (26 July 2024)
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Reportable:
YES/NO
Of
Interest to other Judges:
YES/NO
Circulate
to Magistrates: YES/NO
Application
number: 570/2024
In
the matter between:
NALA
LOCAL MUNICIPALITY
Applicant
And
HANDAX
MACHINERY (PTY) LIMITED
1
st
Respondent
[Reg.
No. 2019[…]]
MABOELA
FORESTRY AND CONSTRUCTION CC
2
nd
Respondent
[Reg.
No. 2007[…]]
CORAM:
VAN ZYL, J
HEARD
ON:
9 February 2024
DELIVERED
ON:
26 July 2024
[1]
In this application, which served before me on an urgent basis, the
applicant is seeking the following relief
as set out in the notice of
motion:
“
1.
that this application be heard as one of urgency…
2.
that the 1
st
Respondent is ordered to restore the
Applicant’s undisturbed possession to the two trucks, to wit:
two Powerstar 6M3
Tipper Trucks 2628 6x4 with registration numbers
and letters: 0[…]2 and within 2 days of this order being
served on
the 1
st
Respondent;
3.
directing that should the 1
st
Respondent fail to comply
with the order in paragraph 2 above, after the expiry of the two day
period, then the sheriff of the
court is hereby authorised to do all
that is necessary, including obtaining the assistance of the South
African Police Service
to give effect to the order in paragraph 2
above;
4.
that the 1
st
Respondent pay the costs of this application
on the scale as between attorney and client;
5.
that in the event of the 2
nd
Respondent opposing this
application, the Respondents to pay the costs of the application on a
scale as between attorney and client,
the one to pay the other to be
absolved;
6.
further and/or alternative relief.”
The
parties:
[2]
The applicant is the Nala Local Municipality and the deponent to the
founding affidavit is the Municipal Manager
of the applicant.
[3]
The respondents are described as follows in the founding affidavit:
“
10.
The 1
st
Respondent is a distributor of Powerstar heavy
duty trucks and Powerstar FT Series trucks in Gauteng, South Africa,
as well as
the sole distributor of Shantui construction and mining
equipment and WEICHAI generators in the SADC sub-equatorial Africa
region.
11.
The 1
st
Respondent provides professional sales and
after-sales service in South Africa and Southern African countries.
12.
The 2
nd
Respondent is Maboela Forestry and Construction CC
a close corporation with registration number …… with
registered
address situated at 14 Wisani Street, Lotus Gardens,
Gauteng Province.
13.
The 2
nd
Respondent is a professional services provider
specializing in forestry and vegetation management, building and
civil construction
and fleet sales and management.”
[4]
The first respondent is opposing the application.
The
applicant’s version:
[5]
According to the applicant the purpose of the application is to
restore the status
quo
ante
as the applicant has been
wrongfully and unlawfully deprived of its possession, access to and
use of two Powerstar 6M3 Tipper Trucks
2628 6x4 with registration
numbers and letters 0[…]2 and 0[…]7 (“
the
trucks
”), whilst being in free and undisturbed possession
of the said trucks.
[6]
On or about 4 July 2023 the applicant bought the trucks from the
second respondent in the amount of R3 041 750-00.
A
copy of the tax invoice and proof of payment made by the applicant to
the second respondent for the purchase of the trucks are
attached to
the founding affidavit as annexures “D1” and “D2”.
[7]
The applicant has since been utilizing the trucks for service
delivery in the Bothaville district, and at
all relevant times had
been in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the aforesaid trucks.
[8]
On or about 14 December 2023 one of the applicant’s employees,
Mr Samuel Meiri Seitsiro, a fleet officer,
received a call from a
certain Mr Tiletso Kumalo informing Mr Seitsiro of two persons who
were on their way to take the trucks
for a roadworthiness test.
[9]
According to Mr Seitsiro he received a WhatsApp message from one Marc
in the employment of the first respondent
informing him that the
first respondent would like to make arrangements to take the trucks
to the test station for roadworthiness
tests so that their
registration can be finalized. The message indicated that a
driver was on the way to “
test and return
”.
Copies of the WhatsApp messages are attached to the founding
affidavit as annexure “E”. Mr Seitsiro responded
that he
is in Klerksdorp and not around.
[10]
The agents of the first respondent in fact had already arrived and
used spare keys to take the trucks unlawfully from
the applicant’s
premises situated on the R707 main road, Bothaville, and drove away.
[11]
The trucks were never returned to the applicant.
[12]
Upon enquiries the applicant was furnished with a letter received by
the applicant`s attorney from the first respondent,
dated 18 January
2024, claiming that the trucks still belong to the first respondent
and that they will only deliver the trucks
once they get paid.
They further stated that they are still in possession of the spare
keys.
[13]
From a letter of the applicant’s attorney to the second
respondent, dated 19 January 2024, it appears that the
second
respondent had been paid in full for the trucks, but that the second
respondent did not pay the money over to the first
respondent.
[14]
A letter of demand was written by the applicant’s attorney of
record to the first respondent, dated 23 January
2024, in which it
was stated that the applicant was in undisturbed possession of the
trucks since July 2023 up to the date when
the first respondent’s
employees repossessed and removed the trucks without consent.
The urgent return of the trucks
was consequently demanded to take
place by Thursday, 25 January 2024, failing which legal action will
be taken.
[15]
The trucks were not returned to the applicant.
Urgency:
[16]
According to the applicant it is responsible for service delivery
within its area of jurisdiction, which includes water,
sanitation,
road maintenance, waste and refuse removal and electricity provision
and maintenance.
[17]
A spoliation application is urgent in nature. In this instance
the urgency is not self-created but justified in
the circumstances as
the applicant cannot utilize the trucks for service delivery and to
serve the Bothaville community at large.
[18]
The spoliation occurred on 14 December 2024 just prior to the festive
season commencing. All businesses were consequently
closed
during builders’ holiday between 6 December 2023 and 4 January
2024. The Municipal Manager was consequently
only informed of
the spoliation on 18 January 2024.
[19]
Subsequent thereto the applicant’s attorney of record addressed
its first letter to the respective respondents
on 19 and 23 January
2024 respectively. A consultation with counsel was scheduled on
24 January 2024, whereafter the application
was drafted the next day
on 25 January 2024 and settled on 26 January 2024 when the additional
documentation requested from counsel
came to hand.
The
first respondent`s version:
[20]
Mr Marc Mynhardt, the sales manager deposed to the affidavit on
behalf of the first respondent.
Urgency:
[21]
According to the first respondent he informed the representative of
the applicant that the first respondent is holding
on to the trucks
until same have been paid as far back as 18 December 2023. Had
the matter been urgent for the applicant,
it is inconceivable that
the deponent to the founding affidavit was only informed of the
alleged spoliation on 18 January 2024.
[22]
In the replying affidavit the applicant explained that he only
returned from holiday mid-January 2024 and that it was
then that he
was informed that the trucks had still not been returned to the
applicant. As accounting officer of the applicant
he is the
only person who has the authority to resolve the issue.
Therefore, as soon as it came to his attention, he immediately
consulted with the applicant’s legal team whereafter the
correspondence followed and eventually the application when it became
apparent that no agreement would be reached.
Authority:
[23]
At paragraph 1 of the founding affidavit the applicant stated as
follows:
“
I
am an adult male and the Municipal Manager of the Applicant. I
am duly authorized
ex lege
to launch this application and to
depose to this affidavit on behalf of the Applicant. I
furthermore attach hereto a signed
delegation of authority marked as
Annexure “A” confirming my authority as aforesaid.”
[24]
However, the delegation of authority does not reflect the delegations
as such, but only reflects a summary and page references
thereto and
not the contents itself.
[25]
In response to the aforesaid, the first respondent indicated that it
has no knowledge of the said allegations, does not
admit same and
puts the applicant to the proof thereof.
[26]
In the applicant`s response to the aforesaid denial of authority, the
applicant attached a very illegible letter to its
replying affidavit
which he states is a “
signed delegation of authority
”.
From the minimal words I can make out from the said document, it
appears to be an appointment letter of the Municipal
Manager.
Be that as it may, I will return to this aspect.
Kena Media/documents
Merits:
[27]
In its answering affidavit the first respondent refers to and relies
on the registration certificate in respect of the trucks
attached to
the founding affidavit as annexures “A” and “B”
respectively. In this regard it is the
first respondent’s
case that it is evident that the title holder and owner of the trucks
is the first respondent. The
first respondent furthermore
relies on the tax invoices issued during July 2023 when the first
respondent sold the trucks to the
second respondent where one of the
conditions of sale is reflected that “
it is an express
condition of this sale that ownership in the goods hereby sold shall
remain vested in seller until such time ….
and the full
purchase price of the said goods has been paid to the seller
”.
[28]
With regard to the contact between Mr Mynhardt of the first
respondent and Mr Seitsiro of the applicant, it is alleged
on behalf
of the first respondent that during the telephonic conversations
between the two parties the logistics were arranged
for the first
respondent to collect the trucks. According to the first
respondent the trucks were taken from the applicant
with the
knowledge and consent of its representative.
[29]
The first respondent furthermore relies on the WhatsApp Mr Mynhardt
sent to Mr Seitsiro on 18 December 2023 wherein he
stated “
Trucks
done with. Test just holding them until we are paid, to date we
received no payment for the trucks….as soon as payment
is
received we deliver back to you immediately
”. Mr
Seitsiro responded at 16h19 on the same day by stating “
Marc
tell me how much we are talking about?
”. The next
morning at 09h45 Mr Seitsiro again enquired from Mr Mynhardt by means
of WhatsApp “
Morning sir, can you please be so kind to tell
me how much is outstanding
”.
[30]
With regard to the events at the stage when the trucks were removed,
the first respondent stated as follows at paragraph
36 of its
answering affidavit:
“
36.1
One of the first respondent’s drivers, Alson Ndove and I were
at the Applicant’s premises…
36.2
Only one truck was at the premises. A representative of the
Applicant gave the original truck
key to Ndove in my presence.
Ndove used the original key to drive the truck to the first
respondent’s premises.
36.3
I waited with Mr Seitsiro for the second truck to arrive. When
it arrived, the Applicant’s
driver gave me the original key to
the truck. I waited for the First Respondent’s second
driver to arrive and when
he arrived, he drove the truck to the First
Respondent’s premises with the original key”.
[31]
The first respondent subsequently avers that in as much as the first
respondent removed the trucks, which are the lawful
property of the
first respondent, the said removal was done with the knowledge and
consent of the duly authorised representative
of the applicant.
According to the first respondent there is consequently no obligation
on it to return the trucks to the
applicant.
[32]
According to the first respondent it was not only in possession of
the spare keys of the trucks, but were also in possession
of all
three sets of keys for the trucks after having been furnished with
the keys to the trucks by the duly authorised representative
of the
applicant.
[33]
The first respondent also dealt in its answering affidavit with the
relevant correspondence between the parties’
attorneys and the
first respondent emphasized the fact that the applicant did not deny
that it furnished the first respondent with
the keys to the trucks.
[34]
With regard to the allegation in the founding affidavit that the true
intention of the first respondent was never to
return the trucks to
the applicant and that a misrepresentation was used to take
possession thereof, the first respondent states
that it made no
misrepresentation. It was the intention of the first respondent
to return the trucks once it has been paid.
[35]
Towards the end of the answering affidavit the first respondent
states as follows at paragraph 52:
“
On
14 December 2024, (
sic
) the First Respondent lawfully, with
the knowledge and consent of the duly authorised representatives of
the Applicant removed
the trucks from the Applicant’s
possession to have the trucks go through roadworthy, then once paid,
have them licenced to
the Applicant. I deny that the removal
constitutes an act of spoliation and the Applicant is put to the
proof thereof”.
CONDISDERATION
OF URGENCY:
[36]
Rule 6(12) determines as follows:
“
6(12)
(a)
In
urgent applications the court or a judge may dispense with the forms
and service provided for in these rules and may dispose
of such
matter at such time and place and in such manner and in accordance
with such procedure (which shall as far as practicable
be in terms of
these rules) as it deems fit.
(b)
In
every affidavit filed in support of any application under
paragraph
(a)
of
this subrule, the applicant must set forth explicitly the
circumstances which is [
sic
]
averred render [
sic
]
the matter urgent and the reasons why the applicant claims that
applicant could not be afforded substantial redress at a hearing
in
due course.”
[37]
Arising from and connected to the aforesaid principle, is the
consequent obligation on an applicant in an
urgent application to
explain all periods of delay for purposes of making out its case for
urgency. The relevant principle applicable
to condonation
applications in this regard is consequently
mutatis
mutandis
applicable to an urgent
application.
In
High Tech Transformers (Pty) Ltd v
Lombard
(2012) 33 ILJ 919 (LC) the importance of a reasonable
and acceptable explanation for a delay was accentuated at para [25]
of the
judgment:
“
[25]
…
Condonation is not merely for the
asking as was duly pointed out by the court in
NUMSA
& another v Hillside Aluminium
[2005] ZALC 25
;
[2005]
6 BLLR 601
(LC):
'[12]
Additionally, there should be an acceptable explanation tendered in
respect of each period of delay. Condonation is not there
simply
for the asking. Applications for condonation are not a mere
formality. The onus rests on the applicant to satisfy the
court of
the existence of good cause and this requires a full, acceptable and
ultimately reasonable explanation. … Nevertheless,
to do
justice to the aims of the legislation, parties seeking condonation
for non-compliance are obliged to set out full explanations
for each
and every delay throughout the process.’”
[38]
In the present matter there was a delay of approximately a month
between the spoliation and the action taken by the applicant.
However, considering the explanation advanced by the applicant for
the said delay, I am of the view that it constitutes a reasonable
explanation in the circumstances.
[39]
In addition it is acceptable and understandable that the applicant is
in urgent need of the use of the trucks for purposes
of service
delivery to the community, which is its Constitutional duty.
[40]
I am consequently of the view that condonation should be granted.
CONSIDERATION
OF AUTHORITY:
[41]
I have already dealt with the relevant factual allegations and the
denial thereof in respect of the authority of the
deponent to the
founding affidavit.
[42]
The deponent’s authority to have
deposed
to the
affidavit on behalf of applicant, is neither here nor there. No
such authority is necessary. In
Ganes and Another v
Telecom Namibia Limited
2004 (3) SA 615
(SCA) [
Ganes
]
at para [19] the Supreme Court of Appeal determined as follows:
“…
.
In my view, it is irrelevant whether Hanke had been authorised to
depose to the founding affidavit. The deponent to an affidavit
in motion proceedings need not be authorised by the party concerned
to depose to the affidavit. It is the institution of
the
proceedings and the prosecution thereof which must be authorised.”
[43]
Insofar as the first respondent attempted to challenge the authority
of the deponent to the founding affidavit to have
launched/instituted
the application on behalf of the applicant, the Court found in
Ganes
,
supra
, at para [19] as follows:
“…
In
any event, Rule 7 provides a procedure to be followed by a respondent
who wishes to challenge the authority of an attorney who
instituted
motion proceedings on behalf of an applicant. The appellants
did not avail themselves of the procedure so provided.
(See Eskom v
Soweto City Council
1992 (2) SA 703
(W) at 705 C – J.)”
[44]
In
Unlawful Occupiers, School Site v City of Johannesburg
2005 (4) SA 199
(SCA) the authority of the person who deposed to the
affidavit on behalf of the respondent (the applicant in the court
a
quo
) was challenged. In the said matter the appellant
directed its attack against a resolution of the municipal council
which
authorised the deponent to have launched proceedings of the
kind in that matter. The Court determined as follows at para
[14]:
“
At
the hearing of the appeal, council for the appellants conceded that
she could not support this kind of appeal. I think
the
concession was fairly made. The issue raised had been decided
conclusively in the judgment of Flemming DJP in Eskom v Soweto
City
Council
1992 (2) SA 703
(W), which was referred to with approval by
this Court in Ganes and Another v Telecom Namibia Limited
2004 (3) SA
615
(SCA) at 624 I – 625 A.
The
import of the judgment in Eskom is that the remedy of a respondent
who wishes to challenge authority of a person allegedly acting
on
behalf of the purported applicant is provided for in Rule 7(1) of the
Uniform Rules of Court.
…”
(Own emphasis)
[45]
The Court further stated as follows at paragraph [16] of the said
judgment:
“
However,
as Flemming DJP has said, now that the new Rule 7(1) remedy is
available, the party who wishes to raise the issue of authority
should not adopt the procedure followed by the appellants in this
matter, i.e. by way of argument based on no more than a textural
analysis of the words used by a deponent in an attempt to prove his
or her authority. This method invariably resulted in
the costly
and wasteful investigation, which normally leads to the conclusion
that the application was indeed authorised. After
all, there is
rarely any motivation for deliberately launching an unauthorised
application. In the present case, for example,
the respondent’s
challenge resulted in the filing of pages of resolutions annexed to a
supplementary affidavit followed by
lengthy technical arguments on
both sides. …”
[46]
The judgment in the matter of
ANC Umvoti Council Caucus and
Others v Umvoti Municipality
2010 (3) SA 31
(KZP) dealth with
all three the aforesaid judgments and determined as follows at paras
[14] and [27] to [29]:
“
[14]
The question is, rather, whether an applicant is obliged to prove, on
the papers, that authority has been given
to initiate litigation
where the applicant is an artificial person. ...
[27]
… Whether or not the litigation has been properly authorised
by the artificial person named
as the litigant would not be dealt
with by means of evidence led in the application. If clarity is
required, it should be
obtained my means of Rule 7(1) since this is a
procedure which safeguards the interests of both parties. ….
[28]
… It is further my view that the application papers are not
the correct context in which to
determine whether an applicant which
is an artificial person has authorised the initiation of application
proceedings. Rule
7(1) must be used. This means that I
disagree with Mr Gajoo’s submission that Rule 7(1) provides
only one possible
procedure and that, if the respondents elects to
challenge the matter of authority on the application papers, the
applicant is
required to prove such authority on the papers.
[29]
There was no challenge in terms of Rule 7(1) in the application which
is the subject of this appeal.
The appropriate procedure was
therefore not used by the appellants. It was accordingly not
necessary for the applicant to
prove the authority to initiate the
application, nor appropriate to attempt to do so on the papers.
It was also not necessary
for the court a quo to make a finding
relating to authority on affidavits delivered in the matter.
Since there was no challenge
in the required manner to the authority
of the respondent’s attorney who signed the notice of motion
and initiated the application
in the accepted way, this court does
not have to deal with the question of authority. I am therefore
of the view that the
appeal on this issue must fail.”
[47]
In the present matter there was no challenge of the deponent’s
authority by means of Rule 7(1) and I therefore
do not have to deal
with the question of authority.
CONSIDERATION
OF THE MERITS:
[48]
It is trite that in order to obtain a spoliation order two
allegations must be made and proved:
“
(a) that
the applicant was in possession of the property; and
(b)
that
the respondent deprived him of the possession forcibly or wrongfully
against his consent.”
See
Erasmus Superior Court Practice,
D.E van Loggerenberg,
at p. D7-6.
[49]
Against the background of the relevant facts and circumstances of
this matter, it cannot be disputed that the applicant
was in the
de
facto
possession of the trucks at the time when the
employees of the first respondent removed the trucks.
[50]
In
Erasmus Superior Court Practice,
supra,
at p.
D7-2 to D7-3 the following principles are stated with reference to
applicable authority:
“
The
reason behind the practice of granting spoliation orders is that no
man is allowed to take the law into his own hands, and to
dispossess
another illicitly of possession of property. This applies
equally whether the despoiler is an individual or a government
entity
or functionary. If he does so, the court will summarily
restore the
status quo ante
, and will do that as a
preliminary to any inquiry or investigation into the merits of the
dispute. The rule is
spoliatus ante omnia restituendus
est
.
A court hearing a spoliation application does
not concern itself with the rights of the parties (whatever they may
have been) before
the spoliation took place; it merely inquires
whether or not there has been a spoliation, and if there has been, it
restores the
status quo ante
. In
spoliation proceedings the court will, therefore, neither enter into
the lawfulness of the applicant’s possession, nor
into the
question of ownership.
” (My emphasis)
[51]
With regard to the “possession” requirement, the
following is stated
in
Erasmus Superior Court Practice,
supra,
at p.
D7-7:
“
The
very essence of the remedy against spoliation is that the possession
enjoyed by the party who asks for the spoliation order
must be
established. In spoliation proceedings the court is not
concerned with the lawfulness of the applicant’s possession.
In
other words, the applicant must show not that he was entitled to be
in possession,
but that he was in
de
facto
possession at the time of being despoiled.
”
(My emphasis)
[52]
From the aforesaid paragraph and also from further allegations in the
correspondence and the answering affidavit, it
is evident that the
first respondent is firstly relying on its alleged ownership of the
trucks in opposition to the spoliation
application. However, it is
clear from the applicable legal principles that ownership is not
relevant for purposes of spoliation.
[53]
In addition the contractual terms which the first respondent is
relying on relates to an apparent contract between the
first
respondent and the second respondent and not between the first
respondent and the applicant. The said contractual issues
between the
first respondent and the second respondent, therefore, do also not
exclude the applicability of the spoliation.
[54]
For the requisite that the applicant has to prove that it has been
deprived of possession, the following principles are
summarised in
Erasmus Superior Court Practice,
supra,
at p.
D7-12A – D7-13:
“
Deprivation
of possession does not entail that the possession of the property
despoiled must have passed over to the respondent. Spoliation
takes place if the applicant is deprived by the actions of the
respondent of control over the property in question.
…
Since
the decision in
Nino Bonino v De Lange
it is
generally accepted that any wrongful deprivation — including by
force or by stealth — suffices.
Wrongful
deprivation in this context means deprivation against the will of the
person and without resort to the legal process. Thus,
a
spoliation order will be granted if the applicant has been deprived
of possession by a trick or secretly, without his knowledge
or
consent;…”
[55]
The first respondent avers that the trucks were removed with the
permission of the employees of the applicant. However,
in my view it
is evident that the employees of the first respondent misrepresented
the true facts to the applicant`s employees
by presenting a scenario
that the trucks were just going to be taken for roadworthy tests and
will then be returned. The permission
that was given was therefore
limited and restricted to a roadworthy tests and not to deprive the
applicant of its free and undisturbed
possession of the trucks
indefinitely. The WhatsApp from Mr Marc Mynhardt of the first
respondent specifically stated “
can take test and return
”.
In these circumsatnces the issue of which keys were used is in my
view irrelevant.
[56]
What is insightful is that at paragraphs 36.2 and 36.3 of the
answering affidavit, where the first respondent dealt with
the
respective keys, it was stated specifically stated that the relevant
keys were used to drive the trucks “
to the first
respondent`s premises
”. This is directly contradictory to
the presentation which was made to the applicant`s employees. In
fact, in the totality
of the firs respondent`s papers there is not a
single indication that the trucks were taken for roadworthy tests on
that day at
all.
[57]
The applicant`s employees were therefore tricked into allowing the
first respondent`s employees to remove the trucks. The first
respondent`s conduct therefore constituted unlawful deprivation of
the applicant`s free and undisturbed possession of the trucks
and
therefore despoiled the applicant.
[58]
The applicant is consequently entitled to the relief it is seeking.
Costs:
[59]
There is no reason why costs should not follow the outcome. The
applicant was seeking attorney and client costs in its
notice of
motion, but Mr Van Amstel, on behalf of the applicant, indicated
during argument that the applicant no longer persist
with seeking as
punitive costs order.
Order:
[60]
The following order is made:
1.
The application is heard as one of urgency in terms of rule 6(12) and
condonation is granted
in respect of forms and time periods.
2.
The first respondent is ordered to forthwith restore the applicant’s
free and undisturbed
possession of the two trucks, to wit: two
Powerstar 6M3 Tipper Trucks 2628 6x4 with vehicle identification
numbers (VIN)
L[…]2 and L[…]7, respectively, and within
2 days of this order being served on the first respondent.
3.
Should the first respondent fail to comply with the order in
paragraph 2 above, after the
expiry of the two-day period, then the
sheriff of the court is hereby authorised to do all that is
necessary, including obtaining
the assistance of the South African
Police Service, to give effect to the order in paragraph 2 above.
4.
The first respondent is to pay the costs of this application.
C.
VAN ZYL, J
On
behalf of the Applicant:
Adv
PC Ploos van Amstel
Instructed
by:
Maritz-Willemse
Attorneys
C/o
Hill, McHardy & Herbst
BLOEMFONTEIN
Email:
lucinda@hmhi.co.za
bertus@mwattorneys.co.za
On
behalf of First Respondent:
Adv
Ferreira
Instructed
by:
Simpson
Incorporated
C/o
Webbers Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN
Email:
john@simpsonlaw.co.za