Real Time Investments 158 t/a Civil Works v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration and Others (JA77/19) [2022] ZALAC 7; [2022] 6 BLLR 524 (LAC); (2022) 43 ILJ 1642 (LAC) (17 March 2022)

85 Reportability

Brief Summary

Labour Law — Unfair dismissal — Reinstatement — Court's authority to grant reinstatement without notice to employer — Appellant dismissed employee for gross misconduct; employee's dismissal deemed fair by arbitrator — Employee's review application led to Labour Court ordering reinstatement without prior request — Appellant contended that reinstatement was not sought and it was not notified of such relief — Court held that reinstatement could not be granted in absence of notice to employer and without opportunity to be heard, rendering the order of reinstatement improper.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The matter concerned an appeal in the Labour Appeal Court against the entire order of the Labour Court (Moshoana J). The Labour Court had, on review, set aside a CCMA arbitration award which had found the dismissal of an employee to be procedurally and substantively fair, and then substituted that award with an order declaring the dismissal substantively unfair and directing retrospective reinstatement.


The parties were Real Time Investments 158 t/a Civil Works as the appellant employer, the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration (CCMA) as first respondent, the commissioner/arbitrator Mohamed Jassat N.O. as second respondent, and the dismissed employee Mr Samuel Rantsieng as third respondent.


Procedurally, the dispute followed the common trajectory of a dismissal dispute under the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA). After dismissal, the employee referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the CCMA. Following unsuccessful conciliation, the matter proceeded to arbitration, where the arbitrator found the dismissal fair. The employee then launched a review application in the Labour Court under section 145 of the LRA, seeking to set aside the award and primarily to have the matter remitted to the CCMA for a fresh hearing. The Labour Court dealt with the review as unopposed and nevertheless granted reinstatement. The employer’s application for leave to appeal was refused by the Labour Court, but leave to appeal was later granted on petition to the Labour Appeal Court.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was an unfair dismissal claim arising from a workplace-related incident, but the appeal itself turned primarily on a procedural and remedial question: whether it was permissible for the Labour Court to grant reinstatement in circumstances where it had not been sought by the employee in the review application and where the employer had not been notified that such relief would be pursued or considered.


Material Facts


Mr Rantsieng was employed by the appellant as a general worker. He was dismissed following an incident that occurred outside the gate of the workplace, shortly after closing time, in which he became involved in a physical altercation with a co-employee concerning money. He was charged with and found guilty of gross misconduct at a disciplinary hearing, and he was dismissed.


It was common cause that, after dismissal, Mr Rantsieng (assisted at the time by his trade union) referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the CCMA. Conciliation failed and the dispute proceeded to arbitration. On 14 July 2016, the arbitrator issued an award finding the dismissal to have been procedurally and substantively fair.


On 16 August 2016, Mr Rantsieng launched a review application in the Labour Court in terms of section 145 of the LRA. In his notice of motion, he sought relief reviewing and setting aside the award, referring the matter back to the CCMA for a hearing de novo before another commissioner, and costs, together with “further and/or alternative relief”. The judgment recorded that he relied on multiple grounds of review and, among other things, alleged a lack of procedural fairness in both the employer disciplinary process and the CCMA arbitration process.


The record reflected that the employer filed a notice of intention to oppose, and an affidavit responding to the review. However, it was common cause that, ultimately, no one appeared on behalf of the employer at the hearing of the review application in the Labour Court. The employer’s explanation (advanced on appeal) was that it elected not to appear, on advice, on the assumption that if the review succeeded, the likely “worst case” outcome would be a remittal to the CCMA for a fresh arbitration, given the relief the employee had sought in his notice of motion.


The Labour Court treated the matter as unopposed, found the award reviewable, and made findings that the fight occurred outside the premises after working hours and could not constitute contravention of a workplace rule, and that there was no evidence that the employer’s business was affected. On that basis, it substituted the award with a finding of substantive unfairness and granted retrospective reinstatement.


A critical factual feature for the appeal was that Mr Rantsieng had not sought reinstatement in his notice of motion, and the employer contended it had not been notified that reinstatement would be sought or contemplated, nor afforded an opportunity to address that form of relief.


Legal Issues


The central legal question on appeal was whether the Labour Court could competently and fairly grant an order of reinstatement in circumstances where reinstatement had not been sought by the employee in the review application and where the employer had not been notified that such relief would be pursued or considered.


This was principally a question concerning the application of procedural fairness principles to motion proceedings and to the framing of issues by pleadings (in the form of a notice of motion and founding affidavit). It also concerned the relationship between the relief claimed and the permissible scope of adjudication in review proceedings, including whether an order may be granted that is materially different from what the initiating papers disclosed, without giving the affected party notice and an opportunity to be heard.


Although the underlying dismissal dispute involved factual questions about misconduct, the appeal was decided on a procedural and remedial basis, focusing on the fairness and permissibility of the reinstatement order given the way the review was framed and conducted.


Court’s Reasoning


The Labour Appeal Court dealt first with an application for condonation for the late filing of the notice of appeal and the record, and for reinstatement of the appeal to the roll if it had lapsed. It accepted the explanation advanced by the employer, including that the delay was not extensive, was largely beyond the employer’s control, and was linked to failures by previous attorneys, while the employer had acted diligently once it became aware of the relevant order. The Court also considered that the appeal had prospects of success. On that basis, the Court granted condonation and reinstated the appeal.


On the merits, the Court emphasised the role of the notice of motion and founding affidavit in motion proceedings. It described it as trite that these documents constitute both the pleadings and the evidence, defining the issues the court is asked to determine. The Court stressed that an applicant must not only state the relief sought, but must also make out a case for that relief in the founding papers. Where relief is not claimed, it is not properly raised as an issue for adjudication, and the opposing party is not properly alerted to the case it must meet.


The Court located the problem in terms of fairness and notice. It held that a pleading is intended to enable the other party to fairly and reasonably know the case it is called upon to meet, and that fairness is paramount. In that context, it treated the Labour Court’s reinstatement order as an instance of the kind of “trial by ambush” that has long been deprecated. The Labour Appeal Court reasoned that it was not unreasonable for the employer—given the employee’s pleaded relief—to assume that an adverse outcome might be a remittal to the CCMA, rather than a direct reinstatement order.


The Court addressed the possibility that the employee’s catch-all prayer for “further and/or alternative relief” could have covered reinstatement. It rejected that as sufficient for notice in the circumstances, indicating that such wording could “hardly” serve to alert the employer that reinstatement would be sought or might be ordered, particularly where reinstatement was not otherwise pleaded and motivated. The Court suggested that an amendment might have been required if such relief was to be pursued, and that notice of such amendment would have had to be given to the employer.


The Court further reasoned that the unfairness was not limited to the remedial question. It recorded that the review was decided on grounds not raised by the employee in the application, which compounded the procedural unfairness. In addition, it highlighted a practical dimension: the grant of reinstatement depends on all relevant facts and circumstances, implying that the employer should have had an opportunity to place such facts before the court if reinstatement were to be considered.


Because reinstatement had been granted without proper notice and opportunity to be heard, and because reinstatement involves evaluative considerations that required a proper ventilation of facts, the Court concluded that the Labour Court’s order could not stand. It held that the appropriate course was to set aside the entire Labour Court order and to remit the matter for a fresh hearing as an opposed matter before a different judge.


Outcome and Relief


The Labour Appeal Court granted condonation for the late filing of the notice of appeal and the record and reinstated the appeal on the roll.


It upheld the appeal, set aside the entire order of the Labour Court, and referred the matter back to the Labour Court to be heard afresh as an opposed matter before a different judge.


As to costs, the order recorded that the appeal was upheld with costs, and further recorded that there was no costs order. The relief granted was stated in those terms in the Court’s final order.


Cases Cited


Molusi and others v Voges NO and others 2016 (3) SA 370 (CC).


GCC Engineering (Pty) Ltd and others v Maroos and others 2019 (2) SA 379 (SCA).


Home Talk Developments (Pty) Ltd and others v Ekuruleni Metropolitan Municipality 2018 (1) SA 391 (SCA).


CUSA v Tao Ying Metal Industries & others [2009] 1 BLLR 1 (CC).


Legislation Cited


Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, section 145.


Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, section 158(1)(g).


Rules of Court Cited


Labour Court Rule 7A(8)(b).


Held


The Labour Appeal Court held that it was procedurally unfair for the Labour Court to grant an order of reinstatement where reinstatement was not sought in the employee’s notice of motion and founding affidavit, and where the employer had not been notified that such relief would be sought or considered and had not been given a reasonable opportunity to be heard on that remedy.


It further held that, given that the review was decided on grounds not raised and that reinstatement requires consideration of all relevant circumstances, the appropriate remedy was to set aside the entire Labour Court order and remit the matter for a fresh hearing as an opposed matter before a different judge.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


In motion proceedings, the notice of motion and founding affidavit perform the dual function of pleadings and evidence, and they define the issues to be decided. A litigant must clearly state the relief sought and must set out a case for that relief in the founding papers.


A party is entitled to fair notice of the case it must meet. Fairness in litigation requires that courts avoid outcomes amounting to a trial by ambush, particularly where a material form of relief is granted without proper notice to the affected party.


A court should not grant substantive relief, such as reinstatement, where it has not been sought or where the opposing party has not been alerted that such relief is in issue and has not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to address it. This is especially so because reinstatement involves an evaluative assessment that depends on the relevant facts and circumstances, which must be properly ventilated.


Where a matter has been determined in a procedurally unfair manner, including by granting relief beyond the pleaded case without notice and hearing, the appropriate corrective step may be to set aside the order and remit the matter for rehearing as an opposed application before a different judicial officer.

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[2022] ZALAC 7
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Real Time Investments 158 t/a Civil Works v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration and Others (JA77/19) [2022] ZALAC 7; [2022] 6 BLLR 524 (LAC); (2022) 43 ILJ 1642 (LAC) (17 March 2022)

IN THE LABOUR APPEAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
JOHANNESBURG
Reportable
Case no: JA77/19
IN THE MATTER BETWEEN:
REAL
TIME INVESTMENTS 158 T/A CIVIL
WORKS
A
ppellant
and
COMMISSION FOR CONCILIATION, MEDIATION
&
ARBITRATION

First Respondent
MOHAMED JASSAT
N.O.

Second Respondent
SAMUEL
RANTSIENG

Third Respondent
Heard:
1 March 2022
Delivered:     17 March
2022
Coram:
Coppin JA, Tokota
et
Phatudi AJJA
JUDGMENT
COPPIN JA
[1]       This
is an appeal against the entire order of the Labour Court (Moshoana
J) in terms
of which it reviewed and set aside an award of the second
respondent (“the arbitrator) to the effect that the dismissal
of
third respondent (“Mr Rantsieng”) by the appellant was
procedurally and substantively fair, and substituting it with
an
order that the dismissal was substantively unfair and directing the
appellant to reinstate Mr Rantsieng retrospectively to the
date of
his dismissal. Leave to appeal to this court was granted on
petition.
[2]      The
issue that arises for decision in this appeal is essentially whether
a court can
grant an order of reinstatement in the absence of and
without having notified the employer in circumstances where it was
not sought
by the employee in its application for review or
initially.
[3]       None
of the respondents, including Mr Rantsieng, filed any papers or heads
of argument
in opposition to this appeal. It was thus assumed by the
appellant’s counsel and the court that the appeal was not
opposed,
until the morning of the hearing of this appeal when Mr
Rantsieng appeared in person.
[4]      Mr Rantsieng
indicated that even though he did not file any documents, including
any opposition
or answering affidavit to the appellant’s
application for condonation/reinstatement of the appeal or any heads
of argument,
he was there to speak for himself and that he was well
capable of doing so. He refused any offer of assistance from the
court with
legal representation and indicated that he did not seek
any postponement or any further opportunity to file any such
documents.
He alleged that the appellant was not being truthful to
the court, but was not prepared to commit anything to paper. Needless
to
say that in those untenable circumstances, Mr Rantsieng was not
allowed to address the court further in respect of the appeal.
[5]       At
the outset, counsel for the appellant moved for an order condoning
the appellant’s
late filing of a notice of appeal and of the
record and to reinstate the matter on the roll in the event of it
being found that
the appeal had lapsed. In its written application,
the appellant gives a full explanation why the said documents had not
been filed
within the time period stipulated in the rules. The
appellant only became aware of the order granted on petition to this
court
on 29 April 2021. The delay, which is not extensive, was
largely beyond the control of the appellant and essentially due to
the
failures of the previous attorneys of the appellant. The
appellant though did not remain supine or lax and acted with
diligence
to mitigate any lateness. In light of the prospects of
success of the appeal itself, there is no reason to refuse the orders
sought
in this regard.
Salient Facts
[6]       It
is not in issue that Mr Rantsieng was employed by the appellant as a
general worker
until he was dismissed by it in connection with an
incident that occurred just outside the gate of its workplace,
shortly after
closing time, where Mr Rantsieng was involved in a
physical altercation with a co-employee about money. Mr Rantsieng had
been charged
with and found guilty of gross misconduct in that regard
in a disciplinary hearing.
[7]       Mr
Rantsieng, assisted by his trade union at the time, had referred an
unfair dismissal
dispute to the first respondent (“the CCMA”)
in terms of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (“the LRA”).

Following an unsuccessful conciliation, the matter proceeded to
arbitration before the arbitrator who rendered an award on 14 July

2016 in terms of which he found that the dismissal of Mr Rantsieng
was procedurally and substantively fair.
[8]       On
16 August 2016, Mr Rantsieng launched an application in the Labour
Court in terms
of section 145 of the LRA in which he sought an order:
(a) reviewing and setting aside the award; (b) referring the matter
back
to the CCMA for a hearing
de novo
before another
arbitrator/commissioner; (c) directing the appellant to pay the
costs; as well as (d) granting him “further
and/or alternative
relief”. The CCMA, the arbitrator and the appellant were cited
as respondents in that application in which
Mr Rantsieng relied on at
least five grounds of review.
[9]       Mr
Rantsieng averred,
inter alia
, in essence, that there was no
procedural fairness in, both, his disciplinary hearing at the
appellant, and in the arbitration
proceedings in the CCMA before the
arbitrator.
[10]    On 10 October 2016,
the appellant filed a notice of intention to oppose that application
(the notice
itself is dated 29 August 2016, in which it indicated,
inter alia
, that it would seek an order dismissing Mr
Rantsieng’s review application with costs and upholding the
impugned award of
the arbitrator.
[11]    In a document
deposed to on 30 August 2016 styled a “founding affidavit”
and filed in the
Labour Court in respect of the same matter, Mr
Gareth Crookes, on behalf of the appellant, proceeded, in essence, to
answer the
averments made by Mr Rantsieng in his founding affidavit
in the review application. In paragraph 3 of the document, Mr Crookes
specifically states “this founding affidavit is deposed to in
support of a notice of opposition to the review and setting
aside in
terms of section 145, alternatively section 158(1)(g), of the LRA of
an arbitration award issued by the second respondent
under case
number GAVL 1560–16 dated 14 July 2016.”
[12]    The document filed
on behalf of the appellant is otherwise strikingly brief. In it, Mr
Crookes, in essence,
denies Mr Rantsieng’s version and defends
the award of the arbitrator. In the final paragraph of the document,
Mr Crookes
asks that the relief sought by Mr Rantsieng in his notice
of motion be dismissed.
[13]    The record further
shows that a copy of the record of the arbitration proceedings before
the arbitrator
and a Rule 7A(8)(b) notice was filed on 4 May 2017. In
terms of the latter notice, Mr Rantsieng notified the appellant that
he
stood by his notice of motion. The notice further indicated that
if the appellant intended to oppose the review application, it
should
do so within 10 working days from the date of receipt of the notice
failing which Mr Rantsieng would request the matter
to proceed on an
unopposed basis.
[14]    In an affidavit of
service deposed to by Mr Rantsieng on 3 May 2017, he attests to
having delivered
the transcribed record by hand to the appellant on
28 April 2017.
[15]     It is common cause
that nothing further was filed by either Mr Rentsieng or by the
appellant and that
no one on behalf of the appellant appeared at the
hearing of the application before the court
a quo
. It is
averred on behalf of the appellant, that acting on advice from its
employers’ organisation representative and an advocate
it
decided not to appear to oppose the review since Mr Rantsieng, if he
was to be successful in the review, at worst for the appellant,

sought an order that the matter be remitted to the CCMA for a hearing
de novo
. The appellant assumed that its decision in that
regard would save it from incurring unnecessary costs.
[16]     It appears from
the judgment of the court
a quo
that it dealt with the matter
as an unopposed one. No reference is made in the judgment to any
notice of opposition, or to the
affidavit filed on behalf of the
appellant in answer to Mr Rantsieng’s review application.
However, of importance, the court
a quo
held that the award
was reviewable.
[17]     The court
a quo
held, in essence, that this was particularly so because the fight
happened outside the appellant’s premises after working
hours
and could therefore not have constituted a contravention of any
workplace rule. It further held that since there was no evidence
that
the business of the appellant had in any way been affected by the
fight involving Mr Rantsieng and the other employee it was
not
reasonable for the arbitrator to have found that Mr Rantsieng had
committed any misconduct.
[18]     The court
a quo
went on to find that since there was no evidence why Mr Rantsieng
should not be reinstated, and reinstatement was “the primary

remedy” it had to be ordered in circumstances where Mr
Rantsieng was not guilty of any work-related misconduct. The court
a
quo
seemed oblivious of the fact that Mr Rantsieng never sought
an order for reinstatement in his notice of application and no notice

had been given to the appellant that he would be seeking such relief
from the court
a quo
or that the court
a quo
was
contemplating the grant of such relief.
[19]     The court
a quo
made an order: (a) reviewing and setting aside the award of the
arbitrator; (b) replacing it with an order that the dismissal of
Mr
Rantsieng by the appellant was substantively unfair; (c) ordering the
appellant to reinstate him without any loss of benefits
effectively
from the date of his dismissal; and (d) making no award of costs.
[20]     According to Mr
Crookes, on behalf of the appellant, the appellant got to know of the
court
a quo
’s order through a Mr Roode, the employer’s
organisation representative. It is then that it brought an
application before
the court
a quo
for leave to appeal that
order. The court
a quo
dismissed the application for leave on
9 May 2019, causing the appellant to petition this court for leave to
appeal. Leave to appeal
was granted on petition on 4 August 2020.
[21]     The principal
argument of the appellant is that it did not oppose the application
because of the relief
sought by Mr Rantsieng in his application for
review. As far as it was concerned, and acting on the advice from Mr
Roode and an
advocate, at worst, the court
a quo
, if it had
set aside the award, would have referred the matter back to the CCMA
for a fresh hearing before a different commissioner/arbitrator.
In
essence, its argument is that the court
a quo
should not have
ordered Mr Rantsieng’s reinstatement in circumstances where (a)
he did not seek such order in his notice
of motion or review and (b)
where the appellant had not been notified that such relief would be
sought by him at the hearing of
the application or that the court
a
quo
was considering granting such relief and (c) it was not given
an opportunity to be heard in respect of such relief.
[22]     The appellant’s
notice of opposition and “answering affidavit” bear the
stamp of
the Labour Court which indicates that it had been filed in
that court on 10 October 2016 under case number JR 1553/16, which is

the case number originally assigned to Mr Rantsieng’s review
application. It is not clear whether the court
a quo
did
consider that document. It does not mention it at all.  But in
any event, it seems unlikely that the contents of that
document, per
se, would have caused the court
a quo
to arrive at a different
conclusion in respect of the merits of the review.
[23]     Nevertheless, the
unfairness of what occurred is obvious. The court
a quo
should
have taken into account before granting the order of reinstatement,
that in his notice of application (or notice of motion),
Mr Rantsieng
did not seek reinstatement and that the appellant had not been
notified that such an order would be sought. The court
could not
grant such an order without at least being certain that the appellant
was aware that such relief was sought, or was contemplated
and had
been given a (reasonable) opportunity to react thereto.
[24]     Without such
notification the appellant could reasonably have concluded that at
worst for it the matter
was to be remitted to the CCMA for a fresh
hearing. It was not unreasonable for the appellant to assume that an
order for reinstatement
would not be granted in circumstances where
(a) Mr Rantsieng did not seek that relief in his application for
review and (b) it
was not notified that such relief was contemplated,
and (c) allowing it an opportunity to react thereto. The request in
Mr Rantsieng’s
application for “further and/or
alternative relief” could hardly have served that purpose. The
notice of application
possibly required an amendment to indicate that
such relief was to be sought and, in such instance, the appellant
would have had
to be given notice of such amendment.
[25]
It is trite that the notice of motion or application and the founding
affidavit in application proceedings
constitute both the pleading and
the evidence. They serve to define the issues which are to be
adjudicated upon by the court. An
applicant is to not only state the
relief sought, but to make out a case for such relief. In this
instance, Mr Rantsieng specifically
did not ask for reinstatement in
those founding documents, and thus did not raise it as an issue that
was to be adjudicated upon
by the court
[1]
.
A pleading is intended to enable the other party to fairly and
reasonably know the case it is called upon to meet.
[2]
[26]
Fairness is paramount
[3]
,
and, the so-called, “trial by ambush” has always been
deprecated. The order of reinstatement was unfairly sought and
or
granted in this matter and for that reason, the court
a
quo
’s
order of reinstatement cannot stand. Not only because the review was
decided on grounds not raised by Mr Rantsieng in his
application,
which was unfair, but for reasons of practicality and because the
consideration reinstatement depends on all the relevant
facts and
circumstances, the entire order of the court
a
quo
must be set aside and the matter is to be remitted to the Labour
Court to be reheard afresh as an opposed matter.
[27]
In
the result, the following is ordered:
27.1     The late filing of
the notice of appeal and of the record is condoned and the appeal is
reinstated
on the roll.
27.2    The appeal is upheld
with costs;
27.3    The entire order of the
court
a quo
is set aside and the matter is referred back to
the Labour Court as an opposed matter for a fresh hearing before a
different judge.
27.4    There
is no costs order.
P
Coppin
Judge
of the Labour Appeal Court
Tokota and Phatudi AJJA
concur in the judgment of Coppin JA.
APPEARANCES:
FOR THE APPELLANT:
GJ Scheepers SC
and EJ Steenkamp
Instructed
by Thyne Jacobs Attorneys
FOR THE RESPONDENT:
Third
respondent in person.
[1]
See,
inter alia,
Molusi
and others v Voges NO and others
2016 (3) SA 370
(CC) para 28;
GCC
Engineering (Pty) Ltd and others v Maroos and others
2019 (2) SA 379
(SCA) para 22.
[2]
See,
inter alia,
Home
Talk Developments (Pty) Ltd and others v Ekuruleni Metropolitan
Municipality
2018 (1) SA 391
(SCA) para 28.
[3]
See,
inter alia,
CUSA
v Tao Ying Metal Industries & others
[2009] 1 BLLR 1
(CC) paras 130-131.