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[2024] ZALCJHB 135
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G4S Secure Solutions (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Chetty and Another (J1328/23) [2024] ZALCJHB 135 (22 March 2024)
FLYNOTES:
.
LABOUR
– Restraint – Protectable interest – Employee
leaving applicant for competitor in security industry
–
Applicant arguing that protectable interest is its confidential
and proprietary information and consumer connections
–
Information that employee was exposed to, without him poaching
actively, would not lead to competitive gain for competitor
–
Employee established that he does not possess any trade secrets or
hold exclusive customer connections – Absence
of protectable
interests renders enforcement of restraint, with its duration of
12 months and nationwide scope, unreasonable
and incompatible with
public policy – Application dismissed.
THE LABOUR COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Reportable
case No: j1328/23
In the matter between
G4S SECURE SOLUTIONS
(SA) (PTY) LTD
Applicant
and
JUSTIN CORNELIUS
CHETTY
First
Respondent
BIDVEST PROTEA COIN
(PTY) LTD
Second
Respondent
Heard:
27 October 2023
Delivered:
22 March 2024
Summary:
Urgent application – The Applicant amongst others, seeks a
final order (interdict) enforcing the
terms of a restraint of trade
and confidentiality clauses contained in an employment agreement
against a former employee.
This judgment was handed
down electronically and was circulated to the legal representatives
of the parties. The date and time for
hand down is deemed to be
22 March 2024, 10:00 am.
JUDGMENT
MORGAN, AJ
Introduction
[1] This
matter came as an urgent application, wherein the Applicant (G4S
Secure)
inter alia
, seeks a final order (interdict) enforcing
the terms of a restraint of trade and confidentiality clauses
contained in the employment
agreement between G4S Secure and the
First Respondent (Mr Chetty). The contractual undertakings sought to
be enforced by G4S Secure
against Mr Chetty were given in favour of
G4S Secure upon the conclusion of the employment agreement.
[2] Upon
the termination of the employment agreement with G4S Secure, Mr
Chetty joined the employ of the
Second Respondent (Bidvest Coin) as a
Regional General Manager. G4S Secure learnt of his new employment
with Bidvest Coin and brought
this urgent application.
[3] The
second respondent, Bidvest Coin, delivered its notice to abide by the
decision of this Court and
thus did not participate in the
proceedings of this case.
Relevant background
facts
[4] The
common cause facts are set out
infra
.
4.1. On
11 March 2019, Mr Chetty entered into an employment agreement with
G4S Secure in the position of
Regional Technology Manager, which
contained a restraint of trade and confidentiality clauses.
4.2. Mr
Chetty formally resigned from the position of Regional Technology
Manager on 30 November 2021 and
transferred to Durban in the position
of Business Development Manager on 6 December 2021.
4.3. Mr
Chetty resigned from his employment with G4S Secure on 31 July 2023,
effective 31 August 2023.
4.4. The
separation or termination of the contractual employment relationship
between Mr Chetty and G4S Secure
was mutually agreed to and amicable.
4.5. Mr
Chetty had not performed any adverse act or conducted himself in bad
faith against G4S Secure to
give G4S Secure the impression or
suspicion that he was to breach the restraint of trade and
confidentiality clauses of the agreement
sought to be enforced by
either approaching or soliciting G4S Secure’s clients. In other
words, he had not been in breach
of the terms nor had G4S Secure
suffered any actual or perceived harm in their operations or
profitability after he joined Bidvest
Coin nor have they proven to
have lost the clients with whom Mr Chetty was working with since he
left G4S Secure’s employ
to the Bidvest Coin.
4.6. Bidvest
Coin is a competitor of G4S Secure and both are arguably the biggest
role players in their specialised
and high-risk industry. Both
entities specialise in the provision of security products, services,
and integrated cash management
solutions.
[5] In
the main, what G4S Secure simply seeks in these proceedings is to
prevent the possibility of losing
the clients that Mr Chetty worked
with and seeks to enforce the restraint of trade during the year
which Mr Chetty would have been
restrained from working with any of
its competitors within the Republic of South Africa.
[6] Mr
Chetty argues that he was not privy to any of G4S Secure’s
confidential information nor was
he in a position to poach or take
away G4S Secure’s customers. Further that G4S Secure has failed
to demonstrate in its papers
that it has any proprietary interests
worthy of protection in the context, role and occupation Mr Chetty
held. He further contends
that his predecessor who held the exact
position at G4S prior to joining Bidvest Coin was able to join
Bidvest Coin without G4S
enforcing the same contractual terms of
restraint of trade sought to be enforced in this application
notwithstanding that they
occupied the same position. This argument
seems to me as if Mr Chetty contends that G4S unfairly discriminated
against him and
did not exercise its discretion consistently.
Urgency
[7]
The
parties came to this Court on an urgent basis. I heard the
Applicant’s
case
on urgency and found
that they had satisfied the test of urgency. However, the complexity
of the substantive issues in this matter
warranted proper
consideration, hence judgment was reserved.
The relevant legal
principles
[8] In
the broadest terms, South African contract law recognises restraints
of trade clauses within contracts
that limit a party's ability to
compete with another after the contract terminates. While generally
upheld under the principle
of
pacta sunt servanda
(agreements
must be kept), enforceability hinges on reasonableness. Courts apply
a proportionality test, balancing the employer's
legitimate
protectable interests, such as confidential information or client
relationships, against the employee's right to earn
a livelihood. The
restraint's geographical scope and duration must be narrowly tailored
to the specific interest protected, ensuring
it is no wider than
necessary.
[9]
The
Labour Appeal Court in
Bonfiglioli
SA (Pty) Ltd v Panaino
[1]
stated:
‘
The restraint
agreement is therefore geared at protecting the employer's
proprietary interest after the employee has left the employer's
employment. In
Reeves
& another v Marfield Insurance Brokers CC & another
,
the object of a restraint of trade term was described as follows:
“
The legitimate
object of a restraint is to protect the employer's goodwill and
customer connections (or trade secrets) and the restraint
accordingly
remains effective for a specified period (which must be reasonable)
after the employment relationship has come to an
end...”’
[10]
The
aim of a restraint of trade clause is to protect the economic
interests of an employer after an employment contract has been
terminated. These economic interests can range from trade secrets,
confidential information, client lists and strategic business
plans.
[2]
[11]
The
Appellate Division in
Magna
Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis
[3]
held that a restraint of
trade provision is valid in principle and will be enforceable,
provided that it is not contrary or offensive
to public policy and
thus unreasonable.
[4]
If such a
clause is found to be contrary to public policy, it would be
unenforceable (not void).
[12]
Thus,
at the heart of restraint of trade are two pivotal considerations:
freedom of trade and the sanctity of contract. The former,
freedom of
trade, is constitutionally protected under section 22 of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Constitution).
[5]
The sanctity of contract, flowing from the principle of
pacta
sunt servanda
(agreements,
freely and voluntarily concluded, must be honoured), is a “
profoundly
moral principle, on which the coherence of any society relies
”
.
[6]
[13]
The
majority of the Constitutional Court in
Barkhuizen
v Napier
[7]
recognised that the
principle of
pacta
sunt servanda
gives
effect to the “
central
constitutional values of freedom and dignity
”
.
[8]
This is because the principle —
‘
gives effect to
the central constitutional values of freedom and dignity.
Self-autonomy, or the ability to regulate one’s
own affairs,
even to one’s own detriment, is the very essence of freedom and
a vital part of dignity.’
[14]
Recently,
in
Beadica
231 CC and Others v Trustees for the time being of the Oregon Trust
and Others
[9]
,
the majority of the Constitutional Court held that “
[p]acta
sunt servanda is thus not a relic of our pre-constitutional common
law. It continues to play a crucial role in the judicial
control of
contracts through the instrument of public policy, as it gives
expression to central constitutional values
”
.
[10]
It further held:
‘
The fulfilment of
many of the rights [and] promises made by our Constitution depends on
sound and continued economic development
of our country. Certainty in
contractual relations fosters a fertile environment for the
advancement of constitutional rights.
The protection of the sanctity
of contracts is thus essential to the achievement of the
constitutional vision of our society. Indeed,
our constitutional
project will be imperilled if courts denude the principle of
pacta
sunt servanda
.’
[11]
[15]
Thus,
restraint of trade requires a delicate balance between several
constitutionally protected interests. Without more, a restraint
of
trade does not infringe on the constitutional right to freedom of
trade.
[12]
This is because
“[
t]he
Constitution does not take such a meddlesome interest in the private
affairs of individuals that it would seek, as a matter
of policy, to
protect them against their own foolhardy or rash decisions
”
.
[13]
[16]
While
individuals generally enjoy the right to freely engage in business,
the principle of upholding agreements (that is, freedom
of contract)
takes precedence as a core societal value. Public policy, as defined
by the Constitution and its fundamental principles,
prioritises the
sanctity of contracts.
[14]
However, this is not absolute. If enforcing a specific restraint of
trade clause from a contract would be deemed unfair or unreasonably
restrictive, it might not be upheld despite initial agreement. The
burden of demonstrating that enforcing the restraint is against
public policy lies with the party challenging the clause, typically
the employee.
[15]
[17]
Determining
the reasonableness of a restraint of trade often involves a
three-pronged analysis: the nature of the activity being
restricted,
the geographic scope of the restriction and the duration of the
restriction. All three factors are considered together
to assess
whether the clause is reasonable.
[16]
[18]
This
Court in
A
J Charnaud & Co (Pty) Ltd v van der Merwe and Others
[17]
set out the approach to
be taken in restraint of trade cases:
‘
In short, the
logical sequence that applies in the case of an employer (the
applicant) seeking to enforce a restraint against an
employee, is
firstly to prove the existence of a restraint obligation that applies
to the employee. Secondly, if a restraint obligation
is shown to
exist, the employer must prove that the employee acted in breach of
the restraint obligation imposed by the restraint.
Finally, once the
breach is shown to exist, the determination then turns to whether the
facts, considered as a whole, show that
the enforcement of the
restraint would be reasonable in the circumstances.’
[19]
Determining
the enforceability of a restraint of trade in South Africa hinges on
a multi-faceted analysis established in the landmark
case of
Basson
v Chilwan and Others
[18]
(
Basson
).
This analysis comprises the following questions: (a) Does the
employer have a legitimate interest needing protection, like
confidential information? (b) Does the employee's post-employment
activity pose a potential threat to this interest? (c) When weighing
these interests, does the employer's need for protection outweigh the
employee's right to work freely in their chosen field, considering
their potential economic hardship? (d) Beyond the specific
employer-employee relationship, are there broader public policy
concerns
that influence the decision? (e) Lastly, as set out in
Kwik
Kopy (SA) (Pty) Ltd v van Haarlem and Another
[19]
,
does the restraint extend beyond what is strictly necessary to
safeguard the employer's interest?
[20]
In
the context of restraints of trade, a concept known as "dual
onus" applies. This means the burden of proof shifts between
parties during the legal process. Initially, the applicant (usually
seeking enforcement) must demonstrate three things: the existence
of
a restraint clause in the contract, that the clause applies to the
respondent (typically challenged by the restraint), and that
the
respondent has breached the terms of the clause. Once these elements
are established, the burden shifts to the respondent to
prove why
enforcing the restraint would be unreasonable. This can involve
arguments based on the restraint being excessively restrictive,
geographically or temporally broader than necessary, or lacking a
legitimate reason for enforcement (e.g. no protectable interest
on
the employer's side). This two-stage approach ensures a balanced
evaluation, allowing both parties to present their arguments
within
the legal framework.
[20]
[21]
When
an employer seeks to enforce a restraint of trade, they generally
only need to present the agreement and demonstrate a breach
of its
terms, as seen in the case of
New
Justfun Group (Pty) Limited v Turner and others
[21]
(
New
Justfun
).
Regarding customer connections, the court held that the employer only
needs to show that such connections exist and have the
potential to
be exploited by the former employee.
[22]
[22]
Similarly,
for confidential information, the burden shifts to the employee to
prove they lacked access to such information or never
acquired
significant knowledge of the employer's customers during their
employment. The employer only needs to establish the existence
of
secret information accessible to the employee, theoretically allowing
them to share it with a new employer. Ultimately, the
responsibility
falls on the employee to demonstrate they did not possess this
information or substantial customer knowledge, balancing
the burden
of proof in such cases.
[23]
[23] I
will now apply the five elements identified above in turn below.
Application of the law
Protectable
Interest
[24] In
the first stage of the
Basson
test, which determines the
enforceability of a restraint of trade, two key types of proprietary
interests qualify for protection:
24.1. Trade
Secrets: This encompasses any confidential information that benefits
the business and, if disclosed
to a competitor, could grant them an
unfair advantage. These secrets may include formulas, customer lists,
or sensitive marketing
strategies.
24.2. Client/Consumer
Connections: This refers to the established relationships with
customers, potential
customers, suppliers, and other parties that
contribute to the overall goodwill of the business. These connections
are considered
intangible assets and deserve protection from unfair
exploitation by former employees.
[25] Whether
information constitutes a trade secret is a factual question. For
information to be confidential
it must be –
25.1. capable
of application in trade or industry, that is useful and not be public
knowledge and property;
25.2. known
only to a restricted number of people or a closed circle; and of
economic value to the person
seeking to protect it.
[26]
The
Labour Court in
Massmart
Holdings v Vieira and another
[24]
asseverated that a
restraint of trade will be unreasonable where there is no proprietary
interest of the party seeking to enforce
this restraint. As
highlighted in
Continuous
Oxygen Suppliers (Pty) Ltd t/a Vital Aire v Meintjies and
another
[25]
,
a restraint of trade is valid and enforceable where there is a
proprietary interest that justifies protection.
[26]
A restraint would be an enforceable restriction and limitation on the
trade of an employee who had access to the company’s
customers
and clients and could use such relations with the customers to
advantage a competitor to the detriment of the company.
[27]
[27] G4S
Secure, argues the protectable interest is both, its confidential and
proprietary information and
consumer connections. In the first
instance, G4S Secure alleges that Mr Chetty
had access
to
the protectable interest in its confidential and proprietary
information that has economic value to it. Further that Mr Chetty
was
exposed
to confidential and proprietary information during his
employment with G4S Secure. In its founding affidavit, the
information is
listed as follows:
‘
47.1.
Information in relation to the technology solutions offered by G4S to
its customers including the components of such
solutions, the way in
which its solutions are structured, the costing of its solutions
including the individual cost elements such
as labour costs,
technology costs and the gross margin charged by G4S and the customer
base.
47.2.
Information in relation to the existing customers of G4S including
their requirements, the solutions provided
to them and the cost of
such solutions both on the technology side and the manned guarding
and access control side.
47.3. The
workforce management system offered by G4S to its customers including
the components of such solutions, the
way in which its solutions are
structured, the costing of its solutions including the individual cos
elements such as labour costs,
technology costs and the gross margin
charged by G4S and the customer base.
47.4.
Information in relation to new and potential business opportunities
being pursued by G4S.
47.5.
Information of the strengths and weaknesses of the G4S product
solution and offering, including pricing and discounts.
47.6.
Information in relation to G4S's staff complement as well as their
remuneration.
47.7. The
sales and business development strategies of G4S in respect of all of
its complete product and service offering.
47.8.
Information relating to G4S suppliers, the on-boarding process,
criteria to be a supplier of G4S, costing and
the commercial terms
that find application to suppliers.’
[28] G4S
Secure further asserts that this information would be useful in the
hands of a competitor of G4S
Secure, such as Bidvest Coin. This is
because the information is not public knowledge as it is not in the
public domain and is
instead industry specific. It also submits that
the security services market in which G4S Secure and Bidvest Coin
operate is highly
competitive. It is alleged that this information
would assist Bidvest Coin in competing with G4S Secure and allow it
to lure and
win over customers, thus financially harming G4S Secure
and its business.
[29] In
the second instance, G4S Secure contends that Mr Chetty
had
developed a relationship with various clients and customers
of
G4S Secure. To this end, it is alleged that these customers felt
comfortable enough to share confidential information with Mr
Chetty
pertaining to their security needs. He was the customers’ first
point of contact. In G4S Secure’s words:
‘
Armed with these
customer relationships. Mr Chetty would be in a position to approach
the existing and potential customers of G4S
to persuade them to place
their business with Bidvest Coin instead of G4S. He is also able to
target existing and maturing opportunities
for G4S and to divert them
away from G4S to Bidvest Coin.’
[30] Mr
Chetty argues that G4S Secure has failed to prove that he was exposed
to any confidential information.
He alleges that he was not placed in
possession of any formulae or designs or any special knowledge that
would amount to an interest
worthy of protection. Thus, Mr Chetty
avers that G4S Secure does not satisfy the requirements of
confidentiality. He argues that
while he knows the workforce
management system, called
XTime
, he does not have any
knowledge of how to reproduce it and does not sell it. He
acknowledges that while Bidvest Coin has a similar
system, his
position does not expose him to it and he does not work on it and
does not sell it either.
[31]
Mr
Chetty also alleges that due to G4S Secure’s business largely
being based on a formal tender process, it has not been proven
that
he automatically carries the customers with him in his pocket, as set
out in
Rawlins
v Caravantruck (Pty) Ltd
.
[28]
He argues that G4S Secure’s argument in this regard is a fiddle
and that G4S Secure’s argument turns on the view that
Mr Chetty
“would be” in a position to persuade these customers to
place their business with Bidvest Coin.
[32] Arguing
that there is no argument made out in relation to the customer list,
Mr Chetty asserts that
G4S Secure has not made a case that his
personality, the frequency and duration of his contact with its
customers, the place of
such contact, the nature of his relationship
with buyers and his knowledge of its customer's businesses was such
that he could
probably induce them to leave the applicant.
[33] There
is merit to Mr Chetty’s argument. G4S Secure has not proven
that it has a protectable interest,
worthy of protection against Mr
Chetty. The factual concession made by G4S Secure that the
information that Mr Chetty was exposed
on its own, without Mr Chetty
poaching actively approaching the clients would not lead to a
competitive gain for Bidvest.
[34] In
New Justfun
, this Court perspicuously held:
‘
Proprietary
interests that are legitimately capable of protection by a restraint
agreement extend both to confidential matters which
are useful for
the carrying on of the business and which could be used by a
competitor, if disclosed, to gain a relative competitive
advantage,
and to relationships with customers, potential customers, suppliers
and others that go to make up what is referred to
as the ‘trade
connection’ of the business. The second kind of proprietary
interest capable of protection is that which
comprises confidential
matter useful for the carrying on of the business, and which could be
used by a competitor, if disclosed,
to gain a relative comparative
advantage. These are referred to as ‘trade secrets…’
[29]
[35] Thus,
if there is no protectable interest that “
could be used by a
competitor, if disclosed, to gain a relative competitive advantage
”,
then the restraint of trade is not enforceable, and it is
unreasonable. G4S Secure has shown no competitive advantage that
would directly arise from the knowledge that Mr Chetty allegedly
has, outside of broad, unsubstantiated claims that the security
industry is highly competitive. This is unhelpful.
[36]
As
Davis,
J in
Mozart
Ice Cream Classic Franchises (Pty) Ltd v Davidoff and Another
[30]
held, citing Olivier, AJ
in
Viamedia
(Pty) Ltd v Sessa
,
[31]
a subjective view that information is confidential will simply not
suffice. The Court stated:
‘
Information does
not become confidential, and a process or practice does not become
secret merely because Viamedia contends that
they do – or,
perhaps, even if Mr Sessa subjectively believed them to be so. It
does not suffice for Viamedia to say that
it has confidential
information or trade secrets.
It
must set out what they are and when and how Mr Sessa was exposed to
them. It must set up the facts from which the conclusion
could be
drawn that something is indeed confidential or secret.
’
[37]
The
Court in
Esquire
System Technology (Pty) Ltd t/a Esquire Technologies v Cronjé
and Another
[32]
held that the question of whether there is a protected interest must
be evinced by the facts and applying the well-known principles
for
final relief in motion proceedings as set out in
Plascon-Evans
Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
.
[33]
[38] Having
carefully considered the evidence presented by both parties in their
respective affidavits, I
find that even though G4S Secure could have
been believed to possesses protectable interests (which I find
doesn’t), Mr Chetty
has established that he does not currently
possess any trade secrets or hold exclusive customer connections that
could potentially
prejudice these interests.
[39] Therefore,
in light of Mr Chetty’s lack of access to confidential
information and demonstrably
non-exclusive customer relationships, I
conclude that enforcing a restraint of trade in this instance would
not be warranted, as
it would not serve the legitimate purpose of
safeguarding G4S Secure's proprietary interests.
[40]
The
Supreme Court of Appeal in
Reddy
v Siemens Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd
[34]
(
Reddy
)
the Court held that:
‘
A court must make
a value judgment with two principal policy considerations in mind in
determining the reasonableness of a restraint.
The first is that the
public interest requires that parties should comply with their
contractual obligations, a notion expressed
by the maxim
pacta
servanda
sunt
.
The second is that all persons should in the interests of society be
productive and be permitted to engage in trade and commerce
or the
professions. Both considerations reflect not only common-law but also
constitutional values. Contractual autonomy is part
of freedom
informing the constitutional value of dignity, and it is by entering
into contracts that an individual takes part in
economic life. In
this sense freedom to contract is an integral part of the fundamental
right referred to in s[ection] 22 [of the
Constitution]. Section 22
of the Constitution guarantees ‘[e]very citizen ... the right
to choose their trade, occupation
or profession freely’
reflecting the closeness of the relationship between the freedom to
choose a vocation and the nature
of a society based on human dignity
as contemplated by the Constitution. It is also an incident of the
right to property to the
extent that s 25 protects the acquisition,
use, enjoyment and exploitation of property, and of the fundamental
rights in respect
of freedom of association (s 18), labour relations
(s 23) and cultural, religious and linguistic communities (s 31).’
[41] The
principles of contractual freedom and the right to freely engage in
trade are enshrined in South
African law, as recognised by the
Supreme Court of Appeal in
Reddy
. Balancing these principles
with the need to protect legitimate proprietary interests
necessitates a careful assessment. In this
case, the absence of
protectable interests renders enforcement of the restraint of trade
clause, with its duration of 12 months
and nationwide scope,
unreasonable and incompatible with public policy.
[42] In
the circumstances, I make the following order:
Order
1. The
application is dismissed with costs.
L.M Morgan
Acting Judge of the
Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances
For the
Applicant:
Advocate P.
Bosman
Instructed
by:
Eversheds
Sutherland (SA) INC
For the First
Respondent:
Advocate K. Naidoo
Instructed
by:
Mikhail Mayet
Attorneys
For the Second
Respondent: No appearance, notice to
abide delivered.
[1]
[2014] ZALAC 59
; (2015) 36 ILJ 947 (LAC) at para 24.
[2]
See:
Reeves
and another v Marfield Insurance Brokers CC and another
[1996] ZASCA 39
;
1996
(3) SA 766
(A) and
Reddy
v Siemens Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd
[2006]
ZASCA 135
;
2007 (2) SA 486
(SCA) (
Reddy
).
[3]
1984 (4) SA 874 (A).
[4]
Ibid at 895D.
[5]
Section
22 of the Constitution reads:
‘
Freedom
of trade, occupation and profession
Every citizen has the
right to choose their trade, occupation or profession freely. The
practice of a trade, occupation or profession
may be regulated by
law.’
[6]
Barkhuizen
v Napier
[2007] ZACC 5
;
2007
(5) SA 323
(CC) at para 87.
[7]
Ibid.
[8]
Ibid
at para 57.
[9]
[2020] ZACC 13; 2020 (5) SA 247 (CC).
[10]
Ibid at para 83.
[11]
Ibid at para 85.
[12]
Reddy
at
paras 15-16.
[13]
Knox
D’Arcy Ltd and another v Shaw and another
1996
(2) SA 651
(W) at 660C.
[14]
Brisley
v Drotsky
[2002]
ZASCA 35
;
2002 (4) SA 1
(SCA) at paras 91 - 95 and
Price
Waterhouse Coopers Inc and others v National Potato Co-operative Ltd
2004 6 SA 66
(SCA) at
para 24.
[15]
Sunshine
Records (Pty) Ltd v Frohling
and
others
1990
(4) SA 782
(A) at 795G-H. See also:
New
Reclamation Group (Pty) Ltd v Davies and another
2014 ZAGPJHC 63 at para
4.
[16]
See:
R. H. Christie, G. Bradfield, ‘
Christie's
Law of Contract
’
,
8
th
ed
LexisNexis at p 459.
[17]
[2020] ZALCJHB 1; (2020) 41 ILJ 1661 (LC) at para 56.
[18]
[1993]
ZASCA 61
;
1993 (3) SA 742
(A) at 767G-H.
[19]
1999 (1) SA 472
(W) at 484E.
[20]
See:
Dickinson
Holdings Group (Pty) Ltd and Others v Du Plessis and Another
(2008) 29 ILJ 1665 (N)
at para 89 and
Bridgestone
Firestone Maxiprest Ltd v Taylor
[2003]
1 All SA 299
(N) at 302J-303B.
[21]
[2014] ZALCJHB 177; (2018) 39 ILJ 2721 (LC).
[22]
Ibid
at paras 13 - 14.
[23]
Ibid
at para 20.
[24]
[2015] ZALCJHB 451 (3 November 2015) at para 4.
[25]
[2011] ZALCJHB 150; (2012) 33 ILJ 629 (LC) (
Continuous
Oxygen
).
[26]
See:
Globeflight
Worldwide Express SA (Pty) Ltd v Grace and Another
(J1178/21) [2021]
ZALCJHB 437.
[27]
Continuous
Oxygen
supra
at para 11.
[28]
[1992] ZASCA 204
;
1993 (1) SA 537
(A) at 541D-H.
[29]
New
Justfun
at
para 12. See:
Sibex
Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk and another
1991
(2) SA 482
(T).
[30]
(2009) 30 ILJ 1750 (C) at 1759E – G.
[31]
Viamedia
(Pty) Ltd v Sessa
(unreported
judgment of CPD case no: 8679/2008).
[32]
[2010] ZALC 198
; (2011) 32 ILJ 601 (LC) at para 43.
[33]
1984
(3) SA 623 (A).
[34]
Reddy
supra
at para
15.