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[2023] ZALAC 9
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Mohube v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration and Others (JA18/2022) [2023] ZALAC 9; [2023] 8 BLLR 733 (LAC); (2023) 44 ILJ 1683 (LAC) (18 May 2023)

IN THE LABOUR APPEAL COURT OF SOUTH
AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Reportable
Case no: JA 18/2022
In the matter between:
MATOME
TUMI MOHUBE
Appellant
and
THE
COMMISSION FOR CONCILIATION
MEDIATION
AND ARBITRATION
First
Respondent
COMMISSIONER
BOTHA N.O.
Second
Respondent
COMMISSIONER
RICHARD BYRNE N.O.
Third
Respondent
PASSENGER
RAIL AGENCY OF SA (PRASA)
Fourth
Respondent
Heard:
30 March 2023
Delivered:    18 May 2023
Coram:
Waglay JP, Coppin JA
et
Gqamana AJA
JUDGMENT
COPPIN JA
Introduction
[1]
This is
an appeal against the whole order of the Labour Court (Phehane J) in
terms of which an application by the appellant to review
a rescission
ruling of the third respondent (Commissioner Byrne), acting under the
auspices of the first respondent (CCMA), was
dismissed. Leave to
appeal to this Court was granted on the petition of the appellant.
[2]
The
appellant had unsuccessfully applied to Commissioner Byrne to rescind
an order made by the second respondent (Commissioner Botha),
also
acting under the auspices of the CCMA, in his absence, and in terms
of which the appellant’s claim for unfair dismissal
against the
fourth respondent (PRASA) was dismissed.
[3]
The
central issue in this appeal is thus whether the Labour Court (i.e.
the court
a
quo
)
correctly found that the rescission ruling of Commissioner Byrne fell
within the bounds of reasonableness.
Background Facts
[4]
The
appellant was employed by PRASA as a company secretary from May 2005
until his dismissal by that body in April 2019.
[5]
Following
the release in August 2015 of the Public Protector’s report on
PRASA titled “DERAILED”, which dealt
with allegations of
financial and tender irregularities at PRASA, the latter brought
charges against the appellant in an internal
disciplinary hearing,
essentially alleging his involvement in financial/tender
irregularities and fraud.
[6]
More
particularly, it was essentially alleged that he had signed
resolutions of the PRASA Board that misrepresented the actual
decisions of the Board and in particular, the monetary value of the
transactions decided upon. It was alleged, for example, firstly,
that
he signed a resolution representing (falsely) that the Board had
approved the appointment of a company, Siyangena Technologies,
for
the supply of access gates, security and supporting equipment to
various PRASA stations for an amount of approximately R1.95
million,
and had authorised payment to that company of that amount; secondly,
that he misrepresented, in a resolution, that the
Board awarded a
contract to Siyaya Energy for the supply of diesel in an amount of
about R856 million, whereas the Board had decided
that it was to be
for an amount of about R308 million; and thirdly, that he
misrepresented in a resolution that the Board awarded
a contract to
Barutho Gas Supply for the supply of lubricants in an amount of R32
million, whereas the Board had decided that it
was to be for an
amount of about R2.28 million (the actual amounts were stated in the
charges).
[7]
At the
internal disciplinary hearing, which was chaired by an independent
senior advocate, the appellant was found guilty of those
charges and
dismissed on 26 April 2019.
[8]
Aggrieved
by the outcome, the appellant referred an unfair dismissal dispute to
the CCMA. The matter was eventually set down for
a con/arb on 12 June
2019. On that date, the appellant appeared but there was no
appearance for PRASA. The commissioner presiding
at that stage issued
a certificate of outcome (i.e. in respect of the conciliation)
certifying that the matter remained unresolved
as at 12 June 2019.
The certificate also states,
inter
alia
,
that if the dispute remains unresolved, it may be referred to
arbitration. However, in the very ruling of that same commissioner,

she states,
inter
alia
,
that the CCMA is to set the matter down for arbitration.
[9]
The
CCMA proceeded to set the matter down for arbitration on 9 July 2019.
Commissioner Botha presided on that occasion. There was
no appearance
by or on behalf of the appellant. Commissioner Botha nevertheless
issued a ruling on that same day which is titled
“Dismissal
Ruling” and which reads as follows:
‘
There
is no appearance for the applicant… According to the CCMA file
the parties were notified of today’s hearing by
email sent on
13 June 2019. Copies of said documents are to be found in the CCMA
file. Ruling: Under the circumstances, I am satisfied
that both
parties have had adequate notice of that date, time and place of
schedule arbitration [sic] and accordingly in terms
of
section 138(5)
of the
Labour Relations Act, 1995
, I hereby dismiss the case.’
[10]
When
the appellant became aware of Commissioner Botha’s dismissal
ruling, he applied for its rescission and for an order that
the CCMA
set down the unfair dismissal dispute matter for arbitration on an
urgent basis.
[11]
The
appellant’s application for rescission was supported by an
affidavit in which he explained that there is good cause for
a
rescission of Commissioner Botha’s ruling that was made in his
absence. He averred,
inter
alia
,
that he was not notified of the date of the arbitration and that he
was not in wilful default and had a
bona
fide
claim
against PRASA and that his rescission application was brought in good
faith. The detail of his explanation will be considered
later in this
judgment.
[12]
His
rescission application was opposed by PRASA. Its attorney, Ms Dawn
Norton, deposed to the opposing affidavit. In sum, she alleged
that
the appellant’s claim had been properly dismissed and that he
had not made out the case for the rescission of Commissioner
Botha’s
dismissal ruling. The detail of this opposition, insofar as it is
relevant, shall also be discussed later.
[13]
The
appellant filed a replying affidavit deposed to by his attorney, Mr
Maropeng Sebola, in which he,
inter
alia
,
raised various “points
in
limine
”
.
The first point was that PRASA’s opposing affidavit had been
filed late and that it had not applied for condonation for
the
lateness. The second point was that the opposing affidavit was
defective because it was not properly attested. The appellant
deposed
to a confirmatory affidavit in that regard.
[14]
PRASA
duly filed an application to condone the late filing of its opposing
affidavit, which application was opposed by the appellant.
After
hearing the parties, Commissioner Byrne issued a written ruling on 28
August 2019 which reads as follows:
‘
This
matter concerns a rescission application of a ruling by a
Commissioner Botha on 9 July 2019, whereby he dismissed the matter

due to the non–appearance by the Applicant party at
arbitration. Both parties filed papers and appeared before me on 14
August 2019. I also need to deal with a condonation application by
the Respondent for its late response to the rescission application.

Condonation for the late filing by the Respondent is granted. It
stated that the Applicant had served its papers on the CEO and
not
the HR Department or legal representatives. This is a reasonable
explanation. The Applicant’s attorney states in his
affidavit
that the applicant never appeared at the CCMA on 9 July 2019 because
the CCMA sent the set down notice to his old email
address and not
his current email address. According to the CCMA file there is no
truth in that statement. The CCMA’s transmission
report shows
that the set down notice was sent to the correct address. I obtained
the Activity Report on the case off the CCMA
system, and it shows
that all notices from the beginning was sent to the correct email
address. I requested Mr Sebola to send me
a copy of the alleged email
he was referring to. None was supplied. On the merits of the case,
the Applicant states that it is
not his signature on the document
authorising additional monies to a Contractor. The disciplinary
hearing was conducted by professionals
and, according to the
Respondent, this argument was dealt with. In the circumstances,
prospects of success appear weak. Taking
into account that there is a
factually incorrect reason for the Applicant’s non–appearance,
and the prospects which
appear weak, Rescission is refused.’
[15]
This
meant that Commissioner Botha’s dismissal of the appellant’s
unfair dismissal claim stood.
[16]
In
response, the appellant brought an application in the Labour Court
to,
inter
alia
,
review and set aside the rescission ruling of Commissioner Byrne. In
the application, the appellant also sought to review and
set aside
Commissioner Botha’s dismissal ruling, which is the very ruling
that he sought to rescind. That relief was clearly
superfluous in
those circumstances.
[17]
In any
event, the appellant’s review application was opposed and the
court
a
quo
,
which was seized with the matter, ultimately decided in favour of
PRASA, by dismissing the appellant’s application to review

Commissioner Byrne’s rescission ruling and directing that there
was no costs order.
[18]
The
material part of the judgment was succinct. Having summarised the
appellant’s grounds of review the judge
a
quo
,
under the heading “Analysis”, states the following before
making the formal final order:
‘
[11]
The test to succeed in a review application is trite.
[12]
The grounds of review pleaded fail dismally to establish reviewable
grounds in terms of
section 145(2)
of the LRA.
[13]
I find no basis to interfere with the rescission ruling.’
[19]
In the
court
a
quo
’
s
judgment, the appellant’s grounds of review are summarised as
follows:
‘
[10]
The applicant’s ground of review in the main, are couched in
the form of an appeal, where the
applicant alleges in the main that
Commissioner Byrne erred in dismissing the rescission application,
as:
10.1
[PRASA] placed its reliance on an incorrect award;
10.2
The applicant did not request that the matter be referred to
arbitration;
10.3
In dealing with the merits;
10.4
In finding an incorrect reason for the non-appearance of the
applicant at the arbitration proceedings.’
[20]
The
appellant applied for leave to appeal the court
a
quo
’
s
order, but he was unsuccessful. The true reason why this was so need
not detain this Court since the appellant was subsequently
granted
leave to appeal that order on petition to this court.
[21]
The
appellant alleges,
inter
alia
,
that the court
a
quo
did
not consider certain crucial material facts pertinently stated in the
affidavit in support of his application to review Commissioner

Byrne’s rescission ruling.
[22]
It is
apparent that the court
a
quo
’
s
summary of the appellant’s grounds of review is not accurate
and arguably does not take into account important aspects of
the
appellant’s case. The appellant pertinently averred, for
example, that Commissioner Byrne’s ruling, given all the
facts
and circumstances placed before him, fell far outside the range of
decisions that a reasonable decision-maker in his position,
would
have arrived at.
[23]
Rules
31
and
32
of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings before the
CCMA
[1]
provide,
inter
alia
,
for the rescission of arbitration awards and rulings, but the test
for granting such rescission is not spelt-out there.
[24]
However,
section 144(d) of the Labour Relations Act
[2]
(LRA)
provides that any commissioner who has issued an award or ruling, or
any other commissioner may on her own accord or on the
application of
any affected party,
inter
alia
,
rescind an arbitration ruling or award “
made
in the absence of any party on good cause shown
”
[3]
.
[25]
There
is no precise definition of the term “good cause”
[4]
,
but it is accepted that this entails that the applicant for such
relief must show at least the following: (a) an absence of
wilfulness;
(b) that it has a reasonable explanation for the default;
(c) that the application for rescission is
bona
fide
and
not made with the intention to delay; and that (d) (i.e. as in the
case of the appellant here who referred the dispute) that
it has a
bona
fide
claim
against the other party/ies
[5]
.
All these elements must be considered and weighed and, for example,
proof of a
bona
fide
claim
may make up for a weaker explanation.
[6]
[26]
In this
matter, the appellant explains that in the CCMA referral form (form
7.11) the primary email address furnished by the appellant
was
“tmohube2@icloud.com” and that his alternative email
address was “maropengsebola@gmail.com”. The latter

address was the private email address of his attorney, Mr Sebola, who
at the time of the referral was employed at Dyason Attorneys
in
Pretoria. He left that employment on 10 June 2019.
[27]
The
appellant further explains that even though he had completed the
form, it was served and filed by Mr Sebola on 30 April 2019
using his
email address at Dyason Attorneys, namely “maropeng@dyason.co.za”.
The appellant himself never indicated
that this was the address at
which he would accept service of process in the matter.
[28]
According
to the appellant, unbeknown to him, on 13 June 2019, the CCMA
(allegedly) sent the set down for the arbitration hearing
to the
private email address of Mr Sebola (i.e. the alternative address as
opposed to the appellant’s primary address). Mr
Sebola
testified under oath that he never received it and accordingly never
informed the appellant about the set down.
[29]
According
to the appellant, his absence at the arbitration hearing on 9 July
2019 was not due to any wilful conduct on his part;
he simply had no
knowledge of the set down. There is no proof that the appellant
otherwise had knowledge of such and wilfully did
not attend. The
attorney, Mr Sebola, was questioned on his alleged receipt of the
notice set down. He denied receiving it and even
went as far as
submitting his personal computer for inspection to prove that he
never received the notice. No one from the CCMA
was called to prove
how the notice was sent and no technical evidence was led about the
functionality and reliability of the system.
Reliance was merely
placed on entries in or the contents of the CCMA file and nothing
else. At best, that could only have been
prime
facie
proof
that the email had been directed to a particular address, but not
conclusive proof that it had been received by the intended

recipient.
[7]
[30]
In
any event, the CCMA was, in the first and foremost instance, obliged
to send the set down to the appellant’s personal email
address,
which he chose as the primary address at which he would receive such
notices.
[8]
This
was not done.
[31]
Taking
into account all the facts and circumstances, the appellant’s
explanation, that he had no knowledge of the set down
date for the
arbitration, was unassailable. There could have been no doubt that if
he knew of that date he would have attended.
There is no reason why
he, who referred the dispute in the first place, would not have
attended the arbitration where the dispute
was to be resolved. When
the appellant became aware of Commissioner Botha’s ruling, he
acted promptly to have it rescinded.
This is not the conduct of a
recalcitrant party who sought to avoid the resolution of the
dismissal dispute that he referred to
the CCMA.
[32]
In
addition to finding that the explanation for the default was not
reasonable, Commissioner Byrne found that the appellant’s

prospects of success “appear weak” because the
disciplinary enquiry was “conducted by professionals”.
There seems to have been an assumption that professionals make no
mistakes, or commit no wrongs, which is false. A reasonable
commissioner
would not have made such an assumption.
[33]
All
that the appellant had to show was that he had a
bona
fide
claim.
The fact of his dismissal was common cause and the only issue
concerns the fairness thereof. Commissioner Byrne failed to
engage
the facts put up by the appellant in that regard. The appellant
contends that he never signed those resolutions or made
the alleged
misrepresentations he was accused of making or signing and was
subsequently dismissed for, and denies that he was ever
involved in
any fraud or corruption.
[34]
The
appellant avers that no evidence was led at the enquiry to prove that
the signatures on the said resolutions were indeed his
and there was
nothing substantial to counter that version. He further avers that
the chairperson of the enquiry was biased and
that too is not dealt
with.
[35]
A
reasonable commissioner in the position of Commissioner Byrne would
have found that the appellant’s referral was
bona
fide
,
that his failure to appear was reasonably explained and was not
wilful and/or intended to delay the resolution of the dispute
which
he referred to the CCMA. The court
a
quo
’
s
finding to the contrary is incorrect.
[36]
It
follows that the appeal must succeed. Taking the law, fairness and
all the facts and circumstances into account, it is not appropriate

to order one party to pay the costs of the other. Accordingly, there
will be no order as to costs.
[37]
In the
result, the following is ordered:
Order
1.
The
appeal is upheld;
2.
The
order of the court
a
quo
is
set aside and is replaced with the following order:
“
1.
The rescission ruling of Commissioner Byrne under case number
GATW8468-19 and dated 28 August 2019
is hereby reviewed and set
aside;
2.
It is substituted with the following order:
‘
1.
The ruling of Commissioner Botha under the same case number and of 9
July 2019 is rescinded;
2.
The matter is to be set down afresh for arbitration before a
different Commissioner.’”
3.
There
is no costs order.
P Coppin
WAGLAY JP
[38]
I have
had the benefit of reading the reasons for the judgment and the order
by my brother Coppin JA. I am in agreement with both.
[39]
I
do however need to address an issue raised in argument by the
Appellant. The issue is of some significance. Relying on the
judgement
of
Solomons
v CCMA and others
[9]
(
Solomons
),
the Appellant argued that:
a)
The
dismissal of his matter by the CCMA for non-attendance at the
arbitration was akin to the matter being struck off the roll.
b)
The
dismissal without consideration of the merits was inconsistent with
section 34 of the Constitution and offends the right to
fair labour
practice as contemplated in section 23(1) of the Constitution read
with section 85(a) of the Labour Relation Act (LRA)
- the right not
to be unfairly dismissed.
c)
The
dismissal of his matter by the CCMA was irrational, invalid and
ineffective in law.
[40]
The
facts in the matter of
Solomons
are
quite straightforward. Mr Solomons, an Applicant in an unfair
dismissal dispute agreed to his erstwhile employer’s request
to
postpone the arbitration hearing allocated by the CCMA because the
employer’s witness was suffering from COVID-19. The

postponement agreement was forwarded to the CCMA. On the date of the
arbitration hearing, the commissioner allocated to hear the

arbitration refused to postpone the matter because the postponement
agreement was not signed by one of the parties. Since neither
party
was present, the commissioner decided to exercise his discretion in
terms of section 138(5) and dismissed the dispute for
non-attendance
by the Applicant, Mr Solomons.
[41]
Mr
Solomons applied to rescind the ruling, which the employer did not
oppose. The CCMA refused the application. Mr Solomons then
took the
matter on review to the Labour Court. The Labour Court declared the
commissioner’s ruling to be irrational, invalid
and ineffective
and held that the rescission ruling was “
a
nullity in law
”
.
[42]
Section
138(5) of the LRA provides that;
‘
(5)
If a party to the dispute fails to appear in person or to be
represented at the arbitration
proceedings, and that party –
(a)
had referred the dispute to the Commission, the commissioner may
dismiss the matter…’
[43]
What
the
Solomons
judgment
held was the dismissal of a dispute in terms of section 138(5)(a) had
the effect of the matter being
struck
off the roll
because
the dispute referred to arbitration had not been resolved as is
required by section 1(d)(iv)
[10]
of
the LRA and offends section 34 of the Constitution
[11]
.
In the circumstances and in terms of
Solomons
,
an applicant whose matter is dismissed in terms of section 138(5) (a)
need not apply for a rescission of the dismissal ruling
but can apply
to have the matter re-enrolled upon providing a satisfactory
explanation for her/his failure to attend the arbitration
hearing.
[44]
In my
view, such an interpretation of the word “dismissal” is
egregious. A Lewis Carrol-type application where a word
means what
you choose it to mean cannot find application in the interpretation
of statutes. While the door to a disputant’s
right to have his
dispute arbitrated or adjudicated should not be easily closed, a
balance should be struck to ensure that a respondent
in a dispute is
not required to wait indefinitely for the matter to reach finality
which will be the effect if a dismissal in terms
of section 138(5) is
interpreted to mean that the matter is “
struck
from the roll
”
.
Alternatively, it places an undue burden on the respondent to apply
to the CCMA to have the matter dismissed.
[45]
While
section 138(5) gives the commissioner the power to “dismiss”
a dispute referred to the Commission for non-attendance
by the
applicant, it is not a power that can be exercised mechanically or
unconsciously. It requires the commissioner to exercise
a discretion
to determine whether to dismiss the dispute. The use of the word
“may” in this sub-section is instructive
of this. Section
138(5) requires the commissioner to apply his mind and consider
whether, in the matter before her/him it is appropriate
that the
dispute be dismissed. To simply adopt the view that
ex-facia
the
file, service was properly effected to the party referring the
dispute and therefore failure to attend the arbitration should
result
in a dismissal of the dispute is a failure to exercise a discretion,
a failure to consider the matter and a failure to apply
your mind to
it. While it is not for the commissioner to guess any of the possible
reasons for the absence of the applicant, it
is appropriate, more
especially, where it is the first occasion that the applicant fails
to attend the arbitration hearing to order
a lesser sanction than
that of dismissal. The commissioner always has the option to postpone
the matter
sine
die
,
(without a date) and if the referring party has no desire to proceed
with his dispute, the matter would simply end there. Alternatively,

the commissioner could postpone the matter to a specific date with an
instruction to the CCMA’s Case Management Officer (CMO)
to do
more than simply forward a “set-down” notice to the
applicant. Perhaps it should order the CMO to telephone (if
a number
is available) and inform the applicant of the new date with a rider
that failure to attend the arbitration may result
in his referral
being dismissed and note that on the file. The CCMA might even
consider adding section 138(5) in all of their notices
of set-down,
so both parties are aware of the possible consequence of
non-attendance at an arbitration hearing.
[46]
The
commissioner’s decision in dismissing the dispute in
Solomons
was
a decision taken without any consideration given to the fact that the
applicant’s absence in that matter was not because
of any
desire not to proceed with his dispute but because of his compassion
to accommodate his opponent whose witness was ill.
If the
commissioner was uncertain about the agreement being properly
concluded, he should have postponed the matter and asked for
a
properly signed document. To dismiss it was not harsh, it simply made
no sense and to compound the problem, the proper next step
of
applying for rescission was similarly met with a reason-defying
refusal of the rescission application. Sadly, though instead
of
reviewing and setting aside the refusal by the commissioner to
rescind the ruling, the Labour Court decided to interpret the
word
“
dismiss”
as set
out in section 138(5) to mean “
struck
off the roll”
.
All this does is create legal confusion and is neither helpful nor
correct.
[47]
To
interpret the word “
dismissal
”
in
section 138(5) (a) to mean “
struck-off
from the roll”
is to
give it a meaning that cannot ordinarily be ascribed to that word and
to attribute to the word a value or a result that would
serve a
purpose other than what it is supposed to convey, this is not
interpretation.
[48]
The
consequence of the
Solomons
judgement
has the effect that a meaning is ascribed to a word in a statute
which departs from the settled understanding of that
word, with the
result that the word “
dismiss
”
is
altered to mean something other than what was intended by the
legislature. This is erroneous and as stated by Kellaway:
[12]
‘
A statute
has no elasticity… it may not be stretched to meet a case for
which provision has clearly not been made…
if the plain and
unambiguous meaning of a provision in an Act is departed from, a
court does not construe it, but alters it.’
[49]
A
decision to dismiss on pure technical non-compliance is a drastic
result because it brings the dispute to finality and must therefore

not be made lightly. It is a decision, especially in the absence of a
proper ventilation of the merits of the dispute, to be made
as a last
resort. Hence the use of the words “
may
dismiss
”
in
section 138(5)(a). One can never set out all the factors which must
be considered before a matter can be dismissed because of
the failure
of an applicant to attend an arbitration hearing but whatever the
commissioner considers in arriving at its decision,
the dismissal of
a dispute due to non-attendance of the applicant must be based on the
understanding that it is a decision of last
resort, added to it is
the consideration that the respondent is deserving of having finality
in the matter. A dismissal consequent
on the proper exercise of a
discretion violates neither the provisions of the LRA nor
Constitutional prescripts as the applicant
was given the opportunity
to have his/her day in court but has refused to make use of it.
[50]
It is
to the applicant’s credit that it sought to review the
commissioner’s decision to refuse the rescission application

and not to seek a reallocation of the arbitration hearing, which I
understand might have been granted by the CCMA. This would then
have
added to the confusion because the CCMA would then have acted
contrary to the clear provisions of the statutes (LRA) which
govern
its actions.
[51]
In the
result, I agree with the order by Coppin JA
B Waglay
Waglay JP and Gqamana AJA concur in
the judgment of Coppin JA and Coppin JA and Gqamana AJA concur with
the judgment of Waglay JP.
APPEARANCES:
FOR
THE APPELLANT:
MD
Maluleke with MS Sebola
Instructed
by
Sebola
Nchupetsang Sebola Attorneys
FOR
THE RESPONDENT:
D
Norton of Mkhabela Huntley Attorneys
[1]
GNR
3318 of 21 April 2023: Rules or the conduct of proceedings before
the commission for conciliation, mediation and arbitration
(CCMA
Rules).
[2]
Act
66 of 1995, as amended.
[3]
See:
Section 144(d) of the LRA.
Shoprite
Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and others
[2007]
10 BLLR 917
(LAC) was decided before the subsection was introduced,
but confirms that the test was “good cause”. See
particularly
para 38.
[4]
See:
Grant
v Plumbers (Pty) Ltd
1949
(2) SA 470
(O) (
Grant
v Plumbers
)
at 475.
[5]
Grant
v Plumbers
at
476 - 477.
[6]
See:
MM
Steel Construction CC v Steel Engineering & Allied Workers Union
of SA and others
(1994)
15 ILJ 1310 (LAC) at 1311J – 1312A and compare e.g.
Zealand
v Milborough
1991
(4) SA 836
(SE) at 838 and
Carolus
and another v SAAMBOU Bank Ltd; Smith v SAAMBOU Bank Ltd
2002
(6) SA 346
(SE) at 349B-E.
[7]
Compare:
Edgars
Consolidated Stores (Pty) Ltd v Kalanda and others
[2007]
7 BLLR 632 (LC).
[8]
See:
CCMA Rule 5A read with Rule 5.
[9]
Unreported
judgment JR99/2021 delivered on 4 August 2021.
[10]
Section
1(d)(iv) of the LRA provides that the purpose of the LRA is to
promote “the effective resolution of labour disputes”.
[11]
Section
34 of the Constitution provides: “
[e]veryone
has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the
application of law decided in a fair public hearing before
a court
or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or
forum
”
.
[12]
E.A
Kellaway, “
Principles
of Legal Interpretation
”
,
(LexisNexis, Butterworths), 1995 at p. 140.