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[2024] ZALCJHB 172
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Public Servants Association of South Africa v Department of Employment and Labour and Another (J 616/22) [2024] ZALCJHB 172; (2024) 45 ILJ 1646 (LC) (2 May 2024)
The
Labour Court of South Africa, Johannesburg
Reportable
Case no: J 616/22
In the matter between:
PUBLIC SERVANTS
ASSOCIATION
OF SOUTH
AFRICA Applicant
and
DEPARTMENT OF
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR
First Respondent
REGISTRAR OF LABOUR
RELATIONS
Second
Respondent
Heard:
09 January 2024
Delivered:
02 May 2024
T
his
judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties
and legal representatives by email. The date and time
for hand-down
is deemed to be 02 May 2024
JUDGMENT
STEENKAMP, AJ
Introduction
[1]
Trade
unions are important for various reasons. Historically, trade unions
were instrumental in bringing about democracy in South
Africa. It is
for this reason that the predecessors to the Labour Relations Act
[1]
(LRA)
were mostly aimed at keeping trade unions at bay and stopped short of
banning them altogether.
[2]
In order to ensure that citizens could freely
associate, either politically or with any other organisation, such as
a trade union,
freedom of association was enshrined as a fundamental
human right in our Constitution.
[3]
Trade unions are further the custodians of
employee rights. Membership of a trade union is for most, the only
shield they have against
unfair treatment in the workplace. It is the
only power they have to try and ensure that they are subjected to
fair labour practices.
There can be no doubt that trade unions are
important and that they should be held to a high standard of
accountability.
[4]
I am certainly not suggesting that all trade
unions are created equal. There are trade unions who flout the lofty
ideals that their
constitutions impose upon them, the LRA requires,
and their members demand from them. The number of trade unions who do
more harm
than good in the workplace and do the most objectionable
disservice to their members is on the increase. But that is a subject
for another day.
[5]
In the current matter, this Court must determine
whether the Second Respondent erred in law and in fact in the
decision to refuse
registration of the Appellant’s amended
constitution.
The facts
[6]
The Appellant is a trade union, duly registered as
such in accordance with Sections 95 and 96(3) of the LRA. The
Appellant is further
compliant with Sections 95(5) and 95(6).
[7]
The Appellant has been a duly registered trade
union in South Africa since 1993.
[8]
Further, the Appellant has been incorporated as a
non-profit company since 1942, and the
status
quo
remains.
[9]
As
such, the Appellant’s dual registration (both under the LRA and
the Companies Act
[2]
and
its successor
[3]
) has subsisted
for approximately 29 years.
[10]
The Appellant is a party to the Public Service
Co-ordinating Bargaining Council, as well as other bargaining
councils in the public
service sector and is an affiliate of FEDUSA.
[11]
The Appellant contends that it is a genuine trade
union.
[12]
The Appellant’s constituency adopted a
resolution to amend its constitution in accordance with Section 91 of
the LRA, at the
Annual General Meeting (AGM) duly convened on 16 June
2021 and 20 September 2021.
[13]
On 1 December 2021, the Appellant applied to the
Second Respondent for the approval, registration and endorsement of
the amended
constitution in accordance with Section 101(3)(a) and
Section 101(3)(b) of the LRA.
[14]
The Second Respondent refused the application and
accordingly refused to approve and register the Appellant’s
amended constitution.
[15]
In a written decision dated 31 March 2022, the
Second Respondent stated that:
‘
In
light of this dual registration which PSA enjoys in terms of the LRA
and a Company in terms of the Companies Act which is in
direct
contrary
(sic)
to
the provisions of the LRA, this Office will not be in a position to
certify any application for amendment/replacement of the
Constitution
in terms of section 101 of the LRA with this dual registration under
the LRA and as a Company under the Companies
Act still in place.
You are hereby informed
that your application for replacement of the Constitution in terms of
the LRA is refused with effect from
31 March 2022.’
[16]
On 29 April 2022, the Appellant requested reasons
for the decision from the Second Respondent, which reasons were
furnished by the
Second Respondent on or about 13 May 2022.
[17]
The Second Respondent, in addition to quoting
content from the refusal notification of 31 March 2022, stated that:
‘
The
auditors further report that these annual financial statements have
been audited in compliance with the applicable requirements
of the
Companies Act, 71 of 2008
. It is the conclusion of this office that
the Union cannot be regarded to have complied with the LRA regarding
audits and submission
to this Office which is attributed to this dual
registration under the LRA and as a Company in terms of the
Companies
Act. The
audited financial statements submitted were not
audited in terms of 98 of the LRA.’
[18]
The Appellant subsequently launched the appeal
against the entire decision of the Second Respondent to this Court in
terms of
Section 111(3)
of the LRA, based on alleged errors of law
and errors of fact.
The applicable legal
framework
[19]
The
drafters of the LRA intended for the process of registration of a
trade union to be a simple one.
[4]
The
intention was that authorities should merely verify the fulfilment of
certain formalities. The Registrar would thus be obliged
to register
a trade union if all the statutory formalities are met.
[20]
The following excerpt from the explanatory
memorandum demonstrates the intention of the legislator at the time
of enactment of the
LRA:
‘
The
proposed system of registration is simple and quick and complies with
the right to freedom of association as guaranteed in the
Constitution
and by international labour standards.’
[21]
Consequently, Section 95(1) of the LRA permits any
trade union to apply to the Registrar –
‘…
for
registration if –
(a)
it has adopted a name that meets the requirements of subsection (4);
(b)
it has adopted a constitution that meets the requirements of
subsections (5) and (6);
(c)
it has an address in the Republic; and
(d)
it is independent.’
[22]
Section 95(2) of the LRA sets out when a trade
union is considered to be independent. The section is worded as
follows:
‘
A
trade union is independent if –
(a)
It is not under the direct or indirect control of
any employer or employer’s organisation; and
(b)
It is free of any interference or influence of any
kind from any employer or employer’s organisation.’
[23]
Whilst an employer is not defined in the LRA, an
‘
employers’ organisation
’
is defined in Section 213 as:
‘
any
number of employers associated together for the purpose, whether by
itself or with other purposes, of regulating relations between
employers and employees or trade unions.’
[24]
A ‘
trade union
’
is defined as:
‘
an
association of employees whose principal purpose is to regulate
relations between employees and employers, including any employers’
organisations.’
[25]
The Minister of Labour issues guidelines, in
consultation with Nedlac, that are to be applied by the Second
Respondent in determining
whether or not an applicant for
registration, such as a trade union, is a genuine trade union. The
Second Respondent may only register
a trade union if the Second
Respondent is satisfied that it is a “genuine” trade
union. A distinction is drawn between
existing trade unions and
applications for the registration of “new” trade unions.
[26]
The
guidelines applicable
in
casu
are
the guidelines published on 12 December 2018
[5]
(Guidelines).
[27]
Paragraph 3 of the Guidelines states the
following:
‘
In
order to determine whether an organisation is genuine, it will be
necessary for the Registrar to examine the actual operation
of the
organisation. In the case of an applicant, particular attention
will have to be paid to the manner in which the organisation
was
established and formed. In the case of an existing
organisation, attention will have to be paid to its actual activities
and functioning. In evaluating whether a trade union or
employer’s organisation is genuine, the Registrar must take
into account all relevant factors.’
[28]
The Guidelines further state in paragraph 6
thereof that:
‘
Therefore,
an organisation cannot be registered as a trade union or continue to
operate as a registered trade union unless –
(a)
It is in fact an association of employees;
(b)
The principal purpose of the activities is to
regulate relations between its members and their employers (or
employers’ organisation
representing those employers).
It will therefore be
necessary to raise and examine the actual process of forming a trade
union, its composition and membership
and the activities it
undertakes on behalf of its members….’
[29]
This is the nub of the Second Respondent’s
issue with the Appellant. The Second Respondent refused registration
of the Appellant’s
amended constitution, not based on the
content thereof, but on the fact that the Appellant is registered as
a non-profit company
under the
Companies Act, as
well as a trade
union under the LRA. From that fact, the Second Respondent then
deduced that the Appellant was not independent
and refused to
register the amended constitution of the Appellant.
[30]
Section 111(3)
of the LRA provides that any person
aggrieved by a decision of the Registrar may appeal against such
decision to this Court within
a specified time period, as the case
may be.
[31]
In
Staff
Association for the Motor & Related Industries v Motor Industry
Staff Association and another
[6]
(
Motor
Industry
)
,
the
Labour Appeal Court (LAC) said that matters such as the current must
be decided on a “
simple
legal principle and that they depend on the facts of each particular
case
”
.
[32]
The
LAC concluded that an appeal in terms of
Section 111(3)
of the LRA is
not an appeal in the narrow sense, nor is it a review. Instead, it is
an appeal in the broad sense and essentially
amounts to a re-hearing
and adjudication on the merits with or without additional evidence or
information.
[7]
[33]
That being said,
Motor
Industry
must be understood in its
proper context as it concerned an objecting party, a rival union, who
was not before the registrar when
the decision was taken. As such,
the procedure allows for such an objecting party to present evidence
before this Court after the
decision has already been taken. This is
however not carte blanche for the Second Respondent to proffer new
reasons why a decision
was taken, after the fact, when, as a matter
of fact, those were not the reasons upon which the decision was
taken.
[34]
I was
referred to the matters of
Natal
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
[8]
(
Endumeni
)
and
Cool
Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard and Another
[9]
(
Cool
Ideas
)
by
counsel for the Respondents in respect of the interpretation of
section 95(2)(a)
and (b) of the LRA, and it was argued that in
accordance with
Endumeni
and
Cool
Ideas
,
the ordinary grammatical meaning of the words used in a statute or
other statutory instrument must be ascribed to those words
in order
to give effect to objective process of interpretation.
[10]
Whilst
the legal principles set out in
Endumeni
and
Cool
Ideas
are
sound, it does not find strict application
in
casu
,
for reasons that I will deal with hereunder.
[35]
In
Municipal
& Allied Trade Union of SA v Crouse NO and others
[11]
(
Crouse
),
the late Steenkamp, J stated that:
‘
The
right to freedom of association must be interpreted generously and
the requirements of registration, insofar as they restrict
that
right, should be interpreted restrictively.’
[12]
[36]
In simple terms, this Court in
Crouse
,
prescribed a specific formula or method of interpretation germane to
sections 95
and
96
of the LRA, in that freedom of association must be
interpreted generously, and the requirements of registration be
interpreted
restrictively. In my view,
Endumeni
and
Cool Ideas
set out a general or over-arching method of
interpretation, it does not find application
in
casu
because a specific method for
interpretation of the aforesaid sections has previously been
determined by this Court.
[37]
The right to register a trade union flows directly
from the right to freedom of association which is enshrined in the
Constitution.
The words used in the LRA are deliberate and sections
95(2)(a) and (b) of the LRA are clear and concise. There is no
ambiguity.
Correctly construed, the content of section 95(2)(a) and
(b) of the LRA, read with the relevant paragraphs of the Guidelines
as
already quoted hereinbefore, do not support an interpretation that
would broaden the scope of “
employer
”
to include any entity.
[38]
The Second Respondent also stated that the
Appellant enjoys “
dual
registration
”
in direct
contravention of the statute. This is patently incorrect, as there is
no prohibition on registration as a separate non-profit
entity in the
LRA. What is prohibited is a trade union being registered as a front
to advance the interests of a particular employer
or employers’
organisation. There is a clear distinction.
[39]
The Second Respondent was misdirected in refusing
registration of the amended constitution of the Appellant.
Analysis
[40]
In
order to determine whether a trade union is genuine, the Second
Respondent is enjoined to undertake an examination of the “
actual
operation of the organisation
”
.
In undertaking such ‘examination’ in respect of an
existing trade union, the Second Respondent needs to pay ‘attention’
to the “
actual
activities and functioning
”
of
the organisation.
[13]
[41]
The Guidelines in effect set out what the Second
Respondent needs to take into account in determining whether or not
an existing
trade union continues to be a genuine trade union.
[42]
As already set out hereinabove, the Guidelines
make it clear that it is necessary for an examination of three issues
to determine
whether a trade union is genuine:
42.1
The actual process of formation thereof;
42.2
the composition and membership thereof; and
42.3
the activities undertaken on behalf of its members.
[43]
These three issues are dealt with in some detail
in the Guidelines. For the purposes of this judgment, the most
important factor
is dealt with in paragraph 16 thereof. Tellingly,
the paragraph is headed “
Independence
from employers
”
.
[44]
The Minister, in consultation with Nedlac,
intended the factors listed in paragraph 16(a) – (c) to be
considered by the Second
Respondent and/or his delegates, to
determine whether or not a trade union is independent (from
employers).
[45]
It is useful for the current purpose to quote this
paragraph:
‘
A
trade union may only be registered and continue to operate as a
registered trade union if it is independent. In terms of
section 95(2), a trade union is not independent if it is under the
direct or indirect control of any employer or employers’
organisation and is not free of interference or influence of any kind
from any employer or employers’ organisation. Factors
that
would indicate that a trade union is not independent are –
(a)
That any of the officials or office-bearers of a
trade union are also officials or office-bearers of an employers’
organisation;
(b)
That the trade union operates from the same
premises or shares facilities with an employers’ organisation;
(c)
An employer assisted with the formation of the
trade union or that the trade union operates as a “sweetheart”
union
(i.e. a trade union that exists to further the interests of the
employer or to undermine independent trade unions).’
[46]
The
Guidelines also, with reference to the requirement of section
95(5)(a) of the LRA which requires a trade union to be an association
not for gain, set out some of the factors that may indicate that a
trade union is operating for gain, or put differently, for the
enrichment of some individuals or as a front for a profit-making
business.
[14]
[47]
These factors include unrealistically high
salaries and allowances paid to the officials, office-bearers or
employees of the trade
union; the provision of interest-free or
low-interest loans to officials, office-bearers or employees of the
trade union, without
such loans being repaid; family members of
office-bearers or officials being employed by the trade union and
income earned by the
trade union not being used for the benefit of
the organisation and its members, but it is paid out to officials,
office-bearers
or employees.
[48]
The
Guidelines further set out what is not in and of itself indicative of
a lack of independence. These factors include that it
is not
inappropriate to pay competitive salaries to attract competent and
qualified officials or employees; that there may be circumstances
in
which the provision of loans on favourable conditions to officials,
office-bearers or employees may be permissible, that a trade
union
may have other sources of income, such as investments and that in
certain circumstances, a member may be required to make
a realistic
contribution to the cost associated with cases brought on their
behalf.
[15]
[49]
Finally,
the Guidelines state that affiliation with a trade union federation,
where the other members of such federation are genuine
trade unions,
is an indicator that the trade union is a genuine trade union.
[16]
[50]
There is nothing in the record which demonstrates
that the Second Respondent considered any of the factors set out in
the Guidelines,
or that any examination of the process of forming the
Appellant, its composition and membership and the activities it
undertakes
on behalf of its members took place. This is a significant
failure by the Second Respondent, as the decision was not taken based
on evidence after a proper process was followed. On this basis alone,
the appeal must succeed.
[51]
The Second Respondent took the decision to refuse
registration of the Appellant’s amended constitution on the
basis that the
Appellant is registered both as a non-profit entity in
terms of the
Companies Act, as
well as a trade union in terms of the
LRA. The Second Respondent deduced that the mere fact of the
Appellant’s incorporation
as a non-profit entity, demonstrates
a lack of independence from the direct or indirect control or
influence of an employer’s
organisation or “
any
entity for that matter and any interference or influence from such
entities
”
.
(Own emphasis)
[52]
The Second Respondent erred in this regard.
Section 95(2)(a)
and (b) of the LRA states that a trade union is
independent if it is not under the direct or indirect control of an
employer or
employer’s organisation, and it is free from
interference or influence from any employer or employer’s
organisation.
The use of the word “entity” by the Second
Respondent is unfortunate. The LRA specifically states that a trade
union
must be independent from the influence or control of an
employer, or employer’s organisation, and not an “entity”
as referred to by the Second Respondent.
[53]
Be that as it may, there is nothing in the record
which demonstrates that the Appellant may be under the control of an
employer,
or employers’ organisation, and consequently, there
is no evidence to support the Second Respondent’s view that the
Appellant lacked independence as set out in the LRA.
[54]
The LRA further contains no prohibition on
registration as a non-profit company in terms of the
Companies Act in
addition to registration as a trade union under the LRA. The Second
Respondent erred in concluding that the “
dual
registration
”
of the Appellant
contravenes legislation or the law.
[55]
The Second Respondent further erred in concluding
that the Appellant is not an independent or “genuine”
trade union
by virtue of the fact that the financial statements of
the Appellant were audited in accordance with the
Companies Act, and
not in accordance with the LRA. This was raised for the first time
when the Second Respondent issued reasons for the refusal to
register
the Appellant’s amended constitution.
[56]
The only evidence before the Second Respondent in
this regard is the note of the auditors on the financial statements
of the Appellant,
which states that the financial statements were
audited in compliance with the applicable legal requirements of the
Companies Act.
>
[57]
I agree with the submission of Mr Malan that the
audit standards detailed in
sections 29
and
30
of the
Companies Act
are
in line with standards set out in
sections 98(1)
and
98
(2) of the
LRA. The standard is the standard of generally accepted accounting
practices, principles and procedures. The LRA does
not set out more
onerous accounting standards than required by the
Companies Act, and
this belated “reason” for having refused registration of
the Appellant’s constitution equally does not pass muster.
[58]
The appeal must succeed on all scores. The Second
Respondent erred in refusing to register the amended constitution of
the Appellant,
both in respect of issues of fact and issues of law.
Conclusion
[59]
As I already stated, the appeal must succeed.
[60]
The only remaining issue is the issue of costs.
[61]
The
LRA prescribes factors the Court should consider in making an award
for costs.
[17]
These
include whether the matter ought to have been referred to statutory
arbitration, and if so, whether the referral to court
occasioned
additional costs; the conduct of the parties in proceeding with, or
defending the matter before court and the conduct
of the parties
during the proceedings before court.
[62]
In
Zungu v
Premier of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal and Others
[18]
,
the
Apex Court said the following:
‘
The
rule of practice that costs follow the result does not apply in
Labour Court matters. In
Dorkin
,
Zondo JP explained the reason for the departure as follows:
‘
The
rule of practice that costs follow the result does not govern the
making of orders of costs in this Court. The relevant statutory
provision is to the effect that orders of costs in this Court are to
be made in accordance with the requirements of the law and
fairness.
And the norm ought to be that costs orders are not made unless the
requirements are met. In making decisions on costs
orders this Court
should seek to strike a fair balance between on the one hand, not
unduly discouraging workers, employers, unions
and employers’
organisations from approaching the Labour Court and this Court to
have their disputes dealt with, and, on
the other, allowing those
parties to bring to the Labour Court and this Court frivolous cases
that should not be brought to Court.’
[19]
[63]
In
Union
for Police Security and Corrections Organisation v South African
Custodial Management (Pty) Ltd and Others
[20]
,
the
Apex Court said:
‘
[33]
These principles find expression in
section 162
of the LRA, which
rejects the ordinary rule of litigation that costs should follow the
result in favour of an approach based on
“law and fairness”.
When we pay heed to this fairness standard, we do so because we are
obliged by the LRA and the
above constitutional imperatives. Hence, I
repeat: when making costs orders in labour matters, courts are
enjoined to apply the
fairness standard in the LRA as a matter of
constitutional and statutory obligation.
[34]
What, then, are the implications of what I have said in this
judgment? Do the principles I have
enunciated dictate that costs can
never be ordered against a party in labour matters? I think it is
clear from this Court’s
jurisprudence that the answer to this
question is a resounding “no”. This Court has previously
affirmed the principle
that costs are discretionary to the court
adjudicating a matter. What applies no differently to labour matters.
But, like all exercises
of discretion, a court exercising its
discretion to award costs must do so judicially.
[35]
In the labour context, the judicial exercise of a court’s
discretion to award costs requires,
at the very least, that the court
must do two things. First, it must give reasons for doing so and must
account for its departure
from the ordinary rule that costs should
not be ordered. Second, it must apply its mind to the dictates of the
fairness standard
in
section 162
, and the constitutional and
statutory imperatives that underpin it. Where a court fails to do so,
it commits an error of law and
thus misdirects itself. This Court
explained this in
Long
:
“
[W]hen
making an adverse costs order in a labour matter, a presiding officer
is required to consider the principle of fairness and
have due regard
to the conduct of the parties. This, the Labour Court failed to do.
There is no reasoning on the question of costs
beyond an indication
that costs are to follow the result. This is a misdirection of law
and it follows that the Labour Court’s
discretion in respect of
costs was not judicially exercised and must be set aside.”
[36]
An instructive approach to a court’s exercise of its discretion
on the question of costs
can be found in the Labour Appeal Court’s
decision in
Bester
. In determining the question of costs in
that case, the Court held:
“
The
appellant seeks a costs order. The question falls to be decided with
reference to law and equity. As an individual, bearing
her own costs
without the help of a trade union, it is appropriate to give
consideration thereto, even though the usual approach
is that costs
do not simply follow the result. It seems to us that fairness
dictates that she be granted costs in the review and
in the appeal
because of the burden such costs would be on an individual. Moreover,
the appellant is a single parent with three
children.
In defending the award in
the review proceedings and in prosecuting the appeal, the appellant
has represented herself. To the extent
that she has incurred legal
costs, she can recover them, including, in principle, the value of
her own legal expertise, as a legal
practitioner, devoted to the
case. It is unnecessary to specify what these costs might include.
Thus, the appropriate costs order
is one that is subject to taxation
in the absence of an agreement between the parties about a sum.”
(Footnotes omitted.)
[37]
Here, the Labour Appeal Court demonstrated its cognisance of the
correct point of departure when
dealing with costs in labour matters,
being
Zungu
, and provided detailed reasons for its costs
award. This approach to costs is an example of a court that has
applied its mind to
the constitutional and statutory principles
enunciated in this Court’s jurisprudence, which are affirmed in
this judgment…’
[64]
I am convinced that this is one of those matters
where costs should follow the result.
[65]
The Appellant has had to approach this Court on
appeal as contemplated in
section 111(3)
of the LRA to vindicate its
rights. The fact that the Second Respondent has no genuine
justification for the refusal to register
the Appellant’s
amended constitution is a factor that tips the scales in favour of
allowing the Appellant its legal costs.
[66]
The
words of Birch Bayh
[21]
ring
true
in
casu
.
He famously said:
“
You
shouldn’t have to sue somebody to get justice. It ought to come
through administrative process”
.
[67]
When the administrative process fails you, it
unfortunately becomes necessary to approach the Court to right the
wrongs of justice
denied, but that justice then comes at a cost,
sounding both in money and time.
[68]
The Second Respondent made a decision which is not
justifiable on any construction of the facts and is completely
incorrect in law.
The Second Respondent, being the Registrar of
Labour Relations, is not a lay litigant. A conscious and calculated
decision was
made to oppose the Appeal, with the parties each seeking
cost against the other.
[69]
It would be unfair to saddle the Appellant with
costs when it had no choice but to approach this Court for relief, in
circumstances
where there was no genuine reason to refuse
registration of the Appellant’s amended constitution.
[70]
In the premises, I make the following order:
Order
1.
The
Appeal is upheld;
2.
The
Second Respondent is ordered to approve and register the Appellant’s
amendments to its constitution in terms of
Section 101(3)(a)
of the
LRA within 14 (fourteen) days from the date of this order and to send
the Appellant a copy of the resolution endorsed by
the Second
Respondent, certifying that the amendments have been registered in
terms of
section 101(3)(b)
of the LRA within 10 (ten) days from the
date upon which the amendments are approved and registered;
3.
The
Respondents are ordered to pay the costs of this appeal on a
party-and-party scale, which costs include the costs occasioned
by
the employment of counsel, where so employed.
_______________________
L Steenkamp
Acting Judge of the
Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances:
For the Applicant:
Advocate L M Malan SC
Instructed by:
Bowman
Gilfillan Inc. Attorneys
For the
Respondent: Advocate E B Ndebele
Instructed
by:
The State Attorney
[1]
Act
66 of 1995, as amended.
[2]
Act 61 of 1973.
[3]
Companies
Act
71 of 2008
.
[4]
Explanatory memorandum
(1995) 16 ILJ 278 at p 324.
[5]
Government Gazette No
42121 of 19 December 2018.
[6]
[1999]
ZALAC 13
;
(1999)
20 ILJ 2552 (LAC) at para 38.
[7]
Ibid at paras 20 –
22.
[8]
[2012]
ZASCA 13
;
2012
(4) SA 593 (SCA).
[9]
[2014]
ZACC 16;
2014
(4) SA 474 (CC).
[10]
Endumeni
at para 18.
[11]
[2015]
ZALCCT 56;
(2015)
36 ILJ 3122 (LC).
[12]
Ibid
at para 23.
[13]
Paragraph 3 of the
Guidelines ibid.
[14]
Paragraph 18(a) –
(d) of the Guidelines.
[15]
Paragraphs 19 – 21
of the Guidelines ibid.
[16]
Paragraph 22 of the
Guidelines ibid.
[17]
See:
section 162(2)(a)
and (b)(i) and (ii) of the LRA.
[18]
[2018]
ZACC 1
; (2018) 39 ILJ 523 (CC) at para 24.
[19]
See also:
Member
of the Executive Council for Finance, KwaZulu-Natal v Wentworth
Dorkin N.O.
[2007]
ZALAC 41
; (2008) 29 ILJ 1707 (LAC) at para 19.
[20]
[2021]
ZACC 26
;
2021 (11) BCLR 1249
(CC) at paras 33 – 37.
[21]
B
Bayh, “
Personal
Insights and Experiences regarding the passage of Title IX, 55 Clev.
St. L. Rev. 463
”
(2007)
Lawyer and American Democrat Senator (1963 – 1981), the author
of Title IX, the landmark law that banned discrimination
against
women in college admission and sports in the USA.