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[2024] ZALCJHB 100
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Mohlabane v Worley RSA (Pty) Limited and Others (JR 965/2021) [2024] ZALCJHB 100 (8 March 2024)
THE
LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Not
Reportable
Case
no: JR 965/2021
In
the matter between:
TEBALO
BRIAN
MOHLABANE Applicant
and
WORLEY
RSA (PTY) LIMITED
First Respondent
THE
COMMISSION FOR CONCILIATION,
MEDIATION
AND ARBITRATION
Second
Respondent
DAN
PRETORIUS
N.O
Third
Respondent
Heard:
27 February
2024
Delivered:
8 March 2024
This
judgment was handed down electronically by consent of the parties’
representatives by circulation to them via email.
The date for
hand-down is deemed to be 8 March 2023.
JUDGMENT
PRINSLOO,
J
Introduction
[1]
The Applicant seeks to review and set aside a jurisdictional ruling
dated
11 May 2021 wherein the Third Respondent (arbitrator) found
that the Applicant had cited the wrong party as the employer in his
unfair discrimination dispute and that the Second Respondent (CCMA)
had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. The application
for
review was filed outside of the prescribed 6-week period and the
Applicant had applied for condonation for the late filing
of the
application. I have considered the application for condonation and I
am satisfied that good cause had been shown and that
the late filing
of the review application is to be condoned.
[2]
The First Respondent (Respondent) opposed the review application.
Background
facts
[3]
This matter has a long history and it is necessary to set out its
history
to provide context to the matter. The Applicant was employed
by Worley Parsons RSA (Pty) Ltd as a C&I senior engineer until
his employment was terminated on 31 August 2016 due to the employer’s
operational requirements.
[4]
Worley Parsons RSA (Pty) Ltd, registered as a company under company
number
1989/002048/07, was renamed as Worley RSA (Pty) Ltd (the
Respondent in this application) under the same company number.
[5]
The Respondent is a subsidiary of a global multinational group, the
Worley
Group, and in April 2019 the holding company of the Worley
Group acquired the whole of the energy, chemical and resources
division
from another internationally based group of consulting
engineers, called the Jacobs Engineering Group. The Jacobs
Engineering Group
had a subsidiary in South Africa, called Jacobs
Matasis (Pty) Ltd, with registration number 2010/019115/07. Worley
RSA (Pty) Ltd
and Jacobs Matasis (Pty) Ltd are two separate legal
entities, both situated in South Africa, each with its own employees,
management,
projects, clients and bank accounts. The only link
between the entities is that they are both subsidiaries and part of
the Worley
Group. Jacobs Matasis subsequently underwent a name change
and is now known as Worley Matasis (Pty) Ltd.
[6]
In October 2019, Jacobs Matasis (Pty) Ltd (Jacobs) advertised a post
of
a senior C&I designer, for which the Applicant applied in
November 2019. In December 2019, the Applicant was interviewed by
Zoe
Egling, the recruiter for Jacobs and the Applicant was informed on 10
December 2019 that his application was not successful.
[7]
On 10
December 2019, the Applicant referred an unfair discrimination
dispute on arbitrary grounds in terms of the provisions of
section 10
of the Employment Equity Act
[1]
(EEA) to the CCMA. The matter was set down for conciliation on 14
January 2020 and after conciliation failed, the dispute was set
down
for arbitration on 29 April 2021.
[8]
On 31 March 2021, the Respondent filed a notice of motion with the
CCMA,
raising a point
in limine
and seeking the dismissal of
the Applicant’s dispute. The Respondent’s case was that
it was not the employer of the
Applicant and that the CCMA lacked
jurisdiction to determine the dispute.
[9]
The Respondent filed an affidavit explaining that the Applicant was
dismissed
by Worley RSA in 2016. In 2019 Worley Limited, the holding
company globally, acquired a division of Jacobs Engineering Group and
acquired shares in Jacobs Matasis (Pty) Ltd. Jacobs is a company with
limited liability and duly registered and incorporated in
accordance
with the company laws of South Africa and Jacobs and the Respondent
remain separate legal entities and separate employers.
The
Respondent’s case was that it did not advertise the position of
senior C&I designer, which the Applicant applied
for, it was not
the employer of the position which was the subject of the
discrimination dispute and that the Applicant was not
entitled to any
relief from the Respondent in this regard.
[10]
The Applicant opposed the Respondent’s point
in limine
on
the basis that “
the respondent is no longer trading as
Worley Parsons but Worley since the acquisition of Jacobs Engineering
Consulting Firm for
a tune of USD 3.2 billion with effect from 26
April 2019. At the time of my dismissal in 2016 August 30, the HR
Manager involved
was Mr Craig Duncan who is still being considered as
HR Manager and remains an employee of Worley as well as being cited
as respondent
on(sic) this matter”.
[11]
The matter was set down for hearing on 29 April 2021 and it is
evident from the transcribed
record that the parties made submissions
on the issue of jurisdiction.
[12]
The Respondent submitted that Worley RSA (Pty) Ltd is part of a
global group of companies,
being the Worley Group, of which the
Respondent is a subsidiary. The holding company, Worley Ltd, acquired
a division from the
Jacobs Engineering Group, with a South African
subsidiary Jacobs Matasis (Pty) Ltd. Worley RSA (Pty) Ltd and Jacobs
Matasis (Pty)
Ltd are separate legal entities and are both part of
the Worley Group of companies.
[13]
The Respondent’s case was that the advert for which the
Applicant applied and was
not successful, was not placed by Worley
RSA and it did not participate in the interviews and the position was
not the Respondent’s,
but it was a position within Jacobs and
the advert was placed by Jacobs and the interviews were conducted by
Jacobs.
[14]
It was submitted that, before the CCMA could assume jurisdiction, it
must be established
that the applicant is indeed an employee. In
terms of section 6 of the EEA, the definition of an employee includes
an applicant
for employment and as the dispute was referred in terms
of section 6 of the EEA, the CCMA had to determine whether Mr
Mohlabane
was an applicant for employment. The entity which
advertised the position the Applicant applied for and that conducted
the interviews,
was Jacobs and not the Respondent. The Respondent is
therefore not the employer and the Applicant could not apply for a
position
with the Respondent that did not advertise, interview or
fill the position of senior C&I designer. The Applicant had cited
the wrong employer for purposes of his EEA dispute.
[15]
The Respondent submitted that Mr Craig Duncan was no longer employed
by Worley RSA, but
he moved to Worley Qatar on 1 October 2019.
Furthermore, the Worley Group is a globally-based multinational and
it is not uncommon
for employees within the group to use an email
address ending in ‘@worley.com’ and that such an email
address was not
an indicator that Worley RSA (Pty) Ltd and Jacobs
Matasis (Pty) Ltd are the same company – they are separate
companies linked
to the same holding company.
[16]
The Respondent also made submissions regarding all the disputes that
the Applicant had
referred against the Respondent, none of which was
either successful or properly prosecuted. It was submitted that “…
it
is abundantly clear to the respondent that Mr Mohlabane, the
applicant in this matter, now has, is starting a crusade against
Worley RSA and as you can see we are dealing with no less than six
case in the space of five years…”
[17]
The Applicant submitted that he was invited for the interview and
given feedback on the
outcome of the interview by Worley. He disputed
that there are different and separate legal entities and insisted
that there is
only one organisation in existence, namely Worley,
after Jacobs Matasis, Worley RSA and Worley Parsons all merged. When
the position
of senior C&I designer was advertised and
interviewed, the merge had already happened and “
we are left
with one organisation”.
The Applicant’s views were
informed by the fact that one email address of ‘@worley.com’
was used and the fact
that Mr Craig Duncan, who was involved in his
retrenchment at the Respondent in 2016, was still the HR manager for
Worley RSA.
The
arbitrator’s findings
[18]
The arbitrator found that the Applicant indeed cited the wrong
employer and that as a result,
the CCMA did not have jurisdiction to
adjudicate the dispute. The arbitrator’s findings were based on
the fact that Worley
RSA (Pty) Ltd and Worley Matasis (Pty) Ltd did
not have the same company number and that they are separate
companies, with separate
employees, management and projects, each
operating independently in South Africa. The arbitrator further found
that the Respondent
did not advertise any C&I post in late 2019.
Applicable
legal principles
[19]
Before I deal with the grounds for review and the merits of this
application, I deem it
prudent to set out relevant principles
applicable to review applications.
[20]
Affidavits
in review applications serve two primary purposes: to define the
issues between the parties and to place the essential
averments and
evidence before the other parties and the court. Rule 7A of the
Labour Court Rules
[2]
(Rules)
provides for the delivery of four sets of affidavits in review
applications, to wit a founding, supplementary, answering
and
replying affidavit. In recognition of the fact that the record
obtained by an applicant in a review application may reveal
that
averments made in the founding affidavit were erroneously made or
omitted, Rule 7A(8)(a) permits the applicant to deliver
a
supplementary affidavit within 10 days after the record is made
available. This affords the applicant the opportunity to supplement
and amend the factual and legal grounds upon which he or she relies
in light of the record. A weak founding affidavit can be augmented
by
a supplementary affidavit.
[3]
[21]
As a general principle, the applicant in a review application must
make out his or her
case in the founding affidavit, as may be
supplemented by a supplementary affidavit, if necessary, after the
transcribed record
becomes available. Rule 7A(2)(c) of the Rules
provides that the notice of motion must be supported by an affidavit,
setting out
the factual and legal grounds upon which the applicant
relies to have the decision or proceedings corrected or set aside.
[22]
As to the requirement of setting out the legal grounds upon which the
applicant relies
in the founding affidavit, this requires the
applicant to set out, with sufficient precision and detail, the
grounds for review
and the bases on which such grounds are relied
upon.
[23]
The role of
the reviewing Court is limited to deciding issues that are raised in
the applicant’s founding (and supplementary)
affidavit. This
was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in
Commercial
Workers Union of SA v Tao Ying Metal Industries and Others
[4]
(Tao Ying),
where
it was held that:
‘…
the
role of the reviewing court is limited to deciding issues that are
raised in the review proceedings. It may not on its own raise
issues
which were not raised by the party who seeks to review an arbitral
award. There is much to be said for the submission by
the workers
that it is not for the reviewing court to tell a litigant what it
should complain about. In particular, the LRA specifies
the grounds
upon which arbitral awards may be review
ed. A party who
seeks to review an arbitral award is bound by the grounds contained
in the review application. A litigant may not
on appeal raise a new
ground of review. To permit a party to do so may very well undermine
the objective of the LRA to have labour
disputes resolved as speedily
as possible
.’
[24]
A party who
seeks to review an arbitration award is bound by the grounds for
review contained in the review application, subject
to one
qualification, namely that the Court is obliged to deal with a point
of law apparent from the papers.
[5]
[25]
The test to
be applied on review, as set out in
Sidumo
and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others
[6]
(Sidumo),
as whether the decision reached by the arbitrator is one that a
reasonable decision maker could not reach, is well known and
established.
[26]
However, it
is now settled law that the test a reviewing court will apply to
decisions relating to jurisdiction is different to
the
Sidumo
test.
The test to be applied when reviewing an arbitrator’s decision
relating to the jurisdiction of the CCMA is whether the
decision was,
objectively speaking, correct, and the review test as laid down in
Sidumo
does
not find application in reviewing such a finding.
[7]
[27]
In
De
Milander v Member of the Executive Council for the Department of
Finance: Eastern Cape and others
[8]
the
Labour Appeal Court (LAC) held that:
‘
Thus
the issue before the commissioner, whether or not there had been a
dismissal, was a jurisdictional issue. This means that if
there was
no dismissal the bargaining council did not have jurisdiction to
entertain the dispute referred to it by the appellant
(
SA
Rugby Players Association & others v SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd &
others; SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd v SARPU & another
(2008)
29
ILJ
2218 (LAC)
[2008] ZALAC 3
; ;
[2008] 9 BLLR 845
I (LAC) at para 39). The question whether, on the
facts of the case, a dismissal had taken place within the ambit of s
186(1)
(b)
involves the determination of the jurisdictional facts. A
jurisdictional ruling is subject to review by the Labour Court on
objectively
justifiable grounds and not on the reasonableness test
approach as enunciated in
Sidumo
.
The test is whether, objectively speaking, the facts which would give
the GPSSBC jurisdiction to entertain the dispute existed.’
[28]
In
Phaka
and others v Bracks NO and others
[9]
,
the LAC
held that:
‘
The
appellants sought review of the award of the arbitrator on the basis
that the conclusion reached by him was not a decision that
a
reasonable decision maker or arbitrator in that position could have
reached. This is an incorrect approach. When the jurisdiction
of the
arbitrator is in question the issue is whether he objectively had
jurisdiction in law and fact. The arbitrator’s finding
was that
as the appellants were not employees he had no jurisdiction to
determine their referrals of unfair dismissal and unfair
labour
practice disputes to the bargaining council. The court on review in
such an instance is required to determine whether that
finding was
correct. The arbitrator either had jurisdiction or he did not. A
finding that he had jurisdiction because he might
reasonably have
assumed as much is wholly untenable in principle. No legal power may
be exercised without authority. The standard
of review enunciated
in
Sidumo
and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others
that in order to
succeed in a review the applicant must establish that the award was
one that could not have been made by a reasonable
decision maker,
applies only to the review of determinations of the fairness of a
dismissal or labour practice. It has no application
to the
determination of jurisdiction.’
[29]
It is within the ambit of the aforesaid principles and the test to be
applied on review,
that the Applicant’s application for review
is to be considered.
Grounds
for review
[30]
In casu,
the Applicant filed a founding affidavit but no
supplementary affidavit. There are three grounds for review as set
out in the Applicant’s
founding affidavit, which I will deal
with in turn.
Jurisdiction
[31]
The first ground for review is that the arbitrator had no
jurisdiction to review and set
aside an “
award issued on 14
January 2020 whereby same point in limine was dismissed when the
matter was referred to arbitration”.
[32]
It is common cause that the dispute was set down for conciliation on
14 January 2020, that
the dispute remained unresolved and that a
certificate of outcome was issued, referring the dispute for
arbitration. The matter
was set down for arbitration in April 2021,
when the Respondent raised the issue of jurisdiction as a point
in
limine.
[33]
There is no merit in the Applicant’s first ground for review.
[34]
There was no evidence placed before this Court to show that the
jurisdictional issue was
raised and considered at the stage of
conciliation and that a jurisdictional ruling was issued by the
conciliating arbitrator.
What is evident is that after the
conciliation was unsuccessful, a certificate of outcome, referring
the dispute for arbitration,
was issued. The certificate of outcome
is not a jurisdictional ruling but merely certifies that an attempt
was made to conciliate
the dispute.
[35]
There is no evidence to show that the issue of the CCMA’s
jurisdiction to adjudicate
the dispute was considered on 14 January
2021 or that a ruling on jurisdiction was issued on the said date.
[36]
The jurisdictional point was raised at the arbitration hearing and
was decided by the arbitrator.
The arbitrator had regard to the
affidavits filed as well as the oral submissions made in respect of
jurisdiction and she made
a finding, based on the evidence placed
before her. The arbitrator did not ‘review and set aside’
any ruling, as no
ruling was issued on 14 January 2021.
[37]
A
certificate of outcome does not confer jurisdiction – it is
merely a recordal that, on a particular date, a dispute remained
unresolved and it has no legal significance beyond that, apart from
entitling a party to refer the dispute to arbitration or the
Labour
Court, depending on the nature of the dispute. If a jurisdictional
issue was not raised or decided at conciliation, it may
be raised and
must be determined at arbitration, irrespective of the issuing of a
certificate of outcome.
[10]
Section
189 of the LRA
[38]
The Applicant’s second ground for review is that the arbitrator
failed to take into
consideration that he was dismissed by the
Respondent in terms of section 189 of the LRA and ‘
ought to
be considered’
that the LRA is clear “
on
requirement to consider those who were laid off on section 189 first,
provided that they are still interested in employment offer”
and that the arbitrator “
misdirects herself by failing
to deal with this requirement as outline (sic) by LRA and argued
during arbitration”.
[39]
There is no merit in this ground for review. Firstly, there is no
such requirement in the
LRA, as alleged by the Applicant. The
arbitrator cannot be accused of failing to deal with a non-existing
requirement.
[40]
Secondly, the arbitrator considered the issue of jurisdiction in
respect of the Applicant’s
dispute in terms of section 6 of the
EEA. The dispute before the arbitrator was one relating to the EEA
and the arbitrator was
not required or mandated to consider any
dispute in terms of section 189 of the LRA.
[41]
Thirdly, section 10(1) of the EEA specifically excludes a dispute
about an unfair dismissal.
An unfair discrimination dispute, pursued
in terms of the EEA, does not include an unfair dismissal dispute and
the Applicant’s
complaint that the arbitrator should have
considered the fact that he was dismissed and ought to have been
considered for employment,
is incompetent and bad in law.
Third
ground for review
[42]
The Applicant’s third ground for review is that the
jurisdictional ruling is riddled
“
with contradictions that
does (sic) not advance fair administration of justice. And prejudice
is suffered by applicant”.
[43]
I already alluded to the fact that an applicant is required to set
out, with sufficient
precision and detail, the grounds for review and
the bases on which such grounds are relied upon. It is critical that
the factual
foundation of the review application, including the
relevant evidence or reference thereto, be canvassed in the founding
or supplementary
affidavit and that it be linked to the applicant’s
grounds for review, supported by the evidence adduced at the
arbitration
proceedings.
[44]
This ground for review is too vague and it is unsubstantiated.
The
arbitrator was biased
[45]
It is evident from the Applicant’s review application that it
is interspersed with
allegations that the arbitrator was biased.
[46]
Bias in the context of a review application is regarded as a patent
gross irregularity.
The principles related to the concept of bias
have been set out by the Courts and a brief overview of those
principles is necessary.
[47]
In
Turnbull-Jackson
v Hibiscus Coast Municipality and others (Ethekwini Municipality as
amicus curiae),
[11]
the Court dealt with unfounded allegations of impropriety made
against public officers, a
nd
held:
‘
Allegations
of bias, the antithesis of fairness, are serious. If made with a
sufficient degree of regularity, they have the potential
to be
deleterious to the confidence reposed by the public in
administrators. The reactive bias claim stems from unsubstantiated
allegations of corruption and incompetence. These are serious
allegations, especially the one of corruption. Yes, if public
officials
are corrupt, they must be exposed for what they are: an
unwelcome, cancerous scourge in the public administration. But
accusations
of corruption against the innocent may visit them with
the most debilitating public opprobrium. Gratuitous claims of bias
like
the present are deserving of the strongest possible censure.’
[48]
In
Sepheka
v Du Point Pioneer (Pty) Ltd,
[12]
the Court threw caution as follows in respect of allegations of bias:
‘
Any
allegation of bias, especially on the part of a Judge of this Court,
must be substantiated by a proper factual basis, must not
be based on
mere speculation and conjecture, and must be proved by the party
alleging bias.’
[49]
It is a trite principle of law that in order to succeed with a claim
of bias, more than
mere conjecture must be shown. It happens that in
the normal course of events, litigants could harbour a sense of
apprehension
against those administering justice. This of course does
not mean that, anytime when a litigant is not happy with the
proceedings
or that the judgment or outcome is not in that party’s
favour, a claim of bias would suffice.
[50]
The Courts
have time and time again warned against litigants making unfounded
allegations of bias on the part of presiding officers
tasked to
decide disputes, without cogent proof to substantiate the
allegation.
[13]
[51]
It is a natural result of adversary litigation that one party would
be successful favour
of the other party, does not render the
presiding officer or decision maker biased. More is required.
[52]
In casu,
the Applicant claims that the arbitrator was biased.
To succeed with this as a ground for review, the Applicant had to
prove bias
and had to substantiate this claim by a proper factual
basis. The Applicant dismally failed to do so, in fact, he did no
more than
to make vague and unsubstantiated allegations of bias.
Conclusion
[53]
The test to be applied in a review application such as this one is
whether the arbitrator
was, objectively speaking, right or wrong in
finding that the CCMA has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute.
[54]
There is not a single averment in the Applicant’s founding
affidavit to the effect
that the arbitrator’s findings were
wrong. ‘Correctness’, the test to be applied
in casu,
does not feature in the Applicant’s pleaded case and the
jurisdictional ruling is not attacked on the ground that it is wrong.
In fact, there is not a single averment made to support a case on the
basis that the arbitrator or the outcome was wrong.
[55]
The Applicant has failed to make allegations to sustain this
application, which is fatal
to his case. In
Tao Ying,
it was
confirmed that the role of the reviewing court is limited to deciding
issues that are raised in the review proceedings.
This Court, sitting
as a review Court, is not to embark on a fact-finding mission in
order to find facts or evidence to support
the Applicant’s
grounds for review.
[56]
The Applicant did no more than to launch a vague and unsubstantiated
attack and to raise
grounds for review that have nothing to do with
the question of whether the arbitrator was correct in finding that
the CCMA lacked
jurisdiction.
[57]
The Applicant dismally failed to make out a case for review and it
follows that the application
for review has to fail.
Costs
[58]
In so far as costs are concerned, this Court has a broad discretion
in terms of section
162 of the LRA to make orders for costs according
to the requirements of the law and fairness.
[59]
The requirement of law has been interpreted to mean that the costs
would follow the result.
In considering fairness, the conduct of the
parties should be taken into account and
mala fides
,
unreasonableness and frivolousness are factors justifying the
imposition of a costs order.
[60]
In
Zungu
v Premier of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal and Others,
[14]
the
Constitutional Court confirmed that the rule that costs follow the
result does not apply in labour matters. The Court should
seek to
strike a fair balance between unduly discouraging parties from
approaching the Labour Court to have their disputes dealt
with and,
on the other hand, allowing those parties to bring to this Court (or
oppose) cases that should not have been brought
to Court (or opposed)
in the first place.
[61]
Mr van As for the Respondent submitted that a cost order should be
awarded in favour of
the Respondent as the Applicant came to Court
with a meritless application. He further submitted that this is the
sixth unfair
discrimination claim against the Respondent as the
Applicant believes he is entitled to an eternal recall position and
to be given
preference every time a position is advertised and when
he is not successful, he claims discrimination. The Applicant is a
vexatious
litigant, who has dragged the Respondent to the CCMA and
this Court on numerous occasions on matters without merit and there
is
a tipping point where ill-founded litigation should be met with an
order for costs.
[62]
The Applicant submitted that he is not employed and would not be in a
position to pay costs.
He had been rejected by the Respondent and he
is unable to find an amicable solution to resolve his disputes with
the Respondent.
[63]
This is a
case where the Court has to strike a balance, considering the
requirements of law and fairness. The generally accepted
purpose of
awarding costs is to indemnify the successful litigant for the
expense he or she has been put through by having been
unjustly
compelled to initiate or defend litigation.
In
Public
Servants Association of SA on behalf of Khan v Tsabadi NO and
Others
[15]
it was emphasized that:
‘…
unless
there are sound reasons which dictate a different approach, it is
fair that the successful party be awarded her costs. The
successful
party has been compelled to engage in litigation and compelled to
incur legal costs in doing so. An appropriate award
of costs is one
method of ensuring that much earnest thought and consideration goes
into decisions to litigate in this Court, whether
as applicant, in
launching proceedings or as respondent opposing proceedings.’
[64]
In my view, this is a case where it is appropriate
to make a cost order.
A cost order is a method of ensuring
that decisions to litigate in this Court are taken with due
consideration of the law and the
prospects of success.
[65]
I am alive to the fact that the Applicant is an individual. This
Court is ordinarily reluctant
to make orders for costs against
individual employees, for whom the prospect of an adverse costs order
may serve to inhibit the
exercise of what they perceive as their
rights. This is however not an immutable rule.
[66]
In casu,
the
Applicant approached this Court on review and the grounds for
review he had raised, had no merit, considering the applicable legal
principles. I am also considering the fact that the Applicant has no
hesitation to institute legal proceedings against the Respondent,
without any consideration of the merits thereof. The Applicant cannot
continue to drag the Respondent to meritless litigation,
without any
consequences, when the Respondent has to incur costs to defend such
litigation.
[67]
F
airness dictates that the Respondent
cannot be expected to endure enormous costs defending litigation
where more thought and consideration
had to be put in before
approaching this Court. It seems to me that in the present
circumstances, the interests of justice require
that the Applicant
pays at least a portion of the Respondent’s costs. In my view,
a sum equivalent to 20% of the Respondent’s
costs will best
serve those interests.
[68]
In
the
premises
,
I make the following order:
Order
1.
The late filing of the application for review
is condoned;
2.
The review application is dismissed;
3.
The Applicant is to pay the costs of the application, limited
to 20%
of the First Respondent’s taxed costs.
Connie
Prinsloo
Judge
of the Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances:
On
behalf of the Applicant:
In person
On
behalf of the First Respondent:
Advocate M van As
Instructed
by:
Werksmans Attorneys
[1]
Act
55 of 1998, as amended.
[2]
GN
1665 of 1996: Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Labour
Court.
[3]
C Bosch, A Myburgh, ‘
Reviews
in the Labour Courts’
,
LexisNexis at p 438 – 441.
[4]
[2008] ZACC 15
; (
2008)
29 ILJ 2461 (CC) at para 66.
[5]
Tao
Ying supra
at
para 67.
[6]
[2007] ZACC 22
; (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC) at para 110.
[7]
SA
Rugby (Pty) Ltd v SA Rugby Players’ Association & another
[2008] ZALAC 3
; (2008) 29 ILJ 2218 (LAC) (
SA
Rugby
),
Member
of the Executive Council,
Department
of Health, Eastern Cape v Odendaal and others
[2008] ZALC 161
; (2009) 30 ILJ 2093 (LC) (
Odendaal
),
Asara
Wine Estate & Hotel (Pty) Ltd v Van Rooyen & others
[2011] ZALCCT 21; (2012) 33 ILJ 363 (LC) (
Asara
),
Majatladi
v Metropolitan Health Risk Management and others
[2013] ZALCCT 15; (2013) 34 ILJ 3828 (LC) (
Majatladi
).
[8]
(2013) 34 ILJ 1427 (LAC) at para 24.
[9]
[2014]
ZALAC 73; (2015) 36 ILJ 1541 (LAC) at para 29.
[10]
Myburgh
et al, ‘
Reviews
’
at p 156 – 161.
[11]
2014 (11) BCLR 1310
(CC) at para 35.
[12]
(2019) 40 ILJ 613 (LC) at para 16.
[13]
See for example
Sappi
Kraft (Pty) Ltd t/a Tugela Mill v Majake NO and Others
(1998) 19 ILJ 1240 (LC) at para 48;
SMCWU
v Party Design CC
[2001] 6 BLLR 667
(LC) at para 12.
[14]
(2018) 39 ILJ 523 (CC) at para 24.
[15]
(2012) 33 ILJ 2117 (LC) at para p 2119 I-J.