Bidvest Protea Coin (PTY) Ltd v SATAWU and Others (JA105/2021) [2022] ZALAC 122; [2023] 3 BLLR 195 (LAC); (2023) 44 ILJ 997 (LAC) (29 November 2022)

78 Reportability

Brief Summary

Labour Law — Dismissal — Substantive fairness — Employee dismissed for alleged insubordination and failure to follow instructions — Employee challenged dismissal at CCMA, which found dismissal substantively unfair — Appellant sought review of CCMA award in Labour Court, which upheld the award — Appeal against Labour Court decision — Employee, a security guard, followed instructions to escort an individual with an arrest warrant but did not prevent him from leaving premises — CCMA found no lawful instruction to detain the individual, and no misconduct established — Labour Court confirmed reasonableness of CCMA's findings — Appeal dismissed, reinstatement upheld.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The matter concerned an appeal to the Labour Appeal Court against a judgment and order of the Labour Court dismissing an application to review and set aside an arbitration award issued under the auspices of the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA).


The appellant was Bidvest Protea Coin (Pty) Ltd (the employer). The first respondent was SATAWU (a trade union), the second respondent was Mr Molahlehi Isaac Phakathi (the employee), the third respondent was the commissioner who issued the award (cited as Mr Gerhard Jansen van Vuuren N.O.), and the fourth respondent was the CCMA.


The procedural history was that the employee, having been dismissed, referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the CCMA challenging substantive fairness. The commissioner found the dismissal substantively unfair and ordered retrospective reinstatement. The employer then launched a review application in the Labour Court, which was dismissed. The employer thereafter appealed to the Labour Appeal Court with leave of that Court.


The dispute arose from an incident at the employer’s client’s premises (Carnival City Casino) in which a person against whom a warrant of arrest had been issued left the premises before the police arrived. The employer alleged that the employee failed to comply with a lawful and reasonable instruction to keep the individual in an interview room, and that his conduct amounted to misconduct, insubordination, and reputational harm.


2. Material Facts


The material facts were largely common cause. The employee had been employed by the employer since 16 October 2003 and, at the time of dismissal, was a duty manager stationed at the Carnival City Casino premises of Sun International (the employer’s client). He had more than 13 years’ service and a clean disciplinary record at the time of dismissal.


On 20 November 2016, Mr Cornelius Johannes Kriek, against whom a warrant of arrest had been issued on 23 May 2016, was identified at the casino. The employee, having been instructed to do so, escorted Mr Kriek to an interview room. The client’s surveillance shift manager, Mr Brian Kgobe, arrived and explained to Mr Kriek that a warrant of arrest existed at the instance of SARS in relation to alleged fraud involving more than R32 million, and that Mr Kriek was to remain in the interview room until the police arrived.


After waiting, Mr Kriek spoke to his attorney and decided to leave. The employee followed Mr Kriek to the car park but did not call for backup to prevent his departure. Mr Kriek left the premises and the police arrived shortly thereafter.


Following the incident, Mr Kgobe compiled a report and it was circulated by email. The client’s surveillance manager queried why Mr Kriek was allowed to leave. Disciplinary action followed, and on 22 December 2016 the employee was dismissed on charges framed as refusing to carry out a lawful and reasonable instruction to keep Mr Kriek in the interview room and allowing him to leave; bringing the employer’s name into disrepute; and insubordination in failing to adhere to Mr Kgobe’s instruction to prevent Mr Kriek from leaving the premises.


Certain aspects of the incident were contested at arbitration, principally the nature and legal character of what the employee had been required to do (including whether he had the power to arrest or detain Mr Kriek), and whether the employee’s conduct in not calling for backup constituted misconduct or insubordination. It was also relevant that, once Mr Kriek indicated he intended to leave (acting on legal advice), the employee contacted Mr Kgobe, and it was material to the Labour Appeal Court’s assessment that Mr Kgobe did not, at that point, instruct the employee to arrest Mr Kriek or to call for backup to prevent him leaving.


3. Legal Issues


The central questions before the Labour Appeal Court were whether the Labour Court erred in dismissing the employer’s review application and, in that context, whether the commissioner’s award was reviewable under the applicable statutory test.


The issues required determination of the application of legal standards to facts, rather than the resolution of primary factual disputes. In particular, the Court had to determine whether any alleged procedural defect in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings constituted a reviewable irregularity, and whether the commissioner’s outcome was one that a reasonable arbitrator could reach on the material before the commissioner.


A further legal issue concerned whether, on the evidence, the employer had proved the alleged misconduct (including insubordination and reputational harm) arising from the employee’s failure to prevent Mr Kriek from leaving, given the instruction relied upon by the employer and the legal position that Mr Kriek had not been arrested by the police at the time he left.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The Labour Appeal Court approached the matter by first addressing the employer’s complaint that the commissioner had intervened improperly in the arbitration and had conducted the proceedings in a manner said to be unfair. Referring to the Constitutional Court’s articulation of the commissioner’s duty to “reach for the real dispute”, the Court noted that section 138(1) of the Labour Relations Act permits a commissioner to conduct arbitration in a manner considered appropriate to determine the dispute fairly and quickly, dealing with the substantial merits with minimum legal formalities. On that basis, the Court accepted that an inquisitorial approach is not barred and may be employed to reach the merits of the dispute.


Applying that approach to the record, the Labour Appeal Court concluded that the commissioner’s conduct, while robust, was neither inappropriate nor unfair. The Court found that both parties were given a fair hearing and were not curtailed in presenting their cases. It rejected the contention that the commissioner created a version for the employee or predetermined the merits before the employer completed its evidence, and it found no support in the record for the claim that the commissioner intimidated or prevented the employer’s witnesses from testifying about relevant facts. The Court characterised the commissioner’s engagement as directed at clarifying the real nature of the dispute, including the source and content of the instruction and whether it was breached, and observed that similarly robust questioning was directed at both sides.


The Court also addressed the employer’s submission that it elected not to call Mr Kgobe as a witness due to the commissioner’s purported hostility. It found that this contention was not borne out by the record and that there was no bar to calling Mr Kgobe. The Court held that the employer’s decision not to call him was made of its own accord and appeared connected to the fact that the employee did not dispute the material facts to which Mr Kgobe might have testified.


On the substantive question of misconduct, the Labour Appeal Court accepted that, as a security officer safeguarding the client’s interests and assets, the client was entitled to provide reasonable and lawful instructions to the employee. The Court identified the employer’s case as resting not on an instruction to arrest Mr Kriek but on an instruction that Mr Kriek was to be kept in the interview room until the police arrived. It considered that this contemplated that the police, not the employee, would arrest Mr Kriek upon arrival.


The Court reasoned that the employer’s case failed to appreciate that, not having been arrested at that time, Mr Kriek was legally entitled to leave the premises. On the Court’s analysis, the employee therefore did not commit misconduct by failing to prevent Mr Kriek’s departure, and the argument that the employee should have called for backup to prevent him from leaving similarly failed because it rested on the premise that Mr Kriek could lawfully be prevented from leaving in the circumstances presented. It was material to the Court’s reasoning that, when the employee contacted Mr Kgobe as Mr Kriek was threatening to leave, Mr Kgobe did not instruct the employee to arrest Mr Kriek or call for backup to prevent his departure.


The Court then addressed the review standard, relying on the authority which holds that an arbitration award may be reviewed if a defect falls within section 145(2)(a) of the Labour Relations Act, including where the arbitrator misconceived the nature of the inquiry or arrived at an unreasonable result, with unreasonableness being measured by whether the outcome is one a reasonable arbitrator could reach on all the material before the arbitrator. In applying that standard, the Labour Appeal Court held that the commissioner’s ultimate result—namely that the employee did not commit misconduct—fell within the ambit of reasonableness, even if the Court reached that conclusion on reasoning different to the commissioner’s.


On the charges of insubordination and bringing the employer’s name into disrepute, the Court held that the employer failed to prove that the employee was insubordinate or that the employer’s reputation had been harmed as alleged. Since misconduct was not established, the Court held that the commissioner could not be faulted for granting the primary remedy of reinstatement which the employee sought, and regarded it as “patently appropriate” in the circumstances.


Although the Labour Court had dismissed the review for reasons that differed from those adopted by the Labour Appeal Court, the Labour Appeal Court concluded that the Labour Court nonetheless did not err in dismissing the review application as being without merit.


5. Outcome and Relief


The Labour Appeal Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Labour Court’s order dismissing the review application, with the result that the arbitration award ordering retrospective reinstatement remained in place.


The Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs, finding no reason in law or fairness to depart from a costs order, having regard to the merits of the appeal and the fact that the employee was no longer represented by a trade union on appeal.


Cases Cited


CUSA v Tao Ying Metal Industries and Others [2008] ZACC 15; 2009 (2) SA 204 (CC).


Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd (Congress of South African Trade Unions as Amicus Curiae) (2013) 34 ILJ 2795 (SCA).


Legislation Cited


Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (as amended), including section 138(1) and section 145(2)(a).


Rules of Court Cited


No specific rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The Labour Appeal Court held that the commissioner’s robust and inquisitorial conduct of the arbitration proceedings did not render the proceedings unfair or the award reviewable. It held further that the employer had not proved that the employee committed the alleged misconduct, including insubordination or reputational harm, arising from the departure of Mr Kriek before the police arrived, particularly because Mr Kriek had not been arrested and was legally entitled to leave, and the instruction relied upon did not involve an instruction to arrest.


The Court held that the commissioner’s conclusion that the dismissal was substantively unfair was a result that fell within the bounds of reasonableness on the material before the commissioner, and that the award of retrospective reinstatement was appropriate. The appeal against the Labour Court’s dismissal of the review was therefore dismissed with costs.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A commissioner conducting CCMA arbitration proceedings is required to “reach for the real dispute” between the parties, and may adopt an inquisitorial approach where appropriate in order to determine the dispute fairly and quickly, consistent with section 138(1) of the Labour Relations Act.


An arbitration award is reviewable under section 145(2)(a) of the Labour Relations Act only if the arbitrator misconceived the nature of the inquiry or arrived at an unreasonable result, with unreasonableness assessed by whether the outcome is one that a reasonable arbitrator could not reach on all the material before the arbitrator. Material factual errors or disputes about the weight and relevance of evidence are not, without more, sufficient to set aside an award unless they render the outcome unreasonable.


Where an employer alleges misconduct for failure to comply with an instruction, the employer must prove the misconduct alleged on the facts and in light of the nature of the instruction relied upon. In assessing alleged insubordination and related misconduct, the enquiry remains focused on whether the employee breached the instruction as formulated and whether the conduct was shown, on the evidence, to constitute misconduct warranting dismissal.


Reinstatement, as the primary remedy sought by an employee where dismissal is found substantively unfair and no sustainable basis is established to deny such remedy, may be ordered, and will not be interfered with on review absent a basis showing the award falls outside the band of reasonableness.

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[2022] ZALAC 122
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Bidvest Protea Coin (PTY) Ltd v SATAWU and Others (JA105/2021) [2022] ZALAC 122; [2023] 3 BLLR 195 (LAC); (2023) 44 ILJ 997 (LAC) (29 November 2022)

IN
THE LABOUR APPEAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Not
Reportable
Case
no: JA105/2021
In
the matter between:
BIDVEST
PROTEA COIN (PTY) LTD
Appellant
And
SATAWU
First Respondent
PHAKATHI
MOLAHLEHI ISAAC

Second Respondent
GERHARD
JANSEN VAN VUUREN N.O.

Third Respondent
COMMISSION
FOR CONCILIATION MEDIATION
AND
ARBITRATION

Fourth Respondent
Heard:
17 November
2022
Delivered:
[29] November 2022
Coram:

Sutherland JA, Coppin JA and Savage AJA
Judgment
SAVAGE
AJA
[1]
This appeal,
with the leave of this Court, is against the judgment and order of
the Labour Court (Makapane AJ), delivered on 15
January 2021, in
which the application to review and set aside the arbitration award
of the third respondent (commissioner), issued
under the auspices of
the fourth respondent, the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and
Arbitration (CCMA), was dismissed.
[2]
The relevant
material facts are, in the main, common cause. The second respondent,
Mr Molahlehi Isaac Phakathi (employee) was employed
by the appellant,
Bidvest Protea Coin (Pty) Ltd, as a security guard on 16 October
2003. At the time of his dismissal, he held
the position of duty
manager based at the Carnival City Casino premises of Sun
International, the appellant’s client.
[3]
On 20 November
2016, Mr Cornelius Johannes Kriek, against whom a warrant of arrest
had been issued on 23 May 2016, was identified
at the Carnival City
Casino. The employee, having been instructed to do so, escorted Mr
Kriek to an interview room. Mr Brian Kgobe,
the client’s
surveillance shift manager, arrived at the interview room and
explained to Mr Kriek that an arrest warrant had
been issued against
him at the instance of the South African Revenue Services (SARS) in
relation to a charge of fraud involving
more than R32 million. Mr
Kriek was informed that he was therefore to remain in the interview
room until the police had arrived.
However, after waiting some time,
Mr Kriek spoke to his attorney and decided to leave the interview
room. The employee followed
Mr Kriek to the car park but did not call
for backup to prevent Mr Kriek from leaving the premises. The police
arrived at the premises
shortly after Mr Kriek had left.
[4]
On 20 November
2016, Mr Kgobe compiled a report about the incident and circulated it
later the same day via email. Mr Shaun Rennie,
the client’s
surveillance manager, sent an email the same day
inter
alia
to Mr
Kgobe and Mr Frederick Masilo, the appellant’s contracts
security manager, asking why Mr Kriek had been allowed to
leave the
premises. Disciplinary action was subsequently taken against the
employee.
[5]
On 22 December
2016, the employee was dismissed for refusing to carry out a lawful
and reasonable instruction to keep Mr Kriek inside
the interview room
and allowing him instead to leave the client’s premises;
bringing the appellant’s name into disrepute;
and
insubordination in failing to adhere to Mr Kgobe’s instruction
to prevent Mr Kriek from leaving the premises. Prior to
his
dismissal, the employee had been employed by the appellant for more
than 13 years with a clean disciplinary record.
Arbitration
award
[6]
The employee
referred a dispute to the CCMA challenging the substantive fairness
of his dismissal. At arbitration, Mr Masilo’s
version was first
that the employee had powers of arrest and should have arrested Mr
Kriek because Mr Kgobe had informed him that
Mr Kriek had committed
fraud; then that the employee was instructed to detain Mr Kriek and
not arrest Mr Kriek, although detention
and arrest were “
one
thing
”;
and then that “
the
instruction was to hold [Mr Kriek] in the interview room
”.
Mr Masilo stated that the employee had the right to hold Mr Kriek
since he had committed a crime, although neither the
employee nor any
other security officer had seen such crime being committed. It was Mr
Masilo’s view that when Mr Kriek left
the interview room, the
employee should have called for backup.
[7]
The employee’s
evidence was that he was asked by Mr Vinas Ntshangase, a surveillance
officer, to escort Mr Kriek to an interview
room. The employee
approached Mr Kriek and informed him that someone wanted to speak to
him. Once in the interview room, Mr Kriek
asked the employee why he
was there but the employee did not know the answer. The employee
called the surveillance room a number
of times because, although he
had been told that Mr Kgobe would arrive, he had not done so and Mr
Kriek wanted to leave. When Mr
Kgobe arrived, he showed Mr Kriek the
warrant of arrest and explained its contents to him. Mr Kgobe did not
arrest Mr Kriek and
allowed him to be accompanied by Mr Mduduzi
Zondo, a supervisor, to collect his cellphone.
[8]
By the time
that Mr Kriek returned to the interview room with his cellphone, Mr
Kgobe had left. Mr Kriek then called his lawyer
on speakerphone. His
lawyer told him that the client had no right to apprehend him. Mr
Kriek became aggressive and asked to see
the General Manager who, he
was told, was not available. The employee called Mr Kgobe and
explained the situation to him. While
he was on the call, Mr Kriek
left the interview room saying that he had no more time and that the
Hawks could contact his lawyers.
The employee testified that he
followed Mr Kriek, trying to persuade him to wait, but that he and
his wife got into their vehicle
and drove away. Once Mr Kriek had
left, the employee met Mr Kgobe and explained what had occurred. The
police arrived approximately
10 to 15 minutes thereafter. The
employee stated that he did not call for backup as the SARS incident
had not taken place on the
client’s premises and that, having
never arrested a person at the client’s premises before, he did
not think that he
was entitled to arrest Mr Kriek.
[9]
The
commissioner found that the first and third charges concerned the
employee’s refusal to adhere to what the appellant considered

was a “
lawful
and reasonable instruction

to keep Mr Kriek in the interview room and prevent him from leaving
the premises. The commissioner noted that Mr Kgobe,
who had
apparently given the instruction that Mr Kriek should be detained,
did not testify at the arbitration hearing. Since no
contract or
document existed which obliged the employee to adhere to an
instruction of the client’s manager, it was found
that the
appellant had not proved that a lawful instruction had been issued to
the employee. In addition, it was found that the
employee was not
entitled to detain Mr Kriek against his will in that he was not a
peace officer who could execute a warrant of
arrest; and that no
crime had been committed or attempted in his presence which would
have allowed the employee to arrest Mr Kriek
without a warrant.
[10]
The
commissioner therefore found that the employee had not refused to
carry out a lawful and reasonable instruction to keep Mr Kriek
inside
the interview room, nor had he been insubordinate in failing to
adhere to Mr Kgobe’s instruction to prevent Mr Kriek
from
leaving the premises when no purpose would have been served by
calling for backup. Furthermore, in the absence of any direct

evidence, it was found not to have been proved that the employee had
brought the appellant’s name into disrepute. The dismissal
of
the employee was therefore found to be substantively unfair and,
having sought reinstatement, retrospective reinstatement was
found to
be appropriate and was awarded.
Judgment
of the Labour Court
[11]
The appellant
sought the review of the arbitration award by the Labour Court on a
number of grounds. These included that the commissioner
had committed
various gross irregularities in the manner in which he had conducted
the arbitration; had ignored relevant evidence
presented by the
appellant’s witnesses; erroneously found that it was not proved
that the employee had the power to detain
or arrest Mr Kriek, despite
his having been presented with a copy of the arrest warrant by Mr
Kgobe; and in reinstating the employee
when this was not an
appropriate remedy given that the relationship between the parties
“had completely broken down”
since the employee could not
be relied upon to perform his duties diligently.
[12]
The Labour
Court found that the appellant had failed to set out clear grounds
for review. Although the commissioner had conducted
an inquisitorial
enquiry which may have been “undesirable”, the Court
found that this did not lead to the award being
reviewable. Instead,
the award was found to be reasonable on the basis that the
appellant’s client could not issue an instruction
to the
employee; that the instruction itself was not lawful; and that, since
no misconduct had been shown to exist, the reinstatement
of the
employee was appropriate. Consequently, the review application was
dismissed.
Submissions
on appeal
[13]
The appellant
appeals against the judgment and order of the Labour Court, taking
issue with most of the findings of the Labour Court
and contending
that the Court erred in dismissing the review application. In
argument, it was submitted for the appellant that
the commissioner
had intervened in the course of the arbitration proceedings in an
unwarranted manner and to such an extent that
he had created a
version for the employee and that, as a result of this conduct, the
appellant elected not to call Mr Kgobe as
a witness. It was stated
that the evidence presented clearly indicated that the employee had
failed to adhere to the lawful and
reasonable instruction given to
him and that in doing so he had committed misconduct, was
insubordinate and had impaired the appellant’s
reputation. As a
result, the appellant sought that the appeal be upheld, with the
arbitration award set aside and the matter remitted
back to the CCMA
for a hearing
de
novo
before a different commissioner, alternatively substituted with a
finding that the dismissal was fair.
[14]
The appeal was
opposed by the employee for whom it was contended that the matter
concerned the bruised ego of the appellant and
its client; that the
commissioner had assessed the evidence in the manner required of him;
and that the arbitration award fell
within the ambit of
reasonableness required. As a result, it was submitted that the
decision of the arbitrator was unimpeachable
and that the appeal
should be dismissed with costs.
Evaluation
[15]
The
Constitutional Court in
CUSA
v Tao Ying Metal industries and Others
[1]
made it clear that the task of the commissioner at arbitration is to

reach
for the real dispute between the parties

[2]
.
In doing so, a commissioner may conduct arbitration proceedings, in
terms of section 138(1) of the Labour Relations Act
[3]
(LRA), “
in
a manner that the commissioner considers appropriate in order to
determine the dispute fairly and quickly, but must deal with
the
substantial merits of the dispute with the minimum of legal
formalities
”.
Nothing bars the commissioner from adopting an inquisitorial approach
to the proceedings to reach the merits of the real
dispute between
the parties.
[16]
The approach
adopted by the commissioner to the arbitration in this matter was
neither inappropriate nor unfair. Although robust,
both parties were
given a fair hearing and not curtailed in the opportunity to present
their respective cases. There is no support
to be found in the
record, as was suggested for the appellant, that the commissioner had
created a version for the employee or
predetermined the merits of the
matter before the appellant had completed its evidence. The record
does not show that he intimidated,
interrupted or bullied the
appellant’s witnesses to point that they could not testify
about facts; or that the appellant
was prevented from putting up its
case. The commissioner was at pains to determine the real nature of
the dispute between the parties.
He engaged in repeated efforts,
directed at both parties, to understand in clear terms the nature of
the dispute, the precise source
and nature of the instruction given
to the employee, and whether such instruction had been breached. His
robust questioning of
the appellant’s first witness was equally
evident in his approach to the employee in his evidence. In doing so,
the commissioner
undertook the task required of him.
[17]
The
appellant’s representative indicated at the outset of
proceedings that two witnesses would testify at the arbitration

hearing. Two witnesses proceeded to testify for the appellant. The
suggestion made for the appellant in this appeal that the decision

not to call Mr Kgobe as a witness was motivated by the hostile
conduct of the commissioner is simply not borne out by the record.

There was no bar on the appellant calling Mr Kgobe to testify had it
wished to rely on his evidence. The appellant elected of its
own
accord not to do so, a decision which appears to have been motivated
by the fact that the employee did not dispute the material
facts to
which that witness may have testified.
[18]
The employee,
as a security officer, was employed to safeguard the interests and
assets of the appellant’s client and in doing
so, the client
was entitled to provide reasonable and lawful instructions to him.
When the employee asked Mr Kriek to accompany
him to the interview
room, on his uncontested version, he was not aware of the reason for
doing so. It was in the interview room
that Mr Kgobe informed both
the employee and Mr Kriek of the existence of the arrest warrant for
the first time and the employee
was told that Mr Kriek was to remain
in the room until the arrival of the police. After he had left the
room, the employee contacted
Mr Kgobe when Mr Kriek indicated that,
acting on the advice of his attorney, he intended to leave the
premises. It is material
that Mr Kgobe at this point did not instruct
the employee to arrest Mr Kriek or to call for backup to prevent Mr
Kriek from leaving
the interview room.
[19]
The
appellant’s case was not that the employee had been instructed
to place Mr Kriek under arrest in the interview room. Rather,
the
instruction on which the appellant relied and which it claimed the
employee had breached, was that the employee was to keep
Mr Kriek in
the interview room until the police arrived. From this it is apparent
that it was contemplated that the police, and
not the employee, would
arrest Mr Kriek on their arrival. What the appellant did not
appreciate in its approach to the matter was
that, not having been
arrested, Mr Kriek was legally entitled to leave the client’s
premises; and the appellant’s contention
that the employee
committed misconduct in failing to prevent Mr Kriek from doing so
fails to appreciate as much. The suggestion
that, in failing to call
for backup to prevent Mr Kriek’s departure, the employee
breached the instruction given to him and
was insubordinate, equally
fails to appreciate that Mr Kriek was entitled to leave the premises.
It follows that since the instruction
did not concern the arrest of
Mr Kriek, the employee did not commit misconduct when he failed to
call for backup or prevent Mr
Kriek from leaving the premises.
[20]
In
Herholdt
v Nedbank
Ltd
(
Congress
of South African Trade Unions as Amicus Curiae
)
[4]
it was held that a review of an arbitration award is permissible if
the defect in the proceedings falls within one of the grounds
in
section 145(2)(a) of the LRA:

For
a defect in the conduct of the proceedings to amount to a gross
irregularity as contemplated by Section 145(2)(a)(ii), the arbitrator

must have misconceived the nature of the inquiry or arrived at an
unreasonable result. A result will only be unreasonable if it
is one
that a reasonable arbitrator could not reach on all the material that
was before the arbitrator. Material errors of fact,
as well as the
weight and relevance to be attached to particular facts, are not in
and of themselves sufficient for an award to
be set aside, but are
only of any consequence if their effect is to render the outcome
unreasonable.’
[5]
[21]
The result reached by the commissioner,
albeit for different reasons to that of this Court, that the employee
had not committed
misconduct, fell within the ambit of reasonableness
required having regard to the material before him. The appellant
failed to
prove that the employee had committed the misconduct
alleged by not calling for backup or preventing Mr Kriek leaving the
client’s
premises. There was no evidence that the employee was
insubordinate in his conduct or that the appellant’s reputation
had
been harmed as a result of it; and the commissioner cannot be
faulted for awarding the primary remedy of reinstatement, as sought

by the employee, when this was patently appropriate. T
he
Labour Court did not err in finding that the review application was
without merit, despite the fact that the Court arrived at
such
decision for different reasons.
[22]
It follows for
these reasons that the appeal is without merit and falls to be
dismissed. There is no reason in law or fairness why
an order of
costs should not be made in the matter having regard to the merits of
the appeal and the fact that the employee is
no longer represented by
a trade union in this appeal.
Order
[23]
The following
order is therefore made:
1.
The appeal is
dismissed with costs.
SAVAGE
AJA
Sutherland
JA and Coppin JA agree.
APPEARANCES:
FOR
THE APPELLENT:

S Lancaster
Instructed
by

Lancaster Kungoane Attorneys
FOR
THE SECOND RESPONDENT:
J Vilakazi
Instructed
by

Creighton Attorneys Gauteng Inc.
[1]
[2008] ZACC 15
;
2009
(2) SA 204
(CC) at para 62.
[2]
Ibid
at para 65.
[3]
Act
66 of 1995 (as amended).
[4]
(2013)
34 ILJ 2795 (SCA).
[5]
At
para 25.