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[2024] ZALCJHB 190
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Sibanye Gold Protection Services (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (JR2424/21) [2024] ZALCJHB 190 (7 May 2024)
IN
THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Not
Reportable
Case
No: JR2424/21
In
the matter between:
SIBANYE
GOLD PROTECTION SERVICES (PTY) LTD
Applicant
and
COMMISSION
FOR CONCIALIATION,
MEDIATION
AND ARBITRATION
First
Respondent
MOOI.
F.
N.O
Second Respondent
NUM
OBO
MAKGOE Third
Respondent
Heard:
on the 24 April 2024 but mostly decided on the Papers.
Delivered:
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties' legal representatives by email. The date
and time for
hand-down is deemed to be on 7 May 2024.
JUDGMENT
NTSOANE,
AJ
Introduction
and background of the issues
[1]
This is an
opposed review application brought by the applicant in terms of
section 145 of the Labour Relations Act
[1]
(LRA) for an order to review and set aside an arbitration award dated
19 October 2021, issued by the second respondent (Commissioner)
under
the auspices of the first respondent the Commission for Conciliation,
Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) under case number
GAJB8332-21.
[2]
It stands testament from the arbitration award which forms the
primary subject matter of this review that the third respondent
(union), from inception, has been acting on behalf of its member and
for purposes of this judgment and ease of reference, the employee
will herein be referred to as Makgoe. It is common cause that Makgoe
was charged for sleeping on duty on 19 December 2020 and consequently
summoned to a disciplinary hearing which he duly attended. Makgoe was
then dismissed from his employment when he was imposed with
a
sanction of a dismissal following such disciplinary hearing.
[3]
Disgruntled by the said dismissal, the third respondent then referred
an unfair dismissal dispute to the first respondent and an
arbitration hearing came before the second respondent. The main issue
which the Commissioner was called to determine, was only
the
substantive fairness of Makgoe’s dismissal. The arbitration was
heard over two days and following extensive ventilation
of the
issues, the Commissioner ordered retrospective reinstatement of
Makgoe with effect from the 26
th
of April 2021 being the
date of his dismissal and back pay in the amount equivalent to six
months’ salary. The applicant
is clearly displeased with the
Commissioner’s arbitration award and sought to invoke the
process in terms of section 145
of the LRA to have the said award
reviewed and set aside.
[4]
Makgoe was employed by the applicant in the capacity of a Security
Guard and his main role comprised of patrolling and guarding
the
premises of the applicant and also doing random employee searches.
From the pleadings filed by the respective parties, it appears
to be
a common cause that there was a recent breach at Sibanye Gold Plant
during which suspects cut through the perimeter fence
to enter the
plant in order to steal gold. Sibanye had implemented a protocol in
terms of which guards would patrol the area on
a 24/7 basis and a
patrol car was specially dedicated to patrol and ensure that the area
was protected in an attempt to curb any
further breach.
[5]
Makgoe was assigned to be part of the patrol team and on 19 December
2020, he was assigned specifically to stand guard on the said
site
which the applicant considers as “high risk”. How Makgoe
came to face a disciplinary hearing was when the applicant
through Mr
Miyelani Mathebula (Mathebula) and Mr Martin Botes (Botes) both
employed by Sibanye, also on duty on the same night
of the 19
th
of December 2020, spotted a vehicle that was parked at the high risk
area with headlights on. It is alleged that on approaching
the
vehicle with no signs of movement, the two gentlemen could see that
Makgoe had reclined his driver’s seat and he was
sleeping.
Makgoe was awakened by the movement of the two gentlemen when Botes
switched on his torch in an attempt to take pictures
of the sleeping
Makgoe. It is further alleged that Makgoe apologised to the gentlemen
for having slept in the vehicle and on duty.
[6]
The dominant and specific events of that night leading to the
dismissal of Makgoe were significantly and generally placed in
dispute
especially the fact that Makgoe had reclined his seat and was
sleeping when he was found.
[7]
This alleged transgression was reported to management and this is how
Makgoe was charged, summoned to a disciplinary hearing and
subsequently dismissed. This dismissal, is sanctioned against Makgoe
despite the chairperson of the disciplinary hearing having
found that
Sibanye did not lead sufficient evidence for him to recommend a
sanction of a dismissal and accordingly issued Makgoe
with a final
written warning. The sanction was referred to Sibanye’s
internal review which process found that the sanction
imposed by the
chairperson of the disciplinary hearing, was not in line with the
provisions of Sibanye’s disciplinary code
as it prescribes that
sleeping on duty was a dismissible offence. Sibanye opted to rather
substitute the chairperson’s sanction
by elevating same to a
dismissal one.
Grounds
for review
[8]
The first ground of review in this regard pertains to the inspection
in
loco
which was conducted by the parties. The
applicant avers that the Commissioner committed an irregularity when
he based most of his
findings on his personal observations and
photographs taken during the inspection
in
loco
. The
applicant submits that the Commissioner should have allowed the
parties an opportunity to comment on his observations during
the
inspection
in
loco
.
[9]
The applicant further contends in its second ground for review that,
the Commissioner has committed an irregularity in the conducting
of
the arbitration proceedings when he made an adverse finding against
all the applicant’s evidence on the basis that there
were
inconsistencies.
[10]
The third ground for review raised by the applicant is that the
Commissioner had committed an irregularity when he failed to properly
consider the totality of the evidence that was placed before him.
[11]
The fourth ground for review was that the Commissioner had committed
a gross irregularity when he found that the chairperson of
the
disciplinary hearing had doubted Makgoe’s guilt.
[12]
The third respondent generally agrees with the determination of the
Commissioner and submits that the grounds for review are ill-founded
and are not sustainable in fact and in law.
The
test for review
[13]
The
grounds for review for arbitration awards are stipulated in Section
145 of the LRA. In the case of
Sidumo
and another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and others
[2]
(Sidumo),
the Constitutional Court held that section 145 is suffused by the
constitutional standard of “reasonableness”. The
Court in
Sidumo
subsequently confirmed that the standard of review is whether the
decision reached by the CCMA Commissioner is one that a reasonable
decision maker could not reach. The Court in the case of
Shoprite
Checkers vs Ramdaw NO
[3]
held that public power must be exercised rationally and therefore a
decision made by a public agency must be rationally related
to the
purpose the decision making power was given. In addition thereof
,
and in
CUSA
v Tao Ying Metal Industries and others
[4]
(Tao
Ying Metal Industries)
O'Regan
J held:
‘
It
is clear... that a commissioner is obliged to apply his or her mind
to the issues in a case. Commissioners who do not do so are
not
acting lawfully and/or reasonably and their decisions will constitute
a breach of the right to administrative justice.’
[14]
What
the Constitutional Court meant in
Sidumo
and
Tao
Ying Metal Industries
was a review test based on a comparison by a review court of the
totality of the evidence that was before the arbitrator as well
as
the issues that the arbitrator was required to determine, to the
outcome the arbitrator arrived at, in order to ascertain if
the
outcome the arbitrator came to was reasonable. This review test was
considered and applied in
Fidelity
Cash Management Service v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and
Arbitration and others (Fidelity Cash Management Service)
[5]
where the Court said the following:
‘
The
Constitutional Court has decided in
Sidumo
that the grounds of review set out in s 145 of the Act are suffused
by reasonableness because a CCMA arbitration award, as an
administrative action, is required by the Constitution to be lawful,
reasonable and procedurally fair. The court further held that
such an
award must be reasonable and if it is not reasonable, it can be
reviewed and set aside.’
[15]
As
to what would be considered to be unreasonable, the Court in
Fidelity
Cash Management Service
held as follows:
[6]
‘
The
Constitutional Court further held that to determine whether a CCMA
commissioner's arbitration award is reasonable or unreasonable,
the
question that must be asked is whether or not the decision or finding
reached by the commissioner 'is one that a reasonable
decision maker
could not reach' (para 110 of the
Sidumo
case). If it is an award or decision that a reasonable decision maker
could not reach, then the decision or award of the CCMA is
unreasonable, and, therefore, reviewable and could be set aside. If
it is a decision that a reasonable decision maker could reach,
the
decision or award is reasonable and must stand. It is important to
bear in mind that the question is not whether the arbitration
award
or decision of the commissioner is one that a reasonable decision
maker
would
not reach but one that a reasonable decision maker
could
not reach...’
[16]
The
Court in
Fidelity
Cash Management Service
then went further and formulated this outcome based review test which
the Court considered the
Sidumo
review
test envisaged, where the Court said:
[7]
‘
It
seems to me that there can be no doubt now under
Sidumo
that the reasonableness or otherwise of a commissioner's decision
does not depend - at least not solely - upon the reasons that
the
commissioner gives for the decision. In many cases the reasons which
the commissioner gives for his decision, finding or award
will play a
role in the subsequent assessment of whether or not such decision or
finding is one that a reasonable decision maker
could or could not
reach. However, other reasons upon which the commissioner did not
rely to support his or her decision or finding
but which can render
the decision reasonable or unreasonable can be taken into account.
This would clearly be the case where the
commissioner gives reasons
A, B and C in his or her award but, when one looks at the evidence
and other material that was legitimately
before him or her, one finds
that there were reasons D, E and F upon which he did not rely but
could have relied which are enough
to sustain the decision.’
[17]
The
Court in
Fidelity
Cash Management Service
then
concluded:
[8]
‘…
Whether
or not an arbitration award or decision or finding of a CCMA
commissioner is reasonable must be determined objectively with
due
regard to all the evidence that was before the commissioner and what
the issues were that were before him or her. There is
no reason why
an arbitration award or a finding or decision that, viewed
objectively, is reasonable should be held to be unreasonable
and set
aside simply because the commissioner failed to identify good reasons
that existed which could demonstrate the reasonableness
of the
decision or finding or arbitration award.’
[18]
What
the judgment of
Herholdt
v Nedbank Ltd (COSATU as Amicus Curiae)
[9]
means is simply that if the Commissioner ignored material evidence,
and the review court in considering this material evidence
so ignored
together with the case as a whole, believes that the arbitration
award outcome cannot still be reasonably sustained
on any basis, then
the award would be reviewable. The Court again in this case
specifically considered the
Sidumo
test,
and concluded as follows:
[10]
‘
In
summary the position regarding the review of CCMA award is this: A
review of a CCMA award is permissible if the defect in the
proceedings falls within one of the grounds in s 145(2)(a) of the
LRA. For a defect in the conduct of the proceedings to amount
to a
gross irregularity as contemplated by s 145(2)(a)(ii), the arbitrator
must have misconceived the nature of the inquiry or
arrived at an
unreasonable result. A result will only be unreasonable if it is one
that a reasonable arbitrator could not reach
on all the material that
was before the arbitrator. Material errors of fact, as well as the
weight and relevance to be attached
to the particular facts, are not
in and of themselves sufficient for an award to be set aside, but are
only of any consequence
if their effect is to render the outcome
unreasonable.’
[19]
I am now, in view of all these cases laying
the test for review, inclined to intensively conduct a review enquiry
in order for me
to be in a better position to determine if
irregularity, which warrants the award to be set aside, occurred. I
will then interrogate
the evidence holistically presented before the
Commissioner in order to establish if there is any irregularity. If,
in conducting
this enquiry, I find that there is no irregularity in
the first place, the matter is at an end, no further determinations
need
to be made, and the review must fail. However, should I find
that a material irregularity indeed exists, then the second step in
the review test follows, which is a determination as to whether if
this irregularity did not exist, this could reasonably lead
to a
different outcome in the arbitration proceedings. If I were to put it
differently, could another reasonable decision-maker,
in conducting
the arbitration and arriving at a determination, in the absence of
the irregularity and considering the evidence
and issues as a whole,
still reasonably arrive at the same outcome? In conducting this
second step of the review enquiry, the review
court needs not to
concern itself with the reasons the arbitrator has given for the
outcome he or she has arrived at, because the
issue of the
arbitrator’s own reasoning was already considered in deciding
whether an irregularity existed in the first part
of the test.
[20]
This
Court has emphasised that the decision in
Sidumo
and another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and others
(
Sidumo)
[11]
does
not mean “…
that
the grounds of review in section 145 of the Act are obliterated
[but]... that they are suffused by reasonableness”
.
[12]
In
Gold
Fields Mining SA (Pty) Ltd (Kloof Gold Mine) v Commission for
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and others (Gold Fields
)
[13]
it was stated that:
‘…
where
a gross irregularity in the proceedings is alleged, the enquiry is
not confined to whether the arbitrator misconceived the
nature of the
proceedings, but extends to whether the result was unreasonable, or
put another way, whether the decision that the
arbitrator arrived at
is one that falls in a band of decisions to which a reasonable
decision-maker could come on the available
material.’
[14]
Determination
[21]
In determining whether the Commissioner’s arbitration award
stands to be reviewed and set aside, I am inclined to simultaneously
consider the findings in the award, the evidence led at the
arbitration and the grounds for review so as to establish if the
outcome
thereof will lead me to conclude that any reasonable
Commissioner faced with the same facts as the second respondent would
have
arrived at the same findings.
Commissioner’s
personal observations and photos taken from inspection in loco
[22]
There is no question that there was an inspection
in loco
conducted by the parties at least on two occasions being during the
disciplinary hearing (the first) and again during arbitration
(the
second). The first inspection
in loco
is covered and dealt
with quite substantially during the arbitration proceedings. During
the arbitration proceedings, there was
a second inspection
in loco
conducted by the parties and it was during this process that the
Commissioner in fact made some personal notes and took photos.
This
is recorded in paragraph 63 of the Commissioner’s award and the
transcript itself.
[23]
I must commence by indicating that, it might be so that the applicant
is correct in its submissions that the Commissioner in his
award,
placed a significant reliance on personal observations and photos
taken during the second inspection
in
loco
and this is
despite the Commissioner’s omission to afford the parties the
necessary opportunity to comment on his observations
as well as his
photos. However, there is simply nothing that seems to portray any
material difference in the actual evidence led
as far as the first
inspection
in loco
is concerned. I smoothly deal with this.
[24]
Whilst Mathebula was extensively cross-examined on the observations
or findings from the first inspection
in loco
and he was
superficially very evasive in his answers, Botes on the other hand
was not part of the said inspection
in loco
thus could not
testify to it. Mathebula accepts that he was there at the first
inspection
in loco
and in fact, went into the vehicle so as to
establish if a person could be seen from the inside out but could not
remember if he
was the only person that went into this vehicle. He
also could not challenge pertinent versions put to him that Makgoe’s
representative also went in and the ER officer also went in. He also
could challenge that someone who was inside could not be seen
or it
could not be determined if the person is sleeping or not. During his
cross-examination, his credibility was brought into
serious question
and he answered the following, on pages 30, 31 and 62 of the
transcript:
‘
APPLICANT’S
REP: Can you tell the Commissioner why was that done?
MR
MATHEBULA: They wanted to see if they can be able to see someone
sleeping inside the vehicle.
APPLICANT’S
REP: So now, earlier on you answered the question. You said you went
into the vehicle there was nothing that was
communicated. Meaning you
are not sure whether they could see you inside the vehicle or not.
MR
MATHEBULA: I do not know, they did not say. They just said let’s
go back to the boardroom and then we went back to the
boardroom. So I
do not know.
APPLICANT’S
REP: Through you Commissioner, what will be your answer if I said it
was not proven that the person cannot be
seen inside the vehicle
sleeping because of the steel plates and the tinted windows, as you
do not know anything you were not told
anything
MR
MATHEBULA: Yes I was not told anything so I cannot answer something
that I was not given a feedback, we can see you, we cannot
see you.
MR
MATHEBULA: Hence I am saying I cannot deny that one but I cannot
recall. What I recall is I went inside the vehicle.
APPLICANT’S
REP: Okay since you cannot deny it, were you able to see the person
that was inside the vehicle while you were
outside?
MR
MATHEBULA: Hence I am saying I cannot recall if someone went in but
what I recall is I went inside the vehicle.
APPLICANT’S
REP: But are you aware that the purpose was to prove if the applicant
was sleeping or not inside the vehicle.
MR
MATHEBULA: Yes, that is why I went inside the vehicle.
APPLICANT’S
REP: So the question is that now that you said that you did this, you
were part of this demonstration, but you
cannot tell the Commissioner
if it was possible that you can see the person inside and you cannot
say that, according to your evidence.
MR
MATHEBULA: I am saying I cannot recall if someone went but you can
see if someone is sleeping inside.
MR
MATHEBULA: That is correct, noting was communicated to me. We went
inside to the boardroom.
APPLICANT’S
REP: Seeing that you do not deny that other people went in, you did
not see any need for you to see if the person
that is in can be
identifiable whether he is sleeping or not.
MR
MATHEBULA:
Ja, because they found what they were looking for, that
is why I did not question if they managed to see me or not
. I
went there, got inside the seat and then went back to the boardroom.’
[25]
Even if I were to accept that the Commissioner has committed an
irregularity by not affording the parties an opportunity to question
his photos, observations and findings during the second inspections
in loco
, which I do with a pinch of salt, Mathebula’s
cross-examination as far as the first inspection
in loco
is
tantamount to a fatal bullet fired towards the applicant’s
case. This ground for review stands to fail as it is not sustainable
on the evidence presented at the arbitration hearing. The point is
that, a person could not be seen from the inside out of this
vehicle
and this then brings Mathebula and Botes' evidence into serious
question whether they saw Makgoe sleeping, especially when
both
inspections
in loco
were conducted during the day versus their
encounter with Makgoe which took place at night. The Commissioner’s
omission does
not change anything; in fact, the essence of the
inspection
in loco
(being it first or second) was fully
covered during the arbitration hearing and this left the applicant’s
case with big holes
to fill. Put it differently, this Court may for
fairness purposes, set aside the second inspection
in loco
and
leave the first inspection
in loco
which once again, was
extensively covered in the arbitration proceedings, the applicant’s
case still does not become better.
Credibility
finding against Sibanye’s evidence
[26]
Both Mathebula and Botes were not credible witnesses and it is on
this basis that the applicant’s review stands to fail.
Makgoe’s
testimony at the arbitration resonates with someone who had reflected
on the events that had taken place and sought
to restructure the
events or fill up the open holes. In his evidence, Mathebula was
questioned quite extensively about why most
of his findings during
the night in question, were not contained in his written statement
and his responses were incredible in
that:
26.1
Mathebula was asked why Makgoe would wake up on the flash of a phone
and not wake up when blasted with the headlights of a vehicle
which
are bigger and brighter and he said he did not know if it was because
of the flashlight. This is inconsistent with the applicant’s
submission that Makgoe was awakened by the cellular phone flashlight;
26.2
Mathebula further conceded that it is not the applicant’s
procedure to flick the vehicle lights, hoot or call on the radio.
He
further conceded that the applicant has never communicated to its
employees that whilst this is not a standard procedure, they
must
nonetheless do it when working in a high risk area. This is in
addition to the fact that this piece of evidence was not contained
in
his statement.
26.3
Mathebula also accepted and conceded that his statement does not
contain the fact that Makgoe was approached from the front, they
parked parallel to him and when they tried to take pictures of him
sleeping, he woke up. His statement also does not contain the
fact
that he and Botes were there for about 5 minutes before Makgoe could
wake up.
26.4
Mathebula could not point out where he had indicated in his statement
that Makgoe had apologised to them simply because this pertinent
piece of evidence was, for unknown reasons, left out to the detriment
of Mathebula’s credibility.
This is exceptionally pertinent
to be left out
, especially because the applicant seems to be
placing a heavier reliance on this. He responded by stating “
I
did not write it in my statement
”. A person who tenders an
apology to an incident is a person who is naturally admitting guilt
hence this is extraordinarily
important;
26.5
Mathebula further conceded that upon finding Makgoe sleeping, this
was not reported in the pocket book of Makgoe despite this being
a
standard procedure. In his own words, “
I did not sign his
pocket book
”. He also did not record this in the site
occurrence book and his omission is in direct contravention of the
applicant’s
standard procedure. Once again, this corroborates
my view that Mathebula’s evidence at the arbitration hearing
was an attempt
to close the loopholes that were realised from the
disciplinary hearing;
26.6
The applicant accepts and in fact insists that Makgoe was working in
a high risk area however following all that had happened and
Mathebula alleging to have found Makgoe sleeping, the applicant
inadvertently omitted to submit the video footage covering the
high
risk area. This is despite the fact that the area is under 24/7
surveillance. In his response, Mathebula states that he did
not bring
the video footage because he had enough evidence. The question
remains, what evidence?
26.7
Mathebula could not show the Commissioner the online report about the
incident and this is the same determination made by the chairperson
of the disciplinary hearing that the applicant’s case was
significantly lacking material evidence – “
yes there
is no online
”. There were also no photos presented both at
the disciplinary hearing and the arbitration.
[27]
Botes on the other hand, did not testify much. In terms of the
Commissioner’s determination, Botes did not corroborate
Mathebula’s
evidence and I am inclined to concur with this
determination.
27.1
Whilst Mathebula estimated their distance to be about five metres,
Botes did not want to estimate the distance they were when they
first
saw Makgoe sleeping and remained connected to his refusal to
estimate;
27.2
Botes was not at the first inspection
in loco
and is in fact
not aware of same. He could not corroborate Mathebula as correctly
determined by the Commissioner.
27.3
Botes also testified on Makgoe having placed the vehicle in reverse
gear. This was never Mathebula’s evidence. This was,
just like
Mathebula, not contained in his statement;
27.4
Botes testified under cross-examination that it is not a rule to
write in the pocket book that Makgoe was found sleeping. This
is
contrary to Mathebula’s evidence which clearly stated that it
was a standard rule. This is a material contradiction as
far as I am
concerned;
27.5
Botes states that his statement was taken immediately after the
incident but could not explain why some of the pertinent and
particular
situations were not included;
27.6
Botes also could not answer as far as the occurrence book (OB) entry,
pocket book entry and online entry are concerned because
this was not
his responsibility. Mathebula on the other hand, conceded that all
these were not done;
27.7
Botes also could not indicate in his own statement where he had
written in terms of Makgoe having apologised and he did not see
the
need to do so. This is highly incredible and for once, he resonated
Mathebula. This however does not make the applicant’s
case any
better. I repeat, Makgoe’s apology, if at all, carries a lot of
weight to be omitted as it was.
Whether
the disciplinary chairperson doubted the applicant’s guilt
[28]
The Commissioner in his award finds that “
the chairperson
found the applicant guilty without analysing why the applicant was
guilty, it is clear that that the chairperson
doubted the applicant’s
guilt for some reasons I gave above for not finding the applicant
guilty. The chairman noted his
reasons for recommending a final
written warning. There is not enough evidence that can warrant a
guilty sanction. No online report.
No OB entry was made and no
photos. The fact that the chairman thought that there was
insufficient evidence vindicates my analysis
above. The dismissal was
substantively unfair
”. There is simply no acceptable reason
to interfere with this determination of the Commissioner as it is
correct in fact
and in law. The point is that the chairperson of the
disciplinary hearing himself did not find enough evidence to find
Makgoe guilty
of the facts presented before him thus is it not clear
how and why he actually arrived at the sanction of a final written
warning
when Makgoe should have been completely acquitted from the
charge. His sanction is clearly inconsistent with his determination
on the facts presented before him. This is in addition to the fact
that during the first inspection
in loco
, it could not be
established that a person could be seen from inside out the vehicle.
This is made worse by the fact that the incident
occurred at night.
[29]
It is also not clear why the applicant instead sought to substitute
the chairperson’s sanction. In its own submission, the
applicant indicates that upon review of the chairperson’s
determination a harsher sanction was opted for despite the
applicant’s
lack of evidence to prove that Makgoe was sleeping.
This piece of evidence was not vigorously presented and interrogated
before
the Commissioner and even then, it remains a destructive and
unanswered question which in my opinion, goes to the core of this
dismissal. The applicant cannot seek to uphold its disciplinary code
which prescribes a dismissal sanction for someone who was sleeping
on
duty when there is essentially no evidence to support this. Makgoe
should have been acquitted on the charge, period.
[30]
The Commissioner’s award is not reviewable as it does not
contain any irregularities and more specifically, any reasonable
presiding officer faced with the same facts such as those presented
before the second respondent would come to a conclusion such
as the
second respondent’s.
[31]
I must also indicate that, given the transcript which seems to
assertively expose the issues, the applicant should have been in
a
better position to judge for itself that the review application is
greatly unwarranted. It is on this basis that costs should
follow the
cause.
[32]
In the premise, I make the following order:
Order
1.
The applicant’s review is dismissed.
2.
The applicant must pay the costs of this review.
Ntsoane
AJ
Acting
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances:
For
the applicant:
Adv Victor Mndebele
Instructed
by:
Solomon
Holmes Attorneys Inc.
For
the respondent: Ms
Motlatso Molewa
Instructed
by:
Seleka
Attorneys
[1]
Act
66 of 1995, as amended.
[2]
[2007]
12 BLLR 1097
CC; (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC).
[3]
[2001]
BLLR 1011
(LAC); (2001) 22 ILJ 1603 (LAC).
[4]
[2009]
1 BLLR 1
(CC);
(2008)
29 ILJ 2461 (CC)
at
para 134.
[5]
[2008]
3 BLLR 197
(LAC);
(2008)
29 ILJ 964 (LAC) at para 96.
[6]
Ibid at para 97.
[7]
Ibid at para 102.
[8]
Ibid at para 103.
[9]
2013
(6) SA 224
(SCA);
[2013] 11 BLLR 1074
(SCA), as per
Cachalia and Wallis JJA.
[10]
Ibid at para 25.
[11]
[2007]
12 BLLR 1097 (CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC).
[12]
See
inter
alia
Fidelity
Cash Management Service v CCMA and others
[2008] 3 BLLR 197
(LAC); (2008) 29 ILJ 964 (LAC) at para 101.
[13]
[2007] ZALC 66
;
[2014]
1 BLLR 20
(LAC);
(2014)
35 ILJ 943 (LAC) with reference to
Sidumo
.
[14]
Ibid at para 14. With reference to s145(2)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the
LRA.