About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Supreme Court of Appeal
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Supreme Court of Appeal
>>
1989
>>
[1989] ZASCA 110
|
|
Mignoel Properties (Pty) Ltd. v Kneebone (219/88) [1989] ZASCA 110 (22 September 1989)
1.
Case no 219/88 /MC
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (APPELLATE DIVISION)
In the matter between
MIGNOEL PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD
Appellant
- and -
DAVID RODERICK KNEEBONE
Respondent
CORAM:
JOUBERT, BOTHA, NESTADT, STEYN JJA et FRIEDMAN AJA.
HEARD:
8 September 1989.
DELIVERED:
22 September 1989
JUDGMENT
FRIEDMAN AJA.
2/...
2.
FRIEDMAN AJA:
On 14 October 1982 a written agreement of lease was concluded between
Himelsein Properties (Pty) Ltd (the lessor) and Computalarm
Transvaal (Pty) Ltd
(the lessee) in terms of which the lessor leased certain premises to the lessee
for a period of three years with
an option to renew for a further two years. The
lease was subject to a condition precedent that certain named persons (who did
not
include the respondent) were to bind themselves to the lessor as sureties
and co-principal debtors for the lessee in terms of a deed
of suretyship
approved by the lessor. This condition was stated to be
3/...
3.
for the benefit of the lessor who could, in its discretion, waive compliance
therewith, which the lessor in fact did. Subsequently,
however, on 8 February
1983 respondent in writing bound himself to the lessor as surety and
co-principal debtor for the due payment
by the lessee "of all such sums of money
which maý now or at any time be or become owing by or claimable from the
debtor(s)
(i.e. the lessee) to the creditor (i.e. the lessor) from any cause
whatsoever, in respect of" the lease. On the same date one Gorton
entered into
an identical suretyship undertaking.
On 6 December 1983 the lessor sold the immovable property of which the leased
premises formed a part, to appellant. The lessee failed
to pay rental in an
amount of R21 504-00 in
4/...
4.
respect of the period from August 1984 to March 1985 and appellant sued
Gorton and respondent (as first and second defendants respectively)
in the
Magistrate's Court, Johannesburg, for payment of the outstanding
rental.
Respondent filed a Special Plea and at the same time pleaded over on
the merits. In the Special Plea he alleged that as there had
been no cession to
appellant of the lessor's rights in and to the lease between it and the lessee,
alternatively that no such cession
had been alleged in the particulars of claim,
appellant was not entitled to claim payment of the outstanding rental from
respondent.
By agreement the matter was argued before the magistrate on the
basis of the facts alleged in the Special Plea
5/...
5.
only.
The magistrate, relying on the decision in
Pizani
and Another v First Consolidated Holdings (Pty) Ltd
1979(1) SA 69(A), held
that appellant had, by operation of law, "stepped into the shoes" of the lessor
and that upon transfer the
relationship of lessor and lessee continued between
appellant and the lessee without the necessity of a formal cession of rights.
He
also held that appellant's right to claim compliance with the lease against the
lessee, extended to a surety for the lessee and
that it was therefore
unnecessary for the lessor to have ceded its rights under the suretyship to
appellant. He accordingly dismissed
the Special Plea with costs.
6/...
6.
Respondent's appeal to the Witwatersrand Local Division against the
dismissal of his Special Plea was upheld. Appellant applied for
leave to appeal
against the judgment of the Witwatersrand Local Division, but that was refused.
He was, however, on petition to the
Chief Justice, granted leave to appeal to
this Court.
In
Pizani's
case the Appellants, who had bound themselves
as sureties for the due payment of any moneys which were or may become owing by
the
lessee to the lessor arising out of certain leases of equipment, were sued
for payment of arrear rental. The plaintiff (respondent)
alleged that the lessor
had ceded to it his right, title and interest in and to the agreements of
7/...
7.
lease as well as all rights of ownership in and to the leased equipment. The
plaintiff alleged, further, that the deeds of suretyship
had also, on an
unspecified date, been ceded to it by the lessor. It was argued, on behalf of
appellants, that unless the cessions
of the deeds of suretyship were effected
simultaneously with the cession of the rights under the leases, the sureties
were relieved
of their obligations under the deeds of suretyship. Dismissing
this argument, the Court held (at 78) that in the absence of any contrary
indications in the cession or in the deed of suretyship, the cessionary of
rights acquires the cedent's rights against both the principal
debtor and the
surety and he may sue the surety without the necessity of a separate
8/...
8.
cession in respect of the rights against the surety.
Pizani's
case
is distinguishable from the facts of the present case: in
Pizani's
case
there was an express cession by the lessor of his rights under the lease whereas
in casu
there was no such cession. It was argued on behalf of the
appellant, however, that the effect of the maxim "huur gaat voor koop"
was that
the appellant, as purchaser, took the place of the lessor and that a tacit
cession of the lessor's rights occurred which,
on the basis of
Pizani's
case, entitled the appellant, as cessionary, to sue respondent on the
suretyship. Respondent's counsel on the other hand contended
that the rights and
obligations created by virtue of the "huur gaat voor koop"
9/...
9.
rule, could not be equated with and did not embody a cession of rights or an
assignment of obligations and that there was accordingly
no room for the
application of the principles enunciated in
Pizani's
case.
It is
necessary to consider the scope and effect of the maxim "huur gaat voor koop".
It had no place in Roman Law.. In Roman Law a
lessee had no
jus in re
in
the leased property. He merely had a
jus in personam
against the lessor.
A purchaser of the leased property was not bound to recognise the lease unless
it was a condition of the sale
that he should. As stated in Code 4.65.9:
"Emptori guidem fundi necesse non est stare colonum cui prior dominus locavit
nisi ea lege
emit". (It is not necessary for the purchaser
10/...
10.
of land to permit the tenant to whom the former owner leased it to remain
until his lease has expired, unless he bought the property
under this
condition.- Scott's translation.) In the absence of such a condition the
purchaser could evict the lessee, leaving the
latter with merely a claim for
damages against his lessor. See
Buckland
: A Text-book of Roman Law, 3rd
ed, p 502.
The origin of the rule "huur gaat voor koop" can be ascribed to a
desire in certain Western European areas, including the Province
of Holland, to
alleviate the position of a lessee under the Roman Law. Out of Germanic and
Dutch customs and local legislation, there
grew a measure of protection for a
lessee which came to be expressed by the maxim "huur gaat voor koop",
11/...
11.
which is a concise statement of the effect of such customs and
legislation on leases of land and houses. See
Graham v Local and Overseas
Investments (Pty) Ltd
1942 AD 95
at 110-111;
Kessoopersadh en 'n Ander v
Essop en h Ander
1970(1) SA 265 (A) at 274.
The history of the
development of the maxim has been dealt with in a three-part series of articles
by Professor J C de Wet, entitled
"Huur gaat voor koop", which appeared in 1944
Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 74
et seq
, 166 et
seq
and 226 et
seq
. Professor de Wet has dealt exhaustively with
all the Roman-Dutch writers on the subject and it is unnecessary to repeat all
those
references. Suffice it to say that the maxim has not been dealt with in
any
12/...
12.
great depth by the writers. Thus Professor de Wet states, op
cit
190:
"Alhoewel die gelding van die reël 'huur gaat voor koop' vir die provinsie
Holland deurgaans aanvaar word, is dit besonder moeilik
om uit wat ons skrywers
meedeel af te lei wat presies die vereistes was vir die toepassing van die
reël, en wat die presiese
werking of gevolge van die reël
was."
Professor de Wet analyses the authorities and
concludes that the effect of the operation of the maxim is that a lesseé
acquires
a real right in respect of the leased property. He then proceeds to
deal with the relationship created between lessee, purchaser
and seller and
points out that it is generally accepted that a purchaser may not
13/...
13.
evict a lessee and that, according to Voet, the lessee may vacate the
property and sue the lessor/seller for damages. However, if
the lessee elects to
remain in the property, the guestion arises as to whether the purchaser becomes
the lessor and the seller disappears
from the scene. On this question Professor
de Wet, having pointed to the difference of approach between Voet and Schorer,
suggests
(op
cit
193) that one could conclude, from the vague
pronouncements of the authorities,
"dat die koper die verkoper vervang as skuldeiser ten aansien van die regte wat
vir die verhuurder uit die ooreenkoms voortvloei,
en natuurlik onderhewig aan
alle verweermiddels wat die huurder mag hê, soos bv. dat hy die
huurpenninge
14/...
14. reeds betaal het".
Professor de Wet's view,
however, is that a purchaser is obliged to tolerate the lessee, not because he
is bound by the contract,
but because of the real right enjoyed by the tenant.
(Op cit, 250).
This theme is further developed in De Wet and Yeats:
Die
Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg
, 4th ed, at 334-5, where the
authors state that the maxim "huur gaat voor koop" does not create contractual
rights or obligations
between the purchaser and the lessee, which can only be
achieved by cession and assignment. They express strong criticism of the
decisions of our courts to the effect that the purchaser of leased
15/...
15.
property becomes entitled, on receiving transfer, to claim the rental from
the lessee and that the seller is relieved of his obligations
under the lease.
In this regard De Wet and Yeats state (
op cit
334) :
"Hierdie houding is onverdedigbaar, eenvoudig omdat dit 'n flagrante afwyking is
van basiese en goeie beginsels van die
verbintenisreg."
The view adopted by Professor de
Wet in his article in THRHR and of the authors of
Die Suid-Afrikaanse
Kontraktereg en Handelsreq
, appears, however, to overlook the
sui qeneris
nature of the "huur gaat voor koop" rule. As RABIE AJA (as he then was)
pointed out in
Kessoopersadh
's case,
supra
at 283 B-C:
16/...
16.
"Dat sessie of delegasie gewoonweg nodig is om regte of verpligtinge, na gelang
van die geval, te laat oorgaan, is natuurlik so,
maar ek betwyfel die
korrektheid van die benadering om die koper se reg op die huurgeld en sy
gebondenheid aan die bepalings van
die huurkontrak, soos dit deur die Howe erken
word, te ontken op grond daarvan dat dit nie in die lig van die gewone beginsels
van
die kontraktereg te verklaar is nie."
RABIE AJA,
went on to state, at 283 C-D:
"Na dit my voorkom, moet die huurder se reg op die huurgeld en sy gebondenheid
aan die bepalings van die huurkontrak in die geskiedenis
van die reël
huur gaat voor koop
gesoek word. Soos hierbo aangedui is, was dit 'n nuwe
reel wat weens praktiese en
billikheidsoorwegings
17/...
17.
tot stand gekom het, en dit sou derhalwe ook nie vreemd wees as daar in sulke
omstandighede verhoudinge tussen huurder, verhuurder
en koper ontstaan en
ontwikkel het wat nie volgens bekende reëls van die kontraktereg te
verklaar is nie."
Although the Roman-Dutch law
sources in regard to the legal relationships created by the "huur gaat voor
koop" rule are sketchy, it
can, in my view, be regarded as generally accepted
that the effect of the rule is that the purchaser steps into the shoes of the
lessor. Nelissen in his thesis entitled "
Huur en Vervreemdinq
", (1880)
states the position thus at 206:
"Wat de verhoudingen betreft door vervreemding van een verhuurd
goed
18/...
18.
geboren, hebben we gezien hoe in alle streken waar het koop breekt geen huur
gold, de nieuwe eigenaar in de plaats werd gesteld van
den oorspronkelijken
verhuurder, hoe tusschen kooper en huurder de huurovereenkomst werd voortgezet,
zoodat al dadelijk na de vervreemding
aan den kooper de huurpenningen moesten
worden betaald, terwijl van den anderen kant deze ook de pligten des verhuurders
had na te
komen."
And at 262 Nelissen states:
"Toen we den regel in ons Oud-Hollandsch regt onderzochten, hebben we gevonden,
hoe in alle streken waar het 'koop breekt geen huur'
gold, de beteekenis van den
regel deze was, dat de nieuwe eigenaar de plaats innam van den oorspronkelijken
verhuurder, aan den nieuwen
eigenaar de
huurpenningen
19/...
19.
moesten worden uitbetaald."
Bodenstein in his
thesis:
Huur van Huizen en Landen Volgens het Hedendaagsch
Romeinsch-Hollandsch Recht
(1907) states at 133:
"Dat de kooper geheel treedt in de schoenen van den verhuurder, dus ook alle
contractueele verplichtingen uit het huurcontract op
zich moet nemen, wordt
nergens met zooveel woorden door de oude schrijvers
gezegd."
Bodenstein goes on, however, to set out the
position as follows at 133-134 :
"Wanneer wij bedenken, dat de verhuurder zijne verplichtingen tegenover den
huurder alleen naar eisch kan vervullen, als hij de beschikking
heeft over het
gehuurde goed, zouden des huurders
20/...
20.
rechten gebrekkig beschermd zijn, wanneer wij aannamen, dat de huurder zich tot
nakoming van de contractueele verplichtingen te wenden
had tot den ouden
verhuurder, omdat deze veelal er niet toe in staat zal zijn. Het is ook moeilijk
aan te nemen, dat men den verhuurder
nog als contractueel gebonden beschouwde,
nadat men hem het recht op de huurpenningen ontnomen had. Hier wordt dus den
huurder een
nieuwe crediteur in plaats van den vroegeren toegevoegd, zonder dat
hij zelf hierin heeft toegestemd en volgt een opvolger onder
bijzonderen titel
ook op in de persoonlijke verplichtingen van zijnen voorganger, beide zeer
ongewone verschijnselen."
This approach has also
been followed in this Court. Thus in
De Jager v Sisana
1930 AD 71
,
WESSELS JA stated at 82:
21/...
21 .
"This principle [i.e. the Roman Law principle that a sale breaks a lease],
however, was modified by the Roman Dutch law, and that
system adopted the rule
that the sale does not break the lease but that the purchaser becomes the
landlord of the tenant under the
same conditions as his lease with the
seller."
In
De Wet v Union Government
1934 AD
59
, BEYERS JA in a dissenting judgment, expressed the view in an
obiter
dictum
, that by taking transfer of the leased property, the purchaser
acguired a tacit cession of the seller's rights under the lease. However,
in
delivering the judgment of the Court, STRATFORD ACJ, with whom DE VILLIERS JA
and GARDINER AJA concurred, stated at 63:
22/...
22.
"This being a contract of lease, the purchaser is bound on it by the doctrine of
huur gaat voor koop
, and bound also by all its material
terms."
Finally, in
Kessoopersadh
's case at
283 F-G, RABIE AJA stated:
"Ek verwys ten slotte na menings van enkele van ons ou skrywers wat m.i. getuig
van h opvatting dat die koper in die plek van die
verhuurder tree en dat hy
gebonde is aan die bepalings van die huurkontrak oor die grond wat hy
koop."
He then referred, in support of this
conclusion, to a number of Roman-Dutch writers including Voet, Grotius,
Groenewegen and Van Leeuwen.
In a minority judgment in
Kessoopersadh
's
case, OGILVIE
23/...
23.
THOMPSON JA (as he then was), after referring to
De Jager
's case and
De Wet
's case, said the following at 289G-290A :
"There is also a line of decisions in the Provincial Divisions pointing in the
same direction. Of these the most striking is perhaps
Boshoff v Theron
,
1940 TPD 299
, wherein GREENBERG, JP, and SCHREINER, J, decided that, once the
purchaser of land which is subject to a lease receives transfer,
the
landlord-vendor is divested both of his rights and his obligations
qua
landlord. While the practical convenience of accepting the situation as
indicated in the above-mentioned decisions is apparent, they
have been the
subject of considerabie weighty criticism in a series of articles by Professor J
C de Wet in vol 8 (1944)
Tydskrif
, more especially at pp 239
et
seq
, and in De Wet & Yeats,
24/...
24.
Kontraktereq
, 3rd ed, p 280. Without pausing to examine that criticism,
it is to be observed that the above-mentioned decisions were all dealing
with
the situation whereunder the purchaser had, as a result of the protection
conferred upon a tenant by the maxim 'huur gaat voor
koop', admittedly become
bound by the lease."
From the aforegoing it follows,
in my view, that once the lessee elects to remain in the leased premises after a
sale, the seller
ex lege
falls out of the picture and his place as lessor
is taken by the purchaser. No new contract comes into existence; all that
happens
is that the purchaser is substituted for the seller as lessor without
the necessity for a cession of rights or an assignment of obligations.
On being
so
25/...
25.
substituted for the seller, the purchaser acquires all the rights which the
seller had in terms of the lease, except, of course, collateral
rights
unconnected with the lease.
Professor van Loggerenberg, in my view, sets out
the position correctly in his doctoral thesis entitled "
Skuldoorname en
Kontraksoorname
" (Leiden 1981), when he states, in regard to the
relationship between the lessee and the new owner of the leased property, at
292-3
:
"Met betrekking tot die verhouding tussen die huurder en die nuwe eienaar van
die huursaak het ons howe hul op die standpunt gestel
dat die
huur gaat voor
koop
-reël meebring dat laasgenoemde in die plek van die oorspronklike
verhuurder te staan kom. Daar is by geleentheid verklaar dat
'the new
owner
26/...
26.
steps into the shoes of the old owner as landlord' en dat die koper 'becomes
the landlord of the tenant under the same conditions
as his lease with the
seller'. Dit veroorsaak dat die oorspronklike verhuurder . sy regte ingevolge
die huurkontrak verloor en ook
van sy verpligtinge bevry word, terwyl die nuwe
eienaar van die saak dienooreenkomstig opvolg in die regte en verpligtinge van
sy
voorganger en gevolglik daarna self as verhuurder optree.
Die resultaat
van die toepassing van die
huur gaat voor koop
-reël by vervreemding
van die huursaak is die vervanging van een van die oorspronklike partye tot die
huurkontrak (die verhuurder)
deur 'n nuwe party, welke vervanging outomaties van
regswee volg nadat eiendomsreg in die saak formeel aan die verkryger oorgedra
is, dit wil sê sonder die medewerking van die oorblywende party tot die
kontrak (die
27/...
27.
huurder)."
After pointing out that there have been
attempts to explain this substitution by reference to the rights which flow from
a transfer
of ownership or by reference to a tacit cession, Professor van
Loggerenberg states at 294 that neither of these explanations is acceptable,
since
"Die koopkontrak tussen die verhuurder en die koper en die daaropvolgende
oordrag van die eiendomsreg stel bloot die
causa
vir die partyvervanging
daar."
Later on the same page he expresses his
conclusion as follows :
"Dit word ter oorweging gegee dat die enigste aanvaarbare verklaring vir hierdie
regsverskynsel geleë is in die
28/...
28.
konstruksie daarvan as kontraksoorname wat van regsweë intree (of 'n
kombinasie van
ex lege
sessie en skuldoorname). Die feit dat die koper
die oorspronklike verhuurder as kontraksparty vervang en met al sy regte en
verpligtinge
beklee word, terwyl daar geen vernuwing van die kontrak plaasvind
nie, dui onteenseglik daarop."
This approach accords
fully with the principle which emerges from the authorities referred to above,
namely that the effect of the
"huur gaat voor koop" rule is that the purchaser
is substituted as lessor in the place of the seller. It is a logical and natural
result of such a substitution that the purchaser also acquires the rights which
the seller had against a surety for the lessee's
obligations under the
29/...
29.
lease. The respondent bound himself to the lessor in terms of his deed of
suretyship, for the due payment by the lessee "of all such
sums of
money
which may become owing .... from any cause
whatsoever, in respect
of (the) lease". As the appellant was substituted as lessor, he acquired the
lessor's right to sue respondent
as surety, in the same way as the lessor could
have done. This was not a collateral right unconnected with the lease; it was a
right
which the lessor had,
qua
lessor, in respect of the tenant's
obligations under the lease.
In the Court a
quo
, GOLDSTEIN J with whom
STRYDOM J concurred, held that the "huur gaat voor koop" rule was
sui
generis
, that there was no room for extending its operation by analogy
with
30/...
30.
other legal principles or rules and that as the rule was silent in regard to
the liability of a surety for the lessee, it could not
result in the surety's
becoming liable to the purchaser of the leased property. The Court
a quo
went on to hold that as there had been no cession in the present case,
Pizani
's case did not apply.
This approach overlooks the basic feature of the "huur gaat voor koop" rule,
namely that its effect is to substitute the purchaser
as lessor. Once this is
recognised, the necessity for a formal cession cloes not arise: the purchaser,
as a matter of law, is substituted
as lessor in place of the seller and as a
natural and logical concomitant of that position, the
31/...
31 .
purchaser acquires all the rights which the lessor enjoyed,
qua
lessor, in terms of the lease. Those rights include the right to claim moneys
owing in terms of the lease from the lessee's surety
in the event of the lessee
failing to pay.
For these reasons the appeal must succeed. In regard to costs
the Court a
quo
, in upholding the appeal, ordered that "the limitation in
Rule 69(1) regarding counsel's fees shall not apply". The reference to
Rule
69(1) is abviously an error. That rule provides that only such fees as are
consequent upon the employment of one advocate shall
be allowed as between party
and party unless the court orders otherwise. As only one counsel appeared on
either side in the Court
a
quo
, the court could not have intended to
refer
32/...
32.
to Rule 69(1). What the Court a
quo
obviously had
in mind was Rule 69(3). That Rule limits
counsel's fees in the case of an appeal from the
magistrate's court, to
the maximum prescribed by
the tariff contained in the Rule, unless the court
otherwise orders.
Having regard to the
complexity of the matter, an order that Rule 69(3)
should not apply, was certainly warranted and
would have been the correct
order for the Court a
quo
to have made.
It is ordered as follows :
The appeal is upheld with
costs. The order of the Court a
quo
is set aside and there is substituted
for it, the following order :
"The appeal is dismissed with costs. The limitation in Rule 69(3) regarding
counsel's fees shall not apply."
G. FRIEDMAN
AJA
.
JOUBERT JA) BOTHA JA)
NESTADT JA) Concur.
STEYN JA)